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Abstract
This thesis considers how pan-Arab and state identity is reproduced in two ideologically different Arab 
regimes: Ba’athist Syria and Hashemite Jordan. There are three main contributions to the study of 
identity and the international relations of the Middle East. Firstly, the thesis re-defines Arabism as a 
swpra-nationalism distinct from Nasser’s Arab nationalism. This is reproduced alongside state identity 
by national governments and is now strengthened by the ‘New Arabism’ of transnational satellite 
television.
Secondly, the lack of engagement with nationalist theory by scholars of the Middle East is addressed. 
Modernist theory is used to demonstrate how Syria and Jordan have utilised everyday symbols and 
mediations to build national communities.
Thirdly Michael Billig’s Banal Nationalism is established as a key mode of analysis for identity in the 
Arab world. It contributes to the growing literature on the everyday features of nationalism.
The thesis considers the history of nation building in Syria and Jordan before discussing three case 
studies of how identities are reproduced. First, public images of the leader are shown to be as unnoticed 
by Syrian and Jordanians as national flags in Western democracies. Alongside other mediations such as 
public speeches, these cults sustain an identity discourse that deliberately includes Arabism, framed to 
serve state interests. Second, state-run television in Syria and Jordan also uses nationalism and Arabism 
to frame its content, building citizens who are both Syrian or Jordanian and Arab.
The third case examines satellite television, which is beyond the control of the state. Rather than 
challenging the regimes’ official identities, programming reinforces both Arabism and state identity. 
The final chapter expands on Billig’s methods to address how citizens consume their nationalist 
discourse, using ethnographic interviews with ‘everyday’ Jordanians and Syrians. The thesis concludes 
by considering how international relations might be affected by the continued reproduction of Arabism.
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Introduction
This thesis is about the daily reproduction of Arabism and state nationalism in contemporary Syria and 
Jordan. It sets out to solve a puzzle: why do citizens in these states still feel Arab? Arabism was 
supposed to be a thing of the past. The failure of the United Arab Republic, the defeat of 1967, the 
death of Nasser, the consolidation of state power and the rise of Islamism were all, many predicted, 
supposed to mark the end of the pan-Arab dream and the consolidation of separate state identities.1 
However, the past decade has witnessed many expressions of ‘hot’ Arabism, when Arabs from all over 
the Middle East have taken to the streets to protest wars in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine.2 At the same 
time new pan-Arab satellite television channels, led by al-Jazeera, provide viewers from the 22 
different Arab states with a shared public arena to debate, discuss and express Arab solidarity.3 As a 
consequence, many commentators and academics have started to speak of a ‘New Arabism’ emerging.4 
Yet where has this new Arabism come from? And what does it mean? Forty years on from 1967, this 
thesis seeks to explain why, how and in what forms Arabism is sustained and reproduced.
‘Arabism’ presents a problem to academics, commentators and policy-makers alike. On the one hand, 
the importance of Arab identity is widely regarded as diminished in recent years. On the other hand, 
those same analysts repeatedly speak of an ‘Arab World’, or more recently an ‘Arab Street,’ which they 
have come to accept as an established fact.5 Few reflect on the contradiction of diminishing Arab 
identity one moment, whilst simultaneously acknowledging its importance. Central to this problem is a 
failure to locate Arabism in today’s Middle East. What does Arab identity mean to today’s Arabs and 
how does it interact with state nationalism and religion? How do we explain the millions of Syrians, 
Jordanians and Egyptians protesting wars in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, yet not such widespread 
popular anger at conflicts in non-Arab Muslim countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan? Similarly, 
how do we square these displays of Arab solidarity with bursts of state nationalism? Inter-Arab sports 
matches continue to arouse nationalist passion, even descending into violence at recent Egypt-Algeria 
football games, and the new phenomena of inter-Arab televised talent competitions, such as Superstar, 
have prompted flag waving displays of state patriotism.6
1 Ajami, Foaud, ‘The end of Pan-Arabism’ Foreign Affairs 57:2 (Winter 1978/9), pp. 355-373.
2 Morten Valbjom, ‘Arab nationalism(s) in Transformation: From Arab Interstate Societies to an Arab-Islamic World 
Society’ in Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez (eds.), International Society and the Middle East: English School 
Theory at the Regional Level (London: Palgrave, 2009), p. 140.
3 Marc Lynch, Voices o f the New Arab public (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 22.
4 Shibley Telhami, ‘Power, Legitimacy and Peace-Making in Arab Coalitions: The New Arabism,’ in Binder, L (ed.), Ethnic 
Conflict and International Politics in the Middle East (Florida: University of Florida Press, 1999), p. 57.
5 Marc Lynch, ‘Beyond the Arab Street: Iraq and the Arab Public Space,’ Politics and Society, 31:1, (2003), pp. 55-91.
6 Marwan M. Kraidy, ‘Reality television and politics in the Arab world: preliminary observations,’ Transnational 
Broadcast Studies, 15, (Fall 2005).
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This thesis uses the examples of Syria and Jordan to demonstrate that, rather than being a new 
phenomenon, Arabism has never gone away. By analyzing the official identity discourses of these two 
ideologically different Arab states, it shows that a layer of Arab identity is constructed, reproduced and 
disseminated daily, irrespective of the ideological leanings and international alliances of state 
governments. The dissertation uses the theories of Michael Billig’s banal nationalism to explain how
n
and why Arab identity has been sustained and reproduced. It adapts Billig’s methodology to conduct a 
discourse analysis of several public mediations encountered by Syrians and Jordanians everyday. Not 
only do these include mediations controlled by the state governments, such as the contents of leadership 
cults and national television, but also the mediations beyond government control: the ‘new Arabist’ 
discourses of Al-Jazeera and its rivals. Further aided by ethnographic interviews with everyday Syrians 
and Jordanians, the thesis shows that the Arabism flagged daily by Arab governments and pan-Arab 
satellite television is in fact the same: a ‘supra-nationalism’ which is reproduced and disseminated daily 
in conjunction with and supportive of state nationalism.
Hypothesis and Key Questions Addressed
The central hypothesis is that Syrians and Jordanians retain a strong sense of Arab identity because 
Arabism remains a central component of each state’s nationalist discourse and has recently been 
boosted by pan-Arab satellite television. Today’s Arabism should be re-defined as supra-nationalist: an 
imagined community in the Andersonian sense which is subordinate to state nationalism, but still 
politically and culturally salient. Furthermore these multi-layered discourses, whilst consciously 
constructed by elites, are now reproduced everyday in a largely banal and unnoticed manner, as 
described by Michael Billig’s Banal Nationalism (1995). Whilst new regional television has served to 
re-energize this identity, it has in fact long been entrenched in the nationalist discourse of the Syrian 
and Jordanian governments -  which promote Arab identity to legitimize their rule. I term this 
phenomenon, ‘Everyday Arabism.’
To do so the investigation focuses on three interrelated themes and sub-questions. Firstly, it asks what 
does Arabism mean today? To answer this it engages the contemporary debates surrounding Arabism. It 
considers previous arguments about the decline of Nasser’s unitary Arab nationalism, which it labels 
‘Old Arabism’, as well as the claims that a ‘New Arabism’ has emerged recently through pan-Arab 
satellite television stations led by Al-Jazeera. The thesis shows that the ‘new Arabism’ of al-Jazeera 
and its rivals is in fact a supra-nationalism that supports and entrenches state nationalism alongside 
Arab identity rather than undermining it. Furthermore, this supra-national Arabist discourse
7 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995), p. 2.
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complements and supports an Arab identity deliberately maintained and reproduced by state 
governments such as Syria and Jordan.
However, far from being ‘new’, supra-national Arabism can be traced to the national discourses in 
Syria and Jordan established in the early 1970s. The second question asked is therefore why do these 
states maintain Arab identity and how does it interact with state identity? The thesis dissects the official 
identity discourses established by Hafez al-Assad in Syria and King Hussein in Jordan to illustrate how 
deliberately including supra-national Arabism within a multi-layered identity discourse in both states 
was closely tied to legitimizing their own mle and maintaining support for their domestic and foreign 
policies in the absence of a democratic mandate. The Arabist layer of discourse is shown to have 
continued under their sons and successors, Bashar al-Assad and King Abdullah II, who have both re­
framed elements of the nationalist discourse whilst maintaining a form of supra-national Arabism.
The final question asks what are the mechanisms and processes by which Arabism and state nationalism 
are produced and reproduced? Here the thesis engages with a new area of nationalism theory, everyday 
nationalism, to demonstrate how the two complementary discourses, the supra-nationalism of Jordan 
and Syria’s official identity and the New Arabism of pan-Arab satellite television converge to daily flag 
a multi-layered identity in an unnoticed, banal manner. Furthermore, identity flagging that Europeans 
might consider overt and propagandist, such as images of the leader displayed in public squares and 
buildings, have become so normalized after 40 years in these states that they too are largely unnoticed. 
It is demonstrated that through these unnoticed discourses both state nationalism and supra-national 
Arabism have become normalized.
Theory, methodology and sources
The thesis grounds itself primarily in nationalism theory. Most scholars of Arabism and state 
nationalism in the Arab world have limited their engagement with nationalism theory.8 This, no doubt, 
has contributed to their failure to explain Arabism in today’s Middle East. The investigation aims to 
correct this frequent over-sight by interpreting the reproduction of identity in Syria and Jordan through 
the lens of nationalism theory. Whilst the views of established theorists such as Anderson, Breuilly, 
Smith and Ozkirmili will be discussed throughout the thesis, the purpose of this investigation is to 
contribute to a new and developing area of nationalist theory: that of everyday nationalism.9 In 
particular it adapts and develops the work of Michael Billig. In his 1995 book, Banal Nationalism,
8 J. Jankowski & I. Gershoni (eds.), Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East (New York: Columbia, 1997), p. 
xiii; Fred Halliday, Nation and Religion in the Middle East, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), pp. 44-51.
9 Umut Ozkirimli, Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: A critical engagement (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005), pp. 32-3.
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Billig suggested the reproduction of nations in the West takes two forms: the conscious, overt flag
tVi *waving such as 4 July parades in the US A, and the banal, un-waved flags that hang unnoticed in petrol 
stations and outside houses.10 This thesis argues that the everyday reproduction of nationalism Billig 
identifies in the West can be successfully adapted and transposed onto Syria and Jordan. It is the banal, 
everyday flagging of Arabism alongside state nationalism that ensures citizens maintain their multi­
layered identity.
Michael Billig stretches the term ‘nationalism’ to cover the ideological means by which nation-states 
are reproduced. He devises the term ‘banal nationalism’, “to cover the ideological habits which enable 
the established nations of the West to be reproduced,” suggesting that, “daily, the nation is indicated, or 
‘flagged’ in the lives of its citizenry.”11 He sees the institutions ofthe state as essential in this ‘flagging’ 
and particularly focuses on the print media: conducting a discourse and content analysis of British 
newspapers to show how they reproduce the nation daily. This thesis will address four aspects of his 
analysis. Firstly, Billig’s emphasis on only national rather than other group identities being banally 
reproduced will be considered. Secondly, his narrow focus on what he terms the Western ‘established’ 
nations will be challenged. Thirdly, Billig’s linking of banal nationalism to democratic political systems 
will be criticised, as will his related rejection ofthe role of ‘hot’ nationalism in reproducing the nation 
alongside the ‘banal’.
Finally, as important as theoretically adapting and challenging Billig will be altering and moving 
beyond his methodology. This thesis argues that a combination of discourse analysis and ethnographic 
interviewing prove the most complete way to explain identity reproduction in the Arab world. In doing 
so, it moves beyond Billig’s methodology in several ways. Firstly, it stretches Billig’s focus on the 
institution of the media to look instead at public mediations in general. Whilst Banal Nationalism 
looked at the print media in Britain, this investigation finds that national television is more accessible in 
the semi-literate societies ofthe Arab world. Secondly, it includes a discussion of the more ‘overt’ or 
‘hot’ mediation of the imagery of leaders’ cults and the political speeches they make, suggesting that 
for the majority of Syrians and Jordanians, these symbols flag their identities in as banal and unnoticed 
a manner as the un-waved stars and stripes in America. Thirdly, due to the unique popularity of 
transnational media in the Arab world, this study widens Billig’s net to include a discourse and content 
analysis of satellite television, a potential rival to the government controlled mediations discussed 
above. Finally, in a complete departure from Billig, this investigation tests the effectiveness of these 
mediations in flagging and reproducing identities by conducting ethnographic interviews with
10 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 2.
11 Ibid., p. 6.
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‘everyday’ Syrians and Jordanians, challenging Billig’s assumption that what is in the media is 
unquestioningly absorbed by its audience.
Of course any investigation into the issue of identity in the Middle East cannot avoid and should 
actively seek to engage with other relevant debates that have emerged on the topic. The thesis not only 
engages at a theoretical level but also addresses the dominant narratives in the field, offering nuance 
and complex explanation. Firstly it seriously engages with literature on old and new Arabism. It 
challenges both anti-Arabists such as Fouad Ajami who believe Arabism has faded from view and neo- 
Arabists such as Khalil Rinnawi who see new Arabism as displacing and undermining state identity. 
The thesis also considers the various discussions of state and nation building in Syria and Jordan and 
the Arab world in general. It addresses and critiques Nazih Ayubi’s argument that the state in the Arab 
world remains weak and only sustainable through coercion. Similarly it considers the work of Lisa 
Wedeen and Nina Tamarkin to compare and contrast the role of leadership cults in identity building in 
Syria and Jordan. Lina Abu-Lughood and Christa Salamantra’s anthropological studies of how 
television contributes to nation building is assessed and critiqued. Finally, whilst any investigation of 
identity in the Arab world contributes to international relations theory in general, the specific impact of 
today’s Arabism upon the realist-constructivist debates of Stephen Walt and Michael K. Barnett will be 
explored.
Value Added
The dissertation’s primary contribution is to the growing body of literature on everyday nationalism. 
Until now investigations into banal nationalism have largely been limited to Europe, with Turkey and 
Ghana proving the most geographically diverse countries covered.12 Not only does this thesis expand 
the geographical scope of Billig’s work to the Arab world, it adds greater theoretical depth by 
demonstrating its applicability to authoritarian regimes and supra-national as well as national identities. 
Furthermore, by analysing television rather than newspapers and including ethnographic interviews it 
offers significant methodological expansions for the study of everyday nationalism.
Secondly the thesis contributes to the increased study of satellite television in the Arab world and the 
impact it has upon identity. Whilst much has been written on the so-called ‘Al-Jazeera effect’ upon 
Arab identity, very few have linked this with complex nationalism theory. The thesis bridges this gap: 
leading the way for theorists to analyse the nationalist content of television, whilst encouraging students 
of satellite television and identity to engage with nationalism theory.
12 Arus Yumul & Umut Ozkirimili, ‘Reproducing the nation: ‘banal nationalism’ in the Turkish Press’, Media, Culture 
and Society, 22:6 (2000), pp. 787-804; Fuller, H.C., ‘Coinage in Ghana and symbols of Nkruma’, Nations and 
Nationalism. 14 (2008), pp. 520-541.
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Thirdly, the dissertation contributes to the work of area specialists focusing on Syria and Jordan. It 
provides a detailed account of identity discourse-building attempts in both states and a thorough 
analysis of two key mediations used to disseminate them: state television and the cult of the leader. 
Finally, by highlighting and explaining the continued salience of Arabism in the contemporary world, 
the thesis contributes to the ongoing debate amongst theorists over the place of identity in international 
relations.
Chapter Structure
The thesis is broken into six analytical chapters and a conclusion. The first two chapters outline the 
arguments of the dissertation and place it in a theoretical context. Chapter one discusses the central 
themes of the thesis, critiquing previous literature and explaining the methodological approach of this 
work. It highlights the limitations of previous approaches and explains why Arabism today should be 
defined as a ‘supra-nationalism’. It explains further why Syria and Jordan make strong case studies to 
demonstrate the continued flagging of Arab identity in national discourses. By examining identity 
construction and reproduction in these ideologically different neighbouring states it highlights how and 
why the state and Arabism have been built and flagged in tandem in the region, irrespective of the 
ideological leanings of ruling governments. It explains why everyday nationalism and discourse 
analysis with ethnographic interviewing proves the best theoretical and methodological approach to 
demonstrate this process.
Chapter two engages with Billig’s Banal Nationalism. It outlines Billig’s theory and challenges it in 
various ways. It shows that Billig’s theory can be extended beyond the sphere of nationalism to 
illustrate how religious, supra-national and state identities are also flagged daily within national 
discourses. It shows how the study of the everyday representation of the nation is applicable in non- 
democratic non-Westem states. Billig’s linking of banal nationalism to democratic political systems is 
questioned, as is his related rejection of the role of ‘hot’ nationalism in reproducing the nation alongside 
the ‘banal’. Methodologically, it explains why Billig’s analysis of print media is to be adapted to 
analyse leaders’ speeches, the use of images in leadership cults, and national and transnational 
television whilst Billig’s assumption that what is flagged in the media is unquestioningly absorbed by 
its audience will be addressed by ethnographic interviewing in Syria and Jordan.
Chapter three discusses the official identity discourses of Syria and Jordan. It compares and contrasts 
the discourses built by Hafez and Bashar al-Assad of Syria and Kings Hussein and Abdullah II of 
Jordan and explains why Arabism is emphasised in each. It analyses the seemingly more overt aspects
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of the discourse: the imagery of leadership cults and the speeches made by the current rulers. In each 
case the regime’s use of imagery and language is scrutinised, highlighting the tendency to emphasise 
state, Arab or Islamic identity in different contexts according to the relative strength or weakness of the 
government.
In chapter four state television in Jordan and Syria is scrutinised to assess a more banal form of identity 
flagging, which also has some overt components. Billig’s methodology is adapted to assess a week of 
prime time television on Syrian and Jordanian TV stations rather than a day’s newspapers as in Banal 
Nationalism. Content of news, sport, weather, advertisements, topical shows and drama serials is 
assessed for their nationalist and Arabist discourse and content. The experiment shows a clear attempt 
by both regimes to use television to culturally construct citizens of both the state and the wider Arab 
world using content that can be deemed both banal and overt at times.
The fifth chapter moves the analysis beyond the mediations controlled by the state to discuss the impact 
of transnational satellite television upon the reproduction and dissemination of identity in Jordan and 
Syria. It considers whether these channels and their widespread audience promote a new pan-Arab 
identity that undermines or complements the national discourse. It will discuss the different genres of 
programme that gain attention and notoriety on satellite television: news, musalsals (dramas), reality 
TV, music TV and religious programming. Finally it will focus on a case study of sport: how Al- 
Jazeera reported the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the Arab, state and religious identities it flagged. It 
shows that, rather than undermining state identity, pan-Arab television constructs an ‘Arab arena’ for its 
viewers. It encourages viewers to see themselves as nationals of their states but who compete, admire 
and interact primarily with other Arab states.
The final chapter discusses the results of various ethnographic interviews undertaken in Syria and 
Jordan, considering a key area that Billig left out of his analysis: reception. Interviews with 51 
‘everyday’ Jordanians and Syrians from different ethnic, religious, economic and geographical 
backgrounds are analysed to suggest that the mediations analysed have been effective at constructing a 
sense of Arab and state identity amongst citizens. Whilst respondents show a great deal of choice and 
cynicism towards these mediations, most conform to the identities they flag and promote. Though this 
ethnographic method lacks scientific rigour, it provides another layer of detail and adds flavour to the 
thesis’ findings.
The conclusion returns to the overall hypothesis of this thesis: that it is through the everyday, unnoticed 
reproduction of identity in Syria and Jordan that has sustained a strong supra-national Arab identity
16
despite the failure of Old Arabism. At the same time, state identity is gradually strengthening in the 
same manner and evolving into a nationalism that encompasses, not opposes, this supra-national 
Arabism.
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Chapter 1 
Arabism and the State
In Spring 2003, as American tanks were gathered in Kuwait preparing to invade Iraq, there was anger in 
Damascus and Amman. In Syria, where the government vehemently opposed America’s invasion,
1 3200,000 people marched on Damascus’ streets in solidarity with Baghdad. In Jordan, where the 
government tacitly approved of the attack in support of its allies in Washington, barely a few thousand 
were able to get onto the streets to protest. In spite of this difficulty, it soon became apparent that this 
war was wholly unpopular throughout the Arab world, whatever their leaders said. Facilitated by 24- 
hour reporting from the comparatively new Qatar-based Al-Jazeera satellite television channel, footage 
of anger on the Arab street was broadcast around the world.14 This protest was not limited to the 
specific circumstances o f2003 and the Iraq war. In 2006, when Israel attacked Lebanon, Arab capitals 
were again awash with outraged citizens. The same was seen in 2008/9 when Israel bombarded Gaza. 
Though such protests were nothing new, Arab capitals had seen similar seemingly spontaneous 
declarations of solidarity with Iraq in 1991 and Beirut in 1982, the presence of a new and popular 
regional media led by al-Jazeera served to magnify and reproduce the sense of solidarity. In defiance of 
their leaders, ‘the Arab street’ appeared to be expressing a ‘hot’ Arabism.15
Yet why do Arabs feel this sense of identity? There is no single ‘United States of Arabia’ from which 
‘the Arabs’ originate but rather 22 separate multi-ethnic states with different governments. Are the 
Arabs a nation? Are they a culture? Such questions are rarely asked by either media commentators or 
academics who have come to accept the ‘Arab World’ as an established fact, without asking how it has 
been established and how it is sustained. It is rarely asked, for example, why a Syrian who has never 
visited Iraq, never lived there and has no relatives in the country should care about the fate of the Iraqi 
people. Nor is it asked why a Jordanian who has no personal ties to Lebanon feels solidarity with the 
victims of Israel’s 2006 attacks. Indeed, it is rarely asked why or how any ‘Arab street’ can exist. States 
in the Arab world have been independent for over 60 years, and the prospect of any realistic Arab unity 
was extinguished by 1967, if not before, yet still ‘Arabism’ seems to arouse passions. This thesis seeks 
to explain why, how and in what form Arabism continues to be reproduced in today’s Middle East.
13 ‘Millions join global anti-war protests,’ BBC News 17/2/2003, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/europe/2765215.stm 
accessed 21/4/10.
14 Sean Aday, Steven Livingston and Maeve Hebert, ‘Embedding the Truth: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Objectivity 
and Television Coverage of the Iraq War,’ International Journal o f Press/Politics, 10:1, (2005), pp. 3-21.
15 John Hutchinson, ‘Hot and banal nationalism: The nationalization of the masses’, in G. Delanty and K. Kumar (eds.), 
The SAGE Handbook o f Nations and nationalism (London: Sage, 2006), p. 298.
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This thesis case studies two ideologically different Arab states, Syria and Jordan, to demonstrate how 
Arabism is reproduced. It argues that Syrians and Jordanians retain a sense of Arabism because Arab 
identity is embedded in each state’s nationalist discourse and has recently been further boosted by new 
pan-Arab satellite television stations. Today’s Arabism is an imaged community in the Andersonian 
sense, but is subordinate to state nationalism and should therefore be re-defined as supra-nationalism. 
This supra-nationalism is now reproduced daily alongside state identities in a largely banal and 
unnoticed manner, as described by Michael Billig’s Banal Nationalism, which is then easily aroused 
into ‘hot’ Arabism at perceived times of threat, such as the 2003 Iraq War.16 This daily discourse is 
termed ‘Everyday Arabism’.
To illustrate and explain this phenomenon, this study poses three interrelated questions. Firstly, it asks 
what Arabism means today; secondly, why do states maintain Arab identity and how does it interact 
with state nationalism; and thirdly, what are the mechanisms and processes by which Arabism and state 
nationalism is reproduced? This first chapter explores the broad historical, theoretical and 
methodological origins of these themes and questions, before opening the way for a deeper examination 
of the principle theory upon which this investigation rests, Billig’s Banal nationalism, in chapter two.
Firstly, to consider what Arabism means today, the many debates amongst historians and theorists 
surrounding Arabism need consideration. The current state of ‘Arabism’ in the Middle East, and even 
finding a definition for it, prompts huge disagreement amongst the academic. When, why and if 
Arabism rose and fell has divided scholars, as has the issue of a possible ‘New Arabism’ in the wake of 
the Iraq War and the emergence of pan-Arab satellite television. Similarly, the significance of Arabism 
within International Relations theory, and the importance of identity in determining the foreign policies 
of Arab states divides theorists and requires exploration. After engaging with these debates today’s 
Arabism is located and defined as a supra-nationalism existing alongside state nationalism.
To explain why states maintain Arab identity and how it interacts with state nationalism, the chapter 
then discusses the debated position of state identity in the contemporary Arab world. Whilst some see 
the states as stronger today than they’ve ever been (Lewis 1999), others see them as weak entities that 
cannot move beyond a coercive form of government for fear of fragmentation (Ayubi 1995). A key 
issue addressed by this investigation is the normalisation of state identity. It will ask whether sustained 
nation-building alongside the simple longevity o f‘Syria’ and ‘Jordan’ has brought about the acceptance 
of state nationalism alongside, rather than instead of, Arab and religious ties. The reasons for case 
studying Syria and Jordan in particular are outlined, explaining that the ideological gulf between the
16 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 2.
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two regimes, despite their historical and geographical closeness makes a comparison useful for similar 
claims on the wider Arab world. Engaging with nationalism and state building theory helps to explain 
why these regimes continue to promote supra-national Arabism within their national identity 
discourses.
To understand the processes and mechanisms by which Arabism and state nationalism are reproduced 
the chapter finally outlines the theoretical and methodological basis for this thesis. It discusses the 
views of Anderson, Breuilly and Smith along with Umut Ozkirmili’s notion of nationalism as discourse, 
before laying the groundwork for a more detailed engagement with Michael Billig and the idea of banal 
nationalism in chapter two. This facilitates an outline of the methodology of the thesis and the reasons 
why certain examples, questions and case studies were chosen over others.
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1.1 Arabism Today: Contested identity
The first theme of this thesis asks what Arabism means today. Over the years academics and 
commentators have used ‘Arabism’, ‘Arab nationalism’ and ‘pan-Arabism’ to describe everything from
17a loose cultural attachment to a movement for political unity. The narrative of Arabism is highly 
debated: whether an Arab identity can stretch back to the birth of Islam or earlier, or whether it was a 
modem creation prompted by interaction with external actors such as France’s invasion of Egypt in 
1798 or the partition ofthe Ottoman Empire.18 Similarly Arabism’s fate is still contested, with some 
seeing its demise in the formation of the Arab League (Owen 1992), the failure of the UAR of 1958-61 
(Dawisha 2003) or the defeat of 1967 (Ajami 1978/9). More recently a group of scholars have claimed 
that a ‘New Arabism’ has emerged out of the development of an Arab public sphere through popular 
transnational satellite television stations such as al-Jazeera (Telhami 1999, Lynch 2006, Rinnawi 2006, 
Valbjom 2009), a fact disputed by others (Dawisha 2003, Ajami 1992). Central to these disagreements 
are competing definitions of Arabism. Telhami and others who see a ‘New Arabism’ emerging, see 
Arabism as a malleable political and cultural bond that has evolved over time. Others, like Fouad 
Ajami, see it as purely a political nationalism, whose time has passed. Between these stand scholars like 
Adeed Dawisha who wish to separate political ‘Arab nationalism’ from cultural ‘Arabism’ -  the former 
having departed but the latter remaining.
One of the most recent scholars of Arabism, Morten Valbjom, defines it broadly. He sees Arabism as, 
“the idea that some kind of special bonds exist between Arabic-speaking peoples sharing not only a 
common language but also history, culture and tradition.” This broad definition allows Valbjom to link 
all expressions of Arab identity in the modem era together. To him, Arabism has had a malleable 
career.19 He claims that since the Ottoman era through to the present day Arabism has at times been 
cultural, political, conservative, revolutionary, unitary and statist. His typology, however, is designed to 
account for the differing behaviour of actors in the Arab world over the past 100 years through the lens 
of international relations theory, and not a consideration of nationalism. Indeed, Valbjom falls into the 
common trap of using ‘Arabism’ and ‘Arab nationalism’ interchangeably at times.20 For example, 
whilst co-operation between the different Arab states in the 1970s might be seen as working towards a 
common Arab goal and therefore Arabist according to his original definition quoted above, they were 
not attempting to politically unify their communities and should not be considered Arab nationalist. 
Though the international relations theory that Valbjom refers to warrants discussion, and will be dealt
17 Adeed Dawisha, Arab nationalism in the 20th Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 8.
18 Samir Amin, The Arab Nation (London: Zed, 1978), 7; Nazih Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State (London: IB Tauris, 
1995), p. 148.
19 Valbjom, ‘Arab nationalism(s)’, pp. 144-148.
20 Ibid., p. 144.
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with in due course, the primary lens through which this thesis will frame its investigation is the study of 
nationalism. A key dimension of this thesis will be to distinguish Arabism from Arab nationalism. 
Arabism can be an umbrella term that incorporates a sense of political and cultural identity, whilst Arab 
nationalism was an older incarnation of Arabism which was a specific political and cultural ideology. In 
order to show how today’s Arabism has reacted to the failure of unitary Arab nationalism (Old 
Arabism) to evolve into a supra-nationalism (New Arabism), it is first necessary to give an overview of 
how that failure came about and the contested debates amongst scholars.
The following discussion of Arabism’s history and present will illustrate that ‘Arabism’ has indeed 
evolved over time. It will be shown that Arabism was only nationalism when it sought to align the 
national community with the political community during the unitary attempts of earlier figures such as 
Sati al-Husri, Gamal Abdul Nasser and Michel Aflaq.21 This unitary Arab nationalist Arabism was 
effectively defeated in 1958-67. Today’s Arabism is different. Whilst it must be seen as more than just 
a cultural bond as it still affects the political mindset, it cannot be seen as a ‘nationalism’ as it 
entrenches rather than undermines the state system and does not have the goal to create a single 
political unit.22 Once this identity has been defined as a supra-national rather than a national ideology 
its impact on international relations will be briefly discussed.
1.1.1 The rise and fall of ‘Old’ Arabism
tViDespite a few claims of the perennial nature of the Arab nation stretching back to at least the 10 
century (Amin 1978), most historians agree that the first seeds of nationalism were sewn in the modem 
era. Until this time ‘Arab’ referred to the Bedouin desert nomads and evoked no pride amongst the 
largely urban intelligentsia or elite who would go on to promote the ideology.23 As with most 
nationalisms, Old Arabism was framed with reference to an ‘other’. Whilst a few see Napoleon’s 
invasion of Egypt in 1798 prompting a realisation of Arabness, most accept it was the Ottoman Turks 
who helped shape the Arab nation. The first writer to use the term ‘Arabism’, C. Ernest Dawn, used it 
in contradistinction to ‘Ottomanism’: an attempt by Istanbul to ‘Turkify’ its Arab provinces. He argued 
that Arab elites reacted against this in the late nineteenth century, desiring autonomy within the 
Ottoman Empire.24 It was these elites who formed Arabist societies in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries in Damascus, Beirut and Cairo allegedly forming tentative links with Emir Faisal before the
21 Dawisha, Arab nationalism, pp. 252-297.
22 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983 [2nd Ed. 2009]), p. 1.
23 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester: MUP, 1993 [2nd ed.]), p. 151.
24 C. Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism (London: University of Illinois Press, 1973), p. 147.
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Great Arab Revolt of 1916-18 that contributed to the eventual defeat of the Ottomans and, 
unintentionally, the partition of the Arab world into mandates.25
Yet historians debate when and where this Arabism became nationalism. Writing long before Dawn, the
first major historian of Arab nationalism, Georges Antonius, claimed the Arab nation emerged in the
26reign of Mohammed Ali in Egypt (1805-48) and matured during the Hashemite Arab Revolt. Later 
historians in the 1950s and 60s such as Seale, Haim, Lewis and Hourani questioned Antonius’ 
periodisation, arguing instead that Arab nationalism did not emerge until the end of the First World War 
and did not reach political maturity until the 1930s 27 Stephen R. Humphreys notes that the Ottoman-era 
‘Arabists’ only claimed the Bilad as-Sham (Greater Syria) region and the first true Arab nationalists 
didn’t emerge until later in the mandate period when theorists such as Sati al-Husri (1882-1968) laid 
claim to all the Arab lands.28 He and Fruma Zachs see the pre-war elites as embryonic ‘proto­
nationalists’ as they lacked the cohesion of vision that is required of nationalists.29
As contested is why Arab nationalism emerged. Dawn maintained that foreign factors indirectly caused 
the growth of the movement amongst elites. He does not argue as has Maxime Rodinson, that this was a 
defused idea from Europe, but rather that Arabism grew out of Ottoman nationalism, itself a reaction to 
increased contact with the West.30 Ghalyun agrees that Western contact prompted Arab nationalism, 
stating, “The Arab World converged with the West.”31 Zachs observed that though foreign contact and 
relations with the West may have affected a sense of inferiority fuelling nationalism at a macro level, 
just as important were the day-to-day contact between US missionaries that influenced the thinking of 
Arab intellectual elites in Lebanon at a micro level.32 In contrast, Rashid Khaldidi, whilst not 
dismissing Dawn’s proposals, maintains that domestic politics, particularly the Arab reaction to 
growing Turkish nationalism in the early 20th century, played a key role.33 In a change of focus, Mary 
Wilson sees Arab responses to Turkish nationalism as a reaction against centralisation as much as it was
25 Ashton highlights that both Dawn and Albert Hourani have questioned these links. See Nigel Ashton, King Hussein: 
a Political Life (London: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 15.
26 Jankowski & Gershoni, Rethinking Nationalism, p. xvi.
27 Ibid., p. 4.
28 Stephen R. Humphreys, Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled Age (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999), p. 68.
29 Fruma Zachs, The Making o f Syrian Identity: Intellectuals and Merchants in Nineteenth Century Beirut (Boston: Brill, 
2005), p. 1; Humphreys, Between, p. 67.
30 Referenced in James G. Mellon, ‘Pan-Arabism, Pan-Islamism and Inter-State Relations in the Arab World’, in 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Winter, 2002; Dawn, Ottomanism, p. 147.
31 Youssef Choueiri, Arab nationalism: A history, nation and state in the Arab world (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), p. 17.
32 Zachs, Syrian Identity, p. 154.
33 R. Khaldidi, L. Anderson, M. Muslih & R. Simon (eds.), The Origins o f Arab Nationalism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991), p. xiii.
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a display of Arab identity.34 Similarly, James Gelvin proposes that the growth of a nationalist mob in
351920s Damascus was as much against economic reforms as it was Arab nationalist.
The Arab nationalism of the mandate era took a dramatic twist once independence from the imperial 
powers had largely been achieved. The nakhba of 1948/9 which saw the creation of Israel and the 
newly-independent Arab states heavily defeated, prompted a shift in both the governments and 
intelligentsia’s attitude to Arabism. Coups and revolutions saw the old regimes removed in Egypt, Syria 
and, later on Iraq and Libya, to be replaced by Arab nationalists who largely advocated physical Arab 
unity. Intellectuals such as Michel Aflaq and Saleh al-Bitar, founders of the Ba’ath party, and George 
Habash, founder of the Arab Nationalist Movement, introduced a new radicalism to intellectual 
Arabism.36 By far the most prominent nationalist was Gamal Abdul Nasser, the president of Egypt who, 
whether intentionally or not, oversaw the first genuine realisation of Arab nationalism -  the unity of 
Syria and Egypt in the United Arab Republic in 195 8.37 Yet this attempt to make the national and the 
political community contiguous soon unravelled when Syrian army officers staged a coup to reclaim 
Syria’s independence barely three years later.38
Though historians accept that the double blow of the 1967 war and the death of Nasser in 1970 
represented a major defeat for Arab nationalism, debate has emerged concerning other issues. Samir 
Amin amongst others disputed whether Nasserist Arabism can actually be considered Arab nationalism, 
claiming it was a thinly disguised ‘Egypt first’ foreign policy.39 Al-Ansari added more revisionism, 
suggesting that Arab nationalism was never more than a linguistic bond, prevented from integration by 
the deserts.40 Amongst the most contentious of issues has been whether 1967 was a final defeat or 
merely a ‘setback’, as the war came to be known in Arabic 41 Fouad Ajami’s 1978 article, ‘The end of 
Pan-Arabism’ was the first major critique of the Arab nationalism of the 1950s and 60s. Reacting 
against the idea that a single Arab nation behind the fa?ade of several states had a ‘super-legitimacy’ 
outstripping that of individual states’, Ajami claimed that the ‘Waterloo’ of 1967 undermined this. The 
subsequent war of 1973 cemented the new status quo that the Arab world would be dominated by 
individual states, not by a universalist Arab nationalism. This was strengthened by the subsequent 
wealth gap between Arabs generated by the oil boom and the legitimacy given to individual state
34 Ibid., p. xi.
35 James Gelvin in Jankowski & Gershoni, Rethinking Nationalism, p. 238.
36 Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from above (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 38-41.
37 Eugene Rogan, The Arabs: A history (London: Allen Lane, 2009), pp. 287-317.
38 Nikolaos van Dam, The struggle for power in Syria: sectarianism, regionalism and tribalism in politics, 1961-1980 
(London: CroomHelm, 1979 [2nd ed.1981]), pp. 1-10.
39 Amin, Arab Nation, p. 51.
40 Ayubi, Overstating, p. 148.
41 Jeremy Bowen, Six Days: How the 1967 War Shaped the Middle East (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2003), pp. 
318-357.
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identities as an unintended consequence of recognizing Palestinian nationalism.42 Through the prism of 
the late 1970s and the shock of 1967 Ajami’s dismissal of Pan-Arabism is stark when contrasted with 
the more nuanced approach of subsequent writers in the 1980s and 90s. Tawfiq Farah, for example, 
whose surveyed data Ajami uses to justify his article, was wary of completely writing off Arab 
nationalism. Whilst highlighting the growth of Islamic and state identities in the wake of 1967, he still 
acknowledges that Arab identity was visible, even if it was less politically prominent than in the past43 
Similarly, Michael Hudson maintains that though fusionist Arab nationalism did die, the impulse for a 
more loose confederal Pan-Arabist dream lives on 44
A second hotly contested issue is why Arab nationalism failed. There are three main schools of 
thought: those who believe it was doomed from the start; those who believe it was achievable but 
prevented by mistakes, individuals or forces; and those who argue it simply ran its course. Starting 
with the latter first, Al-Jabiri limits the perceived goals of Arabism to see it in a more optimistic light. 
By focusing on the anti-imperialistic element of the doctrine rather than the unifying aspect, he claims 
Arabism completed its mission of national liberation from European powers and no longer has a 
purpose.45 A more widely subscribed-to school of thought is that Arab unity was possible but was 
prevented by certain events and forces. In many ways Ajami was one such scholar as he places a large 
emphasis on the defeat of 1967. Kazziha, similarly, cites the Arab states’ recognition of Palestinian 
nationalism after 1967 as delegitimizing a wider Arab nationalism and legitimising states’ identities as 
the cause of decline.46 Adeed Dawisha, in contrast, claims that rather than the 1967 defeat being the 
key turning point, it was Iraq President Qassim’s decision in 1958 to not join Egypt and Syria in the 
United Arab Republic that halted the momentum of nationalism.47 He claims that Nasser effectively 
was Arab nationalism and, contrary to Ajami’s claims, it was he, not Sadat, who began dismantling his 
own work in the wake of 1967. Clearly to Dawisha, individual actors were the most prominent factor 
determining success or failure. Roger Owen similarly maintains that actors and events blocked 
Arabism, yet this occurred years before the coming to power of Nasser, with the foundation of the Arab 
League in 1946.48 Rather than being a step towards Arab integration the Arab League Charter actually 
defended state sovereignty and reduced the chance of any successful ‘fusionist’ project.
42 Ajami, ‘The end of Pan-Arabism’.
43 Tawfic Farah, ‘Attitudes to the Nation and the State in Arab Public Opinion Polls’, in G. Luciani and G. Salame 
(eds.), The Politics o f  Arab Integration (New York: Croom Helm, 1988), p. 3.
44 Michael C. Hudson (ed.), Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economic o f Arab Integration (New York: 
Columbia, 1999), p. 19.
45 Choueiri, Arab nationalism, p. 217.
46 Luciani and Salame, Arab Integration, p. 5.
47 Adeed Dawisha, ‘Requiem for Arab nationalism’, Middle East Quarterly 10:1 (Winter 2003), pp. 25-41.
48 Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making o f the Modem Middle East (London: Routledge, 1992 [3rd ed. 
2004]), p. 5.
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The final group focus on the inherent weaknesses of Arab nationalism, specifically the excessive 
idealism of Arab nationalists and the impracticalities of fusionist unity. Stephen R. Humphreys 
highlights that neither ideologues such as al-Husri nor Ba’ath founder Michel Aflaq, nor politicians like 
Nasser, focused on the practicalities of how a united Arab state would work.49 Ideologues explained 
who an Arab was not how unity might be achieved. Similarly leaders such as Nasser used Arab 
nationalism as a surrogate for other impulses such as anti-imperialism and the conflict with Israel, 
rather than developing serious unity models. Such unpreparedness was exposed in the weak structure, 
and swift collapse of the UAR. Similarly Nazih Ayubi explains that Arab nationalism was always a 
kultumation never a staatsnation, with little focus on the reality of what a united Arab state would look 
like.50 He argues that the Nasserist and Ba’athist unity models of Arabism were never compatible with 
the socialism inherent in their ideologies. Promoting state socialism and inter-state unity, he argued, 
was contradictory and doomed to fail.
Old Arabism, a nationalism trying to unite Arabic speakers into a single political unit that had 
developed since the 19th century thus reached its zenith under Nasser. Whilst historians will continue to 
revise and debate at which point and why this movement failed, failed it did. Arabism in its nationalist 
form, described here as Old Arabism, can thus be seen as a failed nationalism.
1.1.2 A New Arabism?
The 1991 Gulf War marked something of a watershed for many in the debates over the fate of Arabism. 
For some, such as Faksh, who had clung to the hope that Nasserist unitary Arab nationalism would 
revive, it was the final straw.51 The fact that one Arab state, Iraq, had invaded another, Kuwait, and 
then several more, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, had joined a foreign power to resolve the crisis 
exposed the hollowness of Arabist rhetoric and the ruthless self-interest of Arab states. For others, the 
Gulf Crisis provided the opportunity to reassess where Arabism was.52 Sirrieyh, for example, 
interpreted the post-1991 cooperation between Riyadh, Cairo and Damascus as an embryonic form of a 
new pan-Arabism that reconciled Arabism and statism, centred around realism, peace with Israel and 
accommodation with political Islam.53 However, as the optimism of the 1990s faded into the renewed 
conflict of the post-9/11 world, neither Sirriyeh’s new Arab order nor Faksh’s post-Arab world came
49 Humphreys, Memory and Desire, p. 8.
50 Ayubi, Overstating, p. 46.
51 Mahmud A. Faksh, ‘Withered Arab Nationalism,’ Orbis 37:3 (Summer 1993), pp. 425-438.
52 AbuKhalil As'ad, ‘A New Arab Ideology?: The Rejuvenation of Arab Nationalism,’ Middle East Journal 46:1 
(Winter 1992), pp. 22-36.
53 Hussein Sirriyeh, ‘A New Version of Pan-Arabism?’ in International Relations 15:3 (December 2000), pp. 53-66.
26
about. Instead analysts started to observe a ‘New Arabism’ that centred around an unexpected product 
of the 1991 Gulf War: a Qatari satellite television channel called al-Jazeera.
The unavailability of accurate Arabic-language coverage of the 1991 Gulf War was one of the main 
incentives for the development of al-Jazeera in 1996, offering the growing number of Arab satellite 
television viewers western style 24-hour news coverage without the kind of censorship and control 
traditionally imposed by state broadcasters.54 Its growing popularity prompted Shibley Telhami in 1999 
to coin the phrase ‘New Arabism’ to describe the manner in which, “intellectual elites have found a way 
of asserting their political power independently of the state,” using satellite television and offshore 
newspapers to bolster international identity as an independent transnational movement.55 The western 
publicity given to al-Jazeera after 9/11, the 2001 Afghanistan invasion and, particularly, the 2003 Iraq 
War led to a greater academic investigation into the topic. Marc Lynch (2006) concurred that al-Jazeera 
and newly emerging rivals such as Al-Arabiyya, LBC and Abu Dhabi, were the primary drivers in 
creating a ‘new Arab public’ which, “should be defined not territorially but by reference to a shared 
identity and a common set of political arguments and concerns.”56 Khalil Rinnawi similarly argued that 
transnational satellite television stations such as al-Jazeera have weakened nation-state orientation and 
instead created a specifically Arab national public space, which he calls ‘McArabism’.57 The 
expressions of ‘hot’ Arabism on the Arab street in the wake of the Iraq, Lebanon and Gaza wars, 
described at the beginning of this chapter, are the outward expression of this ‘new Arabism’.
How different is this new Arabism from Old Arabism? Its advocates are keen to distinguish it from the 
unionist nationalism of al-Husri, Nasser and Aflaq, and identify several features that distinguish the 
two. Firstly, who leads it: whilst in the 1950s and 60s Old Arabism was state led, according to Telhami 
and Rinnawi, New Arabism is market driven. The desire to sell a television product such as Al-Jazeera 
ox Al-Arabiyya to the widest possible Arabic-speaking audience is determining the shape of the agenda 
rather than any specifically nationalist ideology experienced during Old Arabism.58 Valbjom 
emphasises this point by comparing the style of Nasser’s Sawt al-Arab radio broadcasts with that of al- 
Jazeera. He sees Sawt al-Arab, which frustrated leaders in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq with its Arab 
nationalist appeals to their domestic populations, as “...an ideological tool wielded by a great regional
54 Naomi Sakr, Satellite Realms: Transnational Television, Globalization and the Middle East (London: IB Tauris,
2001), p. 10.
55 Telhami, ‘Power, Legitimacy,’ p. 57.
56 Lynch, New Arab Public, p. 22.
57 Khalil Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism: McArabism, Al-Jazeera, and Transnational Media in the Arab World (New 
York: University Press America, 2006) p. 9 and p. xviii.
58 Telhami, ‘Power, Legitimacy,’ p. 57; Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism, p. xv.
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power.” 59 In contrast al-Jazeera, whilst also appealing to Arabs across state borders, sometimes to the 
consternation of regime leaders, is, “...a commercial, quasi-independent station driven by market 
demand and based in tiny Qatar.” Similarly, whilst Sawt al-Arab was a monological, one-way source of 
propaganda, Valbjom sees al-Jazeera with its discussion shows, debates and phone-ins, as a dialogical 
process without one uniform view.
However, as Naomi Sakr has emphasised, the independence and commercial nature of these satellite 
television channels should not be exaggerated. As shall be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 5, 
though Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiyya and their competitors appear to be market driven, almost none operate 
at a profit and are dependent on wealthy owners.60 Whilst the broadcast journalists and public 
intellectuals may appear, as Telhami claims, to be asserting their political power independently of the 
state, almost all channels have owners directly or indirectly linked to Arab governments. The nature of 
ownership thus limits how independent any content can be. Al-Jazeera is a case in point: it may appear 
‘quasi-independent’, yet its funding and location in Doha ensures the Qatari government is rarely 
criticised.61 The ownership of the stations further negates claims that content is entirely market driven, 
as it is clear that states use television channels as instruments of international relations. Al-Jazeera is 
used by the Qatari government to gain notoriety, promote its version of regional politics and criticise its 
rivals. Similarly Al-Arabiyya was launched in 2005 by Saudi Arabia primarily to counter the attacks 
Riyadh faced on Al-Jazeera.62 State prestige thus appears as much of a driver of satellite television as 
market forces. Valbjom and Telhami amongst others are correct to highlight its more interactive, 
dialogical and seemingly commercial nature that distinguishes it from the overtly political Old Arabism 
of the past, but to suggest that New Arabism is a development independent of the state is misleading. 
As shall be discussed below, this New Arabism actually serves state interests and conforms to their own 
identity discourses.
A second distinguishing feature of New Arabism identified by scholars is the role of Islam. Whilst Old 
Arabism was determinedly secular, Valbjom sees, “an Arab-Islamic identity as the common reference 
point,” in today’s Arabism as seen by the regular presence of Egyptian Islamist Yusuf al-Qaradawi on 
al-Jazeera. 6 3  Similarly, Raymond Hinnebusch claims that Arabism on the Arab ‘street’ has, “reunited 
with Islam, long ago acknowledged by Arab nationalist theorists to be the highest achievement of the
59 For more on Sawt al-Arab see Laura M. James, ‘Whose Voice? Nasser, the Arabs, and 'Sawt al-Arab' Radio’, 
Transnational Broadcasting Studies, 16(2006); Valbjom, ‘Arab nationalism(s)’, p. 164.
60 Naomi Sakr, Arab Television Today (London: IB Tauris, 2007), p. 15.
61 Sakr, Satellite Realms, p. 207.
62 Samantha M. Shapiro, ‘The War inside the Arab newsroom,’ New York Times, 2/02/2005
63 Valbjom, ‘Arab nationalism(s)’, p. 164.
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Arabs.”64 Moreover Pintak suggests that “Arab journalists are at the forefront of a cyclical convergence 
of interests between Arab nationalism, nation-state nationalism, and Islamism,” and that, “Arab 
nationalism and Islamism are two sides of the Janus-faced Arab cultural and political identity.”65 The 
air time given to Islamists like Qaradawi, and the support for Hezbollah and Hamas, particularly by Al- 
Jazeera during their conflicts with Israel in 2006 and 2008/9, are cited as evidence of this Arabism- 
Islamism synthesis.
However, Pintak’s interpretation of Islamism’s role in New Arabism is too generalist. Lynch has 
correctly highlighted how the satellite media have linked together Arab and Muslim identity, but this 
link is cultural rather than political.66 The, “growing Islamic dimension in today’s Arab identity,” 
described by Valbjom is not Islamist. Tellingly Islamists like Qaradawi are given cultural space on al- 
Jazeera, with shows like ‘Sharia and life’, but not political space. The many talk shows described by 
Lynch as forming the ‘new Arab public’ are largely hosted by non-Islamists and, though Qaradawi is 
popular and well publicised, his show is the exception not the rule. Similarly, Hezbollah and Hamas are 
given space in relation to their nationalist conflict with Israel rather than in pursuit of their Islamist 
agenda. Moreover, no such space is given to Islamists who threaten the status quo, such as Syria’s 
Muslim Brotherhood.67 As Sivan has demonstrated, Islamists preaching in mosques mostly retain their 
opposition to Arab nationalism.68 Whilst Islamists in the Arab world remain culturally Arab, and 
Arabists remain culturally Islamic, it is important to maintain a distinction between the two. New 
Arabism might have afforded a more sizeable place for Islamic culture in its discourse than the fierce 
secularism of Old Arabism, and is therefore somewhat different, politically it is a step too far to call it 
‘converged’ with Islamism.
A third and final feature of New Arabism that distinguishes it from Old Arabism is its world view. 
Lawrence Pintak argues that the ‘dreamy’ political unitary Arab nationalism of Aflaq has been 
abandoned and in its place is a new, “multi-faceted Arab self,” that shares a broad world view though 
does not speak of realigning borders like early Ba’athists.69 As shall be discussed below, this 
acceptance of state sovereignty and recognition of Arab identity alongside not instead of state identity, 
transforming Arabism from a national into a supra-national identity, is one of the key distinctions
64 Raymond Hinnebusch, ‘The politics of identity in Middle Eastern International Relations,’ in Louise Fawcett (ed.), 
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between Old and New Arabism. However, one might question whether this concept is ‘new’ at all. 
After all, the principle of state sovereignty was established by Nasser himself after defeat in 1967, 
agreeing at the Khartoum summit to endorse an, “interpretation of Arabism that was consistent with 
sovereignty.”70 Some have argued that this shift away from unionism happened earlier -  either at the 
collapse of the UAR in 1961, or the failed Iraq-Syria-Egypt unification talks of 1963.71
Yet something new has occurred. As shall be demonstrated, whilst Old Arabism clearly failed, states 
continued to include a layer of Arab identity within their official identity discourses. It was this 
continued reproduction of Arab identity which allowed a sense of group identification to be sustained 
and made Al-Jazeera and other stations appealing when they were launched in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Whilst the nature of this Arab identity has not greatly changed since 1967 -  it does not challenge the 
legitimacy of the states as Old Arabism once did -  the means by which this layer of identity is 
reproduced and disseminated certainly is new. Moreover, as Lynch correctly observes, rather than Arab 
viewers only consuming their own states’ version of Arab identity, they now consume the same content 
simultaneously. This effectively homogenises the type of identity discourse they are exposed to and 
helps reinforce, “.. .a shared identity and a common set of political arguments and concerns.”72 What 
has changed in the satellite era is therefore not the nature of Arab identity, it remains subordinated to 
state identity, but the method and scope by which it is disseminated across the entire Arab world, not 
just within individual states’ media.
New Arabism therefore can be considered a different type of identity to Old Arabism, though many of 
the claims made by its advocates are exaggerated. It is less overtly state-led than Old Arabism, though 
states continue to hold the controlling levers of satellite media stations, ensuring they cannot be truly 
independent. Islam has a more prominent role, though this is merely cultural and not political Islamism 
as some have claimed. Finally, as shall be discussed below, New Arabism accepts and endorses the role 
of the state and does not seek Arab unitary whilst simultaneously strengthening the Arab community by 
subjecting viewers to the same media content. Whilst this is not a new conception of Arabism than that 
endorsed by Nasser himself after 1967, its scope and method are significantly different enough to be 
considered something new.
1.1.3 Defining Arabism
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So is New Arabism still Arab nationalism? The numerous scholars who discuss New Arabism afford 
little place to engage with nationalist theory. Lawrence Pintak skims over theory briefly to state that 
digital communication, “is fuelling the rise of a new common Arab consciousness every bit as salient as 
the ‘imagined communities’ that Benedict Anderson tells us are at the core of the concept of nations.” 
Similarly he invokes the work of Anthony Smith to claim that Arab journalists are, ‘“border guards’ 
who provide, ‘a new panoply of symbols myths, memories and values, that set the included national 
states apart.”74 Similarly Rinnawi also briefly references Anderson to suggest that, “...a new 
nationalism, such as McArabism is a form of imagined community.”75 By and large however, 
nationalist theory is absent from these discussions. As a consequence, definitions of New Arabism are 
confused and imprecise. Telhami describes it as a ‘transnational movement,’ a sentiment echoed by 
Lynch who describes his New Arab Public as a, ‘transnationalpublic sphere.’76 Valbjom describes New 
Arabism as ‘non-statist political Arabism’ which he categorises as the latest evolution in Arab
77nationalism. Pintak seems cautious to actually use the term ‘nationalism’ to describe New Arabism, 
but does see the actions of journalists as shaping an emerging ‘imagined’ Arab watan (homeland).78 
Finally, amongst the most confused is Rinnawi, who at different times in his study refers to his 
McArabism as a regional identity, a regionalisation, a new pan-Arabism, a regionalism and a 
nationalism.79 A consultation with nationalism theory suggests however that New Arabism should not 
be considered nationalism.
Ozkirmili highlights that no set of objective characteristics can be found which consistently prove the 
presence of a nation or nationalism.80 Nevertheless, certain features of nationalism have featured 
consistently in the debates amongst theorists to merit discussion with reference to New Arabism. 
Whether nationalism needs to be a mass movement is one such topic.81 By the admission of both Pintak 
and Rinnawi, New Arabism is not a mass nationalism. Rinnawi sees his McArabism as, “an upper 
middle class imagining,” whilst Pintak sees the elite journalists as ‘border guards’ who are promoting a 
new identity.82 This is sufficient to be considered nationalism according to some scholars. Adrian 
Hastings claims that national identity does not need to be present amongst the majority of a population
73 Pintak, ‘Border guards,’ p. 191.
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76 Telhami, ‘The New Arabism,’ p. 57; Lynch, New Arab public, p. 22.
77 Valbjom, ‘Arab nationalism(s)’, p. 148.
78 Pintak, ‘Border guards,’ p. 191.
79 Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism, see p. 148, p. xiv, Abstract, p. xiv, p. 7.
80 Ozkirimli, Contemporary Debates, pp. 19-20.
81 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 176.
82 Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism, xvii; Pintak, ‘Border guards,’ p. 92.
31
for nationalism to be present, merely a ‘substantial portion’ of the elite and middle classes.83 This was 
the argument made by historians of Old Arabism such as Dawn who located the birth of Arab 
nationalism with the national consciousness of the elites in the late 19th century. However, most 
scholars dispute Hasting’s ‘primordialism’ supporting Ernst Gellner’s assertion that, “mass popular 
identity,” is one of the core components of nationalism.84 With this in mind 19th century Arabists should
Of
be seen as ‘proto-nationalists’ with genuine mass nationalism not emerging until the 1920s and 30s. 
Should Pintak and Rinnawi’s elites also be seen, as Pintak implies, as ‘proto-nationalists’ of an 
emerging New Arabism nationalism? The Arab elites of the early 21st and late 19th century have 
significant differences of intent. As Pintak himself declares, today’s journalists are not advocating any 
form of political union, which was the ultimate goal of the 19th century intellectuals.86 Complicating the
thissue is that, unlike in the 19 century, most of today’s masses feel some sense of Arab identity already. 
It may not be their primary identity as hoped by 19th century elites but Gellner’s suggestion that elites 
disseminate identity into mass consciousness has had a degree of success.87 In this regard Rinnawi’s 
assertion that New Arabism is an, “upper middle class imagining,” deserves scrutiny: the media elite’s 
goal is not nationalist, and yet what is imagined is felt at a mass level.
A second debate is over the political and cultural nature of nationalism. Some theorists see nationalism 
as a purely political phenomena. As John Breuilly states, “The term 'nationalism' is used to refer to 
political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist 
arguments.”88 This view is supported by Motyl and Hechter who argue nationalism is primarily a 
political ideal, aiming at independent statehood or political autonomy.89 Applied to Arabism, this 
narrower political definition of nationalism would fit that advocated by Dawisha and Ajami: that the 
only Arab nationalists were the fusionist projects of al-Husri, Nasser and Aflaq. After the failure of this, 
what is left of Arabism today is, according to Dawisha, purely a cultural bond and not political, hence 
not nationalism. He states:
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“To say one is an Arab should denote a different connotation from saying one is an Arab nationalist. The former concedes 
one’s cultural heritage, expressed best in the term ‘Arabism,’ whereas the latter, as we have seen, imbues this cultural 
oneness with the added ingredient of political recognition.” 90
Indeed, Dawisha went on to claim elsewhere that New Arabism will not amount to much because it 
cannot develop into the political sphere, remaining, “ineffectual as long as it is not translated into 
deeds.”91
However, contrary to Dawisha, some theorists argue that a cultural definition of nationalism is more 
appropriate. Tamir, for example, argues the right to national self-determination is based on a cultural 
rather than a political claim.92 Indeed, the common culture and language of the Arabs is the cornerstone 
of the media’s promotion of New Arabism. However, as Ozkirmili states, the reality is that one cannot 
separate either culture or politics from nationalism. Nationalism, he says, “involves the culturalisation 
of politics and the politicisation of culture.”93 It is therefore insufficient for Dawisha to claim Arabism 
is purely cultural, as no cultural identity can be completely depoliticised. New Arabism is in fact deeply 
political, as seen by the strong focus of the transnational Arab media on foreign policy. This is not a 
purely cultural tie being encouraged. As Lynch states,
“In the new Arab public, Arab and Islamic identities serve as a reference point, but no single set of policies or orientations 
necessarily follows from that identity. Arabs take for granted that Palestine and Iraq are Arab issues about which Arabs 
should agree, but they often disagree vehemently about what is done about them. In contrast to earlier eras of Arabism, such 
as the ‘Arab cold war’ of the 1950s and 1960s (Kerr 1971), the public political arguments today throw wide open 
fundamental questions of what it means to be Arab.”94
On the one hand today’s Arabism is more flexible than a purely cultural identity and allows Arabs to 
question the meaning of their identity, on the other it provides a certain fixed political lens through 
which viewers are expected to see their common world.
So New Arabism is both a political and a cultural movement with mass appeal, but one that does not 
seek political unity. Indeed, as shall be shown in this thesis, unlike Old Arabism its discourse not only 
accepts the existence of the Arab state system, it simultaneously reinforces state identity alongside Arab 
identity. Today’s Arabism cannot therefore be seen as nationalism, or even a proto-nationalism, as it 
does not seek to align the supposed national with the political community. The Arabs are an imagined
90 Dawisha, Arab nationalism, p. 8.
91 Dawisha, ‘Requiem’.
92 Ozkirimli, Contemporary Debates, p. 20.
93 Ibid., pp. 21-2.
94 Lynch, New Arab Public, p. 4.
33
community in the Andersonian sense as they, “will never know most of their fellow-members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”95 Yet this 
imagined community is not that of a nation which, according to Anderson must be, “imagined as both 
inherently limited and sovereign.”96 Though the community is clearly limited to Arabic speakers within 
the Arab world (unlike a religious imagined community, such as the Islamic Umma which can be 
expanded and joined) it is not sovereign but rather mled over by various state governments.
So what kind of imagined community are the Arabs as promoted by New Arabism? Several terms have 
been thrown around by scholars of New Arabism such as ‘transnationalism’, ‘regionalism’ and ‘supra- 
nationalism’. Whilst New Arabism shares characteristics with each of these, none is a completely 
accurate description. Transnationalism refers to activities that cross state boundaries, such as human 
migration, the flow of ideas and information, and movements of money and credit.97 New Arabism 
certainly has a transnational component, for example, as the crossing of information over state 
boundaries, transnational satellite television broadcasts, has served to strengthen the imagined Arab 
community. Yet this description seems too weak to describe the political and cultural identity generated 
from this transnational activity. After all, the movement of money, credit and, indeed, broadcasting 
from the West to the Arab world has not made Arabs feel more Western, arguably the opposite. Whilst 
transnationalism might describe the process by which New Arabism is promoted, it does not 
sufficiently describe the identity.
An alternative definition, regionalism, has two meanings depending on context. Within the EU it refers 
to sub-state identities and polices, such as the Basque, Catalan, or Bavarian region. Whilst these regions 
might have national aspirations they are largely not considered nations within the bureaucratic language 
of the EU. The second meaning is more appropriate for its use in the case of New Arabism, and that is a 
supra-state regionalism such as Latin Americanism (Bolivarianism) or Australaisianism. This is 
sometimes, though wrongly, referred to as Continentalism as the region in question may not always 
encompass the whole of a continent. The inclusion of Portuguese-speaking Brazil within Latin 
Americanism, for example, is sometimes debated. With regard to Arabism being a regionalism we face 
the problem that it is clearly aimed at a linguistic community that does not necessarily occupy a single 
region. New Arabism is as much aimed and consumed by Arabs living in Europe, for example, as it is 
those living in the Arab world. Furthermore, not all inhabitants of the ‘Arab region’ are Arabs. Indeed, 
Kurds, Berbers and Armenians, who do not speak Arabic as their first language, are excluded by the
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linguistic and cultural definition of identity assumed by the New Arabism discourse. ‘Regionalism’, 
which has a geographical rather than a political or cultural focal point, is therefore not appropriate.
A final possibility, 'supra-nationalism', describes the increased transfer of power and decision making 
from state authorities to international or regional bodies.98 The most extensive example of this has 
occurred in the European Union prompting some scholars to identify a growing sense of ‘European’ 
identity. Consequently, ‘supra-nationalism’ has come to be used by some as the feeling of European 
identity as well as the formal integration of governing structures.99 Parallels between Arab identity and 
European identity have occasionally been made, especially from the growing technocratic generation of 
elites in the Arab world who see the future of Arabism to be some form of ‘Arab EU’.100 Is New 
Arabism therefore a supra-nationalism like the emerging Europeanism?101
On the one hand the European parallel is not a helpful way to describe New Arabism. On a practical 
level, supra-nationalism describes state behaviour in pooling sovereignty, something not widely seen in 
the Arab world -  only in regional bodies like the Gulf Cooperation Council, or the politically impotent 
Arab League. Moreover, in the formation of an identity-based supra-nationalist Europeanism, European 
states had established their own sense of nationalism before pooling their sovereignty and forming the 
EU. As Gerrard Delanty has shown, the idea of Europeanism came after the EU.102 The Arab world saw 
the reverse. As described above, the era of Old Arabism saw a sense of Arab identity establish itself in 
most cases before a sense of state nationalism. If the discourse of European supra-nationalism is one of 
separate peoples coming together due to their common interests in peace and prosperity, the discourse 
of Arabism is of one people artificially divided. Consequently perhaps, the Europeanist supra- 
nationalism is institution and bureaucrat-led and has not disseminated particularly well to the European 
masses.103 New Arabism, in contrast, is media-led but institutionally incredibly weak, yet well received 
at a mass level.
On the other hand, despite their different starting points, Arab and European supra-nationalism aspire to 
the same things. New Arabism, with its emphasis on preserving the state system whilst heightening a 
common Arab identity has the sense of commonality that Europeanists dream of. In contrast, many 
New Arabists like Bassam Tibi aspire to the kind of infrastructural supra-nationalism seen in the EU. 
Whilst no definition is therefore perfect, supra-nationalism seems to best describe the intent and
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aspiration of New Arabism. It does not seek to make the imagined community sovereign, and hence 
national, but it does promote a supra-national identity which binds the Arabic-speaking peoples of the 
various states together. Arabism has therefore evolved. Whilst Old Arabism was a failed nationalism, 
New Arabism is a complex and widely felt supra-nationalism.
1.1.4 Arabism in International Relations
What does this mean for international relations theory? As highlighted by Valbjom’s typology 
discussed earlier, the changing nature of Arabism has had a significant impact on inter-Arab relations 
and the identification here of New Arabism as a salient supra-nationalism distinct from Old Arabism’s 
failed nationalism could inform the debates amongst scholars of international relations. The primary 
debate discusses how foreign policy is formed in the Arab world and stems from ‘the cultural turn’ in 
international relations (IR) which saw identity, previously absent from IR theory, emerge as a key 
determinate of actors’ behaviour.104 Prior to this point ‘neo-realism’, which asserts that states’ foreign 
policies aim to maximise their advantages within a competitive, anarchic system, had dominated the 
discipline’s analysis of inter-Arab relations, most notably in Stephen Walt’s The Origins o f Alliances.105 
After the cultural turn, ‘constructivists’ began to challenge the realist paradigm, with Michael N. 
Barnett’s Dialogues in Arab Politics leading.
Walt argues that ideology and identity, notably Arabism, play a secondary role in determining Arab 
states’ foreign policies, specifically the alliances they form. He believes that Arab states pursue 
alliances primarily to balance against threats, irrespective of ideological compatibility, adapting 
Kenneth Waltz’ concept of alliances being formed to balance power alone.106 Thus he highlights that 
the majority of alliances formed by Arab countries between 1955-79, such as the Baghdad Pact in 1955 
or the informal Israel-Jordan alliance of 1970, were formed for reasons of balancing threats rather than 
power, and had little relation to ideological solidarity between the signatories.107 Walt goes on to argue 
that, contrary to some suggestions, the Arab world is therefore not exceptional and inter-Arab relations 
follows the same pattern as international relations elsewhere in the world. Though leaders may pay lip- 
service to identity and the ideology of Arabism, in reality they use it as a tool to further state goals and 
protect domestic legitimacy. Walt sees Arabism as an instrument of state power primarily used by 
stronger states, such as Nasser’s Egypt, to intimidate and harass weaker ones, such as Hussein’s Jordan,
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hence its tendency to produce conflict, not cooperation.108 Power then, not identity, determines inter- 
Arab relations.
Challenging this, Barnett argues that identity plays a key role in determining foreign policy as it shapes 
the conception of what state interests are. Inter-Arab politics, rather than a security-driven balance of 
threats system, was instead a competition of discourse over the norms of Arabism. Walt and other 
realists, he says, by focussing on the few occasions when Arab states used military means of influence, 
ignore how Arab states routinely used symbolic technologies to embarrass their opponents.109 Nasser 
was able to define the inter-Arab agenda of the day and rally people on the streets of Damascus and 
Amman through his deployment of the symbols of Arabism, not behind the barrel of a gun.110 The Arab 
leaders were constantly battling to define the norms of Arabism to justify their behaviour to both their 
own populations and to project their influence to the wider Arab world. Arabism thus acts as both a 
weapon in inter-Arab politics, such as Hafez Assad’s ability to rally support for ejecting Egypt from the 
Arab League after Camp David for violating these norms, and also a constraint, such as Hussein’s 
inability to sign a treaty with Israel in 1979 for fear of a similar fate.111 Barnett highlights that regime 
survival was the key motivation for pursuing this Arabism. Though he acknowledges that Arab leaders 
could well have believed in Arabism, leaders were judged by the populations according to how well 
they conducted, manipulated and adhered to the norms of Arabism. The murders of Anwar Sadat, Nuri 
Said and Abdullah I of Jordan were indicators of the possible costs of violating these sacred norms. 
Barnett concludes by highlighting that since 1991 there was a noticeable shift in Arab politics, with 
statism overshadowing Arabism in being the key identity determining foreign policy norms. In this 
sense, he says, the Arab states system was both made and unmade by Arab leaders.
There are weaknesses and strengths with both approaches which have been debated in greater detail 
elsewhere.112 A concern of this investigation is how locating today’s Arabism as a supra-nationalism 
will affect the dichotomy. Firstly, it highlights the need for both approaches to update their works to 
contemporary events. Barnett suggested Arabism’s relevance declined as state sovereignty became 
more legitimised from the 1970s and 80s and would continue to do so as key issues, such as the Israeli- 
Palestine conflict, were resolved, as seemed likely when his book was published in 1998.113 Indeed, as 
Barnett (with Telhami) stated as late on as 2002,
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‘The end of Arabism can be observed not only in the shift in discourse -  that is, the watering down of Arabism and the 
growing references to Islam and the state -  but also in a changing pattern in inter-Arab politics. Specifically, once Arab 
leaders no longer found it useful to compete over the symbols of Arabism (largely because these symbols had lost resonance 
with their populations), their interaction began to stabilize around sovereignty norms, and the regional state system began to 
resemble other regional systems.”114
However, as is hinted in Telhami and Barnett’s work, the growth of satellite media, whilst unlikely to 
revive suggestions of unitary schemes as state sovereignty is increasingly legitimised, has the potential 
to boost mutual identification and encourage renewed competition between states. Indeed, the survey of 
New Arabism described above suggests that this is exactly what is happening. Far from the conflict that 
once marked the region receding, as Barnett had predicted in 1998, war and violence have been 
plentiful in the past decade with the old Arab foes of Israel and the imperialist West, this time the US in 
Iraq, regaining their old mantle.115 In the same way that 1948 and 1967 helped bind Arabs together as 
incidents of shared suffering, the collective anger at wars in 2003, 2006 and 2008/09, facilitated by 
satellite television, seemed to enhance mutual Arab identification in shared outrage. Competition over 
the symbols of Arabism returned, though in a different format: this time through competing state- 
backed television channels. The fact that Saudi Arabia felt the need to launch Al-Arabiyya to combat 
Qatar’s A l-Jazeera to provide a more positive view of its framing of Arab-wide events suggests echoes 
of earlier competition for the norms of Arabism. Indeed, one could make an argument that, now that 
states are more legitimised and talk of union passed, the age of satellite television and New Arabism 
invites a new competition for the norms of this supra-nationalism which are, as yet, undefined.
In a different way, this thesis also contributes to the realism debate by challenging Walt’s assertion that 
Arabism is a tool used by strong states against weaker ones, by demonstrating that Arab identity is 
deliberately reproduced in the official discourses of two comparatively weak states, Syria and Jordan. 
The continued reproduction of Arab identity in Jordan is a particular challenge to Walt’s thesis given 
that promoting Arab identity in many ways goes against its security interests. As a key ally of the US 
and a signatory of a treaty with Israel, the Hashemite regime might be expected to down-play its Arab 
identity to legitimise its alliances.116 Yet this study shows that is not the case, suggesting that Barnett’s 
explanations of regime survival hold greater weight. Similarly, the identity discourse of Hafez and 
Bashar al-Assad questions aspects of Walt’s thesis. Secular Syria’s alliance with Islamist Iran, forged in 
1979, seems to complement Walt’s notion of a balance of threats, offering another example of an
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117alliance based on state interests rather than ideological compatibility. Similarly, Bashar al-Assad’s
strengthening of this alliance, and formation of a new friendship with non-Arab Turkey, against Arab 
regimes in Saudi Arabia and Egypt again supports the idea of state interests. However, an analysis of 
the Syrian identity discourse illustrates that Arabism, rather impractically, remains substantial. Indeed, 
these alliances with non-Arabs are framed as serving both Syrian and Arab interests. As shared enemies 
of Israel, Iran and, recently, Turkey, are portrayed as almost more Arab than those Arab regimes that 
support America. In reply Saudi Arabia has lamented Syria for being allied with ‘Persian’ Iran. As 
described by Barnett, the Arabist discourse is still therefore used to frame inter-Arab relations.
Any study of nationalism, and supra-nationalism, will benefit our understanding of identity in 
international relations and, whilst this thesis does not set out to make substantial contributions to this 
debate within IR theory, it can add depth and complexity to the continuing discussion.118 It contributes 
to constructivist accounts by illustrating how everyday reproduction serves to constitute national and 
supra-national identity. It similarly contributes to realist accounts by illustrating how everyday 
nationalism is used instrumentally by elites to further their regime and state interests.
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1.2 Arabism and State Nationalism: Syria and Jordan
If Arabism has evolved beyond nationalism into a supra-nationalism, where does that leave state 
identity in the Arab world? When Old Arabism failed in the 1960s, those who highlighted its decline 
such as Fouad Ajami predicted that state identities, long restricted by the Arab nationalist discourse 
would assert themselves.119 Certainly state leaders during this period made a concerted effort to 
construct a more distinctive identity around the modem state. However, recent surveys in the Arab 
world suggest that these attempts have met with only limited success. In one survey, compiled by 
Shibley Telhami in 2006, only 39% of respondents in 6 Arab states, including Jordan, considering the 
state to be their primary loyalty.120 On the other hand, as Hinnebusch highlights, the state does seem to 
have emerged as the most popular of the many potential primary loyalties in the Arab world, with the 
same survey suggesting only 33% saw Islamic and 28% saw Arab identity as more important. In this 
sense, he claims, it is quite remarkable that state identity has remained durable, “in the face of powerful 
supra-state identities having no parallels elsewhere.”121 A second theme of this thesis will be to examine 
the interaction between state and Arab identity in its two case studies: Syria and Jordan. A key 
hypothesis will be that one of the reasons why New Arabism has widely disseminated is that it 
complements the national discourse of Arab states which have constructed and promoted Arab identity 
over a sustained period. Rather than Arab nationalism, this discourse might be termed national Arabism 
which shares New Arabism’s acceptance and entrenchment of the state system. The national discourses 
of both Syria and Jordan employ, to differing extents, Arab and religious identity to construct a state 
loyalty.
One of the greatest problems for students of nationalism in the Arab World has been disentangling 
people’s complex multi-layered identities. Many have struggled to apply the various theories of 
nationalism to the Arab case because identifying which nation appears more difficult than in European 
examples. Syrians and Jordanians each have several identities, which could potentially develop into 
nationalism: tribe, region or city, religion, state and ethnicity.122 James Gelvin illustrated that the 
development of the ethnic tie, Arab identity, into nationalism in the 1920s and 30s was by no means 
inevitable, and took considerable effort from intellectual elites to promote.123 Moreover, the subsequent 
diminishing of Arab nationalism’s importance and its failure to unite the Arab world into a single 
nation-state did not guarantee the triumph of state identities. The collapse of Somalia, Lebanon and Iraq
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at different times along tribal, sectarian, religious and ethnic lines has illustrated that the creation of a 
state is not sufficient alone to bind citizens together in a collective identity. Indeed, many commentators 
and academics maintain that Arab states such as Syria and Jordan have failed to construct sufficient 
loyalty to the state and hence need to maintain a coercive dictatorial government to avoid a similar 
fate.124
Much of the difficulty in understanding the multi-layered identities in the Arab world is the attempt to 
project European norms onto the Middle East. On the one hand Fred Halliday is correct to play down 
notions of Arab exceptionalism explaining that European citizens also have multiple layers of 
identity.125 However, Hinnebusch is also correct to highlight that the power of supra-state identities, 
notably Arab and Islamic identities, is not paralleled in European cases because there are not the same 
powerful institutions promoting them: mosques and madrassas for Islam, external media such as
1 9 6Nasser’s Sawt al-Arab in the 1950s or pan-Arab satellite television stations such as al-Jazeera today. 
Given the strong institutions promoting these identities, it is not surprising that the 2006 poll found 
respondents fairly equally divided as to what was their primary identity. However, as Telhami and 
Barnett suggest, the very concept of a ‘primary identity’ is ill-suited to the Arab world. They propose a 
move away from the ‘either-or’ view of national identity accepting that such identities can be fluid and
1 9 9  19 8entangled in different ways. Identity is situational. It is perfectly feasible for someone to feel 
Syrian or Jordanian and Arab and Muslim at the same time and for the order of importance of these 
identities to change not just over the course of their lives, but on a day to day basis according to context.
A further difficulty is the word ‘nation’ in the Arab context. Confusingly, the Arabic word for ‘nation’ 
is debated. Arab nationalist theorist Sati al-Husri made a distinction between lqawmiyya\ translated by
19Qwesterners as meaning ‘nationalism’ and ‘wataniyya', translated as meaning state patriotism. <’al- 
qawmiyya al-Arabiyya’ is therefore seen as Arab nationalism, or Old Arabism, whilst the scholars label 
the shift to more state-focused loyalty in the 1970s as the era of wataniyya}30 However, the word 
‘watan ’ is not a translation of ‘state’, which is dawla, or country (balad) but means instead ‘homeland’. 
This distinction is crucial as it leaves the word ‘ wataniyya ’ open to interpretation. Indeed, many Syrians 
and Jordanians interviewed for this thesis regarded al-qawmiyya al-Arabiyya and al-wataniyya al- 
Arabiyya as the same thing. This inconsistency is seen in the rhetoric of Arab leaders who speak of the
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watan to sometimes mean their state, and at other times to mean the whole Arab world. Indeed, as
Telhami and Barnett have highlighted, the reality in most Arab states after the 1970s was a
contemporary debate not on a state-identity (wataniyya) versus Arab nationalism (qawmiyya) but on the
1^1meaning of a state that has a transnational identity and an Arab identity.
Yet to all intents and purposes, whatever the Arabic translation, most Arab states are now national 
communities. If Arabism is a supra-national imagined community then the states are national imagined 
communities. They are, after all, political, limited and sovereign. Whilst official discourses may contain 
stronger supra-national components than those of European states, these are still attempting to construct 
a national attachment to the specific territory and government of the state. This is certainly the case in 
this thesis’ two case studies, as shall be discussed. In the case of Jordan, this has been a long-term 
project stretching back to the defeat of 1967 and receiving new impetus in 1999.132 In Syria state 
identity-building has been a by-product of regime consolidation, though since 2000 this too has become 
more deliberate.133 Whilst aware of the disputes amongst Arabic-speakers on the correct word, this 
thesis argues that, in fact, watanniyya essentially now translates as state nationalism, whilst qawmiyya 
is specifically the Old Arabism that failed. There are numerous components to official identity 
discourses being constructed in Syria and Jordan. This thesis will demonstrate how, in both Syria and 
Jordan, the discourse combines both state nationalism and national Arabism: a supra-national tie that 
accepts and promotes the continuation of the Arab state system.
Closer scrutiny of the state and nation-building processes in Syria and Jordan illustrates how these 
states have become normalised, even if the regimes have not yet moved beyond coercive rule. To 
illustrate this, a brief discussion of why Syria and Jordan have been chosen as case studies is followed 
by an analysis of the state and identity-building made in each.
1.2.1 Syria and Jordan: Contrary Siblings
Why compare Syria and Jordan? In many ways an analysis of how nationalism and supra-nationalism 
interact in any two Arab states could serve to illustrate how it is that Arabism is recreated in daily 
discourse. Unnoticed symbols of Arabism are present throughout the Arab world. The recurrence of the 
colours of the Arab revolt -  red, white, black and green -  is present in most Arab flags, for example. 
Similarly the word ‘Arab’ appears in the official name of many Arab states, such as ‘the Syrian Arab
131 Telhami and Barnett, ‘Introduction’ in Telhami and Barnett, Identity and Foreign Policy, p. 14.
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Republic’ or ‘the Arab Republic of Egypt’. The Eagle of Saladin, an Arabist symbol prominent in the 
1940s and 50s, is the official emblem of Syria, Egypt, Libya, Palestine and Iraq. However, there are 
several reasons why Syria and Jordan make a particularly relevant comparison. On the one hand, there 
are superficial similarities to the states: their origins from the same Ottoman province; the familiar 
difficulties faced by ruling elites in trying to create identity and loyalty to an artificial state amongst 
heterogeneous peoples; and, more recently, the coming to power of young, modernising leaders. At the 
same time, the divergent paths these states took makes their differences equally pronounced: their 
systems of government, their international allies, their political ideology and their position in the 
international economic and political community. The similarities and differences between the two is 
what make the comparison relevant. On the one hand they faced the same tasks that most Arab state 
leaders did in having to build identity from scratch. On the other, they took very different routes and 
produced politically and economically very different creations on what was traditionally the same land. 
The fact that both ended up using similar methods to build this identity, and both found it necessary, 
convenient or practical to include a prominent layer of Arab identity helps to draw wider conclusions 
about identity building and reproductions, not just about Syria and Jordan, but the Arab world in 
general.
Superficially, Syria and Jordan have many similarities, firstly their close historical origins. Raymond 
Hinnebusch and Neil Quilliam describe Syria and Jordan as ‘contrary siblings’. They are ‘siblings’ on 
account of their territories being carved out of what was historically the same region by European 
empires, having shared the same language, religion and culture for centuries. At the same time they are 
‘contrary’ due to the distinct identities that ruling elites have attempted to create in each state.134 
Greater Syria, or bilad as-sham is the territory now covered by modem Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel 
and the Palestinian Territories that, until 1918, were all part of the Ottoman Empire. The majority of 
modem Syria (including the major cities Hama, Horns and Damascus) and all of modem Jordan were
135 *part of the same administrative unit within the Ottoman State: the vilayat of Damascus. According to
Hinnebusch, this Greater Syrian region could have supported a viable nation along the European 
model.136 However, as has been well documented, breaking wartime promises made to Arab leaders, the 
British and French divided the region into four mini-states leaving two very different mling elites in 
their new mandates of Jordan and Syria. On the one hand in Amman, the new Hashemite rulers 
benefitted from the colonial carve-up, inheriting a state with which they had no historical attachment. 
On the other hand in Damascus, the local rulers considered themselves the victims of imperialism,
134 Hinnebusch, Raymond, and Quilliam, Neil, ‘Contrary Siblings: Syria, Jordan and the Iraq War,’ Cambridge Review 
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being left with a rump state out of the historical Bilad as-Sham they sought.137 Though the states 
therefore had similar origins, the intentions of the differing ruling elites ensured that very different 
states were constructed.
A second similarity between Syria and Jordan was the nature of the state and identity-building task 
faced by the new rulers. Like all Arab states, barring perhaps Egypt, Oman and Morocco, the territories 
inherited by post-independence elites were colonial creations bearing little resemblance to known 
boundaries.138 Borders had been drawn in straight lines crossing former grazing lands and tribal regions. 
Consequently, the new inhabitants were a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-faith group with little 
attachment to the new states. Syria had a population consisting of Sunni, Shia, Druze and Alawi 
Muslims, Orthodox and Catholic Christians, Kurds, Armenians and Assyrians.139 Though Jordan was 
more homogeneous, with most of its population being Sunni Arab Muslims, it too inherited many 
Christians, Circassians and had other divisions between its urban, rural and Bedouin population.140 
Moreover, it soon faced a huge influx of refugees from Palestine after 1948, adding a new ethnic split 
between older Transjordanians and the newer refugees of Palestinian origin. The need to build a 
recognizable group identity amongst these disparate populations was thus a problem shared not just by 
Syrian and Jordanian rulers, but by those in Iraq trying to unite Shias, Sunnis and Kurds, in Lebanon 
trying to balance its combustible confessional mix and in North Africa trying to reconcile Arabs with 
Berbers.141
Despite these similarities, there are notable differences between the two states, which make them all the 
more relevant for comparison. Firstly, the structure and ideology of the two regimes. Whilst elites in 
both states struggled with political instability immediately after independence, the regimes that emerged 
from 1970 onwards in Damascus and Amman appeared diametrically opposed to each other. Hafez al- 
Assad, who seized power in Syria after a coup in November 1970, ruled for 30 years until his death in 
2000. Though certainly not allowing fair elections and arranging for his son to succeed him, Assad still 
maintained Syria as a secular Republic. His regime was founded on the socialism, anti-imperialism and 
Arab nationalism of the Ba’ath party, with Assad regularly portraying himself as the heir to Nasser. In 
contrast the regime established by King Hussein of Jordan was quite different. Inheriting power in
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1952, Hussein maintained Jordan as a monarchy, successfully passing on power to his son on his death 
in 1999. Though less conservative than many Gulf monarchies, Hashemite Hussein still drew 
legitimacy from religion, being a descendent of the Prophet Mohammad. He was a committed capitalist 
and anti-socialist and, though he flirted with alliances with Nasser during the 1960s, fundamentally 
opposed the unionist rhetoric of Old Arabism and the Ba’ath party and defended the rights of state 
sovereignty throughout his reign.142
These ideological differences closely relate to another major difference between the two states: their 
international relations and place in the political and economic international community. Though Assad 
enjoyed sporadic episodes of good relations with the United States in the 1970s and 1990s, for most of 
the Cold War Syria was a close ally of the Soviet Union.143 Having lost the Golan Heights to Israel in 
1967 when he was minister of defence, Assad allowed the Israel conflict to shape and dominate Syria’s 
foreign policy between 1970 and 2000 and it continues to do so today. Indeed, Syria’s continued anti- 
Israel rhetoric and its alliances with overtly anti-westem enemies of Israel such as Iran, Hezbollah and 
Hamas has led to a general distrust and vilification of Damascus in the western media and policy­
making community.144 Though Syria is now slowly opening up its economy to Western investment 
after years of failed socialism, it remains economically under-developed and largely outside of the US- 
dominated international economy. In contrast, Jordan remains a staunch ally of the United States and is 
fully integrated into the world economy. Hussein relied heavily on European and especially American 
financial and military support to stay in power. Though he too fought wars with Israel, the conflict was 
less ideological or personal for him, as seen by a willingness to give up claim to the occupied West 
Bank in 1988 and sign a peace treaty with Tel Aviv in 1994.145
One would expect these starkly different ideological regimes to produce starkly different identity 
discourses. However, closer examination shows many similarities whether intentional or not. Both 
regimes promote Arab identity. Hafez Assad was elaborate with his use of Ba’athist mantra to promote 
‘Arab unity’ whilst Hussein preferred a more nuanced ‘Hashemite Arabism’ which, whilst, “never 
precisely codified,”, proved a recurrent theme during his reign.146 Both, though, were national Arabists 
as the rhetoric primarily served the priorities of the state. Similarly, both leaders oversaw the 
development of state identity. After the loss of 1967 and expelling the PLO in 1970 Hussein began to
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more overtly promote a specifically Jordanian identity.147 Hafez, whilst still employing Arab nationalist 
and even pan-Syrian rhetoric, oversaw the gradual emergence of a Syrian national identity in a more 
nuanced fashion.148 Islam also played a role in both discourses. In Jordan, Hussein’s genealogy as a 
descendent of the Prophet was a cornerstone of his legitimacy, whilst in Syria the more secular Hafez 
used Muslim festivals and some Islamic symbolism to boost his religious credentials, even more so 
after defeating a challenge from political Islamists.149 Also, the methods used by both leaders were 
similar: both had a cult of the leader -  though Hafez’s was far more pronounced -  both shared space 
with their families, promoted ancient symbols and culture and strengthened state institutions like die 
media, education and the armed forces to do it. Both sought to build an identity discourse which could 
appeal to the majority of their disparate population whilst simultaneously inculcating loyalty to their 
rule.
Significantly, these discourses continued into the reigns of Hafez and Hussein’s sons: Syria and 
Jordan’s new rulers who grew up after the age of Old Arabism. Hussein died in 1999 to be succeeded 
by his son, King Abdullah II, whilst Hafez died the next year having arranged to be followed by his son, 
Bashar al-Assad. Both Abdullah and Bashar are of similar age, bom in 1962 and 1965 respectively and, 
unlike their fathers, came of age when their states were less challenged and more established.150 Though 
each has his own priorities and ideology, it is again remarkable how similar the new regimes prove on 
closer examination: both, for example, continue what Lisa Wedeen calls a ‘second generation’ 
leadership cult -  surprisingly Abdullah even more than Bashar.151 Similarly, both have struggled but 
eventually succeeded in stamping their own authority on the state. Finally, both draw heavily on the 
discourse established by their fathers. The succession of the sons has largely led to the continuation of 
the nationalist discourse and hence we see a continuation of state and identity-building efforts over a 
period of more than forty years. In the Arab world where coups, revolutions, civil wars and invasions 
have been commonplace, finding two states that have experienced prolonged stability to compare is 
difficult.
Syria and Jordan therefore prove a useful comparison for both their similarities and their differences. 
When considering how Arab identity is maintained across the Arab world it is helpful to consider two
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states which are ideologically and structurally diametrically opposed: one a traditionally socialist anti- 
western secular republic, the other a pro-West, capitalist Islamic monarchy. As this thesis proceeds to 
show how, despite these differing ideological views, the two states have dealt with the problem of 
identity construction using remarkably similar tools, methods and, ultimately, results, it proves useful to 
draw wider conclusions about Arab identity in the Arab world in general. Though one should be wary 
of drawing too broad conclusions from just two case studies, by showing a certain identity-formation 
process in ideologically different Syria and Jordan, it is not much of a stretch to suggest that one might 
find similar phenomena in other Arab states -  whatever the ideology and structure of the regime.
1.2.2 State building in Syria and Jordan
The 1970s, when both Hussein and Hafez consolidated their rule in Jordan and Syria, coincided with a 
broader reinforcement of the state in the wider Arab world. Funded by increased capital from the Gulf 
oil boom and prompted, at least partly, by the simultaneous discrediting of Old Arabism following 
1967, moves by rulers in Syria and Jordan to expand state infrastructure, bureaucracy, education and the
1 ^7armed forces was typical of a trend seen across the region. Following decades of uncertainty, as early 
as 19881. William Zartman heralded this perceived stability as, “not simply an artificial vision,” but a 
genuine reconcilement between the Arab world and the Westphalian state system.153 As discussed 
above, the smooth transitions of power from Hussein to Abdullah in Jordan and from Hafez to Bashar 
in Syria extended that stability into the present day, prompting more commentators to reflect that 
perhaps the state, seen for so long as artificial and uncertain, might be more entrenched than first 
thought.154 Yet what is the significance of this durability to the development of national identity? Are 
we to assume, as Brian Barry has suggested, that, “the sheer survival of the state over a long period of 
time tends to bring a sense of common nationality among those within its territory?”155 Are the Syrian 
and Jordanian states accepted by their populations? Are these states strong enough to survive without 
the coercive regimes that rule over them?
Ayubi has argued that the dictatorial nature of the Jordanian and Syrian regimes undermines any 
potential for the states to translate longevity into acceptance. He says,
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. .although most Arab states are ‘hard’ states, and indeed many of them are ‘fierce’ states, few of them are really ‘strong’ 
states. Although they have large bureaucracies, mighty armies and harsh prisons, they are lamentably feeble when it comes 
to collecting taxes, winning wars and forging a really ‘hegemonic’ power block that can carry the state beyond the coercive 
and ‘cooperative’ level and into the moral and intellectual sphere.”156
This view is questioned by Bernard Lewis who argues the very survival of the state shows its
1 S7strength. A more balanced approach is taken by Hinnebusch who considers the state-building 
measures of the 1970s/80s to have partly consolidated the Arab states. Contrary to Ayubi, who 
emphasises the inability of governments to win wars as one of their ‘weak’ characteristics, Hinnebusch 
argues that the ability for regimes to survive wars, defeats and internal crises shows how entrenched 
they are.158 Hafez Assad’s survival after defeats to Israel in 1973, in Lebanon in 1982 and the Muslim 
Brotherhood revolt in 1979-82, along with Hussein’s successful recovery from defeat in 1967, civil war 
in 1970 and civil unrest in 1988 shows a greater fortitude than their predecessors who were deposed or 
killed following similar crises. Yet at the same time, Hinnebusch steps back from Lewis’ certainty of 
the power of the state highlighting that the impact of globalisation in the late 1990s and 2000s, the 
information and communication revolution, could potentially undermine the coercive units established 
by the Arab state.159
Whilst Hinnebusch’s approach seems the more sensible, and indeed the breaking of the state’s 
information monopoly in the 1990s presents a challenge which will be discussed in this thesis, he shares 
Lewis and Ayubi’s habit of conflating the ‘state’ with the ‘regime’. 160 As Zartman wrote in 1988, 
“There is also a distinction to be made between regime and state. Governments and regimes are the 
groups of people who run the state at a given time.”161 In fact, most social scientists would further 
separate ‘regime’ and ‘government’: the former being the system of government, such as the 
authoritarian regimes of Syria and Jordan, whilst the latter is the collection of individuals running the 
administration of the day. Whilst Abdullah and Bashar have maintained the authoritarian ‘regimes’ 
established by their fathers, and might be seen as a continuation of ‘government’, the Syrian and 
Jordanian ‘states’ have outlived all of their rulers. Though Hinnebusch and Ayubi both refer at different 
times to the regimes and the state, it appears that their opinions on the strength, weakness or partial 
consolidation of the state are essentially directed at the governments. Obviously the close relationship
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between the state and government make any kind of separation challenging, but it is still needed. This 
thesis concerns the reproduction of and identification with the state, rather than an attachment to the 
authoritarian regime or the Hashemite or Ba’athist governments. It examines how Syrians and 
Jordanians are asked daily to accept the idea of being Syrian or Jordanian even though much of this 
asks them simultaneously to accept the rule of the Assads or the Hashemites. It is possible for the 
regime to remain coercive and the government illegitimate in the eyes of the population whilst the 
existence of the state can be accepted. Therefore, our analysis of identity and state building in Syria and 
Jordan should not be focused on how much the authoritarian regime and its government of the day has 
been carried, “beyond the coercive and ‘cooperative’ level and into the moral and intellectual sphere,” 
but how much an acceptance of a state identity permeates everyday life.
However, as Hinnebusch comments, it is one thing to materially consolidate the state, another to 
construct an identity around it.162 A second debate amongst scholars beyond the strength of the state is 
how deeply felt national identity actually is in the Arab world. Hinnebusch sees an incongruence 
between the relative material consolidation of the state and the shallowness of popular identification 
with it. He sees state identity as comparatively ‘thin’, something seemingly supported by the 35% who 
identified primarily with their state in the 2006 Telhami poll. Moshe Mo’az who argued that the 1982 
Hama Muslim Brotherhood revolt in Syria illustrated that no cohesive national community had been 
built supports this notion.163 However, both Hinnebusch and Mo’az seem to rely on the ‘either/or’ 
approach that Telhami and Barnett convincingly suggest is inappropriate for national identity in the 
Arab world.164 The interviews conducted for this thesis, discussed in chapter six, suggest that whilst a 
majority of respondents may not feel loyalty to their state identity first, most do still identify with the 
state in some capacity.165 The Muslim Brotherhood rebels may therefore have felt more Muslim than 
Syrian, but it is likely that they felt Syrian as well. Similarly, even if some Syrians or Jordanians have 
only a ‘thin’ identification with the state, it is identification nevertheless.166 As Sivan has stated, the 
unwillingness of any Kuwaitis to cooperate with Saddam’s Iraq following invasion in 1990 shows that 
artificial states can still generate loyalty.167 It is hard to imagine contemporary Syrians or Jordanians not 
taking an equally defensive and nationalist stance were one to invade the other today. Therefore just
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because the regime that controls the state is weak and coercive, that does not mean one should dismiss 
the strength of state identity amongst Syrians and Jordanians. If we accept that identities in the Middle 
East are multi-layered, the successful dissemination of a state identity as one of these layers deserves 
closer investigation.
1.2.3 Nation building in Syria and Jordan
Having argued that Old Arabism failed, that new Arabism is a supra-nationalism rather than 
nationalism, and that the existence of the state has become normalised in Syria and Jordan, it would 
seem logical to conclude that a specific state-based Syrian and Jordanian nationalism has consequently 
emerged. A quick discussion of the various theories concerning nation building demonstrates that the 
conditions have existed for the top-down post-colonial construction of a national identity in Syria and 
Jordan, similar to the process seen in 19th century France, described by Eugene Weber in Peasants into 
Frenchmen
Theorists are divided into two paradigms on the ability of governments to construct national identity: 
ethno-symbolists and modernists. For ethno-symbolists such as Anthony Smith, the persistent 
importance to people of earlier myths, symbols, values and memories that pre-date the creation of the 
state undermine attempts to create an identity around an artificial entity like Syria or Jordan.169 At first 
glance, the results of the 2006 Telhami survey makes Smith’s hypothesis sound convincing. The survey 
shows supra-state ties of Islam and Arab identity were still widely felt as primary identities, suggesting 
older identities couldn’t be displaced by state and identity-building efforts. However, as discussed by 
James Gelvin, Arab identity was actually not primordial but itself constructed by elites in the 19th 
century. The continued presence of Islamic and Arab identity actually partly reflects the official state 
discourse which promotes and reproduces those ties. Alternatively, the perceived persistence of tribal 
identities might also support Smith’s theory. However, as Sadowski and Batatu have shown in Syria 
and Layne in Jordan, tribal ties are gradually eroding with the increased urbanisation of both states, and 
is retained only by a rural minority.170 Furthermore, in the case of Jordan, the official discourse actually 
promotes tribalism, which would counter suggestions of its resistance to integration. As with Weber’s 
Frenchmen, what is seen in Jordan and Syria is an identity discourse emanating from the core of the 
major cities and extending its reach in the 1970s and 80s. The few instances of the identity not
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169 Anthony D. Smith, ‘Opening statement: nations and their pasts’, Nations and nationalism 2:3 (1996), pp. 358-65.
170 Linda L. Layne, Home and Homeland: the dialogics o f tribal and national identities in Jordan (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), p. 10; Sadowski, ‘Political Identity in Syria,’ p. 144; Hanna Batatu, Syria's Peasantry, the 
descendents o f its lesser rural notables, and their politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 217.
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disseminating seem to be on the periphery, such as the rural desert regions. Yet this serves to further 
doubt the ethno-symbolists as it is the absence of the state rather than the strength of older identities 
which is obstructing their integration.
There are, however, some instances where non-state identities remain strong, notably the Kurds in Syria 
and some Palestinians in Jordan. Yet these groups have rejected the discourse for reasons other than the 
ethnic persistence of their identity. For Kurds, there has been no attempt to absorb them into the Syrian 
discourse. They have been deliberately discriminated against as non-Arab and, as non-Arab speakers, 
excluded from the discourse. For some of Jordan’s Palestinians, a powerful Palestinian discourse 
remains in refugee camps, schools and the media that at times counters the Jordanian.171 Yet these 
discourses themselves are modem creations -  often reactions against homogenisation attempts rather 
than existing beforehand. The pre-modem ethno-symbolist explanation of nation-building failure is 
therefore unconvincing in Jordan and Syria.
In contrast, modernists such as Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm have argued convincingly that
all nations are in fact, ‘imagined’ or ‘invented’ and, whilst some may need more imagining than others,
110it is certainly possible for primordial ties to be outstripped by newly ‘ invented’ ties to the nation. The
modernist approach is more complex than the ethno-symbolist. Whilst all agree that nationalism is a 
modem phenomenon, and most share Ernst Gellner’s assertion that it is the ruling and intellectual elites 
who promote a proto-national identity into a fully fledged mass nationalism, theorists are divided on 
how this promotion takes place. The choice of ambiguous words such as ‘imagined’, ‘invented’ or 
‘reconstituted’ is deliberate: few suggest that nations are simply ‘created’.173 Motyl suggests both 
‘invention’ (Hobsbawm) and ‘imagination’ (Anderson) presupposes the existence of pre-existing 
building blocs -  we cannot create ex nilhio.114 Similarly Naim and Miller suggest that a nation’s present 
is constrained by its past, that things are handed down, not started from scratch. Breuilly similarly states 
that the ability for a state to change identity is limited by pre-existing beliefs.175 In contrast Hechter 
argues that states actively promote new traditions such as national anthems, flags and monuments that, 
whilst seeming ancient, are in fact recent creations.176
171 See Chapter 3.
172 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 6; Eric Hosbawm, ‘Introduction: Inventing traditions,’ in Eric Hobsbawm and 
Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention o f Tradition (Cambridge: CUP, 1992), p. 1.
173 Ozkirimli, Contemporary Debates, p. 45.
174 Alexander J. Motyl, Revolutions, Nations, Empires: conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 70.
175 Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, p. 277.
176 Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism (Oxford: OUP, 2000), p. 64.
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The Syrian and Jordanian experience of identity building, certainly since 1970, in different ways 
support both Naim and Hechter’s assertions. They were restricted by the past which, as Ozkirimli 
states, they could not simply make up.177 Yet at the same time, they inherited completely new states 
with no history as an integral unit. On the one hand, this precipitated the creation of new symbols, 
rituals, flags and anthems as Hechter suggests. Yet at the same time, as shall be discussed in chapter 3, 
many of these symbols drew on interpretations of the pre-modem past. In this sense they share with 
European nationalists who Tamir states cling, “even to the faintest evidence of historical continuity.. .in 
order to prove their antiquity and assert that the emergence of their nation was a matter of historical
1 78necessity.” As shall be discussed, many of these pre-modem symbols are used to promote supra­
national Arabism, yet almost always in the service of the state: national Arabism.
This thesis will suggest that both Syria and Jordan are carving out increasingly distinctive state 
identities and disseminating them to their populations. In Jordan this has been a deliberate exercise, 
whilst in Syria it has been the by-product of state consolidation. Yet the discourse built is deliberately 
ambiguous and multi-faceted involving state, Arab and, at times, religious identity.
1.2.4 Arabism in Syria and Jordan
If the era of Old Arabism is long gone, and the populations of various Arab countries, Syria and Jordan 
included, have increasingly come to except a nationalism based around the state, a key question is why 
do these governments deliberately reproduce a layer of Arab identity? It would seem illogical for any 
state to maintain a layer of group identity, Arabism, which does not correspond to its own borders and 
territory. It is all very well to highlight that the Arabism now pursued serves the national interest, but 
why not discard Arabism altogether and pursue a solely national agenda? An ethno-symbolist might 
argue that Arab ethnicity has pre-modem roots and hence any national government is forced to include 
it in its identity discourse to maintain legitimacy. However, as previously discussed, being Arab is just 
as modem a creation as being Syrian, Jordanian or Palestinian.179 Of course, just because it is a modem 
creation does not mean it can simply be ‘un-imagined’ when it is politically convenient. Such a process 
would take years of shifting the discourse a certain way and would have to contend with counter- 
discourses. In the era of transnational Arab satellite television channels described above, it would be 
difficult for any Arab leaders to ‘de-Arabise’ their populace. There is a pragmatic dimension to the 
continuance of Arabism: it is difficult to put the genie back in the bottle.
177 Ozkirimli, Contemporary Debates, p. 45.
178 Ibid., p. 20
179 Gelvin, Divided Loyalties, pp. 225-259.
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That said, it is clear from the analysis of Syria and Jordan’s identity discourses that follow, there is no 
visible desire to change the discourse away from supra-national Arabism, even if national identity is 
given increasing prominence. It is reasonable to suggest that the governments themselves might 
genuinely feel themselves as Arab. After all, they have all grown up consuming their own national 
discourses and it would be too cynical to suggest that they deliberately use an identity to which they 
feel no attachment. However, as Michael Barnett suggests, though one should allow for the possibility 
that Arabism is genuinely felt, it cannot be ignored that an engagement with Arabism can serve to 
legitimize a regime.180
An instrumental use of Arabism to legitimize the regime is seen in both Syria and Jordan that, as 
autocratic governments, must seek legitimacy from places other than the ballot box.181 Lisa Wedeen 
states that the Syrian regime established by Hafez, and continued by Bashar, bases its legitimacy on the 
belief that it provides both protection from Israel (and its allies in Washington), and stability from the 
chaos seen in Syria’s neighbours and in Syria itself prior to 1970.182 These two benefits are used to 
justify the unpopular features of the regime: the continuation of emergency rule, the harsh security 
services, lack of democracy, and lengthy military service.183 For example, the regular crackdowns on 
members of the opposition are usually justified by their supposed links to either supporting the foreign 
enemy, or promoting instability.184 As Bashar himself said in an interview for Al-Sharq al Awsat in 
2001:
“When the consequences of an action affect the stability of the homeland, there are two possibilities. Either the perpetrator is 
a foreign agent acting on behalf of an outside power, or else he is a simple person acting unintentionally. But in both cases a 
service is being done to the country’s enemies and consequently both are dealt with in a similar fashion.”185
In other words, repression can be justified in the name of stability and defence. In this regard, the 
instability witnessed elsewhere in the region in recent years actually serves to boost the official 
narrative: civil wars and sectarianism in Lebanon and Iraq serve to highlight the stability of Syria, 
whilst Israel’s invasions of the West Bank (2002), Lebanon (2006) and Gaza (2008/9) emphasize the 
threat from Tel Aviv. This is when Arabism is valuable to the regime. Though none of these conflicts 
actually occurred on Syrian soil nor cost Syrian lives, if Syrians feel an affinity to Palestinians, 
Lebanese and Iraqis when they are attacked by the enemy, it makes the sense of threat and fear far
180 Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics, p. 11.
181 Eyal Zisser, Assad’s legacy: Syria in Transition (London: Hurst & Co., 2001), p. 22.
182 Wedeen, Ambiguities, p. 7.
183 Carsten Wieland, Syria at Bey: Secularism, Islamism, and "Pax Americana’’ (London: Hurst & Co., 2005), pp. 22- 
26.
184 Alan George, Syria: Neither bread nor freedom (London: Zed, 2003), p. 61.
185 Ibid., p. 49.
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greater than if there is no sense of solidarity. The same goes for instability. The regime is keen to 
highlight how unstable post-Saddam Iraq and sectarian Lebanon are, both of which have similar ethnic 
mixes to Syria. This message clearly has more resonance if Syrians identify with Iraqis and Lebanese, 
and can see their own communities in the blood-lined streets of Baghdad and Beirut.
The Jordanian regime also finds it useful to promote Arab identity, though framed slightly differently 
from Syria. Jordan, with its peace treaty with Israel and alliance with the US clearly does not find it 
valuable to emphasize shared suffering between its citizens and those of Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon. 
When it does react to such events, which it invariably has to, the emphasis is similarly on the instability 
factor, rather than the enemy involved, which is the Hashemite’s friend. Whilst in Syria autocracy is 
justified by external factors, in Jordan repression is judged on a scale of comparison with other Arab 
states. Jordan promotes itself as less oppressive than other Arab regimes. As one human rights activists 
states, the regular excuse is, “...we have a heavy-handed, security-orientated political system that is 
both non-democratic and anti-democratic at the same time but, well, it’s less bloody that Syria or 
Iraq.”186 This narrative is far easier to justify if the Jordanian population identify and compete primarily 
with Arab states, all of which are dictatorial or greatly unstable. Jordanians are not encouraged to look 
at democratic Israel or Turkey as alternative forms of government, but instead to authoritarian Egypt, 
Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, against which their lot does not seem so bad.
However, just because there are instrumental and practical reasons why Arab regimes continue to 
sustain and reproduce Arab identity long after the age of Old Arabism, it should not be assumed that 
this is totally disingenuous. Sustaining a layer of Arab identity may serve to support authoritarian 
government in this case, but the two are not contingent. Many non-Arab dictatorships exist which find 
other means to justify and legitimise their rule. Similarly, were Syria and Jordan to transform into 
pluralist democracies tomorrow, it is unlikely Arab identity would suddenly ebb away. Syrian and
1 87Jordanian opposition figures regularly included Arab terminology in their statements. When Saddam 
fell in Iraq there was uproar from Iraqis when the new administration attempted to change the Iraqi flag 
away from the traditional Arab colours of red, black, green and white.188 Supra-national Arab identity 
seems to have been reproduced for so long that it is now embedded as a pillar of national identity. It 
seems sustained in a cycle that may seem illogical to the Western world, but is habitually refreshed and 
unquestioned in the Arab world. Sustaining Arab identity benefits the regimes too much for them to 
actively seek to ‘de-Arabise’ the discourse. At the same time, it has reached such self-sustainability that 
it is debatable whether any leader would be able to do so.
186 George, Jordan, p. 61.
187 George, Syria, p. 53; Assaf David, ‘The revolt of Jordan’s military Veterans,’ Foreign Policy, 16 June 2010.
188 ‘Burning with anger: Iraqis infuriated by new flag that was designed in London,’ The Independent, 28 April 2004.
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1.3 Everyday Arabism: Theory and Methodology
The reproduction of identity in an everyday manner is a relatively new scholarly approach to the study 
of nationalism and one that has not yet been applied to the Arab world nor, specifically, Syria and 
Jordan. The Arab world in general has been neglected by theorists of nationalism and, in turn, many
1 RQscholars of nationalism and identity in the Middle East have limited their use of theory. As seen 
above, this study employs some key theories of nationalism such as the works of Smith, Hobsbawm, 
Anderson and Breuilly. However, the principal theoretical contribution will be specifically in the area 
of everyday nationalism, focussing on Michael Billig’s notion of Banal nationalism. This thesis’ will 
adapt and critique Billig before applying it to the case of Syria and Jordan to suggest that the resonance 
of Arabism alongside wataniyya state nationalism is the result of a daily reproduction of identity in the 
nationalist discourse populations interact with.
1.3.1 Nationalism as discourse
What is meant by the ‘discourse of nationalism’? Umut Ozkirmili provides a useful typology and 
definition.190 He argues that nationalism can be distinguished from other political and non-nationalist 
discourses because of the presence of the combination of four overlapping dimensions: the spatial, the 
temporal, the symbolic and the everyday. The spatial dimension is the linking of territory to the nation 
and is what distinguishes the modem nation-state from older forms of collective social life and 
governance. The temporal dimension links the nation with the past and projects a collective future. The 
symbolic, “provides an alphabet for a collective consciousness or national subjectivity,” through its use 
of symbols, icons and invented traditions.191 The everyday dimension links everyday behaviour to an 
unnoticed reproduction of the nation. A difficult issue in Syria and Jordan is that populations essentially 
interact with three discourses that overlap, the wataniyya of the official state discourse, the New 
Arabism of satellite television, and that of their religion. Each of these has a spatial, temporal, symbolic 
and everyday component. Syrians and Jordanians are fully aware of both the spatial territory of their 
countries and the states that make up the Arab world. They similarly have a very defined temporal 
concept of their state and Arab identities: the former created by the colonial powers, celebrated annually 
on independence days, the latter promoted as primordial. As chapter three will show, the symbolism of 
both regimes draws on wataniyya, Arabism and religion at times, and even in everyday practices, such 
as watching television, these identities are reproduced. However, under the careful preparation of the 
Syrian and Jordanian regimes, these discourses do more than overlap: they are synonymous. Though the
189 Jankowski and Gershoni, Rethinking Nationalism, p. xiii.
190 Ozkirimli, Contemporary Debates, pp. 179-194.
191 Ibid., p. 190.
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emphasis differs between Syria and Jordan, both official discourses contain a wataniyya and an Arabist 
discourse at the same time, and often an Islamic dimension as well.
Of particular interest to this thesis is how these identities interact and disseminate in the latter two of 
Ozkirmili’s dimensions: the symbolic and the everyday. When considering post-colonial states such as 
Syria and Jordan, the temporal and spatial elements of the discourse are effectively fixed. This is not to 
say that the temporal and spatial are unimportant, but they will be discussed in the context of their 
appearance in the symbolic and everyday dimensions of the discourse rather than separately. The 
symbolic and the everyday dimension of a nationalist discourse is what Michael Billig has called the 
‘waved’ and ‘unwaved’ national flag.192 In his 1995 book, Banal Nationalism Billig sees the 
reproduction of nations in the West taking two forms: conscious, overt flag waving such as 4th July 
Parades in the USA, and banal, un-waved flags that hang unnoticed in petrol stations and outside 
houses. It is the noticed and unnoticed ‘flagging’ of Arab and state identity in Syria and Jordan that 
form the central investigation of this study.
Michael Billig stretches the term ‘nationalism’ to cover the ideological means by which nation-states 
are reproduced. He devises the term ‘banal nationalism’, “to cover the ideological habits which enable 
the established nations of the West to be reproduced,” suggesting that, “daily, the nation is indicated, or 
‘flagged’ in the lives of its citizenry.”193 He sees the institutions of the state as essential in this 
‘flagging’ and particularly focuses on the print media: conducting a discourse and content analysis of 
British newspapers to show how they reproduce the nation daily. Chapter two will give a greater 
theoretical explanation for the use and necessary adaptation of Billig’s theory and methodology in this 
study, but broadly speaking this thesis will address four aspects of his analysis. Firstly, Billig’s 
emphasis on only national rather than other group identities being banally reproduced will be 
considered. Secondly, his narrow focus on what he terms the Western ‘established’ nations will be 
challenged. Thirdly, Billig’s linking of banal nationalism to democratic political systems will be 
discussed, as will his related rejection of the role of ‘hot’ nationalism in reproducing the nation 
alongside the ‘banal’.
Finally, as important as theoretically adapting and challenging Billig will be altering his methodology. 
This thesis moves beyond Billig’s subject for analysis in several ways. Firstly, it stretches Billig’s focus 
on the institution of the media to look instead at public mediations in general. Whilst Banal Nationalism 
looked at the print media in Britain, this investigation finds that national television is more accessible in
192 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 40.
193 Ibid., p. 6.
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the semi-literate societies of the Arab world. Secondly, it includes a discussion of the more ‘overt’ or 
‘hot’ mediation of the imagery of leaders’ cults and the political speeches they make, suggesting that 
for the majority of Syrians and Jordanians, these symbols flag their identities in as banal and unnoticed 
a manner as the un-waved stars and stripes in America. Thirdly, due to the unique popularity of 
transnational media in the Arab world, this study widens Billig’s net to include a discourse and content 
analysis of satellite television, a potential rival to the government controlled mediations discussed 
above. Finally, in a complete departure from Billig, this investigations tests the effectiveness of these 
mediations in flagging and reproducing identities by conducting ethnographic interviews with 
‘everyday’ Syrians and Jordanians, challenging Billig’s assumption that what is in the media is 
unquestioningly absorbed by its audience.
1.3.2 Methodology and Case Studies
Methodology
This thesis proposes that the variety of discourse analysis developed by Michael Billig is the most 
appropriate methodology for explaining the place of Arabism in contemporary Jordan and Syria. It also 
suggests that ethnographic interviewing can be added to this methodology to provide a fuller picture of 
how well identity is disseminated. ‘Identity’ in the Middle East is not a subject easily investigated and 
there have been different methodological approaches, some of which have already been mentioned. 
Recent studies of Arab identity have included quantitative surveys (Telhami 1999, Pintak 2009), 
ethnography (Raban 1979, Yamani 2000), historical (Walt 1987, Barnett 1998), anecdotal (Kassir2006, 
Maalouf 1996), and content analysis (Rinnawi 2006, Lynch 2006).194 All methods have their value and 
each investigation contributes to a valuable body of work on the issue of Arab identity. However, the 
combined discourse and content analysis and ethnographic approach of this thesis is the most 
appropriate methodology with which to assess everyday nationalism and addresses some of the issues 
left unanswered by previous authors on the subject.
Writers such as Lawrence Pintak and Shibley Telhami who approach Arab identity from a quantitative 
perspective provide valuable statistics for broad claims about identity in the Middle East.195 The 
surveys they conduct, which ask sizeable samples in different Arab states how they feel about certain 
identities and issues offer an interesting over-view for investigations into Arabism. However,
194 For titles thus far un-cited in this work see Jonathan Raban, Arabia through the looking glass (London: William 
Collins 1979); Mai Yamani, Changed Identities: The Challenge i f  the New Generation in Saudi Arabia (London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 2000); Samir Kassir, Being Arab (London: Verso, 2006); Amin Maalouf, In the Name 
o f Identity (New York: Arcade, 2001 [1996]).
195 Shibley Telhami conducts a survey every year with Zogby International entitled ‘Arab Public Opinion Poll’. For 2010 
edition see (http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2010/0805 arab opinion poll telhami.aspx - accessed 13/8/10).
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investigators of nationalism, such as this thesis, are rightly sceptical of the ability for survey data to 
explain the complexity of identity. Telhami’s polls, for example, ask respondents each year to list their 
identities as ‘Arab’, ‘Muslim’ or ‘State’ - a question repeated in the interviews of this thesis, discussed 
in chapter six. However, unlike in this study, by not following up this question with qualitative 
interviewing Telhami is unable to convey the situational nature of identity and its ability to change 
according to circumstances. Not surprisingly, Telhami’s surveys have shown great diversity in the past 
decade, with the role o f‘Arab’, ‘Muslim’ and ‘State’ identities varying in priority from year to year.196 
Without qualitative methodology it is difficult to explain why it is that a certain identity remains 
persistent or, conversely, diminishes in importance.
The use of qualitative research has been more broadly used when discussing identity, though few have 
focused on everyday discourses. Samir Kassir’s discussion on Being Arab is an insightful investigation 
but seems designed to make a political case that is largely anecdotal and lacks either theoretical or 
methodological rigour. Those qualitative works that have discussed Arab identity in conjunction with 
theory, albeit limited, have tended to focus on a form of content analysis. Marc Lynch’s New Arab 
Public and Khalil Rinnawi’s Instant Nationalism, both commendably combine qualitative interviews 
with content analysis of Al-Jazeera, which they regard as the lynchpin of New Arabism. This thesis 
builds upon a similar methodological approach but suggests that Lynch and Rinnawi both limit the 
scope of the content they analyse. Lynch focuses specifically on one issue, Iraq, and the Arab media’s 
coverage of it to illustrate his ‘new Arab public’.197 Similarly, Rinnawi looks at Al-Jazeera's content 
before and after 9/11.198 Both focus on occasions that are highly politically charged and, not 
surprisingly, suggest Al-Jazeera draws on Arab solidarity in these moments. Yet by failing to consider 
Al-Jazeera’s discourse at less urgent times, what Billig calls the ‘in-between times’, not just in terms of 
news stories but in non-political items such as the weather or sport, they show only that Arab identity is 
used at times of crisis, not how it is reproduced daily. Similarly, by looking only at news channels they 
fail to consider the impact of far more popular apolitical content such as drama serials and reality TV. 
Furthermore, by excluding the discourse of state media from their analysis they only get half of the
196 When asked, ‘which is your most important identity?’ those saying ‘Arab’ were 14% in 2004, 20% in 2006, 20% in 
2008 and 25% in 2010; those saying ‘State’ were 41% in 2004,29% in 2006,39% in 2008 and 32% in 2010; those 
saying ‘Muslim’ were 24% in 2004,45% in 2006, 36% in 2008 and 39% in 2010. The results are shown to fluctuate 
considerably each year suggesting how situational and unfixed the multiple layers of identity are. Interestingly each 
year when asked ‘What is your most important secondary identity?’ ‘Arab’ proved most popular. For 2004 and 2006 
results see Shibley Telhami, ‘2006 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey,’ Brookings Institute 
(http://www.brookings.edu/views/speeches/telhami20070208.pdf - accessed 13/8/10), For 2008 and 2010 results see 
Shibley Telhami, ‘2010 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey,’ Brookings Institute 
/http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2010/0805 arab opinion poll telhami.aspx - accessed 13/8/10).
197 Lynch, New Arab public, pp. 9-11.
198 Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism, p. 108.
58
picture.199 Indeed, it is this limited methodological approach that results in authors such as Rinnawi 
falsely asserting that Arab media and its New Arabism is a challenge to the identity discourses of Arab 
states.200 If they were to analyse both discourses, the states and the pan-Arab media, as this study does, 
it would be seen that actually the two are complementary, with Arabism deliberately reproduced but 
clearly a subordinate supra-nationalism to state nationalism.
Finally, this study proposes that, in addition to discourse analysis, whilst lacking in scientific rigour, 
ethnographic interviews help to add flavour and depth to any explanation of how identity is reproduced 
daily. As John Breuilly comments, it is very difficult to assess how successful attempts at nation 
building are 201 Consequently, most theorists bypass this issue and tend to look at public displays of 
national sentiment, usually in extreme circumstances. The proliferation of public demonstrations such 
as riots, marches or protests have been employed by historians to assess national sentiment. Similarly, 
the collapse of states after wars, conflict or invasion is used to illustrate its absence. No such method 
seems appropriate to gauge nationalist sentiment in the everyday since these incidents are, by definition, 
abnormal. A more appropriate method, rarely employed by theorists, is to interview citizens about their 
everyday attitudes. Whilst quantitative surveying would provide more detailed data and produce a more 
verifiable sample, as discussed, much is lost in the inability for respondents to explain their answers. 
Ethnographic interviewing, in contrast, whilst offering a smaller sample, provides the explanation 
necessary. Some excellent work on identity in the Middle East has an ethnographic dimension, such as 
Mai Yamani’s work on identity in Saudi Arabia, or Alex Klaushofer’s investigation of sectarianism in 
Lebanon.202 Sadly much ethnographic work, though detailed, lacks empirical and theoretical depth. This 
thesis aims to avoid this by combining ethnographic detail with nationalism theory and a thorough 
empirical discourse analysis.
Case Studies
This investigation will use case studies to demonstrate how public mediations promote and reproduce 
this multi-layered identity. Choosing which sample to analyse is challenging. Why, for example, should 
only Arab and State identities be considered rather than the other layers discussed above: tribe, city,
199 Rinnawi conducts an experiment in which he records 8 newscasts on three different channels, Al-Jazeera, Jordan TV 
and CAW from 15 July 2001 to 8 October 2001 - either side of 9/11. He compares the pan-Arab content of Al-Jazeera 
and Jordan TV demonstrating that whist 67% of Al-Jazeera’s content is pan-Arab, only 24% of Jordan’s is, whilst 57% 
of its news items are locally focussed. From this he concludes that Al-Jazeera is undermining the discourse of the 
Jordan state by providing an alternative pan-Arab lens. As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, Rinnawi mistakes content for 
discourse. Whilst Al-Jazeera may be more pan-Arab than Jordan TV that does not make Jordan TV ‘un-Arab’. In fact 
the special section given to ‘Arab news’ after ‘Jordan news’ suggests that al-Jazeera’s message is not so radically 
different. See Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism, pp. 108-125.
200 Ibid., p. 13.
201 Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, pp. 277.
202 Yamani, Changed Identities', Alex Klaushofer, Paradise Divided: A Portrait o f Lebanon (London: Signal, 2007).
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family and, most obviously, religion? Similarly why choose leadership cults, leaders speeches and 
television as public mediations rather than newspapers, the radio or popular culture? Why choose 
mediations at all rather than other wide-ranging state institutions such as the education system or the 
army? Furthermore, why focus on the pan-Arab transnational satellite television as a challenger to the 
official discourse? Why not other mediations that undermine the official discourse like international 
Islamist cassette tapes, or Kurdish (in Syria) and Palestinian (in Jordan) newspapers?
Focussing on Arab and State identities rather than the other tribal, city, family and religious layers of 
identity in Syria and Jordan stems from this being a study of nationalism in the Middle East. Though 
tribal, city and family identities are important and strongly felt they are not even proto-national 
identities. Using Ozkirmili’s discourse typology, whilst they might contain aspects of spatial, temporal, 
symbolic and everyday dimensions, none employ all four combined. Similarly, though religion is a very 
strongly felt identity in the Arab world, can it be considered nationalism? Whilst this is a discussion that 
has aroused much debate amongst scholars, notably the potential of Islam to offer a rival to the nation, 
religion too fails to conform to Ozkirmili’s typology. The two dominant religions in the Arab world, 
Islam and Christianity are both proselytising faiths meaning that the spatial dimension of their discourse 
is theoretically continually open to fluctuation. Whilst they do contain a temporal, symbolic and 
everyday dimension, the ambiguity of fixed territory distinguishes these religious faiths from nations. 
Indeed, the fact that in Syria and Jordan, several faiths share the same territory emphasises this 
incongruity between religion and territory. Admittedly, in recent years Islamists have been more vocal 
about the concept of a core ‘Islamic’ territory, such as Osama Bin Laden’s assertion that the Arabian 
peninsula should not house non-Muslims.203 However, rather than this representing Islam’s shift from a 
religion into a nationalism, it instead suggests certain groups using Islam to assert nationalist goals. The 
importance of territory to Islamists such as Hezbollah and Hamas suggests these groups are nationalists 
not religious universalists.204 Whilst some Islamists have challenged both wataniyya and Arabism in the 
past, they have either been rhetorically universalists and hence not nationalists, or rhetorically state- 
focused and hence simply favouring religious wataniyya. Whilst Islam informs the discourse in Syria 
and Jordan it is not, therefore, nationalism. Arabism and wataniyya therefore represent the only two 
potential national discourses in Syria and Jordan and thus an analysis of nationalism in these countries 
should focus primarily on these two discourses.205 Indeed, the analysis of these discourse will help to 
demonstrate that Arabism is no longer a nationalism but a supra-nationalism.
203 Rogan, The Arabs, p. 448.
204 Frederick Barth, ‘Are Islamists nationalists or internationalists?’ in Kjell Goldmann et al (eds.), Nationalism and 
Internationalism in the Post-Cold War Era, (London: Routledge, 2000); Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: the changing 
face o f terrorism (London: IB Tauris, 2005), pp. 48-52; Sami Zubaida, ‘Islam and nationalism: continuities and 
contradictions’, Nations and nationalism 10:4 (2004), pp. 407-420.
205 The exception to this is rival sub-nationalisms, notably Kurdish separatism in Syria. This is discussed in Chapter 3.
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The official discourse of both Syria and Jordan draws regularly on both State and Arab identity, but 
how best to demonstrate this? As several nationalist theorists, Billig included, have illustrated, state 
institutions provide ruling elites with the capacity to, “project a particular national image to most of its 
subjects.” So why choose public mediations over other institutions such as the armed forces or the 
education system? Whilst a study of such institutions, as has been attempted by Suleiman for example, 
would be a worthy and valuable addition to this study, the main reasons why mediations were preferred 
is one of maximum accessibility.207 The education process in both Syria and Jordan is designed to cater 
for citizens in childhood and, for the few who attend university, early adulthood. Similarly military 
service in each state is between 1-2 years only. It is fair to suggest that it is in these institutions that the 
discourse is built and promoted from an early age. However, the majority of citizens are not in either 
the armed forces or the education system. It is not possible to use an analysis of these institutions to 
explain what discourse a middle-aged man or woman is regularly exposed to as they would not have 
attended either for several decades. Public mediations, on the other hand, are designed for all of society 
and every stage of life. Whilst they may not have an impact or resonate as much as leaders would hope, 
they still provide the analyst with the most visible display of official discourse present.
Within those mediations, why focus on the imagery of leadership cults, leaders speeches and television 
rather than other mediations such as newspapers and radio? Here we need to divide the unit of analysis. 
The images of the leaders cults and their speeches are perhaps the most overt symbols of the official 
discourse in either Syria or Jordan. They prove useful in showing clear attempts at discourse and nation 
building at any one time yet, at the same time, have come to be viewed as banal and unnoticed. 
Television, on the other hand, is a more banal and unnoticed mediation. In theory this unit could have 
been substituted by newspapers or radio, though there are several reasons why television was the most 
suitable. Firstly, unlike in Billig’s analysis of Britain, print media is not widely popular in either Syria 
or Jordan. Circulation rates are much lower than the UK. Similarly, literacy rates are only 79% and 89% 
in Syria and Jordan respectively, thereby excluding many from analysis. Both television and radio are 
widely consumed and theoretically either could have been analysed. What made television the more 
favourable was that, with the advent of satellite television, citizens now have the choice of non-state run 
stations, whereas transnational radio stations do not operate. Assessing choice and attitudes towards 
television stations was therefore considered a useful way of considering the successful dissemination of 
the official discourse.
206 Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, p. 277.
207 Michael Suleiman, ‘The Role of Education in Domestic and Inter-Arab Integration’ in Luciani and Salame, The 
Politics o f Arab Integration, pp. 73-93.
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A further question is why transnational satellite television was chosen as the non-state-run mediation to 
assess how much the official discourse is being challenged or supported. Admittedly there are several 
alternative mediations to this. Sub-state nationalist media, such as Kurdish literature in Syria or anti- 
Hashemite pro-Palestinian literature in Jordan, also present a challenge to the official discourse. Yet 
these mediations are aimed at specific minority groups and cannot be considered a threat to everyone’s 
consumption of the discourse in the way that satellite television can. More widespread might be the 
affect of religious preaching that could threaten the official discourse. Patrick Gaffney’s detailed 
investigation of khotbas (sermons) in Egypt in the 1970s and early 1980s demonstrated how official 
discourse could be undermined by such mediations.208 However, in both Syria and Jordan licenses to 
preach are tightly controlled by the state and most khotbas dare not undermine the government. There 
might be a few on the radical fringe which escape detection but these are not a regular occurrence in 
mainstream society. In fact, khotbas are more affected by the satellite media themselves. As Dr 
Mohammad Rayyan, Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of Jordan, stated when interviewed, 
“The media is vital for setting the agenda in the khotba. Often you will find an Imam who sets his 
khotba entirely around what is in the news that day.”209 A more threatening mediation is cassettes or 
khotbas from abroad that advocate a more radical Islamist agenda. However, whilst an investigation of 
this would be interesting, they do not compete with the widespread access to satellite televisions that 
Syrians and Jordanians have. Moreover, it is satellite television more than any other mediation that 
legally and in a manner endorsed by the regimes, everyday strengthens and supports the official identity 
discourses of the state, and this needs to be demonstrated.
208 Patrick Gaffney, The Prophet’s Pulpit: Islamic Preaching in Contemporary Egypt (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1994).
209 Interview with author 19/10/09.
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1.4 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the three central themes of this thesis. Firstly, it addressed the gap in 
literature discussing Arabism that has limited its engagement with nationalism theory. The Old Arabism 
of al-Husri and Nasser with unionist goals was shown to be a failed nationalism, whilst the perceived 
‘New Arabism’ of al-Jazeera and satellite media is now best defined as a ‘supra-nationalism’. Whilst it 
is political as well as cultural, it does not seek to politically unify its imagined community. It suggested 
that whilst the notion of an Arabism that is subordinated to state nationalism is nothing new, the process 
of dissemination and homogenisation initiated by satellite television is a new phenomena. This 
development is also significant to the constructivist-realist debate amongst international relations 
theorists on Arabism as, on the one hand, the growth of satellite television stations provide new norms 
of supra-nationalism over which states may begin to compete, but on the other hand, Arabism remains 
instrumental to regimes legitimizing their power.
This issue of why governments continue to reproduce Arab identity forms part of the second theme 
explored which also considers how state identity interacts with this supra-national Arabism. Syria and 
Jordan were identified as suitable case studies due to their ideological differences despite facing similar 
state and nation-building challenges since independence. The fact that such different regimes both 
found themselves embedding Arabism within their national identity discourses suggests this trend might 
be replicated across the Arab World. Modernist nationalism theory was utilised to explain how these 
challenges facilitated the production of a multi-facetted identity discourse with supra-national Arabism 
a key component. Finally, the theoretical and methodological approach of this thesis was outlined. It 
was suggested that, given the interest in everyday nationalism that this thesis aspires to investigate, 
content and discourse analysis in conjunction with ethnographic interviews prove the most suitable 
method for investigating the public mediations of Syria and Jordan outlined. This then set the 
background for a more detailed engagement with Michael Billig’s banal nationalism, the theoretical 
cornerstone of this thesis, in the following chapter.
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Chapter 2
Everyday Nationalism in the Arab World
Michael Billig developed a study of the unnoticed reproduction of national identity in Western society 
that provides the best explanation for the daily reproduction of Arabism and state nationalism in 
contemporary Syria and Jordan. This chapter will outline, review and critique Billig’s Banal 
Nationalism and the studies that followed, before explaining how and why the theory needs to be 
adapted and expanded to have relevance beyond Billig’s limited Western, democratic and national 
parameters. Billig’s 1995 work focused on the everyday reproduction of the nation in Western states. It 
is critical of the view that, “...in both popular and academic writing, nationalism is associated with those 
who struggle to create new states or with right-wing politics,” rather than ‘established’ western 
nations.210 He believes the Western view of nationalism as something, ‘not belonging to us’ leads to an 
overlooking of nationalism in the West. He highlights the out-pouring of national feeling during the 
1982 Falklands War in Britain or the 1991 Gulf War in America to emphasise that nationalism in such 
established Western states is alive and well. Yet he insists that such displays are not simply a 
‘temporary mood’ brought about by the extreme conditions of external conflict. Instead, in the ‘in- 
between times’, when these states are not required to outwardly display nationalism, a sense of national 
identity is sustained every day through an unnoticed banal reproduction in society.
Unlike previous theorists of nationalism, Billig insists on, “stretching the term ‘nationalism’ so that it 
covers the ideological means by which nation-states are reproduced.” To this end, he devises the term 
‘banal nationalism’, “to cover the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to 
be reproduced,” suggesting that, “daily, the nation is indicated, or ‘flagged’ in the lives of its 
citizenry.”211 According to Billig, the institutions of the state are essential in this ‘flagging’ and 
consequent reproduction of the nation. He indicates that politicians’ use words such as ‘us’, ‘we’, ‘they’ 
and ‘here’, regularly flagging not just the nation but a ‘world of nations’ to their citizens in a manner 
that both they and their audience consider ‘normal’ and even ‘natural’.212 Also important in this 
reproduction is the style of reporting in the press, and the location of such unnoticed national symbols 
as the American flag waving on public or private buildings. As Billig states, the essence of banal 
nationalism is the flag waving unnoticed on the public building, not the flag waving patriot213 
Importantly for this study, he distinguishes this banal nationalism from the, “overt, articulated and often
210 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 5.
211 Ibid., p. 6.
212 Ibid., p. 14.
213 Ibid., p. 8.
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fiercely expressed nationalism of those who battle to form new nations,” which he later describes as 
‘hot’ nationalism.214
By employing a discourse analysis of newspaper headlines in Britain on a randomly selected day, Billig 
illustrates the frequency of banal nationalism. He demonstrates how all newspapers, whatever their 
political leanings, are presented in a form to reinforce the reader’s sense of belonging to a British 
nation. He applies the same methodology to the reporting of sport and weather that act to reinforce the 
reader’s sense of national belonging in a banal, unnoticed manner.215 At different times he widens his 
scope to include other western nations, whether the French flag being used to indicate quality on loaves 
of bread, or the presence of the US flag in every American classroom. Similarly, the vocabulary of the 
politicians of the day, whether George H Bush or John Major, he argues reinforces the presence of 
banal nationalism, just as the frequency of religious rhetoric from Saddam Hussein is used to indicate
71 f \an absence of banal nationalism.
Billig’s impact was substantial. Michael Skey states that, “Billig’s study led the way in marking 
something of a shift in focus as research began to move away from the more macro-scale theorising on 
nationalism to more empirical-based studies, that focused on issues of representation, contestation and 
localised meaning-making as well as more contextualized case studies.” Whilst theoretical debates had 
mostly focused on the origin of nationalism, Billig highlighted the, “tendency to treat the nation as a 
given both in everyday life and social theory.”217 Banal Nationalism was intended as, “a preliminary 
study,” and called for others to follow with more detailed investigations, which to an extent has been 
seen.218 The banal nationalism of modem Scotland (Law 2001 & Edensor2002) has been investigated, 
as has that of Wales (Jones & Deforges 2003), Catalonia (Crameri 2000), Greece (Tzanelli 2006) and 
Turkey (Yumul & Ozkirmili 2000).219 At the same time, Billig’s work has also promoted criticism for 
some of its assumptions and theoretical conclusions. The presumed homogeneity of the ‘established 
nations’ that Billig suggests has come under scmtiny (Rosie et al. 2004), as has his dismissal of the
214 Ibid., p. 16.
215 Ibid., p. 10.
2,6 Ibid., p. 4.
217 Skey, Michael, ‘The national in everyday life: A critical engagement with Michael Billig’s thesis of Banal Nationalism, ’ 
Sociological Review 57:2 (2009), pp. 333-334.
218 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 9.
219 A. Law, ‘Near and far: Banal national identity and the press in Scotland.’ Media, Culture and Society 23:3 (2001), 
pp. 299-317; Tim Edensor, National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life (Oxford: Berg, 2002); R. Jones & L. 
Desforges, ‘Localities and the reproduction of Welsh nationalism,’ Political Geography 22:3 (March 2003), pp. 271 - 
292.; Crameri, Kathryn, ‘Banal Catalanism?’ National Identities 2:2 (2000), pp. 145-157; Rodanthi Tzanelli, ‘Not 
My Flag!' Citizenship and nationhood in the margins of Europe (Greece, October 2000/2003),’ Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 29:1 (January 2006), pp. 27-49; Arus Yumul & Umut Ozkirimili, ‘Reproducing the nation: ‘banal nationalism’ 
in the Turkish press,’ Media, Culture and Society 22:6 (2000), pp. 787-804.
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reproductive effect of ‘hot’ nationalism (Hutchinson 2006) and the limited consideration of the impact
990of globalisation upon nationalism (Skey 2009).
This thesis highlights a similar tendency to treat supra-national Arabism and state nationalism as a 
given in the everyday life of Syria and Jordan and adapts and expands on Billig’s theories to explain 
why. As well as adding Syria and Jordan to the lists of states that have been empirically investigated for 
banal nationalism, the thesis aims to prove that banal, everyday identity flagging can be expanded 
beyond the narrow parameters Billig affords it. An analysis of how the complex multi-layered national, 
supra-national and religious identities of Syrians and Jordanians are reproduced daily in dictatorial 
political systems will serve to illustrate this point. It will show that Billig’s parameters of everyday 
reproduction operating primarily in western, democratic and national arenas are too limited. It will 
continue to answer Billig’s questions of ‘why don’t we forget our identity?’, but expand his 
interpretation of ‘we’ from a narrow group of Western, democratic, national states to the rest of Billig’s 
‘world of nations’.
The following chapter outlines Billig’s arguments, engages with his critics and then offers its own 
critique and adaptations. Firstly it suggests Billig’s emphasis on only national rather than other group 
identities being banally reproduced is too limited approach. Secondly, it challenges his narrow focus on 
what he terms the Western ‘established’ nations. After this Billig’s linking of banal nationalism to 
democratic political systems will be discussed, as will his rejection of the role o f ‘hot’ nationalism in 
reproducing the nation alongside the ‘banal’. Finally, a new adaptation of Billig’s methodology will be 
outlined that is more theoretically sound and pragmatic to better illustrate the role of banal nationalism 
in Syria and Jordan.
220 Skey, ‘The national in everyday life', p. 335.
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2.1 Layers of Identity
Billig’s Banal nationalism has been criticised for its narrow focus on national social groupings and 
neglect of other forms of group identity. Rosie et al. (2006) complain that Billig, . .assumes that social 
actors’ only way of imagining spatial relations is in national terms,” and underplays the local and sub-
991national identities regularly flagged in the United Kingdom. Other writers have similarly accused 
Billig of ignoring supra-national identities, claiming examples of ‘banal cosmopolitanism’ (Beck and 
Willms 2003) and ‘banal globalization’ (Urry 1999).222 To be fair to Billig, he does acknowledge other 
identities exist, but shares Breuilly’s view of the importance of nationalism above other identities.223 
This thesis does not challenge this assumption but rather highlights that Billig’s sole focus on the nation 
neglects the other forms of identity that are simultaneously banally ‘flagged’ alongside the nation and, 
indeed form a central pillar of the national discourse. In most countries, both Western and Arab, several 
other group identities are flagged banally in an unnoticed manner, not just the nation.
2.1.1 Layers of identity in the West
“As far as nationality is concerned,” states Billig, “one needs to look for the reasons why people in the 
contemporary world do not forget their nationality.”224 However, nationality is not the only identity that 
‘people in the contemporary world’ do not forget. What about religious identity? In the 2001 UK 
census, 61% of the population defined themselves as Christian, yet those attending Church once a year
9 9 c
or more was barely 26%. In the absence of regular exposure to the overt religious flagging of the 
church, how is it that the remaining 35% of Christians in the UK did not forget their religion? Could 
there not be the case for banal Christianity in British society? Billig states that, “national identity is 
more than an inner psychological state or an individual self-definition: it is a form of life which is daily 
lived in the world of nation states.”226 This may be the case but that is not to say that those who do self 
define as another group do not see their identity as a ‘form of life’ as well. Moreover, local, sub­
national and supra-national identities are similarly presented as normal and mundane as the nation 
itself.
221 M. Rosie, P. Petersoo, J. Maclnnes, S. Condor, and J. Kennedy, ‘Mediating which nation? Citizenship and national 
identities in the British press’, Social Semiotics 16:2 (2006), p. 328.
222 U. Beck and J. Willms, Conversations with Ulrich Beck, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006) & J. Urry, ‘Citizenship and 
society,’ Journals o f  World-Systems Research, 5 (1999), pp. 311-324, cited in Billig, Michael, ‘Reflecting on a critical 
engagement with banal nationalism -  reply to Skey,’ Sociological Review 57:2 (2009), p. 350.
223 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 67.
224 Ibid., p. 7.
225 http ://www. vexen. co .uk/UK/reli gi on. html#ChurchAtten dan ce and
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/profiles/commentaries/ethnicitv.asp accessed 20/9/09.
226 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 69.
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The UK’s various national, or sub-national, identities are repeatedly acknowledged by Billig, yet he
997rarely discusses how they are being reproduced alongside the wider British nation. At different times
Billig mentions the varying English, Scottish and Welsh identities that make up the collective ‘British’ 
identity that he shows is banally flagged in society, yet explains only how the latter and not the former 
are reproduced. This has earned him criticism from writers who have unpicked his assumed 
homogeneity of the ‘British’ press.228 Jones and Deforges and Edensor have keenly provided evidence 
that Welsh and Scottish identity are as reproduced locally in the press and other, “.. .small-scale and 
local contexts,” as British identity is nationally. Billig similarly under-represents the reproduction of a 
distinctive ‘English’ identity. In a recent rebuttal to criticism, he admits that, “I oversimplified the 
complexity of nationalism in the United Kingdom.. .in order to show the relentless nationalist message 
in apparently non-nationalist England.”229 Yet in order to do this Billig, like so many commentators, 
conflates ‘British’ with ‘English’, and consequently fails to consider how a separate ‘English’ nation is 
being reproduced alongside a British identity. His day survey of sport in newspapers, for example, 
focuses on a rugby match between New Zealand and the British Lions.230 He forgets to mention that 
this combined team is actually only formed every four years -  the rest of the time each ‘home nation’ 
plays separately. Indeed, on most days, an analysis of the sports pages in England would show a distinct 
English nation being flagged.
As well as the sub-national, Billig neglects how regional identities are regularly flagged in his preferred 
‘western’ societies. In the UK regional identities vary in their strength, but administrative political units 
create a ‘world of regions’ not dissimilar to Billig’s ‘word of nations’ -  though admittedly on a less 
prominent scale. Television, newspapers and local authorities regularly flag a regional identity to their 
audience. Just as citizens in the western world do not forget their nationality, nor do they forget their 
regional origins, and there is scope to explain this within an expanded framework of Billig’s banal 
flagging. Cameri (2000) has already used this method to demonstrate how a regional Catalan identity is 
banally reproduced in Spain.231
More noticeably, a western state that has very prominent regional identity is the United States. Billig 
himself complained in 2009 that he,
227 There is a substantial debate (see Rosie et al. 2004) about the correct term for Britain’s various nations. If England, 
Scotland, Wales etc. are all ‘nations’, is Britain a supra-national identity? For the sake of simplicity the ‘home nations’ 
identity in this thesis are referred to as ‘sub-national’. This is derived from Billig’s own definition that Britain is a 
nation and therefore that its composite members must be something below this.
228 M. Rosie, P. Petersoo, J. Maclnnes, S. Condor, and J. Kennedy, ‘Nation speaking unto nation? Newspapers and 
national identity in the devolved UK.’ Sociological Review 53:4 (2004), pp. 437-458.
229 Billig, ‘Reflecting on a critical engagement,’ Sociological Review, p. 350.
230 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 121.
231 Kathryn Crameri, ‘Banal Catalanism?’ National Identities 2:2 (2000), pp. 145-157.
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. .Hoped that others would analyse in detail the banality of the world’s most powerful nationalism -  that of the United 
States. Instead it has been the less powerful nationalism that have attracted attention.”232
Ironically, though much of Billig’s initial analysis was on the US, he remained blinkered on the nation 
and did not report how regional (State) identity might be banally reproduced. Billig makes much of the 
role of the US flag in sustaining national identity, both in the ceremony of swearing allegiance in 
school, and by its presence in unnoticed places such petrol stations. However, whilst there is no 
equivalent on a regional level to the allegiance swearing ceremony -  perhaps suggesting that the 
national identity remains the most prominent -  state flags are abundant across the United States and one 
could speculate they are just as unnoticed as the Stars and Stripes. Moreover, the other great reproducer 
of identity cited by Billig -  the media -  is far more regional in the US than in the UK. There is only one 
newspaper that could be consider a truly ‘national’ newspaper -  USA Today -  as it does not specialise 
on any one region. In contrast, the other newspapers that have a nationwide readership, such as The 
New York Times, Washington Post and LA Times, remain partly region-focussed dedicating 
considerable space to regional stories.233 Applying Billig’s own methodology to the New York Times on
tHa random day, 8 September 2009, in the large section marked specifically for ‘New York / Region’ 
one finds stories that clearly flag a distinct regional identity. In one article labelled, ‘ 12,000 Teacher 
Reports, but What to Do?’ begins:
“As the city ’ s students return to school on Wednesday, thousands will enter classrooms led by a teacher that the Department 
of Education has deemed low performing on internal reports. But in a sign of how complicated and controversial the reports 
are, many teachers never received them, and there are no plans to release them to parents.”234
Like all regional media, this is appealing to the readers’ sense of localism, not nationalism. ‘The’ city is 
expected to be recognised to the reader as New York, their city, as is ‘the’ Department of Education -  
their department. The ‘parents’ in question are ‘the parents of New York’ not any parents. Billig’s 
methodology proves quite easily adaptable to non-national identity flagging.
Two other layers of Western identity that are flagged banally are the supra-national and the religious. 
Whilst Britain has shown some hostility to the idea of a supra-national European identity, that is not the 
case in other Western European states. Again, given the importance of the flag to Billig’s theory, it is 
notable that the UK is one of the few European Union members that does not fly the European flag
232 Billig, ‘Reflecting,’, p. 351.
233 http://www.thepaperbov.com/usa-top-100-newspapers.cfm accessed 19/9/09.
234 Jennifer Medina, ‘12,000 Teacher Reports, but What to Do?’ New York Times, 8/9/09.
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outside official buildings -  and also hosts the largest number of ‘Eurosceptics’.235 As Laura Cram has 
argued, the extent to which the EU has become accepted in the mainstream suggests an unnoticed 
‘banal Europeanism’, whereby supra-national identity is accepted subconsciously.236
Billig’s attitude to religion is curious. Unlike supra-national, sub-national and regional identities -  
whose reproduction he largely ignores or dismisses -  Billig sets up religion as an example of the ‘pre- 
national’: sharing Anderson’s view that the national community effectively supplanted the older 
religious one.237 He uses the example of speeches by the two leading protagonists in the 1991 Gulf War 
to illustrate his point. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, “...using a rhetoric which echoed pre-national 
times, claimed to be fighting ‘the army of atheism’.” In contrast, President George H. Bush mentions 
God as, “an afterthought,” at the end of his address which Billig identifies as, “..not fighting on behalf 
of God or a political ideology,” but instead for ‘the nation’.238 However, whilst Billig overstates 
Saddam Hussein’s use of religious rhetoric, which will be discussed below, he also understates the use 
of religion in the West. Billig dismisses Bush’s request for God to bless America’s troops at the end of 
his speech as an ‘afterthought’, yet why does the American President include any mention of God at 
all? Other studies of Bush’s rhetoric during this conflict have concluded the contrary to Billig that, 
“President Bush freely and repeatedly made use of religious terminology.”239 Nor was this an aberration 
brought on by conflict, with Jerry Long emphasising that George Bush, “followed the example set by 
his predecessor, President Reagan.”
Whilst Billig is again most probably correct in highlighting that the nation is flagged most often by 
politicians and in society, he is wrong to see it at the expense of religion. National symbols and rhetoric 
are seeped in banal religiosity -  as unnoticed as Billig’s flag or newspaper headline. ‘In God we trust’ is 
embossed on the one dollar bill in the US and ‘God Save the Queen’ is the British national anthem, to 
name but two examples. In the US, it was barely noticed that George W. Bush ended his speech 
announcing the beginning of America’s next confrontation with Saddam in 2003, by echoing his father 
with, “May God bless our country.”240 Before the same conflict Tony Blair’s aides persuaded the 
British Prime Minister to drop, “God bless you,” from his parallel speech announcing war suggesting,
235 Only 33% of British citizens polled in 2006 believed that EU membership was a good thing -  the third lowest and 
considerably below the 49% average. See ‘The Future of Europe’, Eurobarometer, May 2006, p. 27. 
(http://ec.eurona.eu/public opinion/archives/ebs/ebs 251 en.pdf - accessed 19/9/09).
236 L. Cram, ‘Imagining the union: A case of banal Europeanism?’ In Wallace, H. (ed.), Whose Europe? Interlocking 
dimensions o f European integration (London: MacMillan, 2001), p. 239.
237 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 4; Anderson, Imagined Communities, 12; Lisa Wedeen, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power 
and Performance in Yemen (London: University of Chicago Press, 2008), p. 11.
238 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 3.
239 Jerry M. Long, Saddam’s war o f words: Politics, religion and the Iraqi invasion o f Kuwait (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 2004), p. 5.
240 ‘Full text: George Bush's address on the start of war,’ The Guardian, 20/3/2003, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/mar/20/iraq.georgebush - accessed 10/1/10.
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as will be discussed below that, contrary to Billig’s suggestion, there is no ‘western’ uniformity in how 
identity is flagged.241 Nevertheless, this debate highlights the continue presence of banal religion. If 
Billig is keen to highlight a world of nations that is banally flagged every day, his methodology could 
just as well highlight a world of religions that goes largely unnoticed in society. The ringing of a church 
bell or call to prayer from a mosque is considered ‘normal’ and largely unquestioned. Whilst in the 
West Billig might be right to highlight that the nation is the most flagged, he neglects to point out that 
other identities on a sub-national, regional, supra-national and religious level are reproduced at the same 
time.
2.1.2 Layers of identity in the Middle East
It is uncertain exactly what Billig means when he describes Saddam Hussein’s use of religious rhetoric 
as echoing ‘pre-national times’. Does he mean that Saddam is only using a pre-national rhetoric, or is 
he saying, as seems implied, that this rhetoric is necessary because the population to which he appeals 
in Iraq are, unlike George Bush’s audience, not sufficiently nationalist? Though he simply uses Saddam 
as an example to illustrate his point about Western banal nationalism, the implications he makes about 
Saddam’s Iraq are typical of the wider school of thought that questions the applicability of nationalist 
theory to the Middle East. Billig’s simplified interpretation of Iraqi identity does not account for the 
different layers of identity prominent in the Middle East -  the same layers that are present in the West 
but perhaps, as described above, less prominent. Moreover, Billig’s approach suggests a degree of 
unintentional Euro-centrism by drawing a line between the nationalism of ‘us’ in the West and ‘them’ 
in the East or South.
Billig’s suggests that whilst, in the Western nations of George Bush’s coalition in the 1991 Gulf War, 
“the order of nations is not designed to serve God, but God is to serve the order,” when Saddam 
Hussein calls on his Iraqis to be, “the faithful servants of God,” this means that identity in his state is 
‘pre-national’.242 Yet Billig gives no context for Saddam’s speech. At the stage in the 1990/1 Gulf crisis 
that Saddam’s speech was made, the Iraqi President’s rhetoric was not aimed at his own civilians but at 
the wider Arab and Muslim population from whom he sought legitimacy against the Western coalition. 
As Long states, “By carefully fusing appeals to both Islam and Arab nationalism, Saddam enjoyed a 
joint discourse -  both religious and secular -  that resonated with great numbers of people on multiple 
levels.”243 Saddam was in fact a strong believer in the nation-state as a practical unit from which to 
build his personal strength.244 Though he might have used the language of supra-national Arab
241 Peter Stothard, 30 Days: A month at the heart o f  Blair’s War (London: Harper Collins, 2003), pp. 106-107.
242 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 4.
243 Long, Saddam’s war, p. 3.
244 Con Coughlin, Saddam: the Secret Life (London: Macmillan, 2002), p. 139.
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nationalism or Islamism, his primary goal was the defence of the Iraqi state and his own power within 
it. In fact, closer examination of the very speech used by Billig illustrates that he has been highly 
selective. Saddam opens the address with:
“O glorious Iraqis, 0  Holy warrior Iraqis, O Arabs, O believers wherever you are, we and our steadfastness is holding. Here 
is the great Iraqi people, your brothers and sons of your Arab nation and the great faithful part of the human family.”245
Saddam is appealing to his audience as ‘Iraqis’, ‘Arabs’ and ‘believers’. He may be using religious 
discourse, but this is alongside, not at the expense of a nationalist discourse, with later references to ‘the 
valiant Iraqi men,’ ‘we in Iraq,’ ‘the response of Iraq’, ‘our ready missile force,’ and ‘your brothers in 
Iraq’. Billig’s selective interpretation focuses only on the greater presence of religious rhetoric than in 
Bush’s speech, ignoring both the reasons behind it -  which were certainly not ‘pre-national’ -  and the 
simultaneous nationalist and supra-nationalist (Arab) discourse alongside it.
Saddam’s ‘joint discourse’ is however, not unique the invasion of Kuwait. Throughout his reign, the 
Iraqi dictator at times appealed to regional (Tikriti), religious (Islamic), supra-national (Arab) and 
national (Iraqi) layers of identity in his rhetoric.246 Yet, as most investigations into identity in the 
Middle East have shown, such a multi-faceted identity is not restricted to Saddam’s Iraq but is present 
throughout the region.247 Some such studies, such as that by P. R. Kumaraswamy, argue that the 
presence of these multiple identities has inhibited the development of nations such as those found 
elsewhere. “The Middle Eastern countries,” he claims, “have been unable to build a ‘nation’. In other 
parts of the world, nations, both old and new, have become states; the process has been reversed in the 
Middle East, where states are still in search of a nation.”248 Such a view conforms to the wider sense of 
‘Middle Eastern’, or often more specifically ‘Arab’ exceptionalism when it comes to nationalism. This 
view, implicitly shared by Billig, suggest that ‘their’ nationalism is somehow different to ‘ours’ and 
models such as Billig’s will not be applicable.
By focussing his investigation on the reproduction of ‘our’ western nationalism, and by dismissing or 
ignoring the similar reproduction of identity in Iraq, the Middle East, and the wider world, Billig seems 
to be hinting at what Edward Said calls, ‘European superiority over Oriental backwardness’.249 He is 
clearly drawing a line between, “Our mundane practices,” and those mundane practices of an ‘other’.
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Though he concedes in a later article that, in his 1995 publication, “it was certainly not my intention to 
suggest that non-Westem and non-democratic nation states lack similar mundane practices by which 
they reproduce themselves as nation-states,” he is still speaking in the language of ‘them’ and ‘us’
250whereby non-westem and non-democratic’ nations and their nationalism are still somehow different.
It is therefore false to view the Middle East as different because it has seemingly more diverse layers of 
identity and that therefore lacks banal nationalism. Fred Halliday has demonstrated how the Middle 
East’s layers of identity are not much different from those in Europe.251 If someone can be Mancunian, 
English, British, European and Christian at the same time, why can someone not be Aleppan, Syrian, 
Arab, Middle Eastern and Muslim? Moreover, as was highlighted above, Billig is wrong to limit his 
examples of flagging to only the national layer of identity. Closer scrutiny demonstrates a flagging of 
sub-national, regional, supra-national and religious identity in the various mediations of the West.
Perhaps one of the reasons why Kumaraswamy assumes that layers in the Middle East means that 
identity in the region is unique is that the mediations that flag them seem more pronounced to the 
outsider. With religious, state and pan-Arab media each flagging their various identities so overtly, the 
outsider is presented with what appears to be a quite exceptional case in comparison to the seemingly 
more ‘banal’ and ‘mundane’ West. However this analysis contains two assumptions. Firstly, that these 
identities are in conflict with each other, which is rarely the case. Secondly, that these mediations are 
too overt to be banal. However, what might appear overt and ‘hot’ to the outsider such as Billig, could 
be consider banal and unnoticed by the population that sees such mediations every day.
250 Billig, ‘Reflecting,’ p. 349.
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2.2 Banal Nationalism Beyond the West
Michael Billig is overly Euro-centrist and modest in his discussion of banal nationalism. Repeatedly he 
refers to banal nationalism being the property of ‘the established nations’ of ‘the West’, by implication 
dismissing it as not the property of the South or non-western world. Throughout his study, which is 
littered with inconsistencies on the subject, the non-Westem world is barely mentioned. Despite this, 
and with no explanation as to why he has excluded non-Westem states from his theory, Billig is 
confident enough to claim that it is, “in the established nations [where] there is a continual ‘flagging’ or 
reminding of nationhood.”252 Yet Billig is also overly modest. He limits his theory to the West for no 
other reason, it seems, than this is where his investigation has taken place. In a 2009 defence of his 
1995 work, Billig explained that he deliberately focused on the West for, “political and theoretical 
reasons.”253 However, the following critique will explain how there is no theoretical logic in excluding 
the non-West from the banal nationalism thesis and how greater investigation reveals the same traits of 
national reproduction that Billig observed in Western society.
2.2.1 Demystifying the ‘established nations’
Billig claims that his theory explains the reproduction of the nation in, ‘the established nations’, which 
he defines as:
“...those states that have confidence in their own continuity, and that, particularly, are part of what is conventionally 
described as ‘the West’. The political leaders of such nations -  whether France, the USA, the United Kingdom or New 
Zealand -  are not typically termed ‘nationalists’.”254
He goes on to explain, “...the term banal nationalism is introduced to cover the ideological habits 
which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced.”255 Yet this definition prompts two 
interrelated questions: what makes a nation ‘established’, and what should we consider ‘the West’?
Billig chooses an odd definition for an ‘established nation’: . .those states that have confidence in their
own continuity.” How does Billig assess this confidence? There are very few states in the world that 
have no confidence in their continuity as a state, and even fewer who would publically admit it. Should 
the unrecognised republic of Kosovo be considered a more ‘established nation’ than Israel because it 
proudly boasts its confidence in continuity whilst the Jewish state repeatedly plays on fears that it could
252 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 8.
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be driven into the sea?256 Moreover, what does Billig consider as ‘continuity’? The principle of uti 
possidetis juris in the aftermath of decolonization has ensured that the vast majority of states in the 
world have retained the same borders since independence, and very few have had their ‘continuity’ 
threatened. Even when territory has been occupied or annexed by another state, as in the cases of 
Azerbaijan (1991), Egypt (1967) or Cambodia (1978), the existence of the state has rarely been 
threatened. Indeed, enemy states may intend to remove a particular regime, but even the most 
aggressive of neighbours rarely threatens the continuity of the state itself. They are more likely to 
support the continuance of the state but under a friendlier regime. Since the aggressive expansionism of 
Nazi Germany and the USSR, there have been few occasions when one state has actively sought to 
annex another completely and end its continuation such as Tibet in 1949, Western Sahara in 1975, East 
Timor in 1975 and Kuwait in 1990/1. Yet in these cases, the continued existence of governments in 
exile suggests that even when the entire state is occupied and the occupier seeks to destroy the nation, 
the representatives of the old state would not admit that they lack confidence in their own continuity. 
Undoubtedly the Dalai Lama would consider Tibet to be a legitimate and ‘established’ nation, as would 
all those governments that continue to recognize him as leader of occupied Tibet.
Yet if one discounts the few states that might perceive their continuity to be under threat, even if they 
don’t publically admit it, Billig still does not give sufficient explanation why these confident 
‘established nations’ are all presumed to be Western. Large and powerful nations such as Russia, China, 
India and Brazil undoubtedly have confidence in their own continuity, so why should they not be 
considered ‘established nations’? The nature of international law illustrates that even smaller states that 
boast neither economic nor military power can be confident that the international community will 
preserve their continuity as a state should it be threatened, as was the case with Kuwait in 1990/1 and, 
eventually, East Timor in 1999. One of the reasons that new states such as Kosovo seek international 
recognition is the assumption that such recognition will bring them under the protective umbrella of 
international law.
Moreover, the ‘confidence’ of Billig’s own examples o f ‘established nations’ deserves some scrutiny. 
Michael Skey highlights the numerous works that have questioned the, “assumed homogeneity,” of the 
established Western nations that Billig lists 258 Rosie et al. (2006) argue that Billig’s primary example 
of an ‘established nation’, Britain, is actually a composite of several separate nations and, against the 
background of devolution, “... great caution is needed when addressing potentially multi-national states
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such as the United Kingdom.”259 Similarly, Crameri (2000)’ s discussion of Catalan banal nationalism 
emphasises another example of a supposed established Western nation, Spain, that faces separatist 
threats from both Catalans and Basques. Billig himself acknowledges that these states face threats from 
Scottish, Quebecoise or Breton separatists, and yet does not take the further step of suggesting that such 
‘established nations’ can not, in fact, be completely confident that they will continue in their present 
form. However, that is not to say that Billig is incorrect about how the nation is reproduced within these 
states, simply that he has constructed a quite arbitrary line dividing those nations that are and are not 
reproduced banally.
In a reply to Skey’s critique in 2009, Billig attempted to clarify his definition of ‘established nations’. 
He states that:
“I wanted to stress the nationalism of ‘our’ mundane practices. Most analysts have ignored the nationalism of established, 
Western nation-states. By ‘established’, I do not mean secure or unchanging, but simply nation-states that have been 
conventionally accepted in the world of nations -  belonging to the United Nations, issuing internationally accepted 
passports, possessing their own military and so on. My argument was that analysts have defined ‘nationalism’ too narrowly, 
thereby excluding the mundane practices of established Western democracies.”260
Yet even this defence of his definition is contradictory. On the one hand, he opens the ‘established 
nations’ up to those ‘belonging to the United Nations’ -  a total of 192 different states 261 On the other 
hand he twice mentions that he is talking about the nationalism of ‘Western’ states, which would 
restrict this 192 to a far smaller number, depending on definition. It seems odd for Billig to 
simultaneously lament analysts for narrowing their definitions of nationalism to only those that struggle 
for independence, whilst himself keeping the definition of banal nationalism restricted to the mundane 
practices of the West.
This leads to the other consideration emerging from Billig’s definition of which nations see banal 
nationalism is what exactly Billig considers to be, “what is conventionally described as ‘the West’”. An 
initial concern is over, quite literally, where the line is drawn on ‘the West’? Billig is quite tight on his 
definition, mostly focusing on France, the US, Britain and Australasia. However, subsequent authors 
have cast the net wider, incorporating Spain, Greece and Turkey -  countries that in an earlier age were 
probably not deemed ‘Western’ in the popular conscious, but are increasingly viewed as such. The case 
of Turkey is curious, as a state that many view is on the fault line between ‘East’ and ‘West’.262 Yumul
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and Ozkirimli’s 2000 study is referred to in Michael Skey’s 2009 article summarising the impact of 
Billig as, . shifting the analysis beyond a ‘Western’ setting and carrying out a Day Survey of the press 
in Turkey.”263 Yet a re-reading of Yumul & Ozkirimli shows no such acknowledgement -  quite the 
contrary. The authors admit that, “We fully admit that this study does not involve a particular 
theoretical contribution to the literature on nationalism.”264 Instead, their intention is simply to test 
Billig’s theory to see if it applies in Turkey -  a country they clearly view as no different to similar 
authors exploring Scotland, Greece or Spain. Despite Skey’s claim, Yumul & Ozkirimli’s article 
remains within the ‘Western-only’ parameters established by Billig, and makes no attempt to challenge 
them as this thesis does.
A more broad criticism of Billig’s concept of the ‘West’ is that it is too generalist. Billig speaks not as a 
‘Brit’ in particular but as a general ‘Westerner’ when he claims that, . .nationalism is seen as, ‘not 
belonging to us.’”265 In this view of ‘western established nations’ that Billig has constructed, ‘banal 
nationalism’ describes how the nation is reproduced. Yet even in his definition of Western states, he 
glosses over a diverse selection of states and nations that differ greatly in their national reproduction. 
Billig ignores the fact that many of the examples of banal nationalism that he gives for one western 
state, are not valid in another. He makes much of the frequent, unnoticed presence of the American flag 
in class rooms and petrol station forecourts in the USA.266 This is a valid point for the US, but one that 
cannot be replicated in the United Kingdom where there is a conspicuous absence of national flags in 
most public places, let alone garages or classrooms. Similarly, he makes much of the British press 
recreating the nation in the UK, yet fails to highlight that there is no equivalent national press in the 
USA-where in fact only one ‘national’ newspaper exists. Similarly, Billig’s ‘established’ nations are 
subject to change and his assumption that nationalism is ever truly ‘settled’ can be challenged. Western 
states’ concepts of nationalism have recently been seriously challenged by immigration, 
multiculturalism and even secessionist issues in countries like Britain, Spain and Belgium.
Not only are these ‘established nations’ not all homogeneous, but it is wrong to speak of a wider 
‘western’ group of states that use similar methods to reproduce the nation. The subconscious, unnoticed 
element might be present in each state, but the method and tools, whether press, flags or other, differ 
greatly. With this in mind, Billig gives next to no evidence that these various methods of banal flagging 
are not present in states outside of his arbitrarily created ‘western cage’.
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2.2.2 Locating non-Westem Banal Nationalism
A careful reading of Billig exposes numerous confused and uncertain statements about nationalism 
beyond the West. Firstly, he seems unsure how to categorise nationalism in states that are not Western. 
Billig outlines ‘banal nationalism’ in supposed ‘western established nations’ as a direct contrast to the 
popular view of nationalism being something, “associated with those who struggle to create new states
'J f .H
or with right-wing politics.” His thesis argues against the view that nationalism, “is typically seen as 
a force which creates nation-states or which threatens the stability of existing states.”268 The examples 
he gives of such ‘threatening’ nationalists are separatists such as the Quebecois, independence-seekers 
such as the PLO and right-wing politicians such as Jean-Marie Le Penn.269 Yet what about the hundreds 
of states that do not fall into Billig’s parameters of either ‘western’ or ‘threatening’? Is Chilean 
nationalism western or threatening? What of Thailand or Tanzania? Billig’s determination to prove a 
banal nationalism in the West as opposed to the aggressive nationalism of extremists leaves a huge grey 
space into which fall all the non-westem states that are not threatening others.
Billig complains that theorists see nationalism as a development tool but find, “no further stages to 
describe what happens to nationalism once the nation state is established. As if nationalism suddenly 
disappears.”270 He makes a valid point, yet restricts his theories to the West. What of the many post­
colonial states that, indeed, used nationalism to establish their states in the 1950s and 60s, but now do 
not have their right to exist questioned? Does their nationalism and national reproduction not warrant 
the same investigation that Billig affords the West? In a sweeping statement Billig claims that, “.. .in 
the established nations, people do not generally forget their national identity,” yet by implication, 
having already explained that the established nations are only Western, is he claiming that those in the 
non-West do forget their national identity?271 This is hard to believe and, in the case studies of Syria 
and Jordan investigated here, proven to be baseless.272
What makes Billig’s neglect of the non-West harder to fathom is his own repeated assertions that 
nationalism, as an ideology has, “been diffused internationally.”273 He shows surprising inconsistency 
on this matter. He gives examples of a banal flagging of nationhood during a coup d’etat in Nigeria, yet 
surely is not claiming sub-Saharan Africa for ‘the West’?274 On the one hand, he repeats throughout his 
study that nationalism is a highly successful ‘international ideology,’ which has seen the world carved
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up into different nation states.275 On the other hand, he claims that the nation is only banally reproduced 
in the Western states. So how does he believe the non-westem states have their sense of nationhood 
reproduced in such a way that this system of nations can be maintained? Is Billig really suggesting that 
whilst the western states have their identity reproduced in an unnoticed manner, their non-westem 
equivalents must be overtly indoctrinated everyday to be reminded of their sense of nationhood? Here 
Billig displays a subconscious Euro-centrist streak: the non-west is simply the ‘other’ in his 
investigation. Admittedly it is not feasible for him to make a world-wide survey of national 
reproduction. Yet he is willing to make generalisations about reproduction in the West that do not stand 
up to scrutiny. He does not offer the possibility that in the non-West national reproduction could be just 
as banal and unnoticed as in the UK and the US. Moreover he does not consider that even in instances 
in the South where reproduction might appear overt to the western observer, the local citizen may view 
it as banal as the American views their unnoticed flag.
Billig goes some way to explaining these contradictions and grey areas in his 2009 reply. He states that:
“If nationalism is global, then one can expect to find features of banal nationalism across the world. Skey, however, claims 
that I firmly locate ‘banal nationalism’ in the “established democratic nations of the West’. I think there has been a 
misunderstanding. First, it is not only in the West that one can find democratic nation states. Second, it is not difficult to find 
the banal reproduction of national symbols in non-Westem nations.”276
However, as has been shown, this is quite a departure from banal nationalism (1995) and Skey cannot 
be blamed for ‘misunderstanding’ Billig’s vague and contradictory statements. Billig goes on to claim 
that, “It was certainly not my intention to suggest that non-Westem and non-democratic nation-state 
lack similar mundane practices by which they reproduce themselves as nation states.” Yet the above 
analysis of Billig’s 1995 text suggests that, whilst he may genuinely have not intended to be as West- 
centric as he comes across, he is at the minimum woefully neglectful of any non-westem cases which 
might suggest that he feels banal nationalism is indeed ‘global’ and not just Western. Yet even in this 
2009 reply, Billig trips over himself. Despite making statements about a possible non-westem or non- 
democratic dimension to banal nationalism, he continues to refer to ‘our’ nationalism and ‘the mundane 
practices of the West’. It is one thing to say that he accepts that banal nationalism could be global and 
that he is not West-centric, but quite another to prove it. Interestingly, the majority of his reply concerns 
more about western banal nationalism and not about the global dimension. Billig’s great regret is that 
no-one has as yet investigated US banal nationalism -  despite there being a similar absence of 
investigation of banal nationalism in the global South.
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Billig’s neglect of non-Westem nationalism is typical of theorists such as Anthony Smith who view 
nationalisms outside of Europe as simply mimics of those that evolved in Europe. Smith claims that the 
earliest nations that were composed of an ‘ethnic core’ provided a model for future nations, even if they 
didn’t have a similar ‘ethnic core’.277 Even Benedict Anderson, who’s Imagined Communities 
discusses nationalism in Latin America and Indo-China Anderson argues that extra-European nations 
largely ‘copied’ the nationalism they saw in Europe around their own circumstances.278 In contrast, 
some writers complain of the Euro-centricity of theorists. Partha Chaterjee makes the case that 
nationalism changes in a colonial setting and, using the example of India, claims that colonial 
nationalism is manifested in a public, formal sphere which clearly does mimic European nationalisms, 
whilst in a private, informal sphere it is unique to the spiritual culture of India 279 Similarly, Tonnesson 
and Antlov use the example of South-Asian nationalisms to suggest that Anderson ignores the nuanced 
differences between Asian and European nationalisms, particularly the role of religion, and that actually 
they deserve to be viewed in their own right and not as mimics.280
Some of these theorists’ assumptions prove important to this study. Firstly, whilst the nature of 
nationalism in the Arab Middle East may have its origins locally, as claimed by Chateijee, it is 
undeniable that the state system currently in place is a western mimic. When looking at the 
reproduction of the nation, the nature of the polity in place is essential, and both Syria and Jordan’s 
political boundaries are western creations. As Fred Halliday states, “Middle Eastern states ... reflect the 
division of the Middle East in the post-1918 settlement: over a large part the British and French 
determined borders.”281 However, as Tonnesson and Antlov highlight, the prominent nature of other 
layers of identity -  in this case Islam and Arab identity -  make the reproduction of the nation not 
simply a mimic of the West.
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2.3 Banal and ‘Hot’ Nationalism in Non-Democratic States
Having established that there is no theoretical reason not to extend Billig’s methodology beyond the 
West and into the multi-layered identities of the Middle East, there remains a final area of 
incompatibility with banal nationalism's original proposals: its perceived relationship between banal 
nationalism and democracy. Billig repeatedly claims that banal nationalism is a trend seen in the, 
“established, democratic nations,” and, whilst it has been argued that ‘established’ is a relatively flimsy 
term that can be challenged, it is far more of a stretch to call either Syria, Jordan or any of the Arab 
states, ‘democratic’.282 That said, as with his choice of ‘the West’ to frame his theory, Billig gives no 
reasons as to why non-democratic states could not encounter banal nationalism. This thesis argues the 
contrary: that the nation is reproduced in a banal, unnoticed manner in non-democratic states with the 
same frequency as in democracies. Even in states where national reproduction seems obvious to the 
visiting foreigner, such as political slogans, banners and leadership cults they are considered banal and 
mundane to their citizenry. To illustrate this one first needs to reassess Billig’s distinction between 
banal and overt or ‘hot’ nationalism. Following this his proposed relationship between banal 
nationalism and democracy shall be considered.
Billig argued that there were two types of nationalism: the ‘hot’ and the ‘banal’. His complaint was that 
analysts who discussed nationalism saw only the ‘hot’ nationalism that was present when nations were 
formed, and discarded the ‘banal’ everyday nationalism that remained present and reproduced the 
nation thereafter. Billig claims that once the nation is established, this hot nationalism ‘cools’ to 
become banal and unnoticed.283 However, as has been argued by Skey and Hutchinson, in emphasising 
the ‘banal’ nationalism present in these states, Billig discounts the role that ‘hot’ nationalism can 
continue to play in reproducing identity alongside the banal.284 Hutchinson has argued instead that the 
two exist side by side:
“...there were two types of nationalism at work in national identity formation. One is the ‘hot’ didactic nationalism that 
instils the idea of the nation as sacred and transcendent object of worship and sacrifice.. This emerges in waves as a project 
that is self-conscious, systematic and prescriptive, providing exemplary forms of conduct in order to unify all the 
components (of class, region, religion and gender) of the nation....The other is the informal or ‘banal’ nationalism of 
populations who consume nationalism in a relatively unself-conscious manner as a guide to the conduct of everyday life as 
expressed in popular songs, political posters, stamps, banknotes, coinage and brand names on staple products.”285
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He goes on to emphasis that these two nationalisms constantly interact and interrelate and, at times of 
crisis, the banal can easily become ‘hot’.286
Billig actually goes some way to acknowledging this interaction himself. Whilst insisting that ‘hot’ 
nationalism remains something separate, restricted to, “those who battle to form new nations,” he does 
accept that the established nations encounter an ‘overt’ as well as a banal nationalism. He describes this 
distinction in terms of a ‘waved’ (overt) and ‘unwaved’ (banal) flag, stating that, “Some [flags] are 
consciously waved and saluted symbols, often accompanied by a pageant of outward emotions. Others 
-  probably the most numerous in the contemporary environment -  remain unsaluted and unwaved.”287 
This overt nationalism, visible on national days of celebration such as 4th July or Bastille Day is,
. .patterned so that the national flag can be consciously waved both metaphorically and literally.”288 
Such projects would seem to be, “self-conscious, systematic and prescriptive,” such as the hot 
nationalism described by Hutchinson, even if Billig insists that his ‘overt’ nationalism is not the same 
thing. This, albeit, limited acknowledgement by Billig that his ‘established democratic’ nations also rely 
on overt ‘waved’ flags as well as banal ‘unwaved’ flags is an important step in expanding the theory 
beyond democratic states.
‘Self conscious, systematic and prescriptive’ flag-waving in non-democratic dictatorships actually 
appear no more frequently than in Billig’s established west. Of Syria’s fourteen annual public holidays, 
for example, four could be viewed as self-conscious national flag waving: Revolution Day, 
Independence Day, Martyrs Day and October Liberation Day.289 Similarly three of Jordan’s public 
holidays are overtly national: Army Day, Independence Day and the Anniversary of Abdullah’s 
accession to the throne. France sees three of its thirteen public holidays take a national character -  
Bastille Day, VE Day and Armistice Day -  and two of these are more sombre than celebratory.290 The 
US, however, has a greater number of national days than Syria or Jordan, with seven official nation- 
celebrating holidays: Martin Luther King Day, Washington’s birthday, Memorial Day, Independence 
Day, Columbus Day, Veterans Day and Thanksgiving Day. Yet even if non-democratic states did 
dedicate more holiday time to overtly flagging the nation there would still remain a majority of ‘in- 
between’ times when flags remain ‘unwaved’. Though flags might be waved more in the dictatorships 
of Syria and Jordan, this thesis will demonstrate that identity is primarily reproduced by the same 
unwaved, unnoticed and banal symbols that Billig highlights for democracies.
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To the outsider visiting Middle Eastern, or indeed many of the non-democratic states in the world, the 
presence of ‘waved’ or ‘overt’ national symbols seems to present such very different polities that a 
comparison with western democracies is superficially difficult. The frequent images of Thailand’s king, 
green flags in Libya or Communist Party slogans in Cuba might appear to a visitor to be obvious 
examples of intentional nation-building by governments.291 Because such displays are, usually, ordered 
by the governments themselves it might be argued that they are examples of Billig’s ‘overt’ rather than 
‘banal’ nationalism. However, how is the compulsory display of Thailand’s king on every street comer 
any different from the compulsory display of the American flag in US petrol stations that Billig 
describes? Just because a state is a democracy does not mean that it does not have ‘self conscious, 
systematic and prescriptive’ rules about displaying national symbols. As has been described by Christel 
Lane, ‘civil religion’ is still very visible in Britain and, especially, the US. In the US, for example, “it 
becomes most ‘visible’ on such recurring occasions as Independence Day, the anniversaries of 
Lincoln’s and Washington’s birthdays, and in the cult of the American flag.”292 Just because a visitor to 
these states views such symbols as overt, does not mean that its citizens do. If a Thai child has been 
raised in a state where he has seen his King’s face on every comer he will regard it with the same 
unnoticed banality as the American child that swears allegiance to the Stars and Stripes every morning. 
Curiously, Billig acknowledges this himself for the US stating that, “ ...even the saluted [flags] can 
seem so routinely familiar -  so near to home -  that they are ignored.” He highlights this by suggesting 
that most American children are not filled with nationalist passion as they swear to the flag each 
morning -  the nation is celebrating and reproducing itself in a routine, unnoticed manner.293 The 
question Billig fails to answer is why the Syrian or Jordan child singing his or her national anthem each 
morning will not feel the same level of routine familiarity despite not living in a democracy.
So why must we maintain an exclusive link between banal nationalism and democracy? Billig claims 
that, “...nationhood...frames the practice of political democracy,” but does it not also frame the 
practice of political dictatorship?294 Since the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia there remain few 
dictatorships that rule over federal multi-national structures. Instead most of today’s dictatorships claim 
their legitimacy from ruling over what is professed to be a single nation. Billig similarly shares Renan’s 
view that a sense of nationhood is chosen rather than imposed, and claims that, “There is therefore an 
inherently popular if not formally democratic aspect of nationalism.”295 It is curious that he uses this 
statement to justify the democracy link, given that during his study he cites D’Azeglio’s famous 
comment that ‘we have made Italy, now we now must make Italians’ -  a clear example of a nation
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being imposed upon a people. More importantly, Billig seems to be saying that actually, democracy 
is not a key component of nationalism, as long as there is broad consensus that the nation does exist. 
One must wonder how Billig sees a consensus existing amongst the Italian peasants who were 
‘nationalised’ in the 19th and 20th century, yet not amongst the citizens of non-democracies in today’s 
global South.
Billig states that:
“One might predict that, as a nation-state becomes established in its sovereignty, and it faces little internal challenge, then 
the symbols of nationhood, which might once have been consciously displayed, do not disappear from sight, but instead 
become absorbed into the environment of the established homeland.”297
The same could be said of dictatorial regimes. Once they feel established in their sovereignty, as in 
Syria and Jordan, their slogans, portraits and flags might remain -  and seem overt to the outsider -  yet 
slip into the background for the state’s citizens. Whether the regime is democratic or not is immaterial 
to the citizen who is having their identity flagged. Providing the state and, to an extent, the regime is 
accepted or, at the least, considered ‘normal’, there is no reason for the citizen to notice its symbols. It 
is therefore perfectly reasonable to look for banal nationalism in non-democratic states.
296 Ibid., p. 25.
297 Ibid., p. 41.
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2.4 Expanding Billig: an Alternative Methodology
The above critique is not intended to discredit or undermine Billig’s findings. It is designed to highlight 
some of the weaknesses in banal nationalism that need to be corrected before this thesis fulfils Billig’s 
own request to expand his, “preliminary study,” with more, “detailed empirical investigation,” that,
^ Q O
“show the operations of banal nationalism in their detail.” Previous investigations have mostly 
limited themselves to the Western democratic world that Billig himself outlined as the parameters of his 
theory. This chapter has demonstrated that these parameters do not stand up to scrutiny, hopefully 
opening the door for other empiricists to apply banal nationalism to other areas of the non-westem non- 
democratic world. The following study will take one comer of that un-investigated world, Syria and 
Jordan, and apply Billig’s theory in a comparative empirical study. Yet Billig’s methodology needs 
adapting to the states in focus, both for pragmatic and theoretical reasons.
As discussed in chapter one, Syria and Jordan make a good comparison due to their common roots, 
their ideologically different regimes and recent, young leaders. Comparing states’ banal nationalism is 
the first major methodological departure from Billig. Whilst Banal Nationalism does discuss different 
nations and their identity flagging, the assumption is made that their methods are similar, as part of 
Billig’s wider ‘western’ bloc of nations. As has been discussed, this uniformity of flagging is false and 
Billig’s work would have greatly benefitted by his highlighting the differences as well as the 
similarities in the nations he studied. Not only will a comparison between Syria and Jordan’s banal 
nationalism provide two clear examples of the theory’s applicability to the Arab world, it will also 
support the assumption that, even in a region that is relatively similar, methods and style of banal 
flagging can share as many differences as similarities.
The type of public mediations that flag identity to Syrians and Jordanians needs reassessing. Billig 
examined the language of politicians and the use and place of the national flag before conducting 
content analysis of a key public mediation, national newspapers. He did not claim that these are the 
only mediations that flag the nation, simply that they are appropriate samples. Turning the same 
methodology to Syria and Jordan only partially works. One must strike a careful balance between 
keeping close enough to Billig’s original method to ensure a testing of his theory versus adapting to the 
different circumstances of the states in question. As with Billig, chapter 3 will discuss the language of 
politicians, sampling some speeches of the politicians who receive by far the most media coverage in 
dictatorships: the dictators themselves. Rather than look exclusively at the flags of Syria and Jordan, the 
chapter looks instead at national symbols more broadly. In particular, such is the nature of leadership
298 Ibid. p .  9.
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cults in these states, the images of the leaders within a wider cult of leadership comes to be seen as a 
representation of the nation and hence deserve analysis.
A more complex public mediation to consider in Syria and Jordan is the media. Billig chose to focus on 
newspapers on the premise that, “historically, Britain has the highest newspaper readership in the 
world.”299 Not surprisingly, neither Syria nor Jordan boasts anywhere near the same newspaper 
circulation. Whereas Britain’s most read newspaper, The Sun, has a readership of one in twenty, 
Jordan’s, Al-Ra ’ai reaches one in 63 whilst Syria’s most read, al-Thawra reaches barely one in 360.300 
Moreover, with average illiteracy rates at 21% in Syria and 11% in Jordan, and even higher amongst 
women, substantial sections of society don’t have regular access to this mediation.301 Chapters four and 
five will therefore adapt Billig’s methodology to focus instead on television. In 2004, 90% of the 
citizens of both states had access to terrestrial TV and 50% of households received satellite -  a figure 
that is probably larger due to public viewing in cafes and restaurants.302 In such semi-literate societies 
analysing television will indicate what mass identities are flagged in the media far better than the press. 
This adaptation of Billig’s methodology is split into two parts. Firstly, to try to re-create Billig’s ‘day 
survey’ in the television world, a random selection of state-run television programmes were recorded 
and analysed in each country for the same week at the same time. Secondly, to allow for the relatively 
unique phenomena of popular transnational satellite television in these states, a further discussion is 
made of the role of satellite television -  including a content analysis of one channel’s coverage of a 
major sporting event: the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
Finally, in another departure from Billig’s methodology aimed at rectifying one of banal nationalism's 
weaknesses, the last chapter of this study investigates audience response. When Billig says that, “.. .this 
reminding is so familiar, so continual, that it is not consciously registered as reminding,” he assumes 
that whatever is in the press or is flagged is therefore by its audience.303 As Skey comments, Banal 
Nationalism, “.. .does not address how different constituencies might respond to the particular media 
texts or political speeches used as examples of the nation being flagged in a routine or taken-for-granted 
manner.”304 In other words, Billig dedicates no space to assessing whether there is a direct correlation 
between attachment to a national identity and engagement with the institutions that regularly flag it.
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Embarking on a detailed empirical assessment of what impact public mediations have upon Syrian and 
Jordanian audiences is beyond the scope of this study. To gain conclusive data one would need to 
conduct widespread surveys and correlate viewing figures which, in these regimes, is either illegal or 
hard to obtain. Moreover, quantitative surveys lack the detail and complexity needed to explain identity. 
Therefore numerous ethno-graphic qualitative interviews were conducted in Syria and Jordan amongst a 
cross section of society, which will be analysed in this section. Whilst lacking in scientific rigour, these 
interviews offer an extra layer of detail and flavour to further build on Billig’s methodology.
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2.5 Conclusion
In Banal Nationalism Michael Billig asks the important question, ‘why don’t people forget their 
nationality in the West?’ His answer is ‘banal nationalism’ which he defined as, “the ideological habits 
which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced.” Whether Billig’s emphasis on the 
‘established’ democracies of the West was intentionally Euro-centrist or simply a ‘misunderstanding’ is 
open to debate. Nevertheless, his thesis opens the door to further questions that, in its present form, 
banal nationalism does not answer. This thesis poses a similar theoretical query to Billig, asking why 
Arabs don’t forget they are Arab whilst simultaneously entrenching their attachment to their state. It 
argues that Billig is too modest in restricting his theory, and that the methodology and theory of banal 
nationalism can explain how identity is reproduced and sustained in societies the world over. These 
identities are not just national, but sub-national, supra-national and religious also. These societies are 
not just western democracies, but non-westem dictatorships as well. Billig’s own explanation of 
‘waved’ and ‘unwaved’ flags can be equally applied to the seemingly distinctive ‘hot’ and overt 
nationalism of dictatorships as it can the western democracies, and often what appears overt to a visitor 
is banal and mundane to the home citizen.
By applying an adaptation of banal nationalism's methodology to public mediations in Syria and 
Jordan, this study will test the above hypothesis. It will illustrate how state, Arab and religious identities 
are flagged regularly, in both a noticed and unnoticed manner, in the different discourses and public 
mediations of these two similar yet distinct non-westem non-democratic societies. It will discuss the 
images and speeches of leaders, and then analyse the role of national and transnational television. 
Finally, in a notable addition to Billig’s methodology, it will include interviews with these mediations’ 
audience to provide suggestive data on the extent of their reception. The ‘ideological habits’ of Syria 
and Jordan will thus be shown to enable these states’ multiple identities to be reproduced in the same 
way as Billig illustrated for the West.
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Chapter 3
Building a National Discourse in Syria and Jordan
Official identity in Syria and Jordan has never been monolithic. Since independence ruling elites in 
each state have constructed and reshaped different identity discourses often in reaction to political 
circumstances. Even once a comparative political stability was achieved in both countries after 1970 the 
two governments continued to promote a multi-layered and malleable identity, a feature which has 
continued under Syria and Jordan’s new rulers in the 21st century. This chapter examines how and why 
these official identity discourses were built and the role of Arabism and state nationalism within them. 
This overt identity construction serves to test the applicability of Billig to Arab dictatorships. To 
demonstrate how such ‘waved’ flags are now everyday and unnoticed, there then follows an analysis of 
how these identities are routinely flagged daily in arguably the most overt public mediations on display: 
images and speeches of the leader within leadership cults.
As in many dictatorships, and indeed in some democracies, both Syria and Jordan have constructed 
cults around their leaders to inculcate loyalty to the state and the regime. Whilst the public mediations 
within these cults, the pictures of the leader displayed in a public square, or the rhetoric they use in 
speeches, might seem like examples of overt identity flagging to the outsider, they are very much part 
o f the discourse that Syrians and Jordanians consume everyday. This chapter asks whether, in 
authoritarian regimes such as these, such obvious flagging has in fact become unnoticed. Examining 
how these overt symbols have become normalised and even ‘banal’ serves to strengthen this thesis’ 
hypothesis that banal nationalism is as present in dictatorial Arab states as it is in the West. Billig 
argues that, “the symbols of nationhood (coins, bank notes, stamps) become a part of our daily lives. 
These small reminders turn the background space into ‘national’ space.”305 In Syria and Jordan, as shall 
be discussed, images of the leader come to be recognised as symbols of the nation state as much as are 
flags, coins or stamps. In these states, Billig’s ‘unnoticed flag’ is replaced by the unnoticed portrait of 
the leader behind the desk of an official building.
Yet examining the imagery in the cults and speeches made by leaders serves another purpose as well in 
this investigation of nation-building in Syria and Jordan. On the one hand, previous literature on the 
leadership cults, such as Lisa Wedeen’s work on Hafez Assad or Nina Tumarkin’s study of the cult of 
Lenin, can be employed to assess what role these cults played in identity building in Syria and Jordan 
and compare them with similar cults elsewhere. Furthermore, considering the cults helps to answer
305 Ozkirimli, Theories o f nationalism, p. 200.
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whether the identity discourses of Syria and Jordan have evolved between father and son, and how they 
compare with each other in their use of Arab, state and religious symbolism and rhetoric.
Before proceeding to this analysis however, it is necessary to examine the nature of Syria and Jordan’s 
official national discourse. Both the Syrian and Jordanian government are ambiguous in the identity 
they disseminate. With their populations seemingly attached to multiple identities, both the Ba’ath 
regime of Hafez and Bashar al- Assad in Syria and the Hashemite monarchy of Hussein and Abdullah II 
in Jordan have promoted a layered identity in their official discourse: what Frisch calls ‘fuzzy 
nationalism’.306 A key question is why these particular discourses are promoted: whether this ambiguity 
is a deliberate attempt to create an identity that is easy to manipulate around the politics of the day or 
whether it is a result of the weakness and inability of the state to outstrip older, more deeply entrenched 
identities.
306 Frisch, ‘Fuzzy nationalism.’
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3.1 Building Syria and Jordan
Both Jordan and Syria acquired artificial colonially drawn borders that had no history of territorial 
integrity. Understandably, both struggled with nation-building in the years immediately after 
independence. In Syria, political instability in the 1950s and 60s was accompanied by a debate over 
what Syrian identity should be.307 The ruling elites were divided amongst themselves as to whether pan- 
Arabism or Pan-Syrianism should dominate official discourse, with any territory-based Syrian state 
identity pushed to the margins.308 Jordan benefited from greater political stability in these years, with 
King Hussein ruling from 1952 until his death in 1999. However, the acquisition of a large number of 
Palestinians, first through conquest in 1948/9, and then as refugees due to the defeat of 1967, led to 
similar debates over the nature of Jordanian identity -  whether it should be Pan-Jordanian or 
Transjordanian.309
Paul Brass argues that ethnic and national identities are convenient tools used by ruling elites to 
generate mass support.310 Such instrumentalism was most visible in both Syria and Jordan after 1970, a 
period that contrasted greatly with the instability of the 1950s and 60s. In Syria, the ascent of Hafez al- 
Assad to the presidency led not only to political stability, but also to a sustained attempt to pursue a 
consistent program of nation and identity building. In Jordan, victory in the Black September civil war 
by Hussein’s forces over Yasser Arafat’s PLO sidelined Pan-Jordanian identity claims and similarly 
prompted a more deliberate nation-building attempt by the government. However, whilst the post-1970 
stability in each country allowed the leaders the opportunity to promote an identity over a sustained 
period of time, both show a deliberate ambiguity in the official identity promoted. Hafez al-Assad, 
whilst no longer oscillating like his predecessors between Pan-Syrianism and Pan-Arabism, attempted 
to incorporate both into his official identity, alongside a nuanced Syrian territorial nationalism.311 
Similarly, Hussein’s official discourse included three distinctive elements: a Bedouin culture that 
emphasises Jordan’s uniqueness; the Great Arab revolt which stresses Arabism; and his family’s 
connections to the Prophet Mohammad which draws in an Islamic layer of identity.
In assessing these ambiguous discourses, this section will pose the question why such pluralism of 
identity was encouraged. Two alternative suggestions have emerged. The first, from both Layne and 
Frisch is that, as Brass suggests, these governments keep official identity deliberately vague so that
307 Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria (London: OUP, 1965).
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their allegiance can be manipulated around the government’s politics of the day. This is a very 
modernist approach, suggesting that identity is malleable and able to be manipulated. The second is that 
of Ayubi, that all the Arab states, including Syria and Jordan are too weak to carry the state beyond the
2 1  *5‘coercive’ and ‘cooperative’ sphere. By this logic the pluralism of identity is a necessity to legitimate 
the ruling elite by including as many under a common umbrella of identity because, as Anthony Smith 
and ethno-symbolists would argue, older identities cannot be broken down or subordinated.314
3.1.1 Syria
When Syria gained independence in 1946 it was a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-faith state of Sunni, 
Shia, Druze and Alawi Muslims, Orthodox and Catholic Christians, Kurds, Armenians and 
Assyrians.315 Furthermore, against the backdrop of Nasser’s Old Arabism, it was a political 
battleground. Patrick Seale described the 1945-58 period as ‘the Struggle for Syria’ in which the most 
powerful Arab states of the day, notably Nasser’s Egypt and Nuri Said’s Iraq, fought for influence by 
backing different political parties and military strong men.316 From 1946 to 1956 there were several 
coups, 20 different cabinets and the constitution was redrafted four times.317 Though Nasser’s 
supporters appeared to win out when Syria was united with Egypt in 1958, the collapse of this United 
Arab Republic in 1961 following a further coup by the army in Damascus prompted another wave of 
disorder.318 In 1963 the Arab nationalist socialist Ba’ath party seized power, but this only prompted two 
further coups: by leftist Ba’athists in 1966 and, finally, by Hafez al-Assad in 1970.319
Eyal Zisser gives a good account of the two schools of thought on identity facing Syrian rulers prior to 
1970:
“Some of the ideologists might be described as ‘Arab Syrianists’, since they gave priority to the Arab identity and thus to the 
vision of Arab unity, although they did show a readiness to come to terms, for lack of choice, with the existence of a 
separate Syrian state on the condition that it have an Arab colouration. The rest of the ideologues, in essence the majority, 
could be characterised as ‘Syrian Arabists’, giving priority to an authentic Syrian identity and Syrian state, while enveloping 
it, for political convenience and perhaps because of true emotional commitment, in the cloak of Arabism.”320
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Zisser explains how, in this turbulent period, the various regimes tried different formulas to entrench a 
national Syrian identity. Those that tried to emphasise Syria’s pre-Islamic past tended to fail because 
most of the population already felt Islamised or, at the least, Arabised. Similarly those who played on a 
Greater Syrian (bilad as-sham) identity struggled with the reality that that historical territory had now 
been divided into four parts, of which modem Syria was but one.321 In the immediate post-
9^9independence period, Islamists played no role in the debate over Syrian identity. As is detailed by 
Hanna Batatu’s account of the Syrian Peasantry, the power of the state in the post-independence period 
was largely limited to the towns and, with illiteracy levels as high as 42.7% in 1960, the ability for any 
state to disseminate an official identity must be questioned.323 The pre-Assad period was therefore one 
in which elites could neither agree on the nature of Syrian identity nor successfully spread it.
Zisser goes on to claim that, despite this, a, “distinctive, if fragile, Syrian state identity,” did emerge, 
but one that didn’t blossom until Hafez al-Assad’s rule.324 He states that under Hafez this identity,
“.. .lent considerable weight to attempts to portray modem Syria as the heir to Biladal-Sham, even though certain parts of 
those historic lands were not under Syrian sovereignty. The regime adopted a narrative of glorification of Syria’s past, 
moulding an Arab Islamic and an even more ancient pre-Islamic and pre-Arab past into a historical ethos for the Syrian state 
since it stabilised and entrenched itself. At the core of this ethos lay the claim that Bilad al-Sham was the cradle of world 
civilisation and, simultaneously, the cradle of Arabism.”
In essence, Zisser argues that Assad tried to bridge the dichotomy of the post-independence years by 
laying claim to both Pan-Syrianism and Pan-Arabism. This discourse encompassed the cultural 
Arab/Islamic-orientated pan-Arab identity by highlighting Syria’s role as the cradle of Arab 
nationalism, whilst also encompassing a territorial identity that allowed the regime to claim lineage 
from past civilisations that emerged in or occupied Syrian soil, particularly the pre-Islamic era. 
Moreover, unlike previous regimes in Syria Assad’s state was large and, using the Ba’ath party 
machinery and the military as a mobilisation tool, went about creating, “a new generation of Syrian 
Arab Patriots.”325 Rural regions were affected this time with a conscious effort made to bring peasants 
into ‘the nation’.326
A noticeable feature of this multi-layered official identity was both its malleability and its rigidness at 
different times. With regard to Islam, as shall be discussed later, the Ba’ath regime was secular and
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limited the role given to religion. Whilst they amended the constitution in 1973 to ensure that the 
President was always a Muslim and that ‘Islamic jurisprudence’ was the mainstay of legislation, the 
same constitution declared that Syria was a, ‘democratic, popular and socialist state’.327 The 
contradiction of being simultaneously socialist and Islamic was glossed over by the leadership. 
However, this caveat in the official identity allowed for the possibility of Islam’s role to be more 
pronounced later. Inspired by the Iranian Revolution the Muslim Brotherhood launched a revolt against 
Assad’s secular Ba’athism in 1979.328 When this was eventually crushed by Assad’s forces in Hama in 
1982, Talhami explains how Assad subsequently sought to co-opt previous supporters of the Islamist 
rebellion by enhancing his own Islamic credentials.329 He increased public observation of prayers, 
funded more mosques, and revitalised some Sharia and Quaranic studies institutes.330 Whilst the shift 
never altered Syria’s status as one of the most secular regimes in the Muslim Middle East, it 
demonstrates how the official identity could be moulded around political circumstances without 
requiring total transformation. Its broadness therefore offered a certain level of malleability.
As striking was a simultaneous rigidity about the national identity with regard to Syria’s 1.5 million 
Kurds. Whilst Syria’s other minorities -  Alawis, Christians, and Druze amongst others -  were afforded 
space within Assad’s pluralist identity, the Kurds were not. Whilst Armenians were allowed to have 
their own language schools, the Kurds were forbidden even to speak theirs in Arabic-only schools. 
Various programs such as settling Arabs in Kurdish areas were attempted to deny any form of cultural
i ' l l
autonomy for the Kurds. The only option given was to assimilate into the Arabic-speaking 
mainstream, a quite different approach than that demanded of Christians, Armenians, Druze and 
Syriacs. On the one hand, this might be viewed as evidence of Assad’s deep-felt Arabism that, as 
suggested by Daniel Pipes, Hafez was an idealist with no time for non-Arab cultures within Syria.332 
This would explain how he could tolerate Arabic-speaking Christians and Druze, but fails to account for 
the privilege given to Syria’s Armenian or Aramaic-speaking Syriac communities. More convincing is 
Perthes’ view that he was a pragmatist.333 The determining factor that led to unwillingness to find space 
for the Kurds was the size of threat. The Kurds are the largest minority in Syria, making them a greater 
threat than others. They are geographically concentrated rather than the dispersed Christians, and hence
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have a legitimate case for territorial secession. Moreover, they had no economic sway nor use for 
Assad, being mostly of peasant stock unlike the wealthy Christian professional classes. Finally, with co­
nationals in neighbouring states, Hafez had no desire to allow any concessions to Kurdish cultural 
autonomy for fear of igniting a wider wave of Kurdish nationalism and consequent territorial instability 
to his east. The discovery of oil in Syrian Kurdish territory would only have strengthened his resolve to 
quash all talk of Kurdish identity and secession.
Choosing to face down Kurdish nationalism through long-term oppression rather than attempted 
integration suggests an inconsistency to Assad’s official identity discourse. Clearly political expediency 
dictated when the identity was fixed, and when it was malleable. Those groups that were economically 
powerful, but geographically dispersed and unthreatening, such as Christians, Druze and even non-Arab 
Armenians and Syriacs, were easily included. For those who were geographically concentrated and 
therefore a potential threat, but economically and militarily weak, such as the Kurds, the discourse 
remained rigid and not inclusive. For the Islamists, who were both militarily and economically 
threatening because, unlike the ethnic groups, they could potentially recruit the majority Sunni 
population, Assad had to both repress the Muslim Brotherhood militarily to secure his regime, but then 
adapt his discourse to appeal to their potential supporters. In short, whilst the Kurds were containable 
and too insignificant to warrant a shift in the discourse, the Islamists were too great to ignore.
3.1.2 Jordan
Like Syria, Jordan’s early years were characterised by a debate over identity. However, the two newly 
independent states were very different. Whilst Syria had a substantial urban population, the major 
trading cities of Damascus and Aleppo, a sizeable coastline and stretches of fertile land, Jordan,
“was a strip of cultivable land 270 kilometres long with a width tapering from 80 kilometres in the north to nothing in the 
south, and flanked by a great deal of desert; with a population of 350,000, one railway line and hardly any roads, no 
resources whatsoever.”334
By all accounts, basic state building rather than nation building was therefore the priority in the small 
desert kingdom until the 1948-9 Palestine War transformed its demographics. When Abdullah I 
annexed the West Bank, his new united kingdom had a population of 1.43 million, but only 476,000 
were original East Bank Transjordanians. Amman’s population mushroomed from 50,000 to 120,000, 
with many Palestinians living in refugee camps in the city.335 With the East Bankers now forming a 
minority, the next twenty years were characterised by two camps on the direction of Jordan’s identity.
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The dominant group were the Pan-Jordanians who, “believed in the unity of the two banks [of the 
Jordan] as the territorial basis of the Jordanian state, but with the centre of gravity of such a state 
remaining in Amman.” In contrast there were the original East Bankers or ‘Transjordanian 
nationalists’ who increasingly resented the West Bank and its Palestinian population.
It was against the backdrop of this debate that the seventeen-year-old Hussein came to power in 1952/3. 
This was also the era of Nasser and Old Arabism, which further complicated Jordan’s identity debate. 
Many in Jordan favoured Nasser’s Arabism and, though Hussein showed initial enthusiasm for Nasser’s 
rise in 1952, he soon found himself threatened by coups led by Nasserist officers in the Jordan army.338 
Though Nasser was Hussein’s enemy for long stretches his biographer, Nigel Ashton, suggests that 
Hussein did develop a genuine attachment for his own brand of ‘Hashemite Arabism’. It was this that 
conditioned some of Hussein’s actions including his disastrous entry into the 1967 war that saw the 
West Bank occupied by Israel.339 This also ensured that a layer of Arab identity remained within the 
Jordanian discourse long after the Pan-Jordanian/Transjordanian debate had been resolved.
Perhaps more important than the physical loss of the West Bank in shaping Jordanian identity, was the 
Black September civil war of 1970-1 between Hussein’s forces and Arafat’s PLO. After expelling 
Arafat’s ‘state within a state’ from his borders Robins comments, “there was only one state left in 
Jordan.”340 But was there only one identity? Though the Transjordanian nationalists would now 
dominate was Hussein able to construct a ‘coherent and unified’ identity alongside his state?341
Linda Layne emphasised that, like in Syria, the official identity promoted by Hussein’s regime aimed at 
finding a broad common identity for its pluralist population. She states, “Jordan appears to be 
constructing itself in a way that enables it, ‘to make links across all kinds of division.’”342 As with 
Syria, where Hafez attempted to loosely fuse together Greater Syrian and Arab identities, Jordanian 
identity draws on Arabist and Islamic discourse, presumably to included Pan-Jordanians, whilst also 
emphasising a unique civic identity for Jordan, to co-opt Transjordanian nationalists. As Layne 
highlights, Jordanian nationalist rhetoric is composed of these three main elements. Firstly, the Arabist, 
which emphasises the role of the Hashemites in leading the Arab revolt of 1916 against the Ottomans. 
Secondly, the Islamic, which emphasises the genealogical links between the Hashemites and the
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Prophet Mohammad. Thirdly, there is the Jordanian, which highlights Jordan’s unique ‘tribal’ 
character.343 In each of these the monarchy is central.
As with Syria, this Jordanian identity is somewhat contradictory, not least because the Hashemites who 
claim to embody what it is to be Jordanian, have no historical links to the territory and are not of tribal 
origin -  the claim to Jordanian uniqueness. However, as with the Ba’ath regime, “the Jordanian state 
thrives on the ambiguity and haziness of its nationalist ideologies.”344 Frisch coined the term, ‘fuzzy 
nationalism’ to describe this deliberate vagueness, which he states is rooted in security concerns and the 
need for the regime to maintain popular support for its changing foreign policies.345 Useful though 
Hillel’s term is, he essentially is modifying the nationalism theory of modernists such as Halliday who 
suggest that, . .nationalism as an ideology has no fixed state. It is not a matter.. .of a ‘true’ versus 
‘false’ definition of identity, but of shifts in identity and arguments about it, corresponding to shifting 
social and political relations.”346 Hillel’s angle is that, rather than evolve identities over time, the 
Jordanian state attempts to maintain several ‘layers of identity’ at the same time that it can draw upon 
when it wishes. One such occasion that he highlights is Hussein’s dropping of Jordan’s claim to the 
West Bank in 1988 which, surprisingly, was couched in Arabist rather than Jordanian rhetoric. Such is 
the extent to which these multiple layers of identity were entrenched that no one saw it as inconsistent 
to talk of Arab unity whilst abandoning Arab territory.347
Frisch’s analysis does go some way to supporting Ayubi’s assertion that Jordanian identity is flexible 
because of the weakness of the state. Rather like Hafez al-Assad against Islamists in 1982 and the 
Kurds over a more sustained period of time, the Jordanian state has at times resorted to force and 
coercion when challenged by those who claimed an alternative identity discourse. This was seen during 
Black September, when support for the PLO amongst Palestinian Jordanians still seemingly outstripped 
loyalty to the Hashemite state and required violent enforcement.348 Similarly, the suspension of 
Parliament from1970-88 suggests a lack of confidence that Jordanians would choose parties that 
conform to the official identity discourse should they be given the free choice. This was seemingly 
confirmed when free elections mostly returned tribal leaders and Islamists in the 1990s.349 However, in 
contrast to Syria a success of Jordanian identity is that its malleability incorporated older identities 
rather than subsume them to a wider loyalty. Unlike Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood, Jordanian Islamists 
tacitly support the regime and, though the Hashemites would probably prefer them to have less success
343 Ibid., p. 26.
344 Ibid., p. 28.
345 Frisch, ‘Fuzzy nationalism,’, p. 86; Lynch, ‘Jordan’s Identity,’ p. 56.
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in the polls, their victory does not fundamentally challenge the official identity discourse -  which has 
an Islamic component. Similarly, though voters stayed loyal to their tribal chiefs in elections, the tribes 
are loyal to the monarchy and do not challenge the discourse, which includes a tribal element. 
Moreover, despite the oppression of Black September, and the continued suspension of parliament, 
Jordan did not experience the same police state society as Syria. Hafez al-Assad relied far more on 
coercion than did Hussein, and the simultaneous absence of heavy policing alongside a period of 
relative calm suggests at least some acquiescence from the population in Jordan towards the official 
identity.
Can Jordan’s official identity therefore be seen as more flexible and accommodating than Syria’s? 
Perhaps the best way to assess is to compare how each regime’s discourse responded to challenges. 
Both have faced an Islamist challenge, which both have attempted to co-opt in different ways. The 
Ba’athists firstly used violence by killing up to 10,000 civilians in the Muslim Brotherhood controlled 
city of Hama in 1982, before then altering its discourse to contain limited elements of Islam.350 The 
Jordanians faced no such violent challenge from Islamists and were able to mould their branch of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, the IAF, into a loyal opposition. Yet in both states there remains a layer of more 
militant Islamists who would overthrow the regime for a more Islam-only identity. Both states have
also faced an irredentist challenge to their official identity: the PLO-supporters in Jordan who wanted to 
overthrow the monarchy for a republic that would focus on liberating Palestine, and separatist Kurds in 
Syria. Whilst both responded with violence at times, most notably the Jordanians during Black 
September, it is noticeable that after this the Hashemites tried to find space for the West Bankers within 
their official discourse -  by emphasising their Arab and Islamic identities. No such space was found for 
Kurds within Syrian identity.
Evidently then, both regimes promote an identity that is flexible around circumstances and politics but 
that still has fixed ‘red lines’ in places that the regime will not allow to be crossed. The Syrian regime’s 
lines are more fixed than in Jordan, never allowing the Kurdish question to be included and only 
allowing a certain level of Islam. Jordan has its red lines too. In the 1980s a debate over tribalism as a 
symbol of Jordanian identity was ended after intervention from Hussein in favour of the tribes. 
Similarly, the crushing in Black September illustrated the limited concession Hussein was willing to 
give to a Palestinian identity. However, Jordan’s identity has a broader scope than Syria’s. Perhaps this 
is ironically because it is a weaker government and therefore cannot mle with as much of an iron fist as 
Syria. Its official identity has to be flexible enough to gain broad cooperation from the population
350 Fisk, Pity the Nation, pp. 185-6.
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352 Layne, Home and Homeland, p. 104.
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because it does not have the strength or resources of Syria to rule through coercion. In this regard, 
Ayubi’s thesis seems flawed: the weaker regime, Jordan, rules through more cooperation, whilst the 
stronger regime, Syria, uses greater coercion. Moreover, both regimes have shown themselves able to 
be malleable with their identities according to political circumstance. The absence of Islamic rebellion 
in Syria after 1982 suggests that the combination of cooption and coercion has worked. The same could 
be said of militant Palestinian nationalism in Jordan since 1970. On the surface then, contrary to ethno- 
symbolist claims, identities do seem impressionable to official identity discourses.
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3.2 Leadership Cults
These ambiguous, multi-faceted official discourses are disseminated through the institutions of the 
Syrian and Jordanian state. Educational institutions teach children a set curriculum that reproduces the 
official national identity. Conscription into the armed forces ensures that young men have a few years
of direct propaganda. Those who join trade unions or, in Syria, the Ba’ath party itself similarly 
encounter the discourse daily.354 An analysis of any of these ‘waved’ flags would no doubt illustrate the 
workings of the discourse in detail. This study though will focus on the area of overt discourse flagging 
that is arguably the most accessible to citizens in Syria and Jordan for the longest period of their life: 
the images and speeches of leaders, often disseminated as part of a leadership cult.
Any visitor to either Syria or Jordan is struck by the proliferation of billboard posters, photographs and 
banners venerating not just Bashar and Abdullah but also Hafez and Hussein. As well as fostering 
loyalty to the regime, these ‘cults’ intersperse images of the leader with national flags and symbols, 
overtly promoting the multi-faceted identity discourse. Yet what seems overt for visitors is mundane for 
most Syrians and Jordanians: the images being as normal and everyday as advertisements for Pepsi or 
Nestle. Indeed, the cults and national symbols have become so interchangeable that a photograph of the 
leader tends to be the dominant symbol displayed in classrooms, public buildings and shops rather than 
a flag. Rather than being the ‘waved’ flag that an outsider may see, this section will suggest that the 
images and speeches of leaders have become so normalised that they too have become ‘banal’ 
reminders of the national discourse.
3.2.1 Defining Leadership cults
Deconstructing the features of Syria and Jordan’s cults of leadership helps to illustrate the nature of the 
identity discourses outlined above. However, before analysing how the images and speeches in cults 
reproduce the nationalist discourses in Syria and Jordan, ‘cult’ needs to be defined. The advent of mass 
communication in the era of modernity has allowed ruling leaders to promote themselves as a symbol of 
their regime and, at times, the nation, in a way that pre-modem despots such as Louis XIV of France 
never could. The quasi-deification of 20 century dictators such as Hitler, Stalin and Mao through a cult 
has been well documented, and their techniques of using posters, murals, statues, media and symbols to 
promote both loyalty and identity have been mimicked by modem rulers such as Kim Jong II and
353 Suleiman, ‘The Role of Education,’ in Luciani and Salame, The Politics o f Arab Integration, pp. 73-93.
354 Batatu, Syria's Peasantry, p. 188.
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Saparmurat Niyazov (Turkmenbashi).355 Distinguishing and defining cults is not straightforward. On 
the one hand, rulers such as Turkmenbashi who combined absolute power with such vanity that he 
renamed months after himself and his family might adequately be considered ‘cult’. On the other hand, 
what about the ritual veneration of Queen Elizabeth II of Great Britain, who has an official birthday and 
whose image is regularly embossed on stamps, coins, bank notes and official portraits? What about the 
veneration of nationalist founding fathers such as George Washington or Ataturk?
Lisa Wedeen’s, Ambiguities o f Domination, a detailed study of the cult surrounding Hafez Assad 
regards it as a personality cult. It notes several unexpected features of the cult and its relationship to 
power and identity. Wedeen argues that, despite its appearance, Assad’s cult does not produce 
popularity or establish legitimacy, but instead acts as a disciplinary device, generating a politics of 
public dissimulation in which citizens act as z/they revere the leader.356 She highlights the link between 
the cult and nation-building, seeing the cult as defining and generalising a specific type of national 
membership and suggesting that, “national membership is expressed through people’s facility to 
reproduce the symbolism of Assad’s rule. The nation-state, in this sense, extends as far as the cult 
does.”357 Wedeen highlights the paradox of Assad’s cult: that it does not persuade citizens or even the 
producers of the cult to believe in its absurd slogans about Assad’s ability, yet its strength is in its 
ability to act as if they do, to, “say the ridiculous and avow the absurd.”358 Methodologically, Wedeen 
notes the difficulty in assessing how much the images and speeches of a cult impact on nation-building, 
given the disparity between public involvement and private reservations about slogans and symbols. 
She compensates for this by conducting ethnographic interviews with Syrians -  a method repeated in 
this study with the qualitative interviews with Jordanians and Syrians discussed in chapter six.
Wedeen’s work raises several questions of relevance. Did the cult of Hussein in Jordan, for example, 
have similar features to those identified by Wedeen in Syria? In her conclusion, Wedeen identified 
Hussein’s cult, alongside that of Ben Ali in Tunisia, as one that would merit further investigation -  
something addressed here. Similarly, what about the cults of Bashar al-Assad and Abdullah II, which 
Wedeen identifies as ‘second generation’ cults as they were inherited from the regime’s previous 
rulers.360 How has Bashar’s cult changed from Hafez’s? How has Abdullah’s changed from Hussein’s? 
What impact has this had on the official identity discourse they are disseminating?
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Indeed, can Bashar, Abdullah and Hussein’s reproduction of their images, which are less dramatic than 
Hafez’s, be considered cults? Returning to the question posed earlier, how do we distinguish between 
the reproduction of the image of Hafez al-Assad, George Washington or Queen Elizabeth IT? Both are 
used to promote identity and power, so are they both cults? Nina Tumarkin’s study of the cult of Lenin 
offers some useful answers to these questions. Tumarkin asserts that what distinguishes the cult 
surrounding dead leaders such as Lenin or Washington, with that employed by Stalin or Mao is power. 
Whilst Stalin used the cult surrounding him to exercise power, Lenin’s cult emerged after his death. 
Stalin, therefore had a personality cult because of its “excessive vanity and abuse of real power 
combined with the systematic use of political terror”, whilst Lenin had a cult that was disconnected 
from power.361 The cults of Washington and Ataturk would therefore be cults but not personality cults 
as they are deceased and, if Queen Elizabeth II can be said to have a cult, it is one of celebrity rather 
than personality as she holds little power.
The fault with Tumarkin’s model is that it is quite an arbitrary line: when political terror and power 
becomes so great that the reproduction of an image becomes a personality rather than a leadership or 
celebrity cult is difficult to ascertain. This study proposes identifying cults by offering a more detailed 
set of criteria than just this arbitrary line between image use and power. It proposes combining the 
criteria of personality cults identified by Wedeen and Tumarkin to establish a sliding scale for the 
intensity of a cult. Six criteria of a personality cult can be chosen to consider: the actual power of the 
leader, the extent to which terror is systematically used, how much they demand a belief in the absurd, 
how much the leader personifies the state, how much they deliberately build identity, and how much 
space is shared with others. Using these criteria to guide us, the reproduction of images and speeches of 
the leader in Syria and Jordan under Hafez, Hussein, Bashar and Abdullah all display these features 
sufficiently to label them ‘cults’. Whether we cross the line to call them ‘personality’ cults as has Nina 
Tumarkin is actually largely immaterial. With the possible exception of Hafez, none represent the level 
of intensity seen in the cults of Turkmenistan, Saddam’s Iraq or Kim Jong-D’s North Korea, yet the 
concentration of power in the hands of the leader being venerated and the use of some political terror 
ensures that each are more cult-like than the foundation cults of America and Turkey or the monarchy 
cult of Britain.
What remains to be discussed is how these images and speeches serve to build and reproduce identity in 
Syria and Jordan and how, especially under the second generation cults of Bashar and Abdullah, they
361 Nina Tumarkin, Lenin Lives! The Lenin cult in Soviet Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 
xx.
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have become some normal and everyday that they now serve to reproduce the national discourse in a 
banal and unnoticed manner.
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3.3 Images and Speeches in Syria
3.3.1 The Cult of Hafez
Based on Soviet models the cult of leadership that Hafez al-Assad created in the 1970s and was 
maintained until, some say beyond, his death in 2000, proves a useful example of how the regime t 
disseminated its official identity.362 Through murals, slogans, pictures and statues, the cult of Assad 
promoted to the Syrian people the various layers of identity already discussed.
This cult was composed of various themes. Amongst the most prominent was the family, with images 
of Hafez alongside his mother and children widespread. Lisa Wedeen argued that it is this willingness 
to share public space with others that distinguishes Hafez’s cult from others such as Stalin’s.363 These 
images which emphasised the importance of the family unit to Syrian society varied from early pictures 
of Hafez’s mother, often depicted as haloed, to later promotions of Hafez’ eldest sons Basil and 
Bashar.364 Similarly, another theme played upon was that of socialism and populism. Hanna Batatu 
emphasises the references to Assad’s own peasant background and numerous allusions to the power of 
‘the people’, and Wedeen illustrated the paradox of Assad attempting to be both ‘father of the nation’ 
whilst simultaneously being a ‘man of the people’.365 A third theme was the military. Whilst Assad 
didn’t share Saddam’s cult’s penchant for portraying him as all things to all people -  dressed as a tourist 
in portraits in the Iraqi ministry of tourism, or as a chef at the Iraqi culinary association, he was 
nonetheless consistently depicted as a great military leader.366 Having been an air force colonel, images 
of Assad, later joined by Bashar and Basil, dressed in uniform were amongst the most common 
images.367 This militarisation of society was further disseminated by the regime’s decision to alter 
school uniform to be military style.
However, all these themes appealed to a local view of identity and primarily promoted Syrian state 
identity. Hafez’s images of his family were clearly not intended to encourage a commonality between 
all families across the globe, but were a specific model for Syrian families to follow. Similarly, Assad 
was no socialist internationalist and his populist appeals to the masses were not aimed at identifying 
them with international labour. In the same way, the uniforms regularly worn by Hafez and his sons 
were of the Syrian military and it was within this establishment and this Syrian territory that those 
uniforms were valid. This might seem an obvious observation but this level of banal identification was
362 Ibid., p. 27; Seale, Asad, pp. 339-340.
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not widely promoted in the pre-Assad period. The cult’s widespread reproduction of such everyday 
institutions as the military, the peasantry and the family could therefore serve to strengthen state 
identity in a way not seen before. As Wedeen stated, “the nation-state, in this sense, extends as far as 
the cult does.”369
However, the Assad cult was not that straightforward. Alongside those unnoticed images that should 
have strengthened a single state identity was a deliberate attempt to also manufacture the pan-Arab and 
pan-Syrian identities mentioned earlier. As Daniel Pipes has been at pains to highlight, Assad made 
loose territorial claims to Jordan and Palestine emphasising their historical Greater Syrian identity.370 At 
the same time an attempt was made to portray Hafez as an Arab nationalist, as the heir to Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, with images of the deceased Egyptian President sometimes appearing alongside that of the 
Syrian leader.371 Similarly, Zisser’s analysis of Syrian public holidays shows several references to an 
Arabist identity. 6th May celebrates a clash between Ottoman authorities and Arab nationalists in 1916, 
for example, and the 22nd February is known as ‘Arab Unity Day’, celebrating the brief union of Syria 
and Egypt in 1958.372 However, these holidays are celebrated alongside those that are clearly more 
Syrian nationalist, such as 17th April which commemorates Independence from France in 1945, 8th 
March and 16th November which commemorate the two Ba’ath coups of 1963 and 1970, and 6th 
October which commemorates the October War with Israel.373
Syrian state nationalism was promoted in the increased celebration of ancient cultures found within 
Syria’s modem borders. Zisser argues that, despite initial misgivings about these non-Arab cultures 
damaging the regime’s message, “By the 1980s the Syrian regime appeared less reluctant to refer to a 
more distant heritage as a means of strengthening national pride in Syria, and began merging this 
history into the Syrian historical narrative.” A quick survey of such banal nationalist objects as Syria’s 
bank notes helps to illustrate this development. Pre-Assad, bank notes issued in 1958 had mostly Arab 
or Islamic cultures depicted upon them. The Umayyad mosque, Hama’s medieval water wheels, the 18th 
century Azem Palace and the Takiyya as-Suleimaniyya mosque cover four of the five notes, with the 
only ancient symbol being a picture of Palmyra’s ruins. By the early part of Hafez’s rule in the 1970s 
and early 1980s, of seven bank notes four still displayed Arab/Islamic culture with the Umayyad 
mosque and Hama’s wheels now joined by an image of Aleppo’s medieval citadel and an image of 
Saladin. However, now three notes were dedicated to ancient cultures -  Palmyra, the Roman Bosra 
theatre, and Palmyra’s queen Zenobia. This trend continues into the present with the last notes issued
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under Hafez’s rule, those from 1998, portraying in total five Arab/Islamic cultural images and four 
ancient cultures.374 The shift is such that by the end of the Hafez era ancient ‘Syria-only’ images are 
given almost as much space in the discourse as Arab/Islamic cultural images.
Despite this gradual increase in space for ancient figures and cultures, none was as central in the Assad 
cult as the confusing figure of Saladin. Hafez would frequently be referred to as ‘the new Saladin’, 
erected various statues to him, named a castle after him and even had a portrait of his victory over the 
crusaders at Hittin in 1187 behind his Presidential desk.375 The fact that Saladin used Damascus as his 
base to drive out the crusaders from Jerusalem gave Assad an obvious parallel to draw upon during his 
long-standing conflict with Israel. However, quite which element of the Saladin story Hafez wished to 
celebrate seemed to vary. At times, Saladin was a Pan-Arabist who united the Arabs in a kingdom from 
Cairo to Baghdad.376 However, given that he was actually of Kurdish origin, Saladin’s role as ruler of 
an expanded Bilad as-Sham was also used. Finally, given that he was actually bom in modem Iraq, 
Saladin’s connection to Damascus was often emphasised for a more state nationalist. The advantage of 
drawing parallels between himself and Saladin was that his achievements were so wide that the regime 
could interpret them as they wished around which ever layer of identity they wanted to promote at the 
time.
Hafez al-Assad therefore constructed a cult of the leader that complemented the ambiguity of the 
identity he wished to disseminate. At different times he drew upon statist structures such as the military, 
family and the peasantry and at others more Syrian-only symbols such as its ancient cultures. At other 
times he used images such as Nasser to push a more pan-Arab identity and the convenient figure of 
Saladin to incorporate Arabism, pan-Syrianism and Syrian state identity when it suited. One symbol 
remained constant however: the image of Hafez himself. Many authors have commentated that Hafez 
himself became intrinsically linked to national identity.377
3.3.2 The Cult of Bashar
When Bashar succeeded Hafez in 2000, one of his first orders was the removal of portraits of his father 
from everywhere except official buildings.378 Whilst the inefficient Syrian bureaucracy only half­
heartedly carried out this request, its symbolism was still significant: things were to be done differently 
from now on. Yet were they really? Visitors to Syria today are struck by the volume of pictures of
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Bashar and Hafez still scattered around the country. Some, admittedly, are relics from Hafez’s days that 
have not been taken down. Others though, are new additions. So has Bashar just replaced Hafez in the 
cult, or are the changes deeper than that?
Rabil argues that things have changed dramatically, that Bashar has no leadership cult and, 
consequently, is in a far weaker position than his father.379 Zisser argues the contrary that, though the 
style may be different, the substance is the same and despite Bashar’s initial toning down in reality he 
too is the subject of a cult.380 This view is shared by Ghattas, though she believes Bashar genuinely did 
try to move away from the cult and it was only after external factors challenged the regime’s power in 
2005 that a cult around Bashar re-emerged to shore up domestic support.381 Finally, Carsten Wieland 
believes that whilst there remains a cult around Bashar, it has become popularised in a way that was 
never seen under Hafez, with many ordinary Syrians voluntarily placing pictures of Bashar on their cars 
and homes without compulsion from the state.382
Rabil is wrong to say there is no cult around Bashar. The new president’s promotion of the free market 
may have led to advertisements lining the streets alongside government slogans, but the slogans are still 
there even if their impact is diluted. Even before the 2005 revival that saw the giant pictures of the 
President return one should not exaggerate Bashar’s request to reduce the cult. Though there were to be 
no statues or murals like under Hafez, keeping Bashar’s image on official buildings was no small 
caveat. The public sector in Syria employs over a quarter of the Syrian workforce and, alongside 
schools, universities and hospitals, not to mention Ba’ath party facilities, the President’s image is still 
seen by most Syrians several times a day.383 Though the cult became larger after 2005, and even bigger 
during the 2007 campaign where Bashar sought ‘re-election’ in an unopposed referendum, it had been 
nowhere near removed in the intervening five years. Wieland is probably correct in emphasising how 
much more personally popular Bashar is compared to the feared figure of Hafez, and many may choose 
to display images of the President without pressure from the regime. Similarly, after 30 years of Hafez a 
culture of sycophancy has evolved in Syria where many businesses, unions and shops will voluntarily 
use images of the President to entice customers.384 Syrian academic Sami Moubayad explains this by 
saying, “The government has never given an indication if it wants the posters there or not, so people 
assume that they like them. Plus there is the mimicking effect where if one shop or street puts a poster
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up, the next will follow and so on.”385 However, whilst it remains open to debate quite how 
orchestrated the cult is, it is hard to believe that there is no input from the regime. In a tightly controlled 
state the pictures drivers place on their car are produced, manufactured and sold on government licence, 
not by independent merchants spontaneously professing their love of the president.
Zisser though is inaccurate in claiming there was just a superficial change in the cults of Hafez and 
Bashar. Zisser states that, “a survey of Syrian newspapers...reveals no significant change in the 
treatment of him (Bashar) as compared to that of his father.”386 However, whilst there remains a taboo 
around criticising the regime, the style of press is quite different. Whilst Hafez was referred to by 
various different grand titles from al-mualim (the teacher) to Suriyya al-Assad (Assad’s Syria), Bashar 
is simply al-rais (The President). In other ways, Bashar is portrayed with much less deification than his 
father. There are no gold statues nor are there murals portraying him as the ‘father of the nation’. Whilst 
Hafez was at times a peasant, at others a military leader, at times an intellectual -  such as the quite 
comical statue of him reading a book outside the Hafez al-Assad library in Damascus -  Bashar’s image 
is more consistent. Mostly that image is of a modernising intellectual reformer.387 He is also more often 
than not depicted as accessible: either surrounded by people, smiling or waving. One rarely sees the 
same solemnness associated with Hafez. Similarly, whilst there remains a certain militarism to the 
Bashar cult, with images of him in uniform widespread, it is nowhere near the levels seen under Hafez 
and there has been a demilitarisation of society with the end of military school uniforms and a reduction 
in the length of military service.388 One area of consistency with Hafez is Bashar’s cult’s emphasis on 
the family. The most popular images are Bashar with his young and fashionable wife Asma and their 
three children, rather than those of the President with his father or brothers.
So whilst the subject of the cult has altered, has there also been a shift in the official identity it 
promotes? Barry Rubin argues that there has, and the Bashar regime places far greater emphasis on 
Islam than Hafez ever did.389 He cites Syria’s public support of foreign Islamists such as Hezbollah and 
Hamas as evidence for this shift. Rubin however, is mistaken. Whilst there has clearly been a greater 
Islamisation of Syrian society during Bashar’s years in power, this is part of a regional trend that began 
in the 1980s. For pragmatic reasons in the conflict with Israel he backs Islamist elements abroad. In 
2005 when he felt his regime under pressure, as Moubayad states, “Bashar started using religious 
overtones with slogans like ‘God protect Syria.’ This was strange for a secular country and a very
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secular leader but he had to shore up support from the growing Islamic street.”390 However, it is 
noticeable that this faith-filled slogan is religion-neutral and could as well appeal to Christians as much 
as Muslims. Indeed, any survey of Bashar’s cult will notice a conspicuous absence of Islam, even less 
so than under Hafez. Whilst Hafez promoted secularism, he still allowed limited Islamic projects, such 
as having his name inscribed on the restored Umayyad Mosque. Bashar, though he continues his 
father’s tradition of occasional public praying, particularly during Ramadan, has not embossed his 
names on religious buildings, nor are images of him praying amongst those widely distributed -  unlike 
in Abdullah’s Jordan (see below). Indeed, as with Hafez, “Bashar’s speeches and interviews 
consistently reflect a secular perception without any Islamic religious undertones,” declining even to 
open his speeches with Bisimallah (in the name of God) -  seen as standard for any Arab leader.392
A closer examination of Bashar’s public speeches, both to domestic and foreign audiences, suggests 
consistency with Hafez in promoting a mixed Arab and Syrian identity. The author reviewed four 
speeches, two for a domestic audience -  Bashar’s inaugural addresses o f2000 and 2007 -  and two for a 
foreign, albeit Arab, audience -  his opening of the 2008 Arab League summit in Damascus and his 
address to the Syrian Journalists union during the 2006 Lebanese war with Israel. As mentioned, the 
most obvious consistency in all of these speeches is an absolute minimal reference to religion. A second 
consistency is the repeated flagging of the word ‘Arab’. Bashar refers to the ‘Arab nation’, ‘Arab 
national interests’, ‘our present Arab world’, ‘Arab common interests’, ‘Arab values and ethics’ and 
‘genuine Arab characteristics’.393 This pan-Arabist rhetoric is particularly pronounced in the two 
foreign speeches, though it also has a substantial presence in the domestic deliveries. A specific Syrian 
identity is mentioned alongside the Arab in these foreign speeches with Bashar speaking of, ‘We in 
Syria,’ on numerous occasions. However, in the two foreign speeches the Arab identity is the most 
pronounced. In simple numbers, in his speech to the Arab League, Bashar mentions the word ‘Arab’ 
forty-two times, and ‘Syria’ only eight. When commenting on the Lebanon War, ‘Arab’ is mentioned 
seventy-nine times, in contrast to only twenty for ‘Syria’. In contrast, in Bashar’s 2000 inaugural 
address he mentions ‘Arab’ seventeen times to ‘Syria’s ten, and in 2007, ‘Arab’ has twenty mentions 
whilst ‘Syria’ has forty-nine.
Looking specifically at some passages, we see the different elements of Bashar’s discourse. Here, for 
example, is an excerpt from the speech given at the 4th General Conference of the Journalists Union Al- 
Umawyeen Conference Palace, in Damascus on August 15, 2006, just after the Lebanon war:
390 Interview with the author 7/6/10.
391 Miriam Cooke, Dissident Syria (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), p. 13.
392 Zisser, Commanding Syria, p. 58.
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“I would like to say to the Syrian Arab people that the word "proud" is not enough at all to express what a human being feels 
towards the greatness of your support to our Lebanese brothers. You were great when some persons wanted you to look 
small overwhelmed by malevolence. But, the great people of Syria always surprises the adversary by what is not expected. 
You dealt a blow to those who wanted to create a division between Syria and Lebanon. You were magnificent in your 
comprehending the magnitude of the conspiracy, and you were very strong in your reaction towards this conspiracy. In brief, 
you were the beating heart of Arabism with every sense of the word regarding the heat that will rise and the meaning which 
will be more powerful when we liberate the Golan by our hands, will and determination. The destiny of Syria is to be proud 
of Arabism and to defend and maintain it because it is the only base for a bright and honourable future we build for our 
children. We have to implant in our hearts and minds that there is no place in this world but for the strong. Strength starts by 
the power of mind, will and faith and this is the base of resistance and the only way to achieve victory.”394
At once Bashar’s rhetoric is Arabist and Syrian nationalist. He emphasises the commonality between 
Syria and Lebanon, referring to the Lebanese as ‘brothers’ and condemning those who, ‘wanted to 
create a division’ between them. He plays up the Arab identity of Syrians, referring to them as the 
‘beating heart of Arabism’ and as ‘the Syrian Arab people’. Yet at the same time Bashar refers directly 
to Syrian nationalist concerns. He speaks of liberating the Golan: a specifically Syrian rather than Arab 
issue. Similarly he speaks of ‘the great people of Syria’. Indeed, this passage illustrates Bashar’s 
national Arabism. He uses Arabism as something for which specifically the Syrians should be proud. 
By stating that it is ‘the destiny of Syria to be proud of Arabism’ he is in effect creating a national myth 
for the Syrians: that they are more Arabist than other Arabs. In this discourse, being the ‘beating heart 
of Arabism’ is indeed what makes Syrians special.
In a second passage, this time Bashar's speech to the Peoples Assembly following the oath-taking for a 
new constitutional term of office on July 18, 2007, we see a similar use of rhetoric. He says:
“Dear sisters and brothers, I address you with all respect, appreciation, and love. I want us to make every possible effort to 
build Arab Syria, the model in its prosperity and progress as it is the model of steadfastness. I want you to be optimistic 
despite all these circumstances. This nation has known many invaders throughout history. They destroyed mosques and 
churches, burnt libraries and killed scientists and resistance men. But they have all gone and we remained with our nation, 
our heritage, our identity and our language. Today, history repeats itself. They have not learnt the lesson. We did. Here is the 
lively spirit of this nation moving everywhere announcing its existence to the world that it is alive in the heart of every 
resistance man and declaring that it will triumph despite the pain. As for them, they will disappear once again. We remain 
the owners and lovers of this land; we live on it, hold its soil sacred and bequeath its eternal love to one generation after 
another. As for me, I shall remain as you have known me, one of you, I work for you, I drink with you from the spring of 
patriotism and pan-Arabism and breath the blessings of God and the people.”395
See Appendix II, D.
395 See Appendix II, B.
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Again Bashar strikes a balance between Arab and state identity. He speaks of a desire to build ‘Arab 
Syria’ and declares that ‘pan-Arabism’ is one of the crucial ‘springs’ from which he and the Syrian 
people drink. Similarly it is notable that he does add the occasional reference to religion, inviting his 
audience to be shocked that previous invaders, ‘destroyed mosques and churches,’ and breathing, ‘the 
blessings of God’. It is striking though how state nationalist this passage is -  notable as it is the final 
paragraph of his second inaugural speech. He is particular to link the territory of Syria to the people, 
speaking of past invaders to ‘this nation’, and declaring his audience to be ‘the owners and lovers of 
this land’. He is not here speaking of the Arab nation or the Arab lands but specifically Syria. Again, he 
is promoting a mythical bond between people and territory in which the soil is ‘sacred’. He similarly 
identifies an ‘other’ who threaten the nation. He speaks often of ‘they’ who destroyed mosques or did 
not leam the lessons of the past, as a counterbalance to ‘we’ who will triumph. The different identities 
whether Arab or religious are channelled into the common, Syrian, national good.
This suggests that, consistent with Hafez, Bashar balances both an Arab and a Syrian identity. Also like 
his father, he interchanges the ‘us’ group he is projecting to his people from the Arabs to the Syrians. 
To both domestic and foreign audiences, ‘we’ or ‘us’ is sometimes the Syrians, and sometimes the 
Arabs. Similarly, ‘our nation’, ‘our people’ and ‘our society’ varies in its meaning. Due to its specific 
Arabic meaning, ‘Our country’ (Biladna) however, always refers to Syria. Bashar’s flagging of the 
nation is therefore different to Billig’s examples of John Major in Britain or George H Bush in the US 
in that who ‘we’ are remains ambiguous.396 This variability in which layer of identity is being banally 
flagged by a leader’s rhetoric illustrates the need for Billig’s narrow theory to be expanded.
Zisser has argued that, whilst Bashar has retained Hafez’s ambiguity, the balance between Syrian and 
Arab identity has now shifted to be more Syrian.397 An analysis of some of the posters from the 2007 
election campaign, still in place in 2009, might support this view such as Statist slogans like, ‘Syria: 
God is her protector, Assad is her shepherd’.398 Similarly, with the ‘return’ of the cult in 2005 there was 
an unexpected wealth of Syrian flags on the streets and public buildings. In the past the more prominent 
symbol had been the pan-Arab flag of the Ba’ath -  the same as Palestine. However, it is too early to see 
if this will be permanent or just a convenient tool for the time being. Certainly the presence of slogans 
such as, “Yes for the beating heart of Arabism,” alongside more statist ones suggest Arabism won’t be 
subsumed by a solely Syrian identity any time soon.399 A more noticeable shift has, however, been a 
nuanced move away from Pan-Syrianism. Bashar dropped Syria’s long standing claims to the Turkish
396 Billig, Banal Nationalism, pp. 81-92.
397 Zisser, ‘Who's afraid?’, p. 180.
398 See Appendix I, B.
399 See Appendix I, A.
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province of Hatay in 2004.400 Similarly, though not out of choice, Syria has recognised Lebanon’s 
independence for the first time since decolonisation by swapping ambassadors in 2008. This is a far cry 
from Hafez’s quasi-imperialist mantra that the two countries were, “two states, one people.”401
On the other hand, the pan-Syrian Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP) has been legalised under 
Bashar and brought into government and, whilst their power is negligible, the symbolism is still 
significant in forming collective identity -  as seen by the growth of public posters boasting their map of 
historic ‘greater Syria’.402 Similarly, whilst Turkish sovereignty over Hatay might have officially been 
granted, all public maps still show the territory as part of Syria.403 Whilst the Pan-Syrian layer of 
identity might be much further down the line of importance within Syrian official rhetoric and the cult 
of the leader, it still remains. Given how flexible the identity has proven to be, there is no reason to 
suggest the regime will not wish to draw upon it again in the future. Yet as with Arab identity, this Pan- 
Syrianism is likely to be framed to ultimately serve state interests.
400 Philip S. Khoury, Syria and the French mandate: the politics o f Arab nationalism (London: Tauris, 1987), pp. 494- 
514; Perthes, Syria Under Bashar Al-Assad, p. 47.
401 Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon: A Shattered Country: myths and realities o f the wars in Lebanon (New York, N.Y.: 
Holmes & Meier, 1996), p. 196.
402 Rabil, Syria, p. 190.
403 Perthes, Syria Under Bashar Al-Assad, p. 47.
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3.4 Images and Speeches in Jordan
3.4.1 The Cult of Hussein
King Hussein refrained from some of the more egotistical elements of the Hafez cult, even joking in 
private that the one statue dedicated to him in Jordan should be decapitated and presented to Assad as a 
gift to recycle.404 Even so, images of Hussein were found in the usual places: public buildings, bank 
notes, coins and such banal representations as names of bridges, highways and schools. As discussed 
above, there is sufficient ritual veneration coupled with power to be deemed a ‘cult’. As with Hafez, 
Hussein’s cult built a careful image of Jordan’s leader but, unlike in Syria, it was more based in reality. 
Whilst Assad was built up as a demi-God on absurd grounds beyond his ability, such as being Syria’s 
‘first teacher’ or ‘premier pharmacist’, Hussein’s image was more nuanced - based on a glorification of 
his genuine talents.405 His love of fast cars and helicopters was highlighted, as was his military history, 
to promote the image of an ‘action man’ king.406 On the other hand, Jordan sees a more direct 
celebration of the leader himself than in Syria in its public holidays. Whilst there is no ‘President’s 
birthday’ holiday in Syria, both Hussein and Abdullah’s birthdays are national holidays -  though 
Abdullah has recently ordered his to be ended. There is similarly a holiday each year to commemorate 
the ascension of Abdullah II to the throne.407 Yet as well as the personal character of its leader, 
Hussein’s regime built a cult around the monarchy as an institution, weaving in various themes to both 
legitimise itself and to promote an official identity.
Unlike in Syria, one of the most prominent themes was Islam. As Wedeen states, “King Hussein is 
descended from the Prophet Mohammad and his rule is officially represented as being invested with the 
sanctity that his genealogy implies. Regime iconography depicts the king as guardian of the Muslim 
holy places as well as leader of the nation-state.”408 This iconography is supported by state-backed 
projects linking Jordan’s Islamic heritage to the current Hashemite dynasty, such as the new Islamic 
civilisation museum in Samarkland and the restoration of the Umayyad citadel in Amman 409 On 
occasions this iconography is more overt, particularly with the construction of new mosques named 
after members of the royal family. There are numerous King Hussein mosques scattered around the 
kingdom and Jordan’s two largest are the King Abdullah I Mosque and the King Hussein I Mosque. 
Another difference to Syria under Hafez is the role of the military. Whilst Hussein was regularly 
portrayed in uniform, as were other members of the royal family, this was not accompanied by a
404 Randa Habib, Hussein and Abdullah (London: Saqi 2010), p. 78.
405 Wedeen, Ambiguities, p. 1.
406 Ashton, King Hussein, p. 8.
407 http://www.iordanembassvus.org/holidavs.htm - accessed 15/12/08.
408 Wedeen, Ambiguities, p. 158.
409 Irene Maffi, ‘New museographic trends in Jordan: The strengthening of the nation’ in George Joffe, (ed.), Jordan in 
transition 1990-2000 (London: Hurst & Co. 2002), pp. 213-9.
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general militarisation of society as in Syria. A similarity though, is the role of family. Though he was 
married several times, images of Hussein, his wives and children were commonplace.
Alongside an Islamic layer of identity, Arab identity was another key pillar within Hussein’s nationalist 
discourse and cult. However, the emphasis had a quiet different focus to that pursued by Hafez. Whilst 
Assad portrayed himself as the heir at times to Nasser’s revolutionary anti-imperialist Arabism, and at 
others to Saladin’s historic expulsion of foreign invaders, Hussein’s linked his Arabism to his 
grandfather (Abdullah I)’s role in the Great Arab Revolt against the Ottomans in 1916. Despite very 
little of this revolt taking place on Jordanian territory and the Hashemites themselves originating from 
far-off Hijaz, much of the cult’s iconography has focused on this event. Irene Maffi has demonstrated 
how many of the state’s ‘national history’ museums focus on this war of ‘liberation’ from the 
Ottomans. Similarly, each year the 10th June is celebrated as ‘Great Arab Revolt Day’. However, as 
Ashton has observed, Hussein’s, “ideology of Hashemite Arab nationalism was never precisely 
codified.”410 Glorifying the Arab revolt proved a convenient way for Hussein to stave off the challenge 
from Nasser and, to a point, Assad’s brand of Arabism. By portraying the now historically departed 
Ottomans as the enemy of the Arabs, rather than the Western powers who Nasser and Assad blamed for 
the division of Arab lands, Hussein was politically expedient: attempting to legitimise his close contact 
and financial support from the former Imperial powers.411 This supports Frisch’s view that maintaining 
a broad and flexible identity was primarily for political expediency.
Whilst drawing on the ties of Islam and Arabism, an effort was also made to create a distinct Jordanian 
culture. The bank notes of the 1990s, for example, depicted some pre-Islamic places of worship to 
emphasise Jordan as a ‘spiritual land’. Maffi argues that this is not depicted as contradicting the 
monarchy’s role as guardian of Islam, with much emphasis placed on the biblical stories in the Quran 
amongst other things.412 A very pronounced element of this Jordanian culture is tribalism 413 Though 
they have no history as Bedouin tribesmen, the Hashemite monarchy went to great lengths to associate 
themselves with this supposedly unique Jordanian culture.414 The red keffiyah headscarf has come to be 
associated with this tribal aspect of Jordan’s national identity. Not only is it a key component of the 
uniform of the Jordanian army but it is also seen as the ‘crown’ of the monarch worn by Hussein 
regularly, most notably on bank notes and pictures. Yet neither Bedouin nor the red head scarf is unique 
to Jordan. Jordan’s neighbours have far more Bedouin tribes than Jordan. Moreover, the distinct red
410 Ashton, King Hussein, p. 5.
411 Frisch, ‘Fuzzy nationalism,’, pp. 100-102; Marc Lynch, ‘Jordan’s Identity and Interests,’ in Telhami and Barnett, 
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colour is an invented tradition that originated in the minds of British imperialists looking for an army 
uniform, rather than in Jordan.415 Crucially though, the significance of the red head scarf is its contrast 
to the Palestinian black kejfiyah: it has been used to emphasise Jordan’s distinction from the 
Palestinians both when confronting the PLO and right-wing Israeli claims that ‘Jordan is Palestine’ 416 
Indeed much of Hussein’s discourse has involved walking a tightrope between defining a distinct 
Jordanian identity that is separate from Palestine, whilst simultaneously integrating the Palestinian 
majority living in Jordan. The use of Islam and Arabism have been a key component of this, reflected in 
Hussein’s cult.
3.4.2 The Cult of Abdullah II
Abdullah’s cult is both more modest and more overt than Hussein’s. On the one hand, more than his 
father he seeks to emphasise the institution of the monarchy rather than just himself. The first set of 
bank notes issued under Abdullah suggest a shift away from a single monarch cult. Whilst previously 
the reigning king (Hussein)’s head appeared on all bank notes, those issued in 2003 depicted a different 
Hashemite monarch on each bill: Sharif Hussein bin Ali of Hejaz, Abdullah I, Talal I, Hussein I and 
Abdullah II.417 Similarly, much public space is given to Abdullah’s glamorous wife Queen Rania, 
including almost daily reporting on her activities on state television news and one could argue that 
Rania has her own cult - though due to her lack of direct power it is more of a cult of celebrity. Unlike 
Bashar’s also popular wife Asma, Rania occupies space in the public eye without her husband and there 
are some posters and postcards on sale of her alone -  something one would not find in Syria.
An interesting facet of Abdullah’s cult is the space within it given to his father. Wedeen identifies such 
cults as ‘second generation’. Much public space is still dedicated to Hussein and Abdullah receives 
political capital from it, in the same way that Stalin used images of Lenin to legitimise his rule. On his 
succession, the new regime used Hussein’s popularity to boost Abdullah’s credibility, widely 
circulating images of the two together looking relaxed and familial418 Though the same can be said of 
Bashar’s image alongside the deceased Hafez, the style is quiet different. The vast majority of those 
images that remain of Hafez Assad were erected during his rule and haven’t yet been replaced, with a 
stigma attached to their removal for fear of appearing to disrespect the regime. Most images that are 
currently produced of Bashar do not include Hafez and those that do often have the father depicted in a 
ghostly fashion, silhouetting his son from afar. Whilst both rulers seemingly want to take legitimacy
415 Halliday, Nation and Religion, p. 206.
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from their fathers, Bashar’s cult keeps Hafez’s image as a stem, respected, demi-God quite separate 
from his own image as an approachable, young, moderniser. In contrast, Abdullah’s cult has used 
Hussein’s approachable, action man image to absorb some of that popularity for itself. This has shifted 
a little as Abdullah has consolidated his power. Recently, after Abdullah named his own son Hussein 
Crown Prince in summer 2009, pictures of Hussein junior have started to appear either alongside his 
father or even alone. This suggests Abdullah may be already preparing a third generation cult for his 
son to inherit.
However, whilst sharing space with others, Abdullah’s cult is also more overt than Hussein’s because it 
is much larger. There are more pictures and posters of Abdullah, with or without Hussein, Rania or 
others, than there were of Hussein during his mle. As court insider Randa Habib notes, “his portraits 
were extensively displayed on the streets and in public and private offices and the number of songs 
glorifying him increased and were broadcast at the peak viewing time before the 8pm news.”419 An 
analysis of these portraits suggests a cult that requires a certain belief in the absurd, closer in style to 
Hafez Assad or even Saddam Hussein than to that of Bashar al-Assad or Hussein. Whilst Bashar’s 
portraits in Syria show him either in military uniform or in his suit, Abdullah is dressed as a policeman 
outside police stations, in army uniforms by barracks, in a graduation gown at universities and even in a 
football shirt at the national stadium 420
Does Abdullah’s cult continue the national identity fashioned by Hussein? Frisch suggests that the 
eclecticism of Hussein’s cult was continued under Abdullah, but with differing proportions.421 The 
three main facets of Jordanian identity, Islam, Arabism and Jordan’s tribal character, certainly remain in 
place. Alan George suggests a shift during Abdullah’s rule to strengthen a specific Jordanian national 
sentiment. In 2002, following popular demonstrations in support of the Palestinians’ second Intifada 
and the threat of a US invasion of Iraq, Abdullah launched ‘Jordan First’.422 In what was clearly an 
attempt to play down the previously promoted Arab and Islamic solidarity identities around the political 
climate of the time -  Jordan relied on financial support from the US who were supporting Israel’s 
crushing of the Intifada and about to launch the Iraq war -  Jordanian flags and pin badges were widely 
distributed and a ‘patriotic document’ was published. This was later followed by similar overtly state 
nationalist campaigns, ‘The National Agenda’ and ‘We are all Jordan’ 423
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Alongside the state nationalist elements of Abdullah’s cult, analysis of images shows continuity with 
the Islamic elements of Hussein’s discourse. Though less widespread than pictures of him in uniform, 
posters of the king praying in a mosque and some of him on the pilgrimage to Mecca can be found. 
Similarly tying in the promotion of the monarchy as an institution, a popular image used is Abdullah 
alongside the Hashemite monarchs dating back to Sharif Hussein bin Ali of Hejaz, custodian of the 
Holy places of Mecca and Medina.424 However, though Abdullah clearly is displaying continuity with 
Hussein in his use of Islamic identity, and perhaps making a greater effort to promote a Jordanian state 
identity, it is important to highlight that an Arab layer of identity is still part of the cult and discourse. 
Whilst Abdullah’s favoured identity is perhaps more consistent and defined than either Bashar or 
Hussein, Arabism still has a role in the official discourse even if it has been subordinated to state 
identity. Notably, Abdullah’s new bank notes boast Arabist pictures even more than Hussein’s did. 
Alongside the state symbols of the Ma’an and Raghdan palaces and the creation of Amman’s first 
parliament, the new notes depict the 1916 Great Arab Revolt -  which Abdullah still refers to like his 
father -  and Jerusalem’s Dome of the Rock. Including the latter is symbolic given that Hussein gave up 
his claim to the West Bank in 1988. Whether its inclusion is a nod to Pan-Jordanian, Pan-Arab or Pan- 
Islamic idealists is uncertain. However, the fact that a Jordanian bank note boasts a picture of a place no 
longer part of the country illustrates that a solely Jordanian state nationalism is not the only facet of the 
official discourse.
An analysis of Abdullah’s public speeches illustrates the recent shift towards the primacy of Jordanian 
nationalism. The author considered four of Abdullah’s speeches, two of a day-to-day domestic nature: 
addressing a military university graduation ceremony in Kerak in 2008 and opening Parliament in 1999; 
and two of more international significance: responding to Islamist terrorist attacks in Amman in 2005 
and addressing the Arab League in Riyadh in 2007. In each, Abdullah speaks several times of, ‘one 
Jordanian family,’ ‘the homeland’, ‘the free Jordanian will’, ‘the patriots of Jordan’ and ‘we in 
Jordan’ 425 His speeches also encompass Islamic rhetoric, much like Hussein. Unlike Bashar al-Assad 
but akin to most Islamic and Arab leaders, most of his speeches open with bisimallah al rahman al 
raheem. He often also cushions his words with religious references such as ‘with God’s help’, ‘thank 
God’, ‘God willing’, and ‘with the help of God’. In this manner, Jordanian religious identity is flagged. 
Such seemingly deliberate religious rhetoric should not be overstated though. Many of these phrases 
have evolved into colloquialisms and are not always transcribed into written documents. Whilst it is 
certain that Abdullah makes more of religious identity than the deliberately secular Bashar, as analysis 
of state television will show in the next chapter, Jordan still relegates Islam to the background.
424 See Appendix I, G & J.
425 See Appendix II, E-H.
117
There is also a layer of Arab identity flagged by Abdullah, though there is a noticeable difference in 
meaning to Bashar. Take for example this section from Abdullah’s opening of parliament in 1999:
“Jordan has been and will remain, God willing, the inheritor of the message of the Great Arab Revolt and its noble aims and 
aspirations in freedom, unity and a better life, and it will always be Arab in its loyalty, position and message. Stemming 
from this clear vision, the inner Arab depth will remain for Jordan the base of all its relations. No relation will precede those 
of Jordan with its Arab brethren. On this basis, Jordan will continue its endeavours to purify Arab relations, transcend Arab 
disputes and will continue to support joint Arab institutions, work for the purpose of uniting and mobilising its efforts in a 
framework of cooperation and integration aimed at a better future for the coming generations. Our relations with each Arab 
brethren state are based upon compassion, brotherhood, respect, trust, cooperation and non-interference with others' internal 
affairs.”426
On the one hand Abdullah emphasises Jordan’s Arab identity, saying Jordan, “will always be Arab in 
its loyalty, position and message.” He again references Jordan’s founding myth of the Great Arab 
Revolt. Yet his emphasis is on Arab identity shaping Jordan’s international relations whilst Bashar 
suggests Syria’s Arab identity affects its national character. Abdullah talks o f‘joint Arab institutions’, 
‘each Arab brethren state’ and ‘Arab relations,’ thereby drawing a clear line between the national and 
the supranational tie. In this sense Abdullah’s national Arabism is even more obvious and pronounced 
than Bashar’s.
The nature of Abdullah’s rhetoric does alter depending on his audience however. Not surprisingly, he is 
at his most Arabist when addressing the Arab League in 2007, speaking of ‘Arab rights’, the ‘Arab 
nation’ and ‘authentic Arab traditions’ -  sounding much like Bashar in places. He mentions the word 
‘Arab’ twenty-five times, in comparison to only fifteen Islamic references and seven of ‘Jordan’. In 
contrast, these numbers alter when addressing a domestic audience. For the university students he has 
three Arab references, five of Islam and two of Jordan, and in opening parliament he mentions Arabs 
twelve times, Islam nine times and Jordan twelve times.
Interestingly after the terrorist attacks of 2005, he makes no mentions of Arab identity, only briefly 
discusses religion - largely condemning killing innocents in Islam’s name - but he mostly emphasises 
Jordanian identity: speaking o f‘protecting Jordan’, ‘Jordan will continue’ and ‘Jordan does not bow to 
coercion’. In one section he states:
426 See Appendix II, E.
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“‘I appeal to every citizen - man and woman - of this country to consider himself or herself a soldier and a security officer. 
Each one of you has a responsibility to protect your country. Circumstances require each and every citizen to be cautious and 
vigilant, and to cooperate with the security services to prevent any attack on the security and stability of this country. We 
must be united in confronting these terrorists, who have neither a religion nor a conscience. I am confident that the patriots 
of Jordan - men and women - will maintain, as they always have, a watchful eye over the country and its security, and will 
be the first line of defence in protecting Jordan and its achievements. Jordan will continue, with the help of God and the 
determination of its people, to overcome evil.”427
Evidently when under physical threat, it is state nationalism Abdullah wishes to promote. He speaks 
specifically of the security of the country and its defence. He appeals to his audience’s state nationalism 
by emphasising the duties of citizenship: “to be cautious and vigilant, and to cooperate with the security 
services.” As with Bashar, Abdullah identifies an ‘other’ for his citizens to unite against: the ‘terrorists’ 
who ‘we’ (the Jordanians) must be united in confronting. This security theme is repeated when 
addressing a military university graduation ceremony in Kerak in 2008. He states:
“As of today, each one of you will enter the fields of honour, work and dedication, for you are the homeland's devoted 
soldiers. Difficulties and challenges will only enhance your determination and strength and your allegiance to the principles 
and goals of the Great Arab Revolt, which strove to liberate and unite the nation and defend the values of right, justice and 
freedom. I am confident that each and every one of you realises that the homeland's security and stability supersede all other 
interests and considerations. For all of us, the first priority is to protect this homeland and preserve its progress and 
achievements.”428
Again, his theme is security and devotion to the homeland. Again, he uses the Arab tie, the Great Arab 
Revolt, to promote national goals. Notably, we see here the direct flagging of his ‘Jordan First’ 
approach when he says, “the homeland's security and stability supersede all other interests and 
considerations.” As in Syria, though Jordan’s nationalism is framed differently, whether its national 
Arabism or national Islamism, the various components of the multi-layered discourse ultimately serve 
the state.
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3.5 Conclusion
Hafez al-Assad of Syria and Hussein of Jordan constructed a flexible national identity discourse that 
drew on the multiple ties of their populace. Hafez gelled together Pan-Syrian, Pan-Arab and Syria-only 
identities that altered its focus at different times. Similarly, Hussein varied the emphasis on his three 
pillars of Jordanian identity -  its tribal nature, the monarchy’s Islamic heritage, and the legacy of the 
Great Arab Revolt -  according to political circumstances. A notable difference between the two 
discourses was the position of Islam: Hafez wished to minimise religious reference, whilst Hussein used 
it to legitimize his rule. In contrast, both regimes actively promoted a layer of Arab identity though 
through different approaches and for different motives. Hussein’s ‘Hashemite Arabism’ portrayed 
himself as the heir to the Arab revolt against the Ottomans which allowed him to counter the Arabist 
threat of Nasser whilst maintaining a pro-westem outlook. Hafez claimed to be the heir to a more 
radical anti-western Arabism, allowing him to mobilise his population against Israel and its American 
ally, whilst simultaneously pursuing a largely Syria-first foreign policy. Though flexible, these 
identities retain ‘red lines’ that cannot be crossed, with Syria’s red lines being tighter than Jordan’s.
These cases offer a paradox for Ayubi’s theory of weak Arab states. Of the two, Jordan is the physically 
weaker state, and though it was able to militarily defeat the PLO in 1970, the majority of its population 
were still Palestinian and hence it was too weak to impose the same kind of permanent repression 
attempted by Syria towards its Kurds. It therefore had to find space for the West Bankers within its 
official identity. Of Hussein’s three pillars, whilst Jordan’s tribal heritage might exclude Palestinians, 
the monarchy’s link to Islam and the great Arab revolt provided them national space. In contrast, 
Syria’s official identity denied the Kurds space. Unlike the urban Armenians, they weren’t allowed to 
learn their own language in schools and were denied cultural autonomy. Though this shows the 
inconsistency of Hafez Assad’s official identity, rather than any staunch ideological commitment to 
Arabism, it also questions Ayubi’s theory. The stronger state, Syria, uses coercion to enforce its official 
identity because it can, whilst the weaker state, Jordan is forced to use cooption and cooperation, 
altering its identity around its population rather than forcing its population to accept its identity. This 
therefore helps to explain why Arab states promote a multi-layered flexible identity discourse: it is a 
substitute for strength. When a state is weaker, like Jordan, it must fashion an identity that appeals to 
the broadest possible group. When a state is stronger, like Syria, it can afford to exclude elements from 
its discourse.
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To disseminate these identity discourses, both Hafez and Hussein constructed cults that have been 
continued by their sons and successors Bashar and Abdullah. Using Wedeen and Tumarkin’s criteria, it 
is possible to establish certain features that appear in different cults hence allowing us to label the 
images and speeches of the leader in Syria and Jordan as cults. These features are: the actual power of 
the leader, the extent to which terror is systematically used, how much they demand a belief in the 
absurd, how much the leader personifies the state, how much they deliberately build identity, and how 
much space is shared with others. Though the cult of Hafez was more dramatic than the other three 
leaders’, the four cults still share similarities. Though Hafez was more deified than Hussein, for 
example, both used similar themes such as family and military frequently. Similarly Abdullah’s cult is 
more overt than Hussein’s, with a growth in portraits and posters, yet at the same time it is more willing 
to share public space with past monarchs and his family -  notably his predecessor whose popularity 
boosts Abdullah’s legitimacy. Despite claims to the contrary, Bashar has retained his father’s cult, 
though in a more humble form which portrays him as an accessible moderniser unlike his demi-god 
father.
The sons may both have shifted the style of leadership cult since assuming power but they have 
essentially retained the core flexible identities fashioned by their fathers. Public speeches and images 
reveal slight shifts in emphasis in the identities promoted by the younger generation, with Bashar 
softening the Greater Syrian identity and Abdullah promoting his ‘Jordan first’ campaign. These remain 
slight distinctions though, and there is mostly continuity, notably Bashar’s avoidance of Islamic 
language, despite the growing religiosity of his populace. Arab identity, moreover, remains a key 
identity that is regularly flagged in both states’ official discourse, with both leaders making effort to 
pronounce their ‘Arab-ness’ in the international arena. In each case though, the leaders seem to be 
promoting a supra-national Arab identity: one that serves the national interest.
It was suggested at the beginning of this chapter that the images and speeches within the cults of 
leadership can provide unexpected examples of banal nationalism. As will be seen in chapter six, the 
cults’ dominance of Syrian and Jordanian public space for so long has led the portrait of the leader 
appearing ‘normal’ and ‘everyday’. Though they appear to be more overt than Michael Billig’s 
examples of flagging in Western democracies, the deliberate identity discourses described above are so 
frequently reproduced in these overt public mediations, they are no longer seen as overt. With a supra­
national Arabism that serves state interests firmly embedded in the identity discourses of both states, it
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is clear that the images and speeches of the leader so frequently seen and heard by Syrians and 
Jordanians reproduce Arab identity daily.
122
Chapter 4
Flagging the Discourse Daily: State Television
The complex multi-layered identity discourses of Syria and Jordan require state institutions to be 
disseminated into society. In contrast to the seemingly overt leadership cults discussed previously, the 
most institutions reproduce these discourses in a more nuanced, banal manner. In both states the 
military, the education system, press, trade unions, political parties, cultural institutions and the civil 
service vary in the extent to which they are controlled by the regime, and yet all promote or reinforce 
their constructed identities. Billig sees these institutions as the key to national reproduction. The 
following chapter aims to illustrate the applicability of his theory to non-democratic Syria and Jordan 
by analysing arguably the most banal and everyday state institution: television.
Television proves the most interesting institution primarily because it has greater reach than others. 
Political party and trade union membership remains relatively low in Jordan. In Syria, whilst 
membership is high on paper due to the material benefits of joining, the number of active members is 
much lower.429 As with the military, these institutions tend to be male-dominated. The education system 
is perhaps the only major rival to television in terms of reach but, whilst it clearly plays a key role in 
establishing identity amongst the young, it lacks television’s longevity in influencing citizens 
throughout their lives. Television has a widespread audience within society, male and female, old and 
young, elite and mass. In 2004,90% of the citizens of both states had access to terrestrial TV and 50% 
of households received satellite -  a figure that is probably larger due to public viewing in cafes and 
restaurants.430 Given the increasing popularity of satellite television in the region, it is likely that this 
figure is even higher by now. Culturally, television is emerging as a focal point of society. As Hussein 
Amin states, “close family ties combined with often harsh weather countries, low literacy rates, and a 
culture of oral communication have made television the centrepiece of family life in many Arab 
countries.”431 Even in remote areas, television is extending to regions the state previously struggled to 
reach, with satellite dishes replacing traditional jewellery as wedding presents amongst Bedouin 
tribes.432
Whilst the press was Billig’s main case study to illustrate banal nationalism in Britain, this public 
mediation remains restricted to elites in Syria and Jordan.433 Whereas Britain’s most read newspaper,
429 Batatu, Syria’s Peasantry, p. 188.
430 Sakr, Arab Television Today, p. 1.
431 Hussein Amin, ‘Arab media audience research: developments and constraints’ in Kai Hafez ed., Arab Media: Power 
and Weakness (New York: Continuum, 2008), p. 69.
432 Hugh Miles, Al-Jazeera, (London: Abacus, 2005), p. 36.
433 Billig, Banal Nationalism, pp. 109-127.
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The Sun, has a readership of one in twenty, Jordan’s, Al-Ra ’ai reaches one in 63 whilst Syria’s most 
read, al-Thawra reaches barely one in 360.434 With average illiteracy rates at 21% in Syria and 11% in 
Jordan, and even higher amongst women, substantial sections of society do not have regular access to 
this media 435 This study therefore adapts Billig’s methodology, arguing that in semi-literate societies 
analysing television affects mass identity far better than the press -  particularly the Arab world where 
television access is higher than in other developing countries.436
A potential difficulty in transposing Billig’s methodology for the print media onto television is the 
range of channels available to Syrian and Jordanian viewers. Billig selected a single day to conduct a 
content and discourse analysis of the ten national newspapers available to Britons. Whilst Syrians have 
only two terrestrial channels, and Jordanians three, over half of each population have access to satellite 
dishes that offer over 300 free-to-air Arabic language stations.437 Whilst in theory it would be possible 
to record all channels for 24 hours and conduct content and discourse analysis of their banal national 
content, such a mammoth task is beyond the scope of this thesis. It was therefore decided to focus on 
just one channel for each state - the single satellite channel each regime broadcasts -  over a certain 
period of time -  prime time (1900-0000) over seven days. These channels offer a broad array of 
programming to analyse. Unlike Billig’s limited one-day sweep, by covering a full week this presents a 
more rounded picture of typical content. This experiment will thus help to illustrate which identities the 
regime wishes to ‘flag daily’ through its most wide-reaching institution.
This chapter will firstly outline a brief history of television in Syria and Jordan, explaining the 
challenges from the satellite media and considering the hypothesis of writers such as Khalil Rinnawi 
who argue these stations weaken nation state orientation 438 It will then outline in more detail the 
methodology of the content and discourse analysis undertaken, before discussing the results found. 
These results are divided into blocks of program types to be analysed: news; sport, economics, weather 
and programming breaks; chat shows, musalsals (drama series) and Islam. In different ways, each 
programming type shows that, whilst state identity remains the most prominent, Arab identity is still 
‘flagged daily’. Moreover, not only are there are as many, if not more, cases of Arab identity being 
flagged in Jordan in contrast to the more overtly ‘Arabist’ Syria, but both states deliberately minimise 
references to religion.
434Sun: http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/table/2008/sep/05/abcs.pressandpublishing - accessed 8/4/09; Jordan:
http://www.al-bab.eom/media/freedom.htm#Jordan - accessed 8/4/09; Syria: Hammond, Pop Culture Arab World!, p. 102.
435 CIA World fact book: Jordan - https://www.cia.gov/librarv/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/io.html; Syria: 
https://www.cia.gov/hbrarv/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sv.html (accessed 26/03/09).
436 William Rugh, Arab mass media: newspapers, radio and television in Arab politics (New York: Praeger, 2004), p. 2.
437 Amin, ‘Arab media’, p. 69.
438 Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism, p. 9 & p. 13.
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4.1 Television in Syria and Jordan
‘To a visitor, particularly one accustomed to Western practice, the output of state media can at times appear almost 
comical.. .Criticism is rare and where it occurs it is either tame or focuses on external actors; investigating reporting and 
exposes of misbehaviour among the ruling elite is largely unheard of.” 439
4.1.1 Nation-building
Like many in the developing world, the Syrian and Jordanian regimes have long appreciated the 
benefits of television in maintaining their rule and promoting national cohesion.440 Since launching its 
first terrestrial channel in 1960, which then went national in 1967, Syria has operated what William 
Rugh describes as a ‘strict control’ television system: the primary concern being to mobilise the masses 
in support of the regime.441 All three channels broadcast from Syria, Channels 1 & 2 (launched in 1985) 
on terrestrial, and ‘Syria TV’ on satellite since 1995, are run by Syrian Arab Television, a theoretically 
independent government authority. It is financed by the state and a little by advertising, and is operated 
within the General Directorate of Radio and Television, whose board is chaired by the Minister of 
Information.442 Christa Salamandra has commented that though economic liberalisation in Syria during 
the mid-1990s allowed a degree of privatisation in production companies, “these emerged in the most 
Syrian of ways: they tended to be owned by individuals with strong links to the regime.”443 She also 
argues that, “.. .although many Syrian television series are produced by private production companies, 
television stations remain under strict government control.”444
In contrast, Rugh classifies Jordan’s television as a ‘loyalist’ system.445 Unlike in Syria, he claims, 
ownership is not exclusively governmental, but loyal nonetheless, and programming focuses more on 
entertainment than politics. Though the findings of this survey will suggest that Rugh’s claims that 
Jordanian TV’s content is less political than Syria’s is debatable, he does correctly highlight the 
difference in ownership between the two states. Though Jordanian broadcasting, like Syrian, began as 
an arm of the state when it was launched in 1968 as part of the Jordan Radio and Television 
Corporation, restructuring in 2001 led to part-privatisation. Terrestrial viewers now can view two state
439 Steve Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds, (London: Hurst & Co., 2006), p.61
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2005), p. 7; Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism, p. xv.
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international media and communications Vol. 4 (San Diego: San Diego Press, 2003), p. 306; Rugh, Arab mass media, 
p. 183.
442 Ibid., p. 306.
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channels (1 & 2) specialising in news and sport respectively, as well as a third private channel which 
shows movies and cartoons.446 The state-run satellite station ‘Jordan TV’ was launched in 1993, and all 
four are part funded by advertisements, part by licence fee.447 Though Jordan enjoys greater press 
freedom than the tightly controlled Syrians, this does not extent to television which, even when 
privately owned, remains effectively controlled by the state.448
Historically, Arab regimes such as Jordan and Syria have viewed television as pedagogical. As Marwan 
Kraidy states, “In the pre-satellite television era, roughly from the 1950s to 1991, Arab states launched 
television services with assumptions about audiences being subjects to be manipulated, citizens to be 
modernised or potential sinners to be kept on the virtuous path.”449 Lila Abu-Lughod’s anthropological 
study of drama serials in Egypt emphasises television’s historic role o f ‘citizen education’ in the Arab 
world, rather than its more commercial-orientated function in the West450 Indeed, she writes that, until 
the economic reforms of the 1990s, the addressee of television was the citizen, not the consumer. Given 
how artificial borders were, argues Khalil Rinnawi, these citizens had to be created, with one of 
television’s primary goals, “to shape a narrow national identity, orientated towards and controlled by, 
respective political regimes.”451 Televisions sets were reduced in price to promote the distribution of 
this nation-building tool 452 In the post-satellite era, Rinnawi and others argue that state-run television 
continues on this pedagogical, nation-building format. Salamantra’s surveys of Syrian drama, for 
example, concludes that, “Syrian TV makers see Arab audiences as unsophisticated and impressionable. 
Viewers, they believe, will absorb and conform to television’s messages,” and seek to take advantage of 
large audiences for Ramadan holiday TV serials for, “national cultural construction.” 453
4.1.2 The Satellite Era
The remarkable proliferation of satellite dishes in Arab states after 1991 therefore represented a 
significant challenge to state television’s ability to ‘construct’ national citizens. Whereas previously the 
regimes had a monopoly in providing the news, entertainment and culture viewed by their populations, 
they now faced competition from hundreds of popular foreign-owned rivals such as Al-Jazeera, MBC, 
Abu Dhabi TV and LBC 454 Whilst capitalist Jordan initially welcomed the growth of satellite media,
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Syria forbade receivers. This position was soon compromised when regime figures discovered there 
were profits to be made selling dishes, with the ban lifted in July 2000.455 Even when officially illegal 
in 1998, at least 30% of Syrians had satellite access and, after legalisation, by 2004 that number had 
risen to over half the population.456 Figures are similar in Jordan 457 The effects of this explosion in 
alternative viewing, though, are difficult to gauge and analysts are divided on its true impact. On the 
one hand, commentators such as Rinnawi, Hammond and Tatham emphasise the revolutionary potential 
of the pan-Arab media, particularly focusing on Al-Jazeera, to claim that the end of the state 
information monopoly is leading to a weakening of state identity and a revived Arab nationalism. In 
contrast, Naomi Sakr and Christa Salamandra question this, varying their reasons from explaining how 
the regimes were at first threatened but then adapted to the new era, to those who argue that this new 
satellite media promotes the state-driven status quo as much as the old state monopolies.
One argument made by Rinnawi and Tatham is that the proliferation of alternative sources of 
information has led to a greater distrust in the state and hence its delegitimisation 458 Rinnawi argues 
that audiences have become active rather than passive and now take their information from a variety of 
sources, rather than accepting what the state told them as before.459 Moreover, he highlights that most 
Arabs no longer rely on state television for their information. 43% of Egyptians in 2006, for example, 
told a Reuters/BBC survey that they trusted news from international sources more than the state 460 
Similarly, Nawawy’s 2002 survey suggested that 70% of Arabs surveyed relied primarily on Al-Jazeera 
rather than state television for news.461 A similar survey by Telhami discovered that it was the most 
popular station in Jordan 462 According to Alan George, the Qatar-based station is seen as more reliable 
than state TV which received particular criticism, as did Syria TV, for downplaying or ignoring events 
during the 2003 Iraq war which it found politically inconvenient, such as the fall of Baghdad.463
There are several problems with this line of argument. Firstly, Rinnawi assumes that prior to satellite, 
because citizens had no access to alternative television stations, they therefore did not seek alternative 
forms of information. In reality, as Hammond concedes, most Arabs lost faith in their government’s 
capacity to truthfully report the news following their false reports during the 1967 war.464 The 
widespread listenership of the BBC’s Arabic radio services would support this, with two thirds of
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Syrians, for example, preferring foreign to domestic radio broadcasts in the 1990s.465 The second fault 
of this analysis is its narrow focus on news programming. Various surveys have highlighted that drama 
serials, not news, are the most widely watched shows in the Arab world.466 Whilst it might be valid to 
highlight that many prefer non-state sources for news that does not mean that state television is not still 
viewed for other programs. Just because the populations are not passively accepting everything they see 
on state television, which arguably they never have, does not mean that the identities it regularly flags 
are deliberately ignored by viewers. A sceptical view of news authenticity does not translate into a 
dismissal of all the content of state television.
The second part of Rinnawi’s argument is that by delegitimizing the state, pan-Arab satellite media 
weakens nation-state orientation in favour of a revived pan-Arab identity. He states that,
“while traditional state run media in a post colonial context has worked towards creating and solidifying national identities, 
transnational media undermines this in favour of a regional identity, based both upon individual beliefs in the pan-Arab 
nature of the Arab world and the need to appeal to a regional, Arab market.”467
He sees the pan-Arab media as creating a new ‘national’ Arab public sphere that has fostered a 
successful ‘re-imagination’ of Arab and Islamic communities 468 In particular he emphasises the 
commercial drive behind these new stations, arguing that whilst state media is controlled by elites, the 
pan-Arab media is driven by commercial needs 469 In short, he reverses Abu-Lughod’s formula, 
suggesting that these stations address the consumer and not the citizen. In different ways, his thesis is 
supported by other analysts. Salamandra, whilst disputing his conclusions, agrees that many satellite 
broadcasters sees themselves as primarily Arab nationalists, thoughts shared by Pintak and Tatham, 
who reminds us that historically journalists were amongst the most prominent Arab nationalists 470 
Similarly Hammond, whilst disputing the extent to which state identity is undermined claims, “although 
most Arabs identify first and foremost with their nation states, the more collective aspect of Arab 
identity is being indirectly strengthened by this new media.”471
However, whilst the notion that transnational Arab satellite media is reinforcing Arab identity is one 
that is shared by this thesis, it is not at the expense of state identity. Sakr and Salamandra offer different 
explanations for why state regimes and the identities they promote are not at risk from satellite
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television. The first hypothesis is that the regimes were threatened by the rapid rise of al-Jazeera and its 
equivalents, but soon adapted. By breaking state television’s taboos about criticising regimes, Al- 
Jazeera was considered a potential threat in its early years. Their bureau in Amman was temporarily 
closed after the channel criticised King Hussein in 1998, and they were not even allowed to open an 
office in Damascus.472 However, as Sakr and Hafez both emphasise, the regimes have adapted to 
cope.473 Sakr argues that the realisation that bullish tactics like expelling journalists and closing bureaus 
are less effective than wooing the new stations has led to a more TV-friendly approach from Arab
474governments.
Contrary to Rinnawi’s claim that these stations are primarily commercial, the fact that ownership of 
most pan-Arab stations is tied closely to various Gulf states has led regimes to strengthen relations with 
such governments in exchange for an easing of criticism. Syria’s close alliance with Qatar, alongside 
the fact that several producers and journalists working on the station are Syrian, explains why 
Damascus escapes the kind of criticism from Al-Jazeera levelled at others.475 Moreover, the famed 
attacks on Saudi Arabia from the station were at their height whenever Qatar-Saudi relations were 
strained, and criticism of Egypt was similarly related to Qatari-Egyptian relations.476 Hugh Miles 
highlights that this, and external pressure from the United States to ease criticism of its Arab allies, has 
served to dilute the radical criticism of regimes that initially propelled Al-Jazeera to fame.477 Sakr 
argues that in recent years there has been a levelling out of the radical potential of pan-Arab media. 
Whilst satellite media’s emergence initially prompted a forced reassessment by the regimes of their 
attitude towards television, producers are now wedded to ‘safe’ programming that will not rattle the 
status quo 478 This is confirmed by the very few incidents of instability or demands for the dissolution 
of the state during the satellite era. As Hafez points out, “paradoxically enough, the era of the new Arab 
media is also an era of relatively stable authoritarian government.”479
An alternative theory is that the regimes were never more than irritated by the new pan-Arab stations 
and that their inherent structure in fact strengthens the state system rather than undermines it. The issue 
of ownership is paramount to this argument. As mentioned with Al-Jazeera, despite presenting 
themselves as ‘above government’, almost all of the major new stations are owned by elites with strong
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connections to ruling regimes. MBC and its news network Al-Arabiyya, Al-Jazeera’s main rival, are 
owned by a member of the Saudi royal family. Al-Jazeera itself, though claiming to be independent, is 
so closely tied to the Qatar regime that following Jordan’s closure of its bureau in 1998 it was not until 
the Qatar government, not the station, issued an apology that the journalists were readmitted.480 As 
Salamandra states, “Satellite television has worked to strengthen rather than undermine existing 
regimes as new television media has been harnessed by Gulf ruling elites to support and enhance their 
non-democratic power structures.”481 Even beyond the Gulf elites which tend to own the channels, the 
production companies of Syria and Egypt that sell dramas to them are unable to work without licences 
from their regimes. Not surprisingly these are mostly given to trusted associates.482 In such a market 
ruling elites are the only ones with the resources to compete and, by keeping a monopoly on the
AO*
industry, they ensure its ability to undermine their regimes is contained. Alongside ownership, 
Salamandra and Abu-Lughod illustrate that the opening up of the Arab market for state cultural 
products such as drama serials, films or music can promote national pride.484 Whilst on the one hand it 
does strengthen a regional identity by presenting the viewer with a certain geographical/cultural area 
within which their state’s culture should be competing, as will be discussed in the next chapter, this is in 
tandem to not in opposition with state identity. Similarly, the analysis of state television in this chapter 
will also challenge Rinnawi’s hypothesis, illustrating that the regimes themselves, not just the Pan-Arab 
media, promote Arab identity in tandem with state identity.
4.1.3 Islam
A brief word needs also to be said about the relationship between Islam and television. As a key 
identity that is flagged often in the official discourse of Jordan and, to a lesser extent Syria, one would 
expect any analysis of state television to include an assessment of its role on state television. Similarly, 
Islam’s interaction with Pan-Arab media needs to be discussed. Opinions seem divided on this issue. 
On the one hand, Hafez sees pan-Arab media as a balance of secularism against the other main rival 
mass medium: the political Islam preached at the local mosque.485 Amin supports this notion by 
highlighting Islamists’ such as the Muslim Brotherhood’s unwillingness to use television, believing it to 
be a negative force.486 Yet rather than being a force to dilute an increased religiosity in Muslim society, 
others argue television embeds and strengthens Islam. Rinnawi highlights that state television remains 
structured around the Islamic day, with the call to prayer broadcast five times a day in the middle of
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programming.487 Similarly he sees the regional identity promoted by the new pan-Arab media as much 
Islamic as it is Arab. Salamandra takes a more indirect approach to make the same point. She proposes 
that whilst state television used to be a bastion of secularism, the conservative tastes of Gulf stations are 
forcing the previously secular producers of drama serials in Syria to make increasingly religious- 
orientated programming. This is then disseminating a more Islamic identity in Syria than was present in 
the past 488 As well as assessing the extent of Arab and state identity present in state television 
broadcasts, this section will therefore also consider the extent to which Islam is being ‘flagged daily’.
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4.2 A Week of Television: Methodology and News
4.2.1 Methodology
Despite a greater interest in the media of the Arab world since 9/11, complains Kai Hafez, the majority 
of empirical work conducted recently is neither methodologically nor theoretically sound.489 Work by 
authors such as Hugh Miles and Steve Tatham on al-Jazeera, for example, are largely essayist and not 
based on detailed scientific research. To avoid similar criticism, having previously considered the 
theoretical context of this study, its methodology will now be explained.
The purpose of this survey was to investigate what identities were being flagged by state television in 
the ‘everyday’ lives of Syrians and Jordanians. Syrians have two state-run terrestrial and one satellite 
channel run by the state (although at the time of writing a new ‘education’ satellite channel had just 
been launched, and a ‘drama’ channel was on the way). Jordanians have three terrestrial and one 
satellite channel. One of the major advantages for the researcher investigating these state stations is 
that, given all channels are governed by the same authority; it is a safe assumption that the identity 
discourse flagged is similar on each station. Therefore the two satellite channels were selected for 
analysis. An advantage of this is that both are ‘conglomerate’ channels which tend to show a variety of 
programming from news, to entertainment, to discussion shows, whilst the terrestrial channels tend to 
wholly specialise on just one subject matter such as sport. The researcher therefore avoids the trap of 
many analysts such as Rinnawi who focus only on news programming. A third reason for selecting the 
satellite stations is that, whilst officially only 50% of households in each state have access to viewing, 
this does not account for public viewing. The author’s own experiences living in both states suggests 
that in almost every area, even the poorest, cafes chose to show satellite television over terrestrial and 
attract larger crowds as a consequence.490
Of course, here one encounters an obvious limitation of this research -  such evidence of audience 
response is anecdotal, not empirical. The difficulty is that, unlike in the West, there is little data 
gathered on audiences in the Arab world. There are no viewing figures carried out either by state 
governments nor by private channels at anything more than a sample level. Furthermore, the few 
empirical surveys that have been conducted by academic or commercial researchers have been impeded 
by governments. As Hussein Amin states, “Government restrictions make the procedures for obtaining 
official permission to conduct research -  particularly research like opinion polls and surveys for
489 Hafez, ‘Arab Media,’, p. 9.
490 This is further confirmed by ethnographic interviews in chapter 6.
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audience studies -  problematic if not impossible.”491 Whilst the few surveys that have been conducted 
are utilised in this chapter, it is with the acknowledgement that much of this work can be criticised for 
its limited scope. Further questions come when considering the engagement of the audience as much as 
actual viewing. Whilst one might be able to prove that a certain cafe in Amman that screens state 
satellite television receives over 500 customers each night, it is far more difficult to ascertain how many 
of them actually watched the television and, of those, how many responded to the identities or messages 
it flagged. The issue of audience engagement and reception is be dealt with later in this thesis and for 
now the focus is on what the regimes aim to flag to their citizens, irrespective of their success.
Having selected the unit to analyse -  the Syrian and Jordanian state satellite channels -  the issue of 
when to gather data emerged. The model for this experiment came from Michael Billig’s ‘newspaper 
sweep’ of the British press, in which he analysed the 10 national British newspapers for banal 
nationalist content in one random day 492 However, to do the same with Syrian and Jordanian TV would 
be problematic. Firstly, though viewing figures are unavailable, it is safe to assume that in the middle of 
the day when people are at work or school, programming would not prove as valuable to assess as later 
in the day. Indeed, a commercial survey by a private Arab channel, Showtime, in 2005 suggested that by 
far the most popular television viewing time in the Arab Middle East, like in the Western world, was 
‘primetime’ between 1800-0000 493 For technical reasons, recording a full six hours each day was not 
possible, so a five hour broadcast between 1900-0000 was decided upon as the sample from each 
channel. Secondly, a single day of either state would prove an insufficient sample. If on that one day a 
key event occurred -  such as the outbreak of a war or a terrorist attack -  that could not be considered 
‘typical’. Indeed, one could argue that it was only practical considerations that discouraged Billig from 
attempting more than one day in his sweep. Having decided to take a sample of the day rather than a 
full day’s broadcast, there was no such practical restriction on this experiment and so a greater number 
of samples was decided upon. In the end it was decided to record a full week’s (seven days’) worth of 
five hour samples.
The recordings were conducted in February 2009: Wednesday 18th, Thursday 19th, Friday 20th, Sunday 
22nd, Monday 23rd, Tuesday 24th and Wednesday 25th. Technical difficulties prevented recording on 
Saturday 21st so Wednesday 25th was selected as a replacement to complete the week. Rather like 
Billig’s experiment, the intention was to capture a ‘typical’ set of days, rather than a period of any 
particular national, Arab or Islamic celebration. February is free from public holidays in both states, and 
there were no religious festivals celebrated at the time. In the region it is difficult to ever select a time
491 Amin, ‘Arab media,’, p. 72.
492 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 109.
493 Amin, ‘Arab media’, p. 73.
133
when potential ‘Arab’ issues will not be present and, perhaps inevitably, the period covered was just 
after a major conflict: the Israeli war in Gaza of 27th December 2008-17th January 2009. Yet skirmishes 
and violence between the Israelis and Palestinians, as well as the ongoing Iraq conflict, are an integral 
part of the region and any study of the media must acknowledge the considerable coverage these 
conflicts are given.
Unlike Rinnawi and others, by taking a time-period sample rather than a program-type sample, the 
following results display more than just news programming. Whilst news is an important tool for 
disseminating identity discourse, and is consequently discussed first, it is not the only manner. As 
prominent, though completely ignored by the likes of Rinnawi, are the other types of news reported 
upon beyond politics. How the sport, weather and economic news are reported is a key way by which 
these state channels banally flag both state and Arab identity daily. Similarly, the symbols and images 
found in programming breaks are some of the best examples of both overt and banal identity 
reproduction. Discussion and interview shows in contrast, with their audience participation promote 
state nationalism perhaps more than Arab supra-nationalism due to their emphasis on tackling ‘the 
state’s’ problems and culture, though even they nod towards a wider Arab identity. Finally, the role of 
drama serials as the most popular program type in the region deserves far greater analysis than that 
given by Rinnawi, who ignores it, in aiding both nation building and supporting Arab supra- 
nationalism. Throughout this analysis and in a section at the end, there will also be a discussion of die 
presence of Islam in programming. Though Islam has an acknowledged place on both stations, most 
notably Jordan, it is marginal and in terms of symbols and flagging, it is utterly subordinated to State 
and Arab identities.
4.2.2 News
News programming in both Jordan and Syria is frequent. In the sample slot (1900-0000) each day, 
except for Fridays, Jordan TV shows four news programs: a brief bulletin at 1900, its main, in-depth 
hour-long program at 2000, a half hour slot of English language news at 2200, and another brief 
bulletin at 11pm. In the same time slot, Syria TV affords less time to news programming, showing three 
shorter shows. Its main in-depth program which includes sport and economic news (shown separately in 
Jordan) lasts for approximately 45 minutes from 2030; a brief bulletin at 2230; and a longer show for 
approximately 40 minutes beginning at 2340. To maintain a fair comparison, this experiment chose to 
analyse the two shows of similar length from each channel each day: die main in-depth shows at 2000 
in Jordan and 2030 in Syria, and the brief bulletins shown at 1900 in Jordan and 2230 in Syria. In 
reality, the content of the other news shows varied very little and results would have looked similar had
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they been included in this analysis. The survey looked at the four news programs (two Syrian and two 
Jordanian) over seven days and assessed the stories each reported. In particular what was noted was, 
firstly, the subject of the story -  whether about the state, the Arab world, the wider non-Arab Islamic 
world, or international news that was unrelated to the Arab or Islamic world; and secondly, the order of 
the news -  what was prioritised for the viewer and what made headline news. In looking at content, 
Arab news was divided into sub-sections: separating the Israel-Palestine and Iraq conflicts from other 
Arab news. The results can be seen in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Subjects of News bulletins
Jordan TV Syria TV
Headlines Stories Headlines Stories
State news 9 60 14 70
41% 38% 50% 44%
Arab news: Israel-Palestine 8 54 10 43
36% 35% 36% 27%
Arab news: Iraq 3 17 0 6
14% 11% 0% 4%
Arab news: Other 1 12.5 0 11.5
5% 8 % 0% 7%
Arab news: TOTAL 12 83.5 10 60.5
55% 54% 36% 38%
News about non-Arab Islamic States 1 9.5 3 15
(Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan etc.) 5% 6% 11% 9%
International news not related to the 0 3 1 13.5
Middle East or Islamic states 0% 2% 4% 8%
TOTAL 22 156 28 159
News coverage in both counties primarily emphasises domestic ‘state’ news. Whilst the table in Figure 
2 highlights that Jordan had more headlines and stories about Arab issues than about state issues, it does 
not illustrate the order in which those items were given nor the amount of time afforded them. Though 
state news only made 40% of the headlines, compared to 55% about pan-Arab news, the first headline -  
that which producers wished to inform audiences was the most important issue of the day -  was about 
Jordan on six out of seven days. Of those headlines, four were about the King -  reinforcing his cult -
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and two were about the Prime Minister. The one day (20th Feb) when non-Jordanian issues made the / 
first headline, it was news about Israel-Palestine: that Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu had been 
asked to form a government following Israeli elections. This trend of prioritising domestic news was 
even more pronounced in Syria. 50% of headlines concerned Syrian news, compared to 36% about 
Arab issues. Six out of seven first headlines also concerned domestic news and all were about President 
Assad. The one day when Syrian news did not feature in the first headline was also the news about 
Netanyahu on 20th February -  though it was presented more in terms of the Palestinian reaction than 
Jordan TV*s more apolitical description of events.
Rather like Billig’s observations that British newspapers help flag the nation by putting domestic news 
first, followed by foreign, both Syrian and Jordanian TV tend to fill the first half of their news shows 
with state-centred stories. The first 25-30 minutes of Jordan’s hour-long show almost always focussed 
on domestic news. Items tended to be longer and in more depth than the Arab and foreign news that 
followed in the second half of the program, hence the smaller number of state stories shown in figure 2 
is somewhat deceptive: more time is allotted to state news. Standard practice was to open the show with 
3-4 headlines. Some of these would be domestic and some foreign. They then proceeded to tell all 
domestic stories first -  even those not included in the headline bulletin -  before focusing on the non­
domestic headlines and other foreign news in the second half of the show. These domestic stories, that 
focussed on various topics such royal diplomatic visits, government activities and the Queen’s social 
projects, were all presented under the caption of ‘al-mamlika * (The Kingdom) written at the foot of the 
screen. When news about non-Jordanian places was reported on, the practice was to replace ‘the 
Kingdom’ with the place name such as ‘Ramallah’ or ‘Washington’. Here we see a key example of 
Billig’s banal flagging. By writing ‘the Kingdom’ rather than ‘the kingdom of Jordan’ or just ‘Jordan’, 
the viewers are informed that they should already know that ‘the kingdom’ is therefore ‘their’ kingdom 
and does not required a label. The same is seen in their references to ‘the’ Prime Minister and 
occasionally ‘the’ King -  though protocol usually required Abdullah’s full title. Jordanian state 
nationalism is therefore flagged banally in the news.
Syria TV shows similar traits, generally dedicating the first 20 minutes of its 40-45 minute news shows 
to domestic items. Like with Jordan, after it has reported domestic and foreign news in its headlines, it 
then proceeds to tell all domestic stories before moving to non-Syrian items. Though unlike Jordan its 
bulletins are not labelled by country or place, references to ‘the’ President or ‘the’ parliament similarly 
flag that viewers should regard Syria’s parliament or president as ‘their’ parliament or president. One 
noticeable exception though was on Friday 20th February when, bizarrely, the news programs reported 
no domestic news whatsoever. Most news was about Israel-Palestine, but there were also stories about
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Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Sudan, NATO and Hillary Clinton, yet nothing on Syria. Whilst this does 
not take away from the fact that news programming does tend to promote Syrian identity first, it also 
says a lot about the political system in Syria compared to Jordan. Such is the limited mandate for what 
can be reported upon in Syria, it was possible for there to be a day when no ‘appropriate’ domestic 
news was found.
Alongside state news, much space is dedicated to news about the Arab world on both channels. 86% of 
non-domestic stories in Jordan and 62% in Syria was dedicated to news about the Arab world. Rinnawi 
tried to emphasise that state television shows far less news items about the pan-Arab world than al- 
Jazeera. In his sample of the channel’s reporting in 2001 he showed that the Qatar-based station 
covered Arab news with 57% of its stories. In contrast, in his sample, Jordanian TV dedicated only 24% 
of its stories to Arab news, yet 57% of its stories on domestic news and 19% of stories international 
news.494 However, Rinnawi is determined to show the mutual exclusivity of Arab and state identity and 
hence focused on how little pan-Arab news Jordan TV showed in contrast to al-Jazeera. What he failed 
to note was that, even in his experiment, of the non-domestic news shown in Jordan, 56% was about the 
Arab world. Moreover, he ignored the order of news in his experiment. In each broadcast covered by 
my experiment in 2009, and one can assume that the format of Jordanian news has not changed 
dramatically since 2001, Arab news was always placed directly after domestic news but before 
‘international’ news. It highlights to the viewer that this is more important than news about the ‘rest of 
the world’ but less important than news about Jordan. In essence it was giving the viewers a ranking of 
their identities: Jordanian first, but then Arab.
Yet the findings of Rinnawi’s experiment themselves can be questioned. Rinnawi deliberately chooses 
the dates he analyses (8 days in July and August 2001), to include a ‘before and after’ scenario for the 
events surrounding 9/11 and the Afghanistan war.495 Yet in doing so, he chooses dates in which non- 
Arab international news - reaction to 9/11 and the outbreak of war in Afghanistan - is likely to dominate 
headlines. In terms of an ‘international’ to ‘pan-Arab’ news balance then, Rinnawi’s dates are far from 
typical. A similar criticism could be levelled at the dates chosen for this study: with the aftermath of the 
Gaza war and the Israeli elections likely to result in more stories about the Arab world than perhaps 
would be usual. I would contend though that it was 9/11 and Afghanistan that were the freak occasions 
that took the usually region-centric focus of the news temporarily away from the Arab world. The Gaza 
war and Israel’s elections, in contrast, are more ‘typical’ of the Palestine-centric Arab news cycle. Yet 
even if we were to average the findings of this survey with those of Rinnawi’s to balance out the two
494 Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism, p. 108.
495 Ibid., pp. 116-119.
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perceived biases, it shows that, of the non-domestic news shown by Jordanian TV, the majority of it is 
about the Arab world. Rinnawi’s findings showed 56%, this survey showed 86%, which would average 
at 71% - a clear majority of coverage.
Of this Arab content, in both states, most is about Israel-Palestine: 65% in Jordan and 71% in Syria. 
The reasons for this might vary. Syria, whose news tends to focus on Israel’s atrocities, is still at war 
with the Jewish state and has long used this as an excuse to justify dictatorship. Keeping news about 
this war in the public eye is in its interest. Jordan, though at peace with Israel still has an enormous 
population of Palestinian origin who care about the situation. Though its items are more apolitical, 
ensuring that this community is informed of events from the Jordanian governments’ perspective might 
explain the volume of reports. Beyond Palestine, pan-Arab news about Iraq is more prominent in Jordan 
(20%) than Syria (10%). There are more historic and tribal links between Jordan and Iraq which might 
explain the Hashemite state’s greater promotion of these events.496 In contrast, Syria has a recent 
history of animosity towards Iraq and the regime has no interest in the new post-Saddam democratic 
state succeeding as it might prove a model to end its own dictatorship. Whilst it may celebrate reporting 
of bombs and destruction, news on democratic developments could be muted. Finally, very little Arab 
news in either state focuses on other regions. Only 15% of Jordanian and 19% of Syrian pan-Arab news 
focused away from Palestine or Iraq. Much of this concerned a bomb in a tourist area in Cairo and the 
death of a Sudanese poet.
Of non-Arab news, neither state put much emphasis on stories from the wider Muslim world: only 9% 
of Syria’s stories, and 6% of Jordan’s. This slightly higher figure in Syria is in line with another feature 
of Syrian news compared to Jordanian, that of showing more non-Arab international news. The 8% of 
non-Islamic, non-Middle Eastern news shown by Syria was greater than the paltry 2% shown by 
Jordan. This, combined with their coverage of the wider Muslim world presents an interesting figure. 
Of all the stories shown on Jordanian news, only 8% was not about the Arab world, whereas Syria 
allocated 18% of its stories. Given that it is Syria that is regarded as the more politically ‘Arabist’ of the 
two states, and Jordan the more western-facing, ‘liberal’ state, this figure is intriguing. What it 
illustrates is that both states, whilst focusing on domestic news primarily, inform their audiences that 
when they look outside of their state, they should find news from the Arab world, particularly Israel- 
Palestine, far more important than news from beyond it. Moreover, this is banally emphasised even 
more in the news broadcasts Hashemite Jordan than in Ba’athist Syria.
496 Laurie A. Brand, Jordan’s Inter-Arab relations: The Political Economy o f Alliance Making (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), pp. 196-7; David Schenker, Dancing with Saddam: The Strategic Tango o f Jordanian-Iraqi 
Relations (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003), pp. 5-7.
138
4.3 A Week of Television: Sport, Economics, Weather and Breaks
4.3.1 Sport, Economics and Weather
Whereas most literature on pan-Arab satellite television has focused on news coverage, little attention 
has been paid to less politicised topics reproducing identity to viewers. The following analysis of sport, 
economics and weather coverage illustrates how state and, to a lesser extent, Arab identity is regularly 
flagged on Syrian and Jordanian TV. For sport, both stations had regular bulletins: in a separate 15 
minute show at 1930 in Jordan, and as a 10 minute slot as part of the 2030 news program in Syria. 
Whilst each channel also had a separate sports feature program on one day a week, this survey focused 
on the content of the regular daily bulletins only. Neither state gave a sports bulletin on Friday 20th, so 
only six bulletins are discussed. The results can be seen in figure 3.
Figure 3: Subjects of Sports Bulletins
Jordan
Headline 
/1st story
TV
No. of Items
Syria
Headline 
/1st story
TV
No. of Items
State: Football 3 3 4 6
50% 6% 57% 21%
State: Other Sports 0 2 1 1
0% 4% 14% 4%
Total State Sports: 3 5 5 7
50% 10% 71% 25%
Arab: Football 1 8 0 0
17% 16% 0% 0%
Arab: Other Sports 0 0 0 1
0% 0% 0% 4%
Total Arab Sports 1 8 0 1
17% 16% 0% 4%
Foreign (non-Arab): Football 2 22 2 11
33% 43% 29% 39%
Foreign: Other Sports 0 16 0 9
0% 31% 0% 32%
Total Foreign sports 2 38 2 20
33% 75% 29% 71%
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Total Football 6 33 6 17
100% 65% 86% 61%
TOTAL 6 51 7 28
Unlike with political news coverage, figure 3 illustrates that international stories -  from outside of the 
domestic and Arab world -  dominate both stations’ sport broadcasts. 75% of Jordanian sports stories 
and 71% of Syrian sports concerned news from foreign countries. Moreover, this is contrasted by very 
few stories concerning domestic sporting events -  only 10% of Jordanian and 25% Syrian stories. The 
likely explanation for this is not that there is a deliberate attempt by producers to under-report domestic 
sport but more that, as small countries with limited resources for professional sport, there is simply less 
sport to report on. Similarly, the popularity of commercial international brands of sport such as the 
English football Premier League and the American Basketball NBA within these states means that there 
is substantial demand for sporting news from outside of Syria, Jordan and the Arab world. Nevertheless, 
the use of sports reports to flag national identity is still noticeable given how much attention each 
bulletin gives to such a small pool of state sports. In Jordan, 50% of headlines were about state sports, 
with producers making the most of the paltry 10% of stories. Similarly, 71% of Syrian headlines 
concerned state sport, despite barely a quarter of stories covering this topic.
The relative absence of sport news from within the Arab world is surprising. Jordan reported 16% of its 
stories on Arab sport, whilst Syria managed only 3%. Syria similarly declined to report any headlines 
on Arab sport, whilst Jordan managed one. Again, as with the news, the surprising result here is that 
supposedly Arab nationalist Syria shows more domestic and less Arab sport than Jordan. One could 
speculate a few reasons for this. As can be seen, football dominates most sports reports. Most state 
sports reported on in both countries were domestic football and most foreign sports reports were about 
foreign football. Unlike Syria, Jordan also reported on the football leagues in Saudi, the Gulf and Egypt. 
Syria’s reason for not reporting these leagues might be political -  unlike Amman, Damascus was not 
enjoying strong relations with these states at the time of investigation. They might also be due to 
domestic demand, with Jordan being geographically closer to the states whose leagues they showed and 
having a greater number of their migrants. Yet even these numbers are slim -  barely 1.7% of the 
Jordanian population, for example, is of Egyptian origin, hardly a significant lobby.497 For whatever 
reason, it is interesting how in sport, whilst domestic states sport is inflated to dominate headlines, Arab 
sport enjoys less focus, especially in Syria. Given how Arab identity is flagged elsewhere in Syrian
497 Arouri, Fathi A., ‘Non-Jordanians working in Jordan’ in Cooperation Project on the social integration o f  
immigrants, migration, and the movement o f  persons (European Commission, 2007) (http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/e- 
texts/CARIM-AS 2007 05.pdf) accessed 8/4/09.
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television, this is more likely to be due to an absence of interest in other Arab leagues, or a political 
decision to not endorse the commercial leagues of Syria’s Arab foes.
Economics news is reported in a similar fashion to sport in both states. In Jordan a separate 15 minute 
show is aired daily at 1945, just before the news and after the sports bulletin. In Syria, the 10 minute 
economic bulletin is part of the 2030 evening news, just before sport. This survey focused on these 
daily broadcasts, the results of which can be seen in figure 4.
Figure 4: Subjects of Economics News Bulletins
Jordan
Headline 
/1st story
TV
No. of Items
Syria
Headline 
/1st story
TV
No. of Items
State Economic news 7 43 7 17
100% 77% 100% 53%
Pan-Arab Economic news 0 2 0 0
0% 3% 0% 0%
International Economic News 0 11 0 15
0% 20% 0% 47%
TOTAL 7 56 7 32
In a reversal of the results seen for sport, yet in line with news reporting, the majority of news stories 
focused on domestic economic news. 77% of Jordanian stories and 53% of stories from Syria TV 
concerned the state economy. Moreover, as was seen with sport, there was a clear effort to flag to the 
viewer that this news was of the greatest importance to them, with the first story / headline on each day 
on each station concerning domestic economics. More surprising was how little economic news from 
the Arab world was reported: 3% of Jordanian stories and none of Syria’s. This was in contrast with the 
quite detailed international economic news being reported, especially in Syria which dedicated 47% of 
its stories to this area, with Jordan only 20%. The reasons for this lack of focus on the Arab world, yet 
wider coverage of the international scene -  the reverse of what was seen with news coverage -  could 
have numerous explanations. Firstly, the context of the experiment: February 2009 was a time of world 
wide economic uncertainty and the state of the world stock market would have a considerable enough 
impact on local economies, justifying interest. Similarly, Syria’s detailed focus on the international 
economy might be explained by the regime’s attempts to blame its own weak economy on the global 
downturn, keeping viewers aware of the global problems to lighten their own troubles. Another 
explanation might be that neither economy, but particularly Syria, is that open and hence there is not 
much domestic economic news to fill the 10 minute slot. To show economic news from other Arab
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states could prove politically difficult: to show successes might lead the domestic audience to question 
why fellow Arab economies are better, yet to show failures could damage relations with other Arab 
states. International economic news is suitably unfamiliar to Syrian or Jordanian viewers that they 
would not be as controversial. Having said that, even in Syria Arab economies are not totally ignored, 
and the connection with the Arab world is flagged briefly with the currency markets shown at the end of 
each bulletin. The value of the Syrian pound is shown first next to the US Dollar, then Euro, Swiss 
Franc and Yen. Then its value is given to the Iranian Rial, followed by that of Egypt, Emirates, Saudi 
and Kuwait.
A far more visible flagging of both state and Arab identity can be seen in the weather forecasts of both 
states. Jordan shows two main weather forecasts in the evening. The first, starts with a map of the 
Eastern Mediterranean which then zooms in to a map of Jordan. ‘Jordan’ is never labelled as it is 
assumed that the viewers know ‘their’ country, something that Billig highlights is a key to banally 
flagging national identity.498 The camera on this computer generated map then pans across the cities of 
Jordan forecasting the day’s weather. This in itself is a clear case of nation-building through television: 
daily flagging to the viewer that this is ‘their’ state. The second weather bulletin of the day, just after 
the 2000 news, is more intriguing. It too repeats the map of Jordan, but then proceeds to show a similar 
computer generated map of the Arab world. Starting at Mecca and Medina, the camera pans around the 
Arabian peninsular, across to the Levant and finishes in North Africa at Rabat in Morocco. As the 
camera moves, the capital of every Arab state is labelled and the weather over it depicted by a symbol. 
Crucially, none of the non-Arab states that the map passes by are labelled. We do not see a label for 
‘Tehran’, ‘Ankara’, ‘Tel Aviv’ or ‘Madrid’, all of which are within view of the map. The existence of 
this map supports the idea that Jordanian state television helps to promote an Arab identity alongside 
state identity. The broadcast clearly prioritises Jordan first, but then flags to its viewers that, after 
Jordan, they should care about the weather in the Arab world. This was not just regional, as there would 
be no need to give the forecast as far west as Morocco, and clearly had an Arab-only focus, illustrated 
by the unlabeled Iranian, Israeli and Turkish capitals.
Syria shows only one weather map in the evening, but it too flags both state and Arab identity. Starting 
with a map of the world that then zooms in to just Syria, it emphasises to the viewer that they should 
care about ‘their’ state’s weather first. After this, unlike in Jordan, it shows a map of the regional area 
only at first. This includes the Arabian peninsular and Levant, but also Turkey. Though no cities are 
labelled and only weather symbols shown over broad areas, this map does not include the whole Arab 
world. A second map is then shown which does show the remaining Arab states in North Africa, but
498 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 108.
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this is part of a larger map that includes Western Europe. Unlike in Jordan, this map makes no 
distinction to the viewer that they should care more about the Arab regions than the non-Arab regions. 
The end of show summary does flag Arab identity though. After the maps, the broadcast lists Syria’s 
principle cities and the weather they will experience in the next 24 hours, continuing the state flagging 
seen before. However, after this it proceeds to list the weather in all the Arab capitals: Damascus, 
Beirut, Jerusalem, Amman, Cairo, Riyadh, Sana’a, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Manama, Doha, Muscat, 
Baghdad, Khartoum, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers and Rabat. After this follows a long list of European cities 
followed at the end by ‘Moscow’, ‘Istanbul’ and, finally ‘Tehran’. By listing all the Arab cities first 
before the Europeans, and making a key distinction between them and regional cities such as Istanbul 
and Tehran, the show clearly flags that these Arab cities should be of greater interest to the Syrian 
viewer than either European, Russian, Turkish or Iranian cities. Curiously, the list of Arab cities 
includes only 18, not the full 22 members of the Arab League. The capitals of Comoros, Mauritania, 
Somalia and Djibouti are excluded. These states though are included on the map of the Arab world that 
is seen across Syria as the symbol of the ruling Ba’ath party. The absence from the weather bulletins 
suggests that, to an extent, the Syrian producers consider the Arab world to be slightly different from 
the party line and that the party are not so wedded to the principle that they have intervened in what 
remains a tightly controlled television station.
4.3.2 Programming Breaks
When assessing how identities are banally flagged by Syrian and Jordanian television, it is as important 
to take note of what fills the spaces between shows as much as the shows themselves. These ‘breaks’ 
are the very background space which, as Billig claims, becomes ‘national space’. Their content was 
quite unlike that found on western television and varied a great deal from day to day, and a sense of 
schedule was sometimes hard to obtain. Commercial advertisements did take place on both stations, 
though more so in Jordan than Syria, but there were far more adverts for forthcoming shows, and brief 
government information films than one would find on western television. As well as this there were 
short music videos shown, some with a very patriotic theme especially in Jordan, and ‘links’ that 
showed a montage of national images with the station logo. Whilst it would be difficult in this brief 
summary to list the content of every break encountered in this experiment, the following section will 
discuss the most noticeable features of what was found. In particular, it will note the occasions when 
breaks overtly flagged state, Arab or religious identity, and those occasions when it was more banal.
Of the two channels, breaks on Jordanian television tended to show more items that overtly flagged 
state identity. On five occasions (18th, twice on 19th, 24th and 25th February) patriotic music videos were
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played in five-minute slots. These all were of a similar nature. They all had very patriotic titles: likateb 
imakya baladee (to write your name my country); hethe baladna (this is our country); watanee al helu 
(my beautiful homeland,); balad ordon (country Jordan); ya baladee (oh my country). The exact content 
for each video varied, but the themes were essentially the same. All showed images of Jordan: ancient 
sites, the cities and areas of natural beauty. They also showed symbols of the regime: the flag, the army, 
and the royal family, especially the King. Jordanian people were also focused upon, with many images 
of children in schools, students at university, factory workers and farmers in fields. Notably, in terms of 
religious identity, there were also several images of famous Jordanian mosques. Such music videos 
support Kraidy and Abu-Lughod’s assertions about regimes using television to quite deliberately ‘create 
citizens’. These images are so frequent and ‘normal’ to Jordanians though that, whilst the western 
viewer might see them as overt nation building, the local viewer might let them pass in a banal 
unnoticed manner.499
In contrast, Syrian television showed far fewer examples of overt nation-building. For one thing, Syria 
TV was less consistent. Whilst Jordan TV seemingly had a semi-regular place for patriotic videos -  just 
after the 8pm news show, presumably when producers thought most were watching -  Syria saw no such 
regularity. Whilst it had no patriotic music videos, Syrian TV did show two different slogans ‘from the 
speeches of President, Bashar al-Assad’. One stated: la hawieh wa la watan min doun lugha (no identity 
and no homeland without language,), and the other, al timsak bil lugha al arabi anwan liltimsak bi 
wajoudana a qawmi (holding the Arabic language is the key to holding the soul of nationalism) -  both 
being displayed for a few seconds on a blank screen, without the fanfare afforded in Jordan. Similarly, 
on another occasion in between shows, the slogan ''Suriyya biwasal al arab ’ (Syria the Arab compass,) 
was shown. Unlike in Jordan, these slogans were strongly Arabist and made a conscious effort to link 
nationalism {qawmi) and Syrian identity (hawieh) to the Arab language and Arab identity. In the latter 
case, they simultaneously promoted state pride by suggesting that Syria is the ‘compass’ of the Arabs: 
the first state where others look for guidance. Curiously though, these slogans were shown over two 
days only: one on Thursday 19th and four repeats of the same slogans on Friday 20th. No similar slogans 
were repeated on any other day of the experiment. The author could not find any particular significance 
attached to these dates and therefore concludes that being evening on a Thursday and Friday -  the 
weekend in Syria -  producers believe this will be viewed by the largest audience. Curiously, on Syria’s 
very few overt instances of nation flagging, there is a considerable effort in all three to link in with Arab 
identity or the Arab language.
499 See Chapter 6.
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More exclusively state-orientated flagging was also visible in Syrian breaks, though more nuanced than 
Jordan’s patriotic music videos or its own Arab nationalist slogans. This was particularly visible on 
network ‘links’. These links were short montages that would end with the logo of the Syria TV network, 
rather like those seen on the BBC or CNN. These links were shown 21 times during the time period 
recorded, averaging at once every two hours. There were five types of link, each showing a short film 
that flagged state identity. The most frequent showed a young boy making a paper boat with his 
grandfather, attaching a small Syrian flag to it and then floating it on a pond. This then cut to him 
building a ship in the Arwad boat yard on the Syrian coast, and then to a display of large tankers in the 
Syrian merchant fleet. This was clearly designed to give viewers pride in the industriousness and 
modernity of the country. The same is seen in other ‘modem’ links. One shows a businessman in a 
modem shopping mall and another shows a female architect drawing plans in the ancient Bosra Roman 
theatre, before cutting to a very modem building being constructed in Damascus. The links again try to 
instill a sense of pride in the nation in the viewer by seeing its ancient and modem successes. The two 
others do the same, but emphasize Syrian cultural pride. One shows a boy playing football in the 
Ottoman Azem Palace in Damascus, whilst the other shows a teenage girl ballet dancing in the newly 
constructed national opera house. Each link points to state identity.
Other examples of less overt identity flagging were seen on both stations in the advertisement breaks 
for products, future shows or events. Figure 5 shows the subjects of all the advertisement breaks during 
the week’s experiment.
Figure 5: Subjects of advertisement breaks
Jordan TV Syria TV
Commercials for transnational companies 18 4
19% 4%
Commercials for local (Jor/Syr) companies* 27 12
29% 13%
Government advertisements & advice 27 13
29% 14%
Ad for Al Quds Arab capital of culture 1 16
1% 17%
Ads for upcoming shows 21 48
22% 52%
Total 94 93
* In Syria almost all companies advertised are state owned
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The first notable feature of figure 5 is the different place given to commercial advertisements on each 
station. Jordan, perhaps due to its longer history of capitalism compared to more socialist Syria, has 
more commercial advertisements.500 Whilst nearly half of Jordan’s advertisements (48%) are for 
commercial companies, only 17% of Syrian advertisements are -  and most of those products advertised, 
such as the new ‘Syria Drama’ channel, orfinoon entertainment magazine, are government owned. Of 
these commercial advertisements, Syria finds very little space for non-domestic transnational 
companies such as Pepsi (4%) compared to Jordan (19%). However, both states give the majority of 
their commercial advertising space to local products -  60% in Jordan and 75% in Syria -  which in itself 
banally flags state identity to viewers: showing that producers believe local products should be of more 
interest than transnational ones. Whilst Syria TV proved to be less commercially orientated than Jordan 
TV, which is no great surprise given how little the former relies on advertising revenue to survive, it 
tended to promote itself more than any other product or business. 52% of its advertising slots covered 
upcoming shows on the network, compared to only 22% on Jordan TV. Indirectly this could be seen as 
a form of state identity flagging: by promoting the national station so often, producers continued to 
remind Syrians that this was their station from their country.
Also flagging state identity were adverts offering advice from the government, which are seen more in 
Jordan’s breaks (29%) than Syria (14%). In Jordan these are varied in nature. Some portray a cartoon of 
a Jordanian man -  wearing a red keffiyeh and flagging to the viewer this national symbol -  wasting 
electricity, and then warning citizens against doing the same. Others warn against speeding on the roads 
by showing photographs of ‘model citizens’ -  families, a son graduating from university -  in a glass 
frame which is then smashed to the sound of screeching tires. One of the more bizarre government 
adverts has no dialogue or writing, but shows a group of young men (Shebab) joking around on a street 
comer, and yet rise to their feet in respect when an older man walks past them. The message, like the 
others, shows a more banal, unnoticed attempt to create ‘good citizens’.501 Syrian government advice is 
similarly aimed at creating ‘better’ citizens, though they almost all tended to focus on health. Short 
adverts showed families visiting their local clinic -  naturally with a picture of the President hanging 
unnoticed over the entrance -  and proclaiming how good the government-run service was, and how 
others should do likewise.
Whilst state national identity seems to dominate both stations’ advertisements Arab identity is not 
totally ignored. In particular, adverts for the cultural festival held in Jerusalem: ‘Al Quds capital of
500 Eberhard Kienle, Contemporary Syria: liberalization between Cold War and Cold Peace (London: British Academic 
Press, 1994), p. 1.
501 Kraidy, ‘From Activity to Interactivity’, pp. 94-5.
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Arab culture’ was shown on both stations. However, the fact that Jordan showed it only once in the 
week, compared to 16 times in Syria is curious. Whilst analysis of news and sport suggested that Jordan 
was more inclined than Syria to report banal unnoticed flagging of Arab identity, it seems to minimize 
the advertisement of a far more overt item as the Arab capital of culture. The reasons for this though, 
may well be political. The advert shows Palestinians celebrating the festival in spite of occupation, with 
colorful kites being flown over the West Bank separation wall. As mentioned before, whilst it is in 
Syria’s interests to keep its population reminded of the Israeli occupation, Jordan finds the topic 
uncomfortable due to its unpopular peace with Israel. Moreover, Jordan’s agreement with Israel gave 
the Hashemites a nominal influence over Jerusalem’s Islamic holy places, which Tel Aviv has since 
largely ignored. This commercial, which draws attention to the suffering of Jerusalem, only serves to 
further humiliate Amman’s impotence. Jordan’s limited display of the advertisement may therefore be 
more a sign of its dismay at the advert itself rather than a conscious effort not to flag Arab identity. This 
is in line with other trends in its programming breaks though, which are generally far less Arab-focused 
than Syria. Unlike its other shows, Jordan tends to reserve programming breaks almost exclusively for 
nation-building by banally and, more often than not, overtly, flagging state identity.
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4.4 A Week of Television: Chat Shows, Musalsals and Islam
4.4.1 Chat Shows
Discussion shows are a good way of flagging state identity and forging a national community. Whether 
by having a live studio audience, or using phone-ins, the audience is exposed to ‘ordinary’ citizens from 
around ‘their’ country being involved in the program, and hence strengthens the ‘imagined community’. 
This was seen in discussion shows in both Syria and Jordan. As figures 6 and 7 demonstrate, several of 
these shows had expert guests questioned by viewers via the telephone. On each show on each station, 
the caller’s name and city were listed on screen. Yet in listing simply ‘Aleppo’ or ‘Aqaba’, rather than 
‘Aleppo, Syria’ or ‘Aqaba, Jordan’, the viewer was being told that they should already know that these 
cities are part of their country and hence don’t need the state name to be labeled.
Figure 6: Jordanian discussion shows
Show name Date Discussion topic Audience / Phone in? Principle focus: 
Domestic, Arab, 
Islamic or 
International?
That al qabuh (Under 
the dome)
Wed
18th
Regional Politics, esp. Is-Pal Phone-in Arab
Fikr wa hedara 
(Thinking and 
civilisation)
Thurs
19th
Arts and Culture Phone-in Arab
That al daw (Under the 
light)
Fri 20th Moral Issues: how young to 
marry?
Phone-in Domestic / Islamic
Lihakee alna (The talk 
is ours)
Fri 20th TV dramas Audience Domestic
Mura al a ’lam (Mirror 
of the world)
Sun 22nd Regional Politics: Discuss regional 
and world media’s view of Gaza
None Arab
Fusalu ihal althakr 
(Ask the people who 
know)
Mon
23rd
Religion Phone-in Islamic
Ifa f Islamiyeh (Islamic 
piety)
Tues
24th
Religion Phone-in Islamic
That al qabuh (Under 
the dome)
Wed
25th
Regional Politics, esp. Is-Pal Phone-in Arab
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Figure 7: Syrian discussion shows
Show name Date Discussion topic Audience / Phone in? Principle focus: 
Domestic, Arab, 
Islamic or 
International?
Khat al ahmar (The red 
line)
Wed
18th
Topical Issues: Prison Audience & Phone-in Domestic
Masa al kheer ya Arab 
(Good evening Arabs)
Thurs
19th
Culture: pop music, Arabic 
language.
Phone-in Arab
Songs and wishes 
(English title only)
Sun 22nd Pop music Phone-in Domestic / Arab
Nadee television 
(Television club)
Sun 22nd TV dramas None Domestic
Mula ’ab al ghud 
(Stadium of tomorrow)
Mon
23rd
Sport None Domestic / 
International
AI shabab raee (The 
youth’s opinion)
Tues
24th
Youth issues Audience Domestic
Khibree ya teer (Tell 
me little bird)
Tues
24th
Family: Syrians living abroad Phone-in Domestic
Madaraat (Orbits) Tues
24th
Science: new agricultural methods Phone-in Domestic
Khat al ahmar (The red 
line)
Wed
25th
Topical issues: education Audience & Phone-in Domestic
Al jithur (The roots) Wed
25th
Topical issues: international crime, 
Is-Pal.
None Arab / International
The topics of the discussion shows suggest which identities producers hoped to flag. Both channels had 
discussion shows on a variety of topics such as politics, culture, family, religion and sport, yet Jordan’s 
discussion shows tended to focus on Arab issues more, whilst Syria focused on the domestic. Possible 
reasons for this could vary. The Syrian regime tends to discourage political discussion in public more 
than Jordan, even the much celebrated Israel-Palestine issue, which might explain why the one show 
that did concern this topic in Syria was a show with panelists that was not open to public phone calls. 
Moreover, it would be logical that Syria wants a very strict control over its message on the Israel- 
Palestine conflict, which can be controlled far more easily by showing news items rather than 
discussion shows. The number of discussion shows on each side, moreover, is yet another area where 
Jordan surprisingly shows more Arab content than Syria, with Damascus offering more nation-building
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domestic shows. Similarly, it questions Rugh’s notion that, as a ‘loyalist’ system, Jordan’s television is 
less political than Syria’s.502
Having said that figure 8 shows that in more controlled interview shows Syria does promote Arab 
content. In its choice of interview guests in six shows, none were Syrian and only one concerned 
domestic rather than Arab issues. Jordan seemed to prefer to involve interview guests in discussion 
shows, having only one ‘interview only’ program in the week, which had a domestic focus. Syria dealt 
with both regional politics and Arab culture in its interviews. By having cultural guests from Algeria, 
Egypt and Sudan, producers were clearly flagging that they are culturally relevant to Syrian viewers. 
Significantly, in these cultural interviews and on discussion shows the presenter and, often, the guest, 
referred to al watan al arabi (the Arab homeland,). During Dee al canadeel on Friday 20 February, the 
host asked the guest, an Egyptian writer and dissident, about her experiences in the ‘Arab homeland’. 
The guest responded, also talking about the ‘Arab homeland’. A similar exchange took place during the
t l iMas a khal kheerya Arab (Good evening Arabs) discussion show on Thursday 19 F ebruary, when the 
host and guest talked about the ‘Arab homeland’s’ interaction with western culture. In each case, guests 
and hosts spoke of the ‘Arab homeland’ not as a question but as an established fact. This flags not only 
the existence of an Arab nation, but Syria’s desires to lead it. Whether the Syrian viewers believe that 
there is an Arab homeland or nation is disputable, but that is clearly the message banally flagged by 
such shows.
Figure 8: Jordanian and Syrian interview shows
Show name Date Guest Topic Principle focus: 
Domestic, Arab, 
Islamic or 
International?
Jordan Wajha li waja 
(Face to face)
Mon
23rd
Head of Jordan Valley 
civil engineering 
authority
The ‘national strategy’ for 
development in Jordan
Domestic
Syria Al akbar al 
masura (The 
pictured news)
Wed
18th
Amr Moussa -  Head 
of the Arab League
Regional politics Arab
‘Special show’ 
for Rashid 
Bujadra
Fri
20th
Rashid Bujadra Discuss Algerian poet / writer’s 
work
Arab
Dee al canadeel Fri Dr Nawal al Salawee Discuss Egyptian writer and Arab
502 Rugh, Arab mass media, p. 189.
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(These are the 
lamps,)
o B dissident’s work
‘Special show’ 
for the late Dr 
Mohammad 
Saleh Ahmed
Fri
20th
Dr Mohammad Saleh 
Ahmed
Archive interview with 
Sudanese writer who died this 
week
Arab
‘Special show’ on 
American peace
Fri
20th
Anna Baltzar Discuss American student / 
author’s experiences living in 
the West Bank
Arab
Al balad baladak 
(the country is 
yours)
Mon
23rd
Spanish academic Discuss Syrian ancient sights, 
tourist attractions -  all featured 
in guest’s new book
Domestic
In contrast, most Jordanian shows that mention the topic refer to al alam al arabi (the Arab World,) 
rather than al watan al arabi (the Arab homeland/ One such example is Fikr wa hedara (Ideas and 
civilisation) on Thursday 19th February when the host and guests speak of culture ‘from the Arab 
world’. On the one hand this suggests that Jordan TV promotes a lesser Arab identity than its Syrian 
equivalent -  seeing it as a more disparate ‘world’ rather than a specific ‘homeland’. However, even this 
throwaway comment suggests to the viewer that they are bound more to the Arabs than other states. In 
Mura al a lam (Mirror of the world) on Sunday 22nd February, the host says he and his guests will be 
analysing ‘Arab newspapers and newspapers from the world’. In doing so he flags to the audience that 
the Arabs should somehow, collectively, be distinguished from the ‘outside’ world: that they are more 
important to Jordanians than citizens of other, non-Arab states. The discourse is, in this case, perhaps 
less overt than in Syria, yet in both their content and language, Jordanian discussion shows also flag 
Arab identity alongside that of the state.
4.4.2 Musalsals (Drama serials)
The final type of programme discussed here is also the most popular: the musalsal (drama serial). 
Though it is hard to assess exact numbers, numerous surveys and research confirm that more than news, 
sport or entertainment shows, nightly screenings of dramas attract the largest audiences in the Arab 
world.503 With the advent of satellite television in recent years, the musalsal industry has boomed, with 
Egyptian and Syrian productions in particular dominating the field.504 For all television producers in the 
Arab world, the most important time of the year is Ramadan, when new dramas are screened each night,
503 Amin, ‘Arab media,’, p. 73; Abu-Lughod, Dramas o f Nationhood, p. 21.
504 Salamandra, New Old Damascus, p. 103.
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attracting at times near-obsessive followings.505 For the rest of the year these series that were made for 
the holiday peak season are shown again in runs of different length. During this experiment, Jordan TV 
was screening two different series each night, one at 2100, the other at 2330, whilst Syria TV screened 
one at 2230, as well as two separate ‘feature-length’ films.
The connection between musalsal and identity has only begun to be studied recently, such as Abu- 
Lughod’s analysis of Egypt and Salamandra’s investigations of Syria. Both argue that these serials 
‘help to form a national imagining’.506 This pedagogical approach was certainly seen in the two feature 
films shown on Syria TV during the period analysed. The first, shown on Thursday 19th was calledfilm 
jawlan (Golan film) and was fairly naked national propaganda. It centred on a family who lived on the 
Syrian side of the Golan Heights, close to the Israeli border, who communicated with other family 
members on the occupied side via carrier pigeon and other methods. The lead character, the father in 
the family, had fought in the 1973 war, and flashbacks showed him fighting bravely against the Israelis. 
The pedagogical message was clear: Syria is still occupied by the enemy and Syrians should not forget 
the bravery of families split by the conflict. Just as pedagogical, in another way, was the second film: 
Yemeni al rahan al khaser (The lost Yemeni bet). This told the tale of Islamist fighters in Yemen who 
attempted an insurgency but eventually were either killed or saw the error of their ways. This continues 
the anti-Islamist theme of the Syrian regime and, whilst perhaps less obviously nation-building, had a 
clear pedagogical message against the dangers of Islamism.
Most Musalsals are more nuanced than this, and are good examples of identity being banally flagged. 
The main Syrian drama shown during the week, Yawm momatar akhr (another rainy day), is more 
typical. It is set in modem Damascus around a middle class family and their friends. On the one hand 
this can be seen as directly pedagogical in the manner described by Abu-Lughod. The characters 
presented are of a wealthier background than most Syrians, and yet presented as ‘normal’, suggesting 
role models for citizens. The various problems the family face are dealt with in a manner that viewers 
can relate to. In a more banal way, this series flags state identity by presenting a national perspective: 
the problems faced by the characters are those facing all Syrians, not just those in Damascus or the 
middle classes.
However, Salamandra contends that the recent success in the Syrian drama industry has actually led to a 
weakening of the nation-building potential of its musalsals.501 Whilst in the 1990s, Syrian dramas were 
largely made for a domestic audience they are now made for export to the wider Arab world. According
505 Salamandra, ‘Syrian Television,’, p. 253.
506 Abu-Lughod, Dramas o f Nationhood, p. 229.
507 Salamandra, ‘Syrian Television,’ p. 257.
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to Salamandra this has not only lead to their broadening in subject to appeal to the widest audience, but 
also to their inclusion of a more Islamic tone to please conservative Gulf buyers. She cites the growth in 
period pieces about the ‘glorious’ Islamic era in Andalucia as evidence of this.508 However, whilst there 
might be a broader trend in this direction, it is far from comprehensive. As Salamandra states, over 100 
new serials are aired each Ramadan, which leaves much room for diversity.509 During the week of this 
experiment, the broadcast of two clearly state-focused pedagogical films suggests that there is still 
plenty of state identity flagging content on Syria TV. Moreover, as shall be discussed in chapter six, the 
success of Syrian dramas within the Arab world has offered Syrians a focus for national pride. Syrian 
production companies might be edging towards more conservative and religious content for export, but 
the week covered in this experiment suggests that Syrian state TV itself still prefers pedagogical, 
secular, nation-building dramas.
More curious is Jordan which, unlike Syria, has a very weak drama industry. Both dramas shown 
during the week were imported: abbas al abyad f i  yawm al aswad (the white Abbas in black days) from 
Egypt and Al mawt al qadim ila alsharq (The next death to the east) from Syria. Abbas al abyadfi 
yawm al aswad (the white Abbas in black days) is set in modem Cairo about a man, Abbas, who spent 
years in prison in Iraq, only to return to Egypt to find his wife has married his best friend and his 
children don’t know him. He spends the series slowly building a relationship with his unassuming 
children and rebuilding his life. Al mawt al qadim ila alsharq (The next death to the east) is a fantasy 
series set in a fictional past whose costumes resemble the early days of Islam. It is set in a safe city on 
the frontier which is seized by a gang of bandits. Throughout the series the main characters attempt to 
liberate the city. Neither of these shows can really be said to be promoting Jordanian state identity.
Both series can though be seen to promote Arab identity. Al mawt al qadim ila alsharq (The next death 
to the east) is a Syrian series which is said to have direct parallels with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
The evil bandits who illegally seize the peaceful city are clearly supposed to represent the Israelis. This 
series is typical of many Egyptian and Syrian serials that thinly veil criticism of Israel.510 More banally, 
abbas al abyadfi yawm al aswad (the white Abbas in black days) can also be seen to flag Arab identity. 
Though it is set in Egypt, the series was popular across the Arab world. Like many popular musalsals, it 
prompted discussion shows on pan-Arab satellite television stations and, though in this case it was 
shown on a domestic channel, can be seen as part of a wider trend that links Arabs in an ‘imagined 
community’ who all watch the same TV series and, crucially, conduct transnational public discourse
508 Ibid., p. 256.
509 Ibid., p. 253.
510 Hammond, Pop Culture Arab World!, pp. 68-69.
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about it. Contrary to Rinnawi though, this is not in opposition to the state system. The series makes no 
attempt to disguise the fact that it is set in Egypt, yet attracts non-Egyptian viewing nonetheless.
The presence of a thriving drama industry therefore allows Syria to be more pedagogical and nation- 
building in the dramas it screens than Jordan. The existence of more Arab-leaning Syrian shows, such 
as Al mawt al qadim ila alsharq (The next death to the east) does suggests though that, at another time, 
this experiment might have found a more pan-Arab flagging drama than the state-focused series 
discussed. This would be in line with the general trend on Syria TV of flagging both state and Arab 
identity. Jordan, in contrast, seems not to flag state identity so readily in the dramas it shows. This 
though is more due to financial constraint than a conscious choice. Nonetheless, it is yet another 
example of Jordanian viewers being exposed to more Arab flagging.
4.4.3 Islam
Finally, a word should be said about the notable absence of Islamic identity flagged on both Jordanian 
and Syrian television. Whilst state identity is clearly dominant, the analysis described above indicates 
that in different ways and at different times, both Syria TV and Jordan TV find considerable space to 
flag Arab identity as well, sometimes overtly, sometimes banally. However, as noticeable is the limited 
exposure given to Islam. Unlike most state television stations, Syria TV, does not interrupt its 
programming for the Islamic call to prayer five times a day.511 This is in line with the secular values of 
the ruling Ba’ath party and, as was discussed in the previous chapter, the personal characteristics of the 
cults of Hafez and Bashar al-Assad. These calls are shown in Jordan, but they are framed by state 
identity. Rather than showing the Ka’ba in Mecca as some stations choose to do, Jordanian mosques -  
notably the King Abdullah mosque in Amman -  are filmed. Again, this is consistent with the leadership 
cults of the Hashemite kings that derive legitimacy from their lineage from Prophet Mohammad. This is 
reflected in the previously mentioned Jordanian mosques that sporadically feature in patriotic music 
videos, though it is notable that the number of religious images is far fewer than those of the army, the 
King and other more secular national symbols.
A more visible sign that secular rather than Islamic identity is promoted on both stations is the portrayal 
of women. Despite the regional stereotype of male-dominated societies, both Syrian and Jordanian TV 
have more female than male presenters on their shows. On all the shows viewed during the week, Syria 
7T had 41 female presenters, and only 24 male, whilst Jordan TV had 40 female to 31 male. Naomi 
Sakr has highlighted that the widespread presence of women presenting on television is deceptive
511 Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism, p. 138.
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because it hides the reality that women in the Arab Middle East are largely disempowered.512 However, 
irrespective of this reality, the image that the two regimes wish to promote regarding women is one of 
equality and a visible presence. Importantly, not one of the female presenters in either Jordan or Syria 
wears the veil. The picture of women presented to viewers is decidedly un-Islamic: highlighted hair, 
business suits and make-up. This image is supported in the musalsal dramas where lead female 
characters are almost always unveiled. The standard practice, and certainly in the case of the four 
modem series discussed above, is for only older women to wear headscarves, usually as a sign of 
respect and maturity rather than any visible religiosity. These musalsal stars and presenters are, as Abu- 
Lughod explains, intended as role-models by the regime.513 The absence of Islam from their appearance 
and practice says a lot about the identity they wish, or don’t wish, to flag.
Islam is not completely ignored however, and there are some shows dedicated to religion. Figure 6, for 
example shows that two of Jordan’s eight discussion shows concerned an Islamic topic. Similarly, each 
Wednesday, Syria TV shows Darasat Quaranieh (Quaranic lessons) in which an elderly Imam reads 
parts of the Qur’an. More banal examples of Islamic flagging can be seen in Jordan’s weather reports of 
the Arab world which notably begin at Mecca and Medina. This could be related to the Hashemite’s 
historical ties to the holy cities and be regarded as regime strengthening as much as Islamic focused. 
Syria’s list of Arab cities, in contrast, excludes the Islamic holy sites, only displaying capitals -  in line 
with their secular ideology. As well as this, though presenters and musalsal stars are unveiled, a small 
number of female guests on discussion shows, and a sizeable number of the women in studio audiences 
are shown wearing the veil. The producers clearly are not so rigid as to only select their guests and 
audience from those citizens who chose to be unveiled. However, in both states anywhere from a third 
to half of the women are veiled, yet this is not reflected in its portrayal of women. Evidently there is a 
conscious effort to discourage taking the veil by the regime by pedagogically flagging secular identity 
through its leading female stars. Moreover, though a few shows may have an Islamic focus, their 
number is tiny compared to the vast majority that focus on secular domestic issues and the sizeable 
number flagging Arab identity. Even news broadcasts show less than 10% of their stories on non-Arab 
Islamic states. Islam is therefore deliberately marginalised by both regimes in its television 
programming, especially in Syria.
512 Sakr, Arab Television Today, p. 105.
513 Abu-Lughod, Dramas o f Nationhood, p. 233.
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4.5 Conclusion
This survey of Syrian and Jordanian state television illustrates several features of identity reproduction 
in each state. Firstly, many of the banal traits that Billig identified that reproduce the Western nations 
are visible. In news coverage in Britain, Billig highlighted that . .all the broadsheets, whatever their 
politics, maintain a principle of news apartheid, keeping ‘home’ news and foreign news paginally 
separate.” The same can be seen in Syrian and Jordanian television news coverage. Moreover, there are 
the same unnoticed indicators that link the viewer to the nation through unnoticed linguistic 
assumptions. Jordan, for example, is referred to as ‘the Kingdom’ in news reports, indicating to viewers 
that they should regard it as ‘their’ kingdom. Similarly Bashar al-Assad is always referred to as ‘the’ 
President. Many other banal indicators of nationhood can be found nightly on Syrian and Jordanian 
television, such as the unlabelled map of the state during the weather broadcast which assumes both 
recognition and attachment from the audience. Elsewhere, this experiment has highlighted several 
instances of programming designed to quietly inculcate a sense of nationhood on viewers. This was 
seen in the pedagogical nature of Syrian drama series, for example, or in Jordanian commercials that 
instinctively took a national focus. In each instance the experiment shows how successfully Billig’s 
theory and methodology can be transplanted both on to the mediation of television, and into the non- 
western non-democratic states of Syria and Jordan.
At the same time, the experiment revealed how a supranational Arab identity is flagged alongside state 
nationalism on both Syrian Mid Jordanian television in a banal and unnoticed manner. On the news, 
stories from the Arab world automatically followed those from each state and preceded news from 
either the Muslim or the non-Arab world. These news stories were mostly about Israel-Palestine and 
Iraq though it should be noted that considerably more news about the Arab world was found in Jordan 
than Ba’athist Syria. Rather like the weather forecasts on each channel which showed the weather in the 
Arab world after the state but before Europe or other parts of the world, the order of news stories gives 
viewers a clear list of identity priorities. Elsewhere on the television schedule there were further 
examples of this supranational identity being highlighted. In Jordan, chat shows talked about the Israel- 
Palestine conflict and Arab culture, whilst in Syria interview shows were with largely non-Syrian Arab 
cultural and political figures.
Finally, religious identity was banally flagged on each channel. In Jordan, shows were regularly 
interrupted for the call to prayer five times a day, which focused on national religious symbols such as 
the King Abdullah I mosque in Amman, illustrating how this everyday event is fed into the national 
discourse. Syria was much less religious, not playing the call to prayer and only having one religious
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programme a week in primetime. However, it should be noted that in both states a broadly secular 
image was encouraged -  even in Jordan. Female presenters were always unveiled and modelled on 
European secular women. Though Islam was given a slightly more prominent role in Jordan, which fits 
into its place in the national discourse, it was noticeable that Islam and religion were flagged far less 
frequently on each channel than either state or supra-national Arabism.
It was noticeable, however, that not all identity flagging seen on television could be considered ‘banal’. 
At different times and for different reasons each channel showed signs of overt identity building that 
might be deemed national propaganda. This was surprisingly most noticeable in Jordan, considered to 
be less authoritarian than Syria.514 The regular music videos that showed images of Jordan, the King, 
and national symbols played after the news each night to a patriotic tune, whilst in line with Abdullah’s 
increased leadership cult and ‘Jordan First’ campaign, cannot really be considered banal. Syria too had 
more overt identity flagging, such as its programming breaks that portrayed Syrians in famous Syrian 
places, usually undertaking a constructive activity such as building a boat or dancing. Whilst these may 
have been more nuanced than in Jordan, they still betrayed a concerted nation-building intent. 
Moreover, in Syria, unlike in Jordan, there were overt attempts at building Arab identity, with slogans 
such as ‘Syria the Arab compass’ displayed. This though again shows how the Syrian national discourse 
uses Arab identity to serve national goals, emphasising its ultimately supranational nature. However, as 
with the images and speeches of the leadership cult, just because Billig might consider these instances 
of national propaganda to be overt, does not mean that viewers have not become used to them and see 
them with the same unnoticed indifference as they do billboard posters, as Chapter six will suggest.
All of this seems to conform to Christa Salamandra’s view that television is a pedagogical means of 
‘national cultural construction,’ as both Syria and Jordan use television to banally and overtly 
disseminate their national discourses. Two things should be noted however. Firstly, in contrast to 
Rugh’s argument that Syria has a more political and mobilising media to Jordan’s loyal passive media, 
this experiment has suggested that, if we look beyond the content of news programming, both television 
stations show roughly the same level of propaganda, deliberate and undeliberate identity construction 
and political content. If anything, Jordan is more propagandist at times. Secondly, in contrast to 
Rinnawi’s claims that satellite television is undermining state identity by promoting Arabism, it is clear 
that Arab identity is already a key component for framing the content of Syrian and Jordanian 
television.
514 Volker Perthes, The political economy o f Syria under Asad (New York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 1997), pp. 180-190.
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Chapter 5
Challenging the discourse? Transnational Arab Television
In January 1991, a Syrian or Jordanian wanting to watch news coverage of the Gulf War on television 
had few options. They could watch the limited coverage their governments allowed on state television 
or, for the privileged few who had satellite dishes and understood English, they could watch the 
American coverage of the war on CNN. In contrast, when Israel launched a similarly intense military 
campaign against Hamas in Gaza in December 2008-January 2009, Syrians and Jordanians had a 
plethora of choice. With over half their populations owning satellite dishes, and even more having 
access to this new media, viewers in each state could now watch over 300 different channels in their 
native Arabic language, originating from beyond their borders. Though the state-run channels are 
adapting to the new climate, increasingly viewers prefer pan-Arab focussed channels such as Al- 
Jazeera, Al-Arabiyya, MBC and LBC. Not only do these channels offer different images and reporting 
of key events such as the Gaza War, they often offer different opinions than the official line promoted 
by state regimes. Having previously established that both Jordanian and Syrian regimes use state- 
controlled television to reproduce state nationalism and supra-national Arabism together, the following 
chapter discusses whether that discourse is challenged or complemented by the growing popularity of 
transnational Arab satellite television beyond their control.
Analysing the impact of transnational television upon Syrian and Jordanian identity represents a 
departure from the methodology of Michael Billig so far employed by this study, as it considers a 
public mediation originating outside of the ‘nations’ under consideration. However, having established 
that television provides a better gauge of banal nationalism than Billig’s preferred print media in semi­
literate Syria and Jordan, to dismiss the most frequently watched stations because they are transnational 
would undermine this study. Indeed, the following analysis complements chapter 4’s discussion of state 
television and helps explain the two identity discourses encountered by Syrian and Jordanian viewers. 
As well as this, the popularity of transnational satellite television in Syria and Jordan, and the Arab 
world in general, can be used to challenge and expand upon Billig’s theory. As was discussed in chapter 
two, with Billig’s study on the reproduction of British and American nationalism, it is not surprising 
that he placed little focus on the banal reproduction of supra-national identities. British and American 
citizens are not regular consumers of transnational media and, perhaps as a consequence, supra-national 
identity -  such as Britain’s sense of European-ness -  is relatively weak. However, in the Arab World 
we encounter the reverse: supranational Arabism is strong and consumption of transnational Arab 
media, notably satellite television, is widespread. An analysis of Arab satellite television can therefore
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show how Billig’s theory can be applied beyond the limited national arena: do we see the ‘daily 
flagging’ of Arab identity? Is this the reproduction of the Arab nation or a supra-nationalism? What role 
is given to state identity and Islam?
Whilst satellite television is not the only form of transnational public mediation available to Syrians and 
Jordanians, it is by far the most accessible. International Arab-language newspapers are available in 
Syria and Jordan, but the three most popular A l-Hayat, Al-Sharq al-Awsat andAl-Quds al Arabi have a 
readership of fewer than 300,000 globally, and the majority of these readers are Saudi Arabian rather 
than Syrian or Jordanian.515 Internet access has increased in both states in recent years but access 
remains far lower than access to television. In 2008, Syria had 3.565 million internet users, or 18% of 
the population, and Jordan had 1.5 million users, or 24% of the population.516 Both of these mediations 
tend to be limited to the literate and urban sectors of society. Whilst more modem mediations like text 
message news services are increasing in popularity, their usage is similarly limited to a largely young 
and urban demographic.517 In contrast to the urban-focused access for internet, any journey into rural 
Syria or Jordan will reveal rusty satellite dishes on the roof of almost every home, no matter how 
modest. The author even encountered satellite dishes beside nomadic farmers’ tents in rural Jordan.
However, analysing the banal and overt nationalist content of satellite television is a challenging task. 
Over 300 channels broadcast for twenty-four hours a day. Consequently, the kind of content and 
discourse analysis employed by Billig for newspapers and replicated for state television in chapter four 
cannot realistically be repeated here. As well as the amount of content is the challenge of variety. The 
different channels are not uniform. A great number are state-focused channels from other Arab 
countries, broadcasting like Syria TV and Jordan TV for their satellite-using domestic audiences as well 
as projecting a positive image onto wider international audiences. Several stations are religious, both 
Christian and Muslim, broadcasting sermons and prayers. However, the stations that receive the widest 
audiences across the Arab world, and consequently the most attention from scholars and journalists, are 
those that seem to deliberately target an Arab-wide rather than a domestic audience. As Andrew 
Hammond states, “...their audience is not so much Egyptian, Saudi or Jordanian as ‘Arab’” - Marc 
Lynch’s ‘Arab public sphere’.518
515 ‘The Press in Saudi Arabia,’ BBC News, 13/12/06 http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/middle east/6176791 .stm 
accessed 18/11/09; ‘The Palestinian Press’, BBC News 13/13/06 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/middle east/6176691.stm accessed 18/11/09.
516 ‘Jordan,’ CIA World Fact Book https://www.cia.gov/librarv/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/io.html accessed 
18/11/09; ‘Syria,’ CIA World Fact Book https://www.cia.gov/librarv/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sv.html 
accessed 18/11/09.
517 Kraidy, ‘From Activity to Interactivity’, p. 92.
518 Hammond, Pop Culture Arab World!, p. 16; Lynch, New Arab public, p. 22.
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Scholars debate the impact of satellite television upon Arab identity. Lawrence Pintak claims that it 
creates an, “emerging ‘imagined’ watan” whilst Marwan Kraidy contends that, “regionalisation is skin 
deep.” However, it is a notable weakness of many of these studies that most focus on only one type of 
channel, the news, and Al-Jazeera in particular.519 Though studying news sources is important, and will 
be discussed below, it is worth noting that by far the most popular type of shows within the Arab world, 
Syria and Jordan included, are entertainment. Any analysis of the unnoticed identities flagged on 
television would surely gain as much, if not more, from entertainment shows than from news channels 
which are, by their nature, more overt in the identities they promote.
Rather than conduct a broad content analysis of satellite television channels, this chapter will therefore 
lead a discussion of the different identities flagged in different types of shows found on the most 
popular Arab satellite channels. Firstly, there follows an analysis of the ongoing debate amongst 
scholars on the impact of transnational television upon Arab, state and Islamic identity in the Arab 
world. Following this, the well-versed role of news channels including Al-Jazeera andAl-Arabiyya in 
promoting Arab identity will briefly be considered. There then follows analysis of four different types 
of the under-studied area of entertainment television. Firstly the three most popular program types are 
discussed: reality TV, music television and soap opera dramas (musalsals). There then follows a 
consideration of the often ignored impact of Islamic television. Finally, there is a case study of a final 
programming type, sport. An empirical study was made of Al-Jazeera" s coverage of the 2008 Olympics 
and the results displayed highlight the broad themes explored in the rest of the chapter.
In conducting this analysis of the identities flagged to Syrians and Jordanians through satellite 
television, this chapter illustrates four points. Firstly, that when considering the impact of transnational 
television on identity in the Arab world, the role of entertainment is as important to study as the widely- 
covered subject of news. Secondly, that whilst the vast majority of entertainment is largely apolitical, a 
layer of Arab identity is clearly promoted. Thirdly, contrary to the views of scholars like Rinnawi, this 
Arab layer of identity is not being promoted at the expense of state identity which is in fact further 
entrenched by transnational satellite broadcasting.521 However, entertainment and news shows create a 
clear ‘arena’ of Arab states in which viewers are encouraged to see other Arab states as more important 
than other non-Arab states, both as friends and rivals. Finally, whilst Islamic culture is clearly flagged 
in both news and entertainment, political Islam is not.
519 Pintak, ‘Border Guards,’ pp. 191-211; Marwan M. Kraidy, ‘Reality television and politics in the Arab world: 
preliminary observations,’ Transnational Broadcast Studies 15 (Fall 2005).
520 Miles, Al-Jazeera, p. 327; Amin, ‘Arab media,’ p. 73.
521 Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism, p. 9.
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5.1 The Satellite Television Debate
As discussed in chapter four, the emergence of satellite television and its impact upon mass identity in 
the Arab world has divided scholars. For a region that has historically attracted little interest from 
theorists of nationalism the widespread popularity of stations such as Al-Jazeera, MBC andAl-Arabiyya 
has prompted some authors to cite Anderson and Smith to prove or disprove the emergence of new 
‘imagined communities’ created by satellite television.522 Unlike many of these studies the purpose of 
this chapter is to highlight the identities promoted on transnational television rather than make any 
claims about their successful dissemination, which will be explored in more detail in Chapter six. 
However, no analysis of this topic can ignore these issues and there follows a discussion of the key 
three debates emerging from this recent literature.
5.1.1 Tandem identities: Arab supra-nationalism and state nationalism
As part of the New Arabism debate discussed in chapter one, some scholars claim that satellite 
television is reviving, enhancing or even creating Arab nationalism. Media analyst Lawrence Pintak, for 
example, states, “In the Arab world, a media revolution is contributing to the emergence of a 
reawakened regional Arab consciousness,” whilst veteran Egyptian Arab nationalist Saad Eddin 
Ibrahim states, “.. .in many ways Arab satellites defacto or by default are creating the infrastructure for 
the dream of Arab unity.”523 Lynch emphasises the growth of a new politicised and united ‘Arab street’, 
whilst Khalil Rinnawi sees a ‘new regionalisation’.524 At the same time critics have claimed these 
scholars are too selective in their analysis. Christa Salamandra argues that sentiment on the ground does 
not reflect the Arab unitary message of Arab satellite television stating, “In an argument extending 
Benedict Anderson...new pan-Arab and pan-Islamic communities are said to be emerging through 
internet usage and satellite TV watching, although ethnographic evidence supporting such claims is 
scant.”525 Similarly, Marwan Kraidy argues that the inter-Arab rivalries evident during popular reality 
TV shows such as Superstar question any claims that satellite TV is diminishing state identity.526 
Rather, he claims, it is the new Arab identity that is superficial, stating that, “.. .regionalisation is skin 
deep.”
The impact that transnational television has had upon state identity has prompted similar divisions. 
Rinnawi believes that his new regional identity causes state de-legitimisation and undermines state
522 Salamandra, ‘London’s Arab media,’; Pintak, ‘Border Guards,’ p. 193.
523 Pintak, ‘Border Guards’, p. 191; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, ‘Thoughts on Arab Satellite Television, Pan-Arabism and 
Freedom of Expression,’ Transnational Broadcast Journal 13 (Fall 2004).
524 Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism, p. 154; Marc Lynch, ‘Beyond the Arab Street: Iraq and the Arab Public Space,’
Politics and Society 31:1 (2003), pp. 55-91.
525 Salamandra, ‘London’s Arab media,’.
526 Kraidy, ‘Reality television.’
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identities.527 In contrast, several commentators such as Kai Hafez and Naomi Sakr highlight the 
structural bias of the satellite system ensuring that state interests remain prominent.528 No matter what 
Arab nationalist gloss is given to the rhetoric on satellite TV, states William Rugh, “.. .existing national 
political systems are still a dominant variable affecting the structure and behaviour of Arab media.”
Yet many scholars in this debate tend to lurch to the extreme, and view state and Arab identities as 
mutually exclusive. In Rinnawi ’ s case any increase in a sense of Arab community must be accompanied 
by state de-legitimisation and an undermining of state identity. For Kraidy, expressions of state pride 
during a talent contest therefore indicate the absence of Arab solidarity. Yet neither allows for multiple 
layers of identity that overlap and inter-relate. Rinnawi does not consider that Arab audiences might 
increase their Arab identity the more transnational satellite television they consume, without discarding 
their original state attachment. Similarly Kraidy does not account for the intra-state format of his talent 
competition. Surely a better gauge of Arab solidarity would be a contest in which Arab states took on 
non-Arab states, as in the Olympics discussed below. Similarly on the matter of ownership, it is 
unquestionable that the majority of owners of Arab satellite channels have a vested interest in 
maintaining the state system from which they derive their power. However, that does not mean that they 
oppose any attempts at promoting Arab solidarity or supra-nationalism, only the variant of Nasserist 
Old Arabism that would call for the destruction of the state system and, consequently, their power base. 
It is perfectly feasible that, whether for genuine idealistic reasons or more commercial interests, 
producers, editors and, most importantly, owners, favour the promotion of both state and Arab identities 
as long as those identities don’t seriously challenge the status quo or power of the states’ rulers.
This chapter will demonstrate how satellite television promotes both state and Arab identity in tandem. 
At the most obvious level, the discourse, rhetoric and content of certain programmes quite overtly flag 
Arab identity. In a more banal and unnoticed manner, the structure of shows and ownership promotes 
the imagining of a supra-national arena of Arab states to which viewers should attach more interest than 
elsewhere. Within this arena, however, viewers are discouraged from forgetting their state identity. The 
state system is flagged in almost all forms of programming and, contrary to Rinnawi’s assertions, it is 
given increased legitimacy and further entrenched as a consequence of satellite television.
5.1.2 ‘Arab Street’ or elite?
527 Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism, p. 9.
528 Sakr, Arab Television Today, p. 15; Hafez, ‘Arab Media,’ p. 4.
529 William Rugh, ‘Do national political systems still influence Arab media?’ in Arab Media and Society 2, Summer 
(2007).
162
A second debate emerging from the impact of satellite television upon identity concerns its elite nature. 
For those, like this study, who accept that Arab identity is promoted through transnational television, a 
central question is, who is doing this promoting? Is this a case of television simply reflecting the 
widely-felt Arabist feelings of the masses, or are the journalists, producers and owners themselves 
leading a new trend in the hope of influencing their audience to think likewise?
Several analysts regard the television producers as leading New Arabism. Zayani believes that it is the 
Arab media who are ‘creating’ a pan-Arab public opinion that is becoming known as the ‘Arab 
street’. Khalil Rinnawi similarly believes that his new regional Arab nationalism is directed by elites, 
calling it an, “...upper middle class imagining.”531 This top-down conclusion is elaborated upon by 
Lawrence Pintak who uses Anthony Smith’s nationalist theories to explain why. Pintak expresses 
Smith’s belief that nationalist ideologies create ‘border guards’ who provide, “‘a new panoply of 
symbols and myths, memories and values, that set the included national states apart’ from those 
surrounding them.” For Pintak, “Arab journalists are the border guards -  if not the architects -  of this 
new imagined watan.” In contrast, many scholars subscribe to what Alderman has called, “Arabism 
from the ground up,” which sees the growth in Arabist television reflecting a genuine grass roots sense 
of national identity rather than leading it.533As the Washington Post claimed about Al-Jazeera they, “are 
being led by the masses, they don’t lead the masses.”534 Jeremy Tatham supports this point highlighting 
that such was popular feeling against the Iraq War of 2003 that any news station such as al-Jazeera 
would be committing commercial suicide were it to report in an impartial manner that did not reflect the 
audience’s outrage.535 This was seen by the relative failure and unpopularity of the American-sponsored 
Arabic news station, al-HurraP6
The difficulty in entering this debate is that it is hard to assess whether a television station is leading or 
reflecting popular opinion. How do we assess from where public opinion originates? Tatham’s point 
that the Iraq war was so unpopular that Al-Jazeera had to portray it negatively is undoubtedly true, but 
why was the war unpopular in the first place? How much did Al-Jazeera s own coverage of the run-up 
to war, and the decade of sanctions on Iraq before this inform public opinion to make a dislike for the 
war inevitable? Similarly, given the level of Arab identity seen on state television and in the speeches
and images of leadership cults, how much do domestic mediations still inform opinion?
530 Amin, ‘Arab media,’ p. 82.
531 Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism, p. xvii.
532 Pintak, ‘Border Guards,’ p. 193.
533 Amin, ‘Arab media,’ p. 81.
534 Rugh, Arab mass media, p. 235.
535 Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts, p. 191.
536 Ibid., p. 78.
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To avoid this self-sustaining debate, one must therefore accept the interactive nature of agenda setting 
and popular opinion on Arab satellite television. Whilst elites clearly have the power to broadly set out 
agendas and programming, they would not be as popular as they are if they did not at least broadly 
reflect mass notions of identity. As William Rugh states, television media reinforces existing Arab 
values rather than promoting a particular agenda.538 It must be remembered, however, that many of 
these ‘Arab values’ have been reproduced and sustained in state discourses for decades.
5.1.3 Islam and satellite television
As with state television, the role of Islam on satellite TV has prompted considerable discussion. On the 
one hand some scholars see satellite television as continuing the traditional secular role played by state- 
led TV and on the other are those who see channels such as Al-Jazeera promoting Islam. Interestingly 
two of the leading advocates of a New Arabism being forged by satellite TV, Rinnawi and Pintak both 
see a convergence between Arabism and Islamism.539 Similarly, several US-based critics of al-Jazeera 
claim it is promoting an Islamic identity, with its willingness to grant a platform to political Islamists 
such as al-Qaeda and Hamas. However, a distinction needs to be made between highlighting and even 
promoting Islamic identity and encouraging Islamism. Outside of Neo-Conservative circles, few 
analysts believe that al-Jazeera's willingness to broadcast footage from al-Qaeda or to interview 
Hamas or Hezbollah spokespeople is actively promoting Islamism. Rather this is interpreted both in the 
context of their attempting to present a balanced picture of the news, and their desire to gain viewing 
figures with exclusives and controversy.540 Their willingness to interview Israeli government officials 
or British diplomats does not lead to charges of the station trying to promote pro-Western views, for 
example. However, that is not to say that Pintak and Rinnawi’s claims should be discounted, rather that 
a distinction between flagging Islamic and Islamist identity should be made. Later analysis will show 
that there are numerous instances of both banal and overt flagging of Islamic culture and identity within 
news broadcasting on Arab satellite television, but this is largely within the aforementioned Arab supra­
national arena and not any deliberate endorsement of Islamism.
Curiously the same level of debate and analysis has not been afforded the potentially Islamic or Islamist 
content of non-news satellite channels. Pintak and Rinnawi all but discount responses to new religious 
stations such as Irqa, al-Risalah and al-Majd whose content is deliberately Islamic. Though they rush to 
highlight the Islamic content of al-Jazeera, the fact that Islamic programming receives less than 1% of
538 Rugh, Arab mass media, p. 18.
539 Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism, p. 22; Pintak, ‘Border Guards,’ p. 209
540 Miles, Al-Jazeera, p. 326.
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viewer ratings in the Arab world is conveniently ignored.541 Could this not suggest that some, if not all 
viewers, of al-Jazeera watch it in spite of, not because of, its supposed Islamic orientation? Similarly 
under-analysed, yet potentially of far greater impact than these rarely-watched Islamic channels is the 
popularity of entertainment shows, particularly musalsal drama covering Islamic history. Marlon Dick 
and John Shoup have both written about the glorification of Islam’s past in drama series, yet such 
analysis has not yet been included by Pintak and Rinnawi. Yet, as with the news, closer analysis of this 
genre will show that it is Islamic cultural identity rather than a political Islamism that is regularly 
highlighted.
541 Amin, ‘Arab media,’ p. 73.
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5.2 Arabism and the News
News programming on satellite television and its relationship to Arab identity has already received a 
great deal of attention from scholars of the Arab world. This thesis will therefore not dwell long on the 
subject before moving on to the less well studied area of entertainment television. However, before this 
two key questions need to be addressed: is Arab identity actually being promoted by news channels on 
Arab satellite television, and are they simultaneously discouraging state identity?
A key difficulty when answering these questions, however, is what do we mean by ‘news 
programming’ on satellite television? The majority of literature has focused on one channel: al-Jazeera 
(Tatham, Miles, Rinnawi). The Doha-based station is primarily funded by the Emir of Qatar and widely 
regarded as the most popular in die region, though most surveys declaring this are usually denounced 
by its rivals.542 However, it is easy to forget that al-Jazeera is not the only player. Whilst the Qatari 
station has always faced rivals from state news shows and fellow Arab-world focused networks like 
ANN or Abu Dhabi, the world-wide publicity it achieved after the 2003 Iraq war led to a new wave of 
challengers. Marwan Kraidy describes this as a, . .global struggle for Arab hearts and minds,” which 
has seen the establishment of American, British, German, Russian, French and Iranian-funded Arabic- 
language news channels, as well as numerous new Arab channels, to challenge the dominance of al- 
Jazeera.543 However, as confirmed by surveys and interviews in Jordan in Syria, discussed in chapter 
six, these international stations have made little headway primarily because they are viewed as foreign 
propaganda. Arab stations such as LBC, Abu Dhabi, Hezbollah’s al-Manar and Future TV have 
achieved modest success, but the main rival to al-Jazeera is undoubtedly the Saudi-based al-Arabiyya 
channel that was launched in 2005.544 Al-Arabiyya is the news arm of Sheikh Walid al-Ibrahim’s 
Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC) satellite network and comes second, albeit by quite a long 
way, to al-Jazeera in most Arab-wide polls.545 Al-Ibrahim is the brother-in-law of Saudi Arabia’s late 
King Fahd who sees MBC’s, and al-Arabiyya's, main goal to, “promote Arabs and Arabic, and Saudi 
Arabia in particular.”546
5.2.1 Arabism
Though set up as a rival to al-Jazeera analysts are tom over al-Arabiyya’s role in promoting or 
discouraging Arab identity in its broadcasts. On the one hand, Paul Cochrane highlights the threat 
Arabism has to Saudi national interests and suggests that producers deliberately employ an anti-Arabist
542 Sakr, Arab Television Today, p. 13.
543 Kraidy, ‘From Activity to Interactivity,’ p. 95.
544 Samantha M. Shapiro, ‘The War inside the Arab newsroom,’ New York Times 2/02/2005
545 Ibid.
546 Salamandra, ‘London’s Arab media.’
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tone.547 Moreover, he states that far from being a promoter of Arabism, al-Jazeera itself is simply using 
Arabist rhetoric to promote Qatari interests.548 In contrast, others suggest the background of many al- 
Arabiyya journalists as former employees of al-Jazeera means that despite their employer’s preference, 
they still push an Arabist agenda whenever they can.549 This supports the hypothesis of Lawrence 
Pintak that the majority of Arab journalists are, “ .. .shaping an emerging ‘imagined’ watan,” through 
news television.
Several authors agree with Pintak’s assertion that all the pan-Arab news stations, whether Jazeera or 
Arabiyya broadly promote Arab identity because of the Arabist sentiments of journalists.550 Interviews 
with journalists and news-makers support this assertion. Yousi Fouda, al-Jazeera's station chief in 2003 
stated, “ .. .you adopt a pan-Arab mentality, this is the number one criterion that will help you decide 
whether this news item someone in Mauritania would be interested to know about, someone in Somalia 
or Iraq or Morocco.”551
The argument that Arab identity is promoted by satellite news programs is further supported by 
analyses of its discourse and content. The use of a single vernacular, Modem Standard Arabic (MSA), 
on news broadcasts has, according to Hugh Miles, “..accustomed Arabs to a standard form of Arabic 
speech and led to a growing sense of regionalisation.”552 This has had a knock-on effect on the news 
presentation of state satellite channels as well who, as far as Morocco and Algeria, have reversed recent 
trends of localisation to demand all state news is read in MSA rather than local dialect.553 Similarly, the 
content of the news channels, which places disproportionate focus on uniting issues like Palestine and 
the Iraq or Lebanon wars is considered by many as a key factor in raising Arab consciousness.554 One 
Jordanian politician stated, “Before we had been ignorant about how Arabs lived in other countries; 
now Jordanians care about events on the other side of the world.”555 Similarly, al-Jazeera’s chief in the 
West Bank stated, “I think we can say that al-Jazeera is broadening Arab perspective; before us no-one 
was saying anything about Arab leaders or Arab corruption or about the Arab situation even.”556 Both
547 Paul Cochrane, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Media Influence,’ Arab Media and Society, Issue 3 (Fall 2007); Andrew Hammond, 
‘Saudi Arabia’s Media Empire: keeping the masses at home,’ Arab Media and Society, Issue 3 (Fall 2007).
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Pintak and Rinnawi suggest that news producers choose this content deliberately because they have,
. .a financial/professional stake in fostering a pan-Arab perspective.”
5.2.2 Islamism
Yet there is debate over the extent to which New Arabism is linked to Islam. Several commentators see 
a distinction between the specifically Arab Islamist agenda of al-Jazeera in comparison to other 
stations. Lisa Shapiro makes the case that al-Jazeera is viewed by Arab journalists as too Islamist for 
their taste.558 She further states that there is nothing on other stations like al-Arabiyya that has the same 
Islamic message as signature shows on al-Jazeera such as, ‘Islamic Law and Life’ which, “.. .offers 
advice to viewers on how to apply Sharia to their lives.”559 However, this view is challenged by Hugh 
Miles who argues the Qatar based station’s un-Islamic stance is reflected by the fact it relies entirely on 
only one religious scholar, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, for all its religious shows and opinions.560 In 
fact, argues Paul Cochrane, it is al-Arabiyya that is the more Islamist in outlook, as it deliberately stirs 
up fitna (discord) between Sunnis and Shia in its reporting of events in Lebanon, Iraq and Iran.561
This reflects a simultaneous debate amongst Arab viewers as to which station represents the interests of 
the Islamists and which those of Arabism.562 These debates, states Pintak, “...obscure the reality that in 
the newsrooms from Casablanca to Sana’a the agendas of the two are blurring, producing a synergy of 
interests reflected on television screens across the region every day.”563 However, Pintak exaggerates 
this ‘synergy of interests’ between Islamism and Arabism on the news. The varying degrees of 
favourable treatment that different Islamist groups receive on the news illustrate this. Islamists that are 
fighting for goals that coincide with broader Arabist aims are presented in a favourable way. Hamas and 
Hezbollah’s conflicts with Israel are largely reported positively on both al-Jazeera and al-Arabiyya, and 
until recently, suicide bombers in Palestine and Iraq were referred to as martyrs on the former.564 
However, the same degree of support is not shown to domestic Islamists operating away from these 
Arab nationalist conflicts, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood or Morocco’s Justice and Development party 
being cases in point. Similarly, al-Qaeda style attacks on Arab targets, such as in Jordan or Syria are 
more swiftly condemned than similar attacks on American or Western targets in places such as Iraq or 
Afghanistan.565 The political agenda of these news channels can therefore be seen to be more
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consistently Arabist than Islamist. Shapiro’s use of religious programming like ‘Islamic Law and Life’ 
is similarly tenuous. As seen by analysis of Jordanian and Syrian TV, religious programming is seen 
across the Arab world even in secular regimes like Syria. Whilst this can, and does, flag a cultural 
Islamic identity, it is more difficult to link this to a political Islamist agenda.
5.2.3 State Nationalism
Whilst Pintak, Miles and Rinnawi correctly highlight that the content of news shows is deliberately 
promoting a pan-Arab perspective, the reasons behind this are more complex and help explain the 
limitations that any New Arabism via television can have. Rinnawi sees the motivation as primarily 
financial.566 In the hunt for viewing figures and profits, news stations want to appeal to as wide an 
audience as possible and hence attempt to create a pan-Arab discourse. Pintak agrees with this but also 
highlights the nationalist ideology of the journalists reporting themselves. Whilst their employers at the 
stations might be pushing Arabism for commercial reasons, Pintak sees the reporters as genuinely 
believing in promoting Arab unity.567 However, there is a further explanation: the desire by owners to 
use their channels to promote their home state’s interest.
It is highly possible, as Pintak asserts, that the journalists on al-Jazeera genuinely hope to promote a 
stronger sense of Arab identity, and even that the Qatari owners see the commercial importance of 
fostering that sense of Arab collectivism to maintain its high viewing figures. However, it should not be 
forgotten for what reason the Qatari owners want high viewing figures: to promote the interests and 
profile of Qatar. Naomi Sakr highlights how the Emir of Qatar uses al-Jazeera to gain notoriety for his 
state rather than for any ‘globalised’ vision.568 At a simple level, the station rarely criticises the Doha 
government, but on a wider scale it acts as an instrument of Qatar’s international relations. When it has 
reported negatively about certain Arab governments in the past, for example, they lodged their 
complaints by withdrawing their Ambassadors from Qatar, addressing the state rather than the 
station.569 Similarly, past content analyses of al-Jazeera have shown that until 2008 it took a 
particularly aggressive line against the government of Saudi Arabia. Yet this was not for any Arab 
nationalist reasons but rather the product of an ongoing feud between Riyadh and Doha, fuelled by 
personal grudges from many of al-Jazeera's employees who lost their jobs after Saudi Arabia cancelled 
a proposed BBC Arabic television service in their territory.570 Moreover, it was the diplomatic 
reconcilement of the two state governments in 2008 that ended this feud on the airwaves, which then 
was reflect on the station’s content. Whilst the content and shape of al-Jazeera's broadcasts may
566 Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism, p. xvi.
567 Pintak, ‘Border Guards’ Middle East Journal, p. 196.
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therefore take an Arabist tone to increase its audience figures, the motives behind this are as much 
linked to inter-state and intra-Arab rivalries as any perceived Arabist vision.
The same can be said of al-Arabiyya. Tatham, amongst others, notes that al-Arabiyya’s raison d ’etre 
was to counter the wave of anti-Saudi news produced by al-Jazeera, highlighting how state rather than 
pan-Arab interests have defined its agenda from the beginning.571 As with al-Jazeera the Dubai-based 
station must adopt a more pan-Arab content to appeal to the widest possible audience but again, the 
ultimate goal of attracting this audience is to promote a positive view of a state, Saudi Arabia. This 
appears to be a modem echo of the inter-Arab propaganda between Nasser and Saudi Arabia in the 
1950s. Once again states are competing to frame Arab-wide events to a favourable way, hinting at a 
return to a competition over the norms of Arabism.572
Rinnawi * s claim that state identity is gradually being eroded by the growth of satellite television news is 
therefore questionable as the stations and their ownership structure actually further entrenches rather 
than erodes the state system. In recent years the creation of ‘media free zones’ in Arab cities like Dubai, 
Cairo and Doha have brought many transnational news stations back from outside the Arab world and 
forced them to operate within the boundaries set by the states.573 As Naomi Sakr highlights, it was the 
existing Arab elites who had the initial capital to establish and purchase most channels.574 These elites, 
who profit from the continuation of the state system, were able to ensure that any radical Arab 
nationalist potential of news programming was contained. That is not to say that there is no Arabist 
agenda on the content on the news, this certainly does exist, in an attempt to draw as many viewers to 
the station as possible. However, the stations are there to ultimately serve state interests and so fall short 
of promoting a true unitary Arab nationalism that might question state legitimacy. As with Syria and 
Jordan’s official discourses, these stations ultimately pursue national Arabism. As William Rugh states,
“Al-Jazeera is on the one hand an example of pushing the boundaries of what is possible on Arab television, yet at the same 
time, its behaviour tends to reinforce the basic thesis that domestic political concerns are very important to the media.”575
In other words, whatever the channel, satellite television news promotes Arab supra-nationalism, that 
instils a sense of interest amongst the widest possible audience within the Arab world, but does not 
question the legitimacy of the state system.
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5.3 Entertainment
“With so much talk of al-Jazeera, it is easy to forget that the most popular shows on Arab television are Egyptian and 
Lebanese soap operas and films, as well as imported western game shows.” 576
Whilst most literature discussing the impact of satellite television upon identity in the Arab world
<77covers news programming, it is only the fourth most popular amongst viewers. As in Western 
societies, television audiences spend more time watching entertainment shows than news. It therefore 
proves advantageous to consider what is seen on the most popular shows rather than just those that have 
attracted the most attention. Interviews in Syria and Jordan, discussed in chapter six, highlight that 
viewers of news are mostly men, older, and people who are already interested in politics. The viewing 
preferences of more apathetic or politically disinterested audiences, women and younger viewers are 
therefore not considered if we analyse only the identities flagged on the news.
This section will consider four different genres of popular programming. Two of these, reality TV and 
musalsals (drama serials), are consistently the most watched type of programmes in the region. The 
third, music television, whilst not statistically as popular as other genres, warrants analysis for its 
amount of public display. Indeed, fieldwork in Jordan and Syria revealed that, after news stations, 
music television is the most likely type of programme to be displayed in public places like cafes and 
restaurants. This is just the kind of ‘background’ space that Billig claims becomes ‘national space’. 
Finally, Islamic television, whilst not that popular, warrants analysis within the wider debate over how 
much Islamic identity is highlighted on satellite television.
5.3.1 Reality TV
Reality TV has provided both the most popular and the most controversial television shows in modem
cn q
Arab history. Televised talent shows like Star Academy and Superstar regularly attract the largest 
Arab-wide audiences when they are shown. Syria and Jordan are no exception: when a Syrian and a 
Jordanian reached the final of the 2003 edition of Superstar citizens in both states were glued to their 
TV screens, with the governments openly encouraging them to publically display their ‘hot’ 
nationalism.579 At the same time, such shows court controversy. In 2004, an Arab version of the show 
Big Brother, known as Al-Ra ’is (The President), which involves numerous contestants of mixed gender 
living together in a house full of cameras, was closed down after a week on air after considerable
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pressure from religious conservatives in Bahrain where the show was filmed.580 Star Academy and 
Superstar attract similar protests for ‘promoting un-Islamic values’, despite their widespread popularity.
These reality TV shows overtly flag national state identity, which might question the assertions of this 
thesis. The format of Superstar and Star Academy encourages national rivalry amongst viewers. 
Usually each Arab state has a representative in the singing tournament and one by one they are voted 
off by texts and phone calls from the viewing public. Marwan Kraidy suggests that viewers are 
encouraged to be nationalistic and vote for the representative from their state. He says that, “contestants 
become embroiled in a ‘battle of nations’ in which their compatriots appropriated them as national 
symbols.”581 This is embodied in the visual presentation of shows like Superstar where studio 
audiences wave the different national flags of the contestants. Far from this being unintended 
behaviour, it is actively encouraged by producers who deliberately select contestants from different 
countries and parade the various flags of the nationalities competing in the show’s opening credits.582 
This appears a clear example of Billig’s ‘waved’ flag, but it is state identity that is being encouraged by 
reality TV, not Arab supra-national identity.
Kraidy gives a case study of the 2003 Superstar final to illustrate this point. The final two contestants 
were from Jordan and Syria, prompting widespread expressions of nationalism rather than Rinnawi or 
Pintak’s New Arabism. In Syria, telephone companies placed billboards urging citizens to perform their 
‘national duty’ and vote for the Syrian contestant. When interviewed by Western press, “.. .Syrians on 
the street were unequivocal: they were voting for him [the contestant] because he was Syrian. The fact 
that he was a good performer was just fine, but his national identity was the primary motivation for 
their participation in the show.”583 A similar response was seen in Jordan where, “...rumours spread of a 
fully-fledged national mobilization. King Abdullah himself was reported to have instructed officers in 
the Jordanian armed forces to issue orders to the soldiers under their command to vote.”584 Some 
Amman restaurants and cafes even offered free deserts for customers who voted for the Jordanian 
candidate, who eventually triumphed. This kind of passionate patriotism leads Kraidy to conclude that, 
“While there are burning issues with transnational appeal, such as the plight of the Palestinians and 
Iraqis under occupation, they appear to cede the way, even if temporarily, to more provincial
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affirmations of patriotism,” for reality TV shows like Superstar,585 This, he suggests, shows that any 
regionalisation as a product of satellite television, is only ‘skin deep’.
A further feature of reality TV is its apparently secular nature. The regular portrayal of ‘un-Islamic’ 
behaviour has prompted a backlash from religious conservatives, such as the protests in Bahrain against 
al-Ra ’is encouraging unmarried women to co-habit with men.586 Similarly, many have complained that 
such shows distract youth from their religious duties with foreign culture. Al-Jazeera’s Yusuf al- 
Qaradawi stated, “reality TV and Star Academy especially are instruments of cultural and intellectual 
invasion of the Ummah.”587 Such protests further question the assertions of Rinnawi amongst others 
who see satellite television as promoting a new Arab-Islamic identity. However, as Marc Lynch has 
highlighted, such protests should be placed in context. Whilst there has been a religious backlash 
against reality TV, it has largely been in places such as Jordan, Bahrain and Kuwait where pro-western 
governments see reality TV as, “.. .a "safe" area of cultural critique which allows Islamist politicians to 
hold marches, demand parliamentary inquiries, and flex their muscles without violating any of the real 
"red lines" governing politics.”588 Moreover, just because reality TV might offend certain conservative 
Islamic streams does not make it rigidly secular. Many of the female contestants in several editions of 
Star Academy and Superstar have worn headscarves and often contestants sing songs that have a 
religious component. The fact that religious authorities do not notice these pro-Islam elements when 
they protest perhaps illustrates just how normal and everyday aspects of Islamic culture are to the Arab 
world. Whilst religious conservatives might object, there is still at least some level of banal flagging of 
Islamic identity in reality TV.
Similarly, whilst Kraidy rushes to interpret the overt state nationalism on display in reality TV shows, 
he fails to notice the banal supra-national Arabism being promoted. Shows like Superstar 
simultaneously promote two identities. On the one hand, they encourage state rivalry by encouraging 
flag waving and patriotic competition. This is almost certainly a commercial decision to maximise 
viewers who will initially tune in to cheer on the representative of their state. However, just as 
important to the producers is to promote the very regionalisation that Kraidy believes is only skin deep. 
When the Jordanian contestant won in 2003 she was not just crowned ‘Superstar’, but instead handed 
the title ‘Superstar of the Arabs.’589 Whilst only a Jordanian and a Syrian were left in the competition, 
the majority of the viewers, and voters, were from other Arab states who continued to watch long after 
the contestant from their state had been eliminated. By parading the different flags of the competitors at
585 Ibid.
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the beginning of the show the producers of Superstar were sending viewers two messages. Firstly, that 
they should support their state, but secondly that these were the states with which they should be 
competing: the Arab states. Non-Arab states were not involved in the competition and viewers were 
effectively being told that these states should not matter to them as much. A Tunisian viewer is told 
they should compete more with far-off Iraq than neighbouring Italy. In doing so, reality TV is 
promoting an ‘Arab arena’ for its viewers. Both solidarity and competition should be limited to the 
Arab states, irrespective of distance and geography. Whilst state identity is being overtly flagged and 
reproduced, in a more banal manner Arab supra-nationalism is also sustained and encouraged.
5.3.2 Music TV
Music television, alongside the news, is the most visibly popular genre of satellite program in both 
Jordan and Syria as it occupies much public space. Most restaurants, cafes and bars that have 
televisions, which is the overwhelming majority, show either news or music television and those that 
have a clientele of mixed age and gender tend to prefer music TV. There are now over fifty different 
music TV stations broadcast over Arab satellites, though by far the most popular is the Saudi-owned but 
Lebanese-based Rotana, followed by the Egypt’s Melody, Muzzika and the US-owned MTV Arabia, all 
of which broadcast multiple channels.590 Ownership of these channels reflects the regional trend, with 
most owners closely linked to state governments. The owner of Rotana, for example, is a Saudi prince, 
Al-Walid Bin Talal, who has been described as, “the Rupert Murdoch of media ownership in the 
Middle East,” whose empire extends to newspapers, record labels and even the religious channel al- 
Risalah,591 With owners so closely tied to state governments, one might expect an analysis of the 
content and style of music television to show banal and overt flagging of state identity to dominate. 
However, as with news, reality TV and drama series, we instead see a mixture of identities flagged. On 
the one hand, songs and videos are largely apolitical but, when it does stray into political territory, we 
see a relatively even mix of songs highlighting Arab, state and Islamic identity. At the same time, the 
visual format of music TV continues the trend of banally flagging to the viewer a world composed of 
Arab states and flags.
Most pop songs and videos found on music TV are apolitical.592 Observing a few hours of Rotana, for 
example, the author found most songs and videos share the same themes as their western counterparts: 
love, relationships, betrayal, friendship and, perhaps more than in the West, family. One video, saw 
Lebanese singer Haifa Wehbe sing a song for her son dressed in pyjamas waiting for his father to come 
home. Another song observed by female artist Shereen portrayed the Egyptian singer in a beach house
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wearing a variety of dresses and revealing clothing awaiting her man. These romantic ballads typify the 
majority of the content, without any overt flagging of identities.
However, songs about identity, nationalism and religion are also popular in the Arab world. 
Interestingly, Rotana frequently shows songs referencing Islam. This is most obvious during Ramadan 
when religious songs and videos appear, often recorded by mainstream artists who would usually be 
singing about love and relationships but now wear pious clothing to sing about religion. Even outside of 
Ramadan, there are videos that are either overtly religious, featuring an artist in white robes, or more 
subtle ‘moral’ tales involving a reckless youth reforming his decadent ways to find religion. Such 
videos might suggest the channel is used by Saudi authorities to pedagogically promote religion. 
However, whilst it has been suggested by many writers that the huge stake in transnational media tied to 
Riyadh plays a role in promoting a positive view of the Kingdom, the frequency of distinctly un-Islamic 
material on Rotana must question how much it can be seen as a pro-religion vehicle.593 Most videos of 
female artists portray them in ‘racy’ clothing, prompting widespread criticism from Islamic 
authorities.594 The fact that the station bases itself in Beirut rather than Saudi Arabia illustrates that 
religious promotion is not its main function. Instead, the presence of these religious videos alongside 
songs about love and relationships reflects the pluralist content of music television. It is considered 
normal when a love song is immediately followed by one about religion, perhaps indicating that an 
Islamic identity is flagged quite banally.
As with religious videos, state nationalism-focused songs are also often seen in-between scantily-clad 
divas warbling about lost love. The love for one’s ‘balacT or country has long been a feature of Arabic 
popular music, and its continuation into the satellite age is not surprising. What is noticeable is the 
predominance of songs about certain states. The vast majority of performing artists come from either 
Lebanon or Egypt and so it is not surprising that songs about these states are more frequent than those 
about either Syria or Jordan. These songs can vary from nuanced ballads about the beauty of Beirut, to 
more crude songs such as the 2008 hit, ‘Egypt, Egypt, Egypt!’, who’s lyrics didn’t evolve far beyond 
those of the title. Because few artists from beyond these two states make it into the mainstream, very 
few songs flag other state identities so overtly. Syria’s greatest contemporary pop star, George 
Wassouf, for example, prefers singing about poetry and romance than his state.595 The two notable 
exceptions are Iraq and Palestine. Though Iraqi singers are not that well known due to their isolation 
from the wider Arab world during Saddam’s rule, Kathem al Saher has recently made a name for
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himself singing tragic ballads of the destruction of Iraq under occupation and war.596 His success might 
indicate a certain level of Arab solidarity, with viewers opting to show their support for Iraq through the 
purchase of songs depicting their misfortune. A far greater focus for songs about specific countries is 
Palestine. Whilst several Palestinian figures have risen to prominence singing about their occupied 
lands, it remains the only state where Arab singers from other countries will repeatedly refer to. 
Lebanese artists Marcel Khalife and Fairouz are famous for their songs of Palestine, notable the latter’s 
Zahrat al-Mada ’in (flower of cities) about Jerusalem.597
An extension of this country-focused genre are the numerous songs that have a more specifically 
Arabist bent. The outbreak of the second Intifada in the West Bank in 2000 prompted a wave of new 
pro-Arab pop songs. In 2001 Egyptian singer Shaaban Abdel Rahim produced the blunt but highly 
popular, ‘I hate Israel’ and Lebanese artists Yuri Mrakadi sang Arabiyyun Ana (I am an Arab) to 
widespread applause.598 Similarly, a collection of mainstream singers from across the Arab world 
recorded al-Quds hatirga Una (Jerusalem will return to us), the video for which featured images of 
Israel attacking Palestinians.599 However, whilst contemporary events might surge the popularity of 
Arab nationalist songs, they remain present on music television throughout the year. One particular 
video that repeatedly appears is the 1998 al-Hilm al-Arabi (the Arab dream). This was recorded by a 
cooperation of singers before the second Intifada, at a time of peace negotiations, yet has many images 
of Arabism that proved popular, such as videos of Nasser or of Palestinians throwing stones.600 
Interestingly, this video was initially banned in Egypt, but popularity on other channels eventually 
forced authorities to make a volte face.
Content on music television can therefore best be described as pluralist. Though the vast majority of 
songs and videos are apolitical pop about love and relationships, there are also regular songs about 
Islam, state nationalism and Arabism. External events, such as Ramadan or an escalation in Palestine or 
Iraq, seem to effect the frequency with which these differing types of song are shown. However, they 
retain a presence even in ‘colder’ periods of interest, banally flagging all three identities in between 
love songs. This further supports the thesis that producers have no qualms about promoting Arab and 
Islamic identity, as long as it is alongside, not in opposition to, state identity and interests.
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This hypothesis is confirmed when one examines the presentation of most music TV in the Arab world. 
All of the mainstream channels present viewers not only with music videos, but at the same time a 
‘newsfeed’ bar scrolls over the bottom or top of the screen with SMS text messages from viewers 
sending their opinions on songs and messages to their friends. In order to coordinate the receiving of 
these messages, which earns the channel a tidy profit, numbers to call are listed which differ according 
to which national state telephone network they are on. Consequently, the names of almost all of the 
Arab states are frequently flashed to viewers throughout the broadcasts as songs are playing, 24 hours a 
day. On some stations, the flags of these states are similarly shown. Such images are largely unnoticed 
by viewers and considered normal. However, as with the opening credits to Superstar these symbols 
and names are encouraging viewers to see themselves as members of separate countries, whilst 
simultaneously encouraging them to think of themselves as part of a wider network or arena of Arab 
states. Again, no non-Arab state’s name or flag is mentioned. All viewers are expected and encouraged 
to be part of the Arab supra-nation.
5.3.3 Drama series
By far the most popular shows in the Arab world are drama serials, or musalsals. As discussed in 
chapter four, though state television regularly shows these widely-watched series -  a tradition that 
began in the 1950s and 60s with popular Egyptian dramas rebroadcast on various state networks - it is 
now on the transnational satellite channels that they are most often viewed. In recent years a ritual has 
emerged during Ramadan whereby, after the fast-breaking Iftar meal in the evening, most families sit 
down to watch several hours of musalsals on television.601 As a consequence, the different 
entertainment satellite networks -  MBC, LBC, Dubai and Future being the most prominent -  spend 
huge sums producing dramas to win over this vast audience. 80% of Egyptians are estimated to watch 
musalsals during Iftar and, though figures are not available, discussions with Syrians and Jordanians 
suggest that a comparable number in those states do likewise.602 In the early years of satellite TV 
dramas from Egypt, the home of the Arab movie industry, dominated the airwaves. However, in recent 
years dramas from Syria and, more recently, Turkish shows that have been dubbed by Syrian producers 
with the Damascene dialect, have, “quickly become a staple in the Arab world.”603 Lila Abu-Lughood 
argued that, in the 1990s, such musalsals in Egypt were pedagogical vehicles used by the state to bind 
the nation together. Can the same be seen of an Arab nation in the musalsals of the satellite era?
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Marlon Dick highlights that an increasing number of musalsals, in their attempt to appeal to a wider 
audience, draw on pan-Arab and Islamic themes. He notes that, as previously discussed with music TV, 
external events had a bearing on the frequency of Arabist and Islamic content in dramas.604 He states 
that, “when the regional situation heated up with the A1 Aqsa Intifada, the attacks of 11 September 2001 
and the US-led invasion of Iraq, musalsals have reflected the Arab world’s tensions, albeit in different 
ways.”605 Some of these musalsals seems to fuse both Islamic and Arab identity, which would support 
Rinnawi and Pintak’s assertions that the two are synchronising, especially those that focus on Islamic 
history. One popular trend in this period has been to set dramas in al-Andalus (Andalusia) during 
Omayyad rule.606 Many of these series, such as 2005’s Mulukal-Tawa ^ /(War Lords) positively portray 
an era of religious and political tolerance when Arabs and Muslims were united together, drawing
AH 7obvious analogies with the divisions in the contemporary Arab world.
However, despite some assertions that musalsals glorify Islamic history, the shear volume of different 
series produced each Ramadan suggests space for pluralistic content and, in reality, Islam is not the 
most prominent subject.608 As Dick explains, “while most producers respect the Islamic conventions 
required for selling their shows, writers and directors usually qualify as secularists, reformists, 
conservatives, Arab nationalists, leftists or some combination of the above.”609 In fact, whilst most 
historical dramas about Islam tend to have a parallel message of Arab solidarity, there are also many 
shows about Arab nationalist history that lack any similar religious meaning, perhaps suggesting 
flagging Arab identity is generally more prominent. Shows celebrating past Arab nationalists such as 
Nasser 56, Gemal Abdul Nasser and Umm Kalthoum take a distinctly secularist bent, for example.610 
Similarly, even some comedies touch on Arabist themes, whilst avoiding religion. The Syrian comedy 
Spotlight, for example, features a Damascene character who emphasises that it is an Arab’s duty to fight 
occupation in Iraq -  that is until he is offered the chance to fight himself at which point he fearfully 
asks, “Y-y-you mean, where the b-b-bombing is?”611
As with music TV, pluralism dominates when one analyses the content of musalsals. Whilst shows 
appealing to Arab and Islamic identity may be prominent, most deal with small-scale subjects. “Purely 
domestic concerns, though, are the standard fare of musalsals,” reassures Dick. There appears to be a
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dichotomy of content. On the one hand, many shows could be considered ‘mindless’ domestic 
entertainment based in Syria, Turkey or Egypt, following characters with ‘everyday’ lives that their 
audience can relate to, which primarily flag domestic and state identity, continuing the pedagogical 
themes discussed in chapter four. On the other hand, there are also a large number of high-profile 
shows, particularly historical dramas that emphasise the audience’s wider Arab and Islamic identities. 
However, unlike in the pre-satellite era, studios and channels must fight for their audiences, suggesting 
that the volume of one type of musalsal on television appeal to the wider Arab audience. The continued 
presence of shows that emphasise Arab and Islamic identities, alongside domestic-focussed shows 
suggests that, as with music TV, producers do not see these identities as threats to their interests.
This dichotomy between apolitical domestic dramas and more politicised historical musalsals can be 
seen by the two most popular musalsals in Syria and Jordan, and the wider Arab world, over the past 
few Ramadans: Bab al-Hara and Nour. Bab al-Hara (The Neighbourhood Gate) typifies the political 
historical drama. Now into its fourth Ramadan, with a fifth series already commissioned, the musalsal 
is Gulf funded but Syrian produced and aired on the Saudi-owned MBC network. Set in a 
neighbourhood in old Damascus under French occupation during the 1920s and 30s, the show follows 
numerous characters and their families over several years. Whilst many of the storylines follow 
relatively mundane events of local gossip and intrigue, there is a distinct emphasis on both culture and 
politics. Culturally, it has a pedagogical edge in its emphasis on older ‘Arab’ value of honour, which 
many audience members harked for in today’s society.613 Politically, the decision by many of the 
characters to fight either the French in Syria or to travel to fight in the Palestinian revolt of the 1930s, is 
a clear nod to Arabism. The widespread popularity of this show -  enough to commission five series 
and, reportedly, clear streets and force restaurants to broadcast it on big screens to retain their customers 
each night -  perhaps illustrates the popularity of shows that overtly flag Arab identity.614
Yet at the same time, the popularity of Nour might indicate that escapism and entertainment are as 
much motives for watching musalsals as any political views. Shown on MBC in Ramadan 2007 and 
2008, this dubbed Turkish show is an apolitical soap opera. It sparked controversy from religious 
figures for its distinctly un-Islamic style -  showing young Muslims drinking, having premarital sex and, 
in the case of one of the protagonists, an abortion.615 Nevertheless, it was enormously popular, 
prompting MBC to launch a separate pay-per-view channel that showed the series twenty-four hours a 
day, and leading to a dramatic rise in the number of babies in the Arab world named Nour and
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Muhannad -  the show’s lead protagonists.616 Being from a Muslim country like Turkey made its 
controversial topics more accessible than similar shows from America. As Nadia Bilbassy-Charters 
writes, “Coming from a Muslim country like Turkey (even one imbued with a strong secular identity) 
made it easy to penetrate the thick walls of conservatism in the Arab world where bigotry and misogyny 
often masquerade as "moral" or "ethical" issues.”617
The contrast in values and identities flagged in Nour and Bab al-Hara illustrates the pluralism of choice 
available to viewers of musalsals in the Arab world, yet their equal popularity suggests that a show’s 
values or political persuasion does not effect audience choice as much as storyline and entertainment. 
Indeed, the presences of such Arabist fare as Bab al-Hara in the schedule alongside ‘mindless’ 
entertainment like Nour supports the claim of this thesis, that programming that promotes a wider Arab 
identity is considered ‘normal’ and ‘banal’ by viewers.
5.3.4 Islamic television
Aside from the various forms of banally flagged Islamic identity in mainstream entertainment shows 
described above, there exists a sizeable number of shows and channels specifically dedicated to Islamic 
programming. Whilst they are not as popular as the other genres assessed, with one estimate putting 
Islamic programming’s share of transnational audiences at less than 1%, this relatively unique 
phenomena merits discussion.618
It is notable that most political Islamists disapprove of the their members using television. 
Organisations such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood openly condemn television as a corrupting, 
immoral influence, and regularly release statements of outrage at shows such as Superstar and Nour.619 
The content of Islamic television is therefore largely set by comparatively moderate Muslims who see 
the role of their channel or show as primarily cultural rather than political. Moreover, self-styled 
Islamic channels such as al-Risalah, al-majd and Irqa are owned by the same (mostly Saudi) Gulf elite 
who own other stations and hence have a vested interest in promoting a discourse which does not 
challenge the state system as a universalist political Islam possibly could do. Indeed, the first line of the 
statement of intent of Irqa, one of the first Islamic channels, was to, “promote the moderate and tolerant 
line of Islam.”620
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However, whilst promoting a political Islam that would challenge the state system is against the 
owners’ interests, it is notable how much Arab identity is flagged in their content. The founding 
statement of Irqa, for example, mentions ‘Arabs’ almost as much as it does ‘Islam’. They state amongst 
their goals: “reinforcing the significance of the Arabic language;” “highlight the notable features of 
Arab and Islamic culture;” “tackle the present and future problems and issues facing Arabs and
£V) 1Muslims;” and, “to present recreational programs for all members of the Arab family.” Indeed, whilst 
34% of Irqa’s programming was specifically religious, a further 22% was drama serials (mostly 
historical) which, as has already discussed, often have an Arab nationalist element to them. However,
this does not support Pintak’s views that Arabist and Islamist views are synchronising as the Islam 
promoted on these channels supports the status quo. Instead this illustrates the cultural element of Islam 
which is promoted across Arab satellite TV shows, rather than a specifically political Islamism which is 
largely absent. Whilst not widely watched, these Islamic channels seem to therefore support attempts to 
promote an Arab-wide audience through its use of Arab rhetoric and choice of programming. However, 
as with other shows, this is alongside Islamic and state identities, not in opposition.
A notable exception to this rule would by Hezbollah’s increasingly popular al-Manar (The Beacon) 
channel. Unlike the largely unwatched al-Risalah, al-Majd and Irqa, al-Manar enjoys a relatively 
popular following, particularly in Lebanon, Palestine and Syria. The channel, which focuses on the 
conflict with Israel, includes news, sports, entertainment and children’s shows, and is one of the few in 
the Arab satellite world, along with al-Jazeera, which does not fall into the ‘Saudi space’ Riyadh- 
funded orbit of influence.623 Unlike the other Islamic channels, al-Manar does seem to support Pintak’s 
hypothesis of synchronisation as it is both overtly and banally Islamist and Arabist, regularly showing 
images of suffering at the hands of the Israelis. It states as its aim to, “preserve the Islamic values and to 
enhance the civilising role of the Arab and Islamic community,” as well as to be, “...the first Arab 
establishment to stage an effective psychological warfare against the Zionist enemy.”624 More banally, 
it portrays all its female presenters in headscarves, promoting Islamic identity, and has quiz shows such 
as ‘The Mission’ where contestants must answer questions which will get them ‘to Jerusalem.’ 25% of 
the winnings are sent to ‘support the Palestinian people’ and often the questions include asking the 
name of recent suicide bombing ‘martyrs’.
However, the impact of this Islamist channel should not be over-exaggerated. Despite the rhetoric, 
Hezbollah remains a state-based Islamic political group, unlike universalists like al-Qaeda. As a
621 Ibid.
622 Ibid.
623 Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts, p. 76; Hammond, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Media Empire.’
624 Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts, pp. 76-7.
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consequence it frames its content within the state system: speaking of ‘liberating’ Lebanon or Palestine 
more than creating a single Islamic state. Even domestically the party has moderated its language, no 
longer calling for the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon. Similarly, Katharina’s Notzold’s
research demonstrated that, even within the different channels available in Lebanon, al-Manar did not 
have the most religious rhetoric or content.626 Al-Manar therefore flags Islamic, Arab and state 
identities at different times. Whilst it might oppose the status quo more than its mostly Saudi-owned 
rivals, it does not actively undermine the state system -  just calls on the existing states to act differently. 
This perhaps shows the limits of satellite television to undermine existing identities and structures. 
Despite all its rhetoric, Hezbollah is a Lebanese organisation which depends primarily on Lebanese 
support for its existence, and this is reflected in its al-Manar channel. As with other shows and stations, 
it might promote Arab or Islamic identities alongside this state identity, but not in opposition to it.
625 ‘Hezbollah cuts Islamist rhetoric in new manifesto,’ Reuters, 30/11/09 
(http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5AT3VK20091130) accessed 6/12/09.
626 Katharina Notzold, ‘The political elites dominance over the visual space: a qualitative and quantitative content study 
of Lebanese Television,’ in Hafez, Arab Media: Power and Weakness, pp. 139-140.
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5.4 Sport: A Case Study of al-Jazeera’s 2008 Olympic Coverage
The final section of this chapter considers sport on satellite television, using an empirical case study of 
how al-Jazeera reported the 2008 Beijing Olympic games. Whilst there are several stations dedicated 
specifically to sport, the most popular news channel’s sports bulletins seemed an appropriate sample of 
sporting broadcasts at this time.
5.4.1 Methodology
The 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics saw over 360 athletes from Arab states competing and each of the 
22 members of the Arab League, as well as the Palestinians, had some representation. This two week 
sporting event seemed a suitable occasion to analyse whether al-Jazeera’s sports coverage was flagging 
Arabism, state nationalism or even Islamism, as some would suggest. Whilst there is a separate al- 
Jazeera Sport channel that covered each event in detail, this experiment was more concerned with the 
short five minute sports news bulletins displayed every few hours as part of the regular al-Jazeera 24 
hour news channel. These were the reports that the majority of Syrians and Jordanians in the audience 
would be watching, whilst the sports channel only caters for specific sports fans and not the whole of 
society.
To assess the extent to which content and discourse flagged Arab, state or Islamic identity an 
experiment was set to record these bulletins each day throughout the Olympics. As with the experiment 
in chapter four it was decided to record the prime time slot of six hours between 1800 and 0000 Mecca
• (\) 7time (KSA), or 1700-2300 in Syria and Jordan, when most viewers watch their daily news. This time
period incorporated the two main evening news hours: ‘This evening’ at 1900 KSA and Has adal-yawm 
(‘Harvest of the Day’) at 2300 KSA, each of which usually had a 5-10 minute sports bulletin of the 
day’s events from Beijing. Occasionally, a third sports bulletin would be shown at the earlier time of 
1800 KSA, and on a few occasions the news hour shows were reporting live from a crisis event and 
cancelled the sports bulletin. The data gathered proved sufficient to draw various conclusions about the 
Arab, Islamic and state nationalist nature of sports reporting on al-Jazeera.
5.4.2 Discourse: flagging ‘the Arabs’
The use of the word ‘Arab’ in al-Jazeera’s Olympic coverage is perhaps the clearest example of a banal 
Arab identity being flagged. When reporting on the performances of athletes from the Arab world, die 
reporters repeatedly describe ‘Arabs’ oruse some reference to ‘the Arabs’. Whilst the competitors’ state
627 Amin, ‘Arab media,’, p. 73.
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of origin was also mentioned, by emphasising the commonality between the athletes and the wider 
Arab-speaking audience from different states, we see a clear sense of Billig’s banal flagging.
thOn 13 August, for example, after an Algerian boxer won silver and an Egyptian Boxer won bronze, 
the sports bulletin headline was, “New medals for Arabs in Beijing,” and not ‘New medals for Algeria 
and Egypt in Beijing.’628 The item did go on to say the athletes’ country of origin, and so was not 
undermining state identity as Rinnawi claims, but it was the athletes’ Arab character that producers 
thought would attract maximum audience attention. Such flagging sends the message that the viewers, 
like the athletes, are ‘Arab’, and should take pride in the achievements of ‘their’ competitors, even if 
from a different state.
This discourse was repeated throughout al-Jazeera's Olympic coverage, particularly when discussing 
several athletes from Arab states. On 20th August, following the success of two Algerian, two Sudani, 
two Bahrainis, a Saudi and a Kuwaiti athlete in the qualifiers for the 800m mens’ semi final, the 
headline announced, ‘8 Arabs have qualified for the 800m men’s’ semi final’.629 Similarly, the success 
the next day of four of these was presented as ‘4 Arab competitors’ reach the final.630 In the same 
bulletin, on 21st August, the qualification of a Bahraini and two Moroccan women for the women’s 
1500m final was headlined as, ‘3 Arab competitors also,’ qualify. Again, though the athletes’ names 
and states of origin were subsequently listed, the priority headline was that it was ‘Arabs’ who had 
succeeded.
The use of the word ‘Arab’ was not simply a tool to save time. Whilst it did allow the sports newscaster 
to deliver a snappier headline, the use of the word ‘Arab’ elsewhere suggests that choice of vocabulary 
is more attuned to keep the broad-based audience engaged. This was illustrated in the recurrence of the 
word ‘Arab’ in the reportage of individual success. The gold medal taken by Tunisian swimmer
• tViOussama Mellouli on 17 August was reported as ‘the Arabs’ first gold’ of the games and, in a 
summary of the games on 24th August, a report hailed the event as a, ‘first gold for Arabs in 
swimming’, in Olympic history.631 Though each bulletin mentioned that the swimmer was Tunisian, 
their priority was not to state the equally true, ‘Tunisia’s first gold’ or the ‘first gold for Tunisia in 
swimming’. As with Oussama Mellouli’s gold, the sports bulletins took the individual successes of 
athletes representing Arab states and presented them in a manner as if all the athletes were representing 
a single ‘Arab’ team. On 19th August, after a Bahraini athlete took gold in the 800m, they announced,
628 'Hasadal-yawm’al-Jazeera, 2300 KSA, 13/8/08.
629 ‘This evening’, al-Jazeera, 1900 KSA, 20/8/08.
630 ‘This evening’, al-Jazeera, 1900 KSA, 21/8/08.
631 ‘This evening’, al-Jazeera, 1900 KSA, 24/8/08.
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‘The Bahraini Rashid Ramzi won Arab countries another Gold’.632 Similarly, on the 24th August a 
Moroccan silver was presented as, ‘the Moroccan Jaouad Gharib has won a new Olympic medal, the 
eighth for the Arabs by finishing in second place in the Marathon’.633 Again, the athletes’ state is 
pronounced, whilst simultaneously implying a common Arab goal in the competition.
Presenting athletes as a combined ‘Arab team’ was also highlighted in the medal tables displayed at the 
end of most sports bulletins. Whilst usually only the top five countries in the medal table were 
displayed in these bulletins -  mostly highlighting the growing rivalry between the USA and China -  on 
days in which Arab states won medals, a second table was displayed illustrating where these individual 
states were in the overall rankings. Figure 11 replicates this ‘top five’ table, labelled ‘biladArab’ (Arab 
countries) that kept a running tally on the total number of medals for ‘the Arabs’.
Figure 11: Example of medal table from 24th August 2008
State Gold Silver Bronze Overall place
Bahrain 1 52nd
Tunisia 1 55th
Algeria 2 65th
Morocco 1 1 69th
Sudan 1 77th
The table also encouraged competition between the different Arab states. This helps illustrate how Arab 
identity is being flagged in tandem with, not against, state nationalism. They encourage state pride and 
rivalry between the states, but also ‘flag’ that it is these states with which the Arab audiences should 
feel competition. Sudanese viewers should feel a greater sense of competition with Morocco than with 
neighbouring Ethiopia. Moroccans should compete more with Kuwait than neighbouring Spain. The 
discourse allows viewers a state identity, but within a wider Arab arena around which they should 
orientate themselves.
5.4.3 Content: proud winners
The discourse and direct use of the word ‘Arab’ is not the only way in which al-Jazeera's coverage of 
the Olympics seemed to flag Arab identity. As crucial is content: what is shown and the order in which 
it is presented. Michael Billig emphasised how important it was in the flagging of British identity that 
domestic news was placed first in newspapers, with foreign news a lesser priority later on in the
632 lHasad al-yawm ’ al-Jazeera, 2300 KSA, 19/8/08.
633 ‘This evening’, al-Jazeera, 1900 KSA, 24/8/08.
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edition.634 The same can be seen in the presentation of the Olympic sports bulletins. Arab successes, 
particularly medals, are given greater priority than comparative successes or news about competitors 
from non-Arab countries.
Examples of this can be seen most obviously on the occasions when Arabs won medals. Though the 
360 athletes from Arab states managed to acquire a fairly paltry tally of only eight medals, each one 
was given major priority by al-Jazeera. On average, the sports bulletins displayed from five to ten 
stories each bulletin. On the days when Arab athletes won gold, the Tunisian swimmer Oussama
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Mellouli on 17 August and the Bahraini 800m runner Rashid Ramzi on 19 August, their achievement 
was the first headline on each sports bulletin. 635These were deemed more important news than the 
other golds won by non-Arab athletes. Similarly, though Al-Jazeera tended to pack its bulletins with 
stories about the various gold medals that had been won in Beijing that day, on days when one of the 
remaining six Arab silver or bronze medals was won, this was always either the first, or, occasionally, 
the second headline. Figure 12 shows the example of 13th August when the success of two Arab boxing 
medallists was given the first headline spot ahead of the news that the American swimmer Michael 
Phelps had broken the world record for the number of gold medals achieved by a single athlete. The 
audience were being informed that the achievement of two ‘Arab’ medals in one day, neither of which 
were gold, was of more importance to them -  in both the 1900 and the 2300 report -  than the 
remarkable individual achievement of one American swimmer. There might be an argument to say that, 
with its audience’s perceived anti-American feeling the al-Jazeera producers chose to relegate die news 
of American success. However, the numerous reports on Michael Phelps that were featured in 
subsequent sports bulletins, on days when there were no Arab successes, would question this.
This trend of putting Arab achievements on a higher pedestal than non-Arab achievements was 
extended to non-medal successes, such as qualification. The qualification of the Moroccan Hasna
tliBanhassi for the final of the women’s 800m on 16 August was given the second headline at 1800 and 
1900 that day, behind only the world record-breaking Jamaican Sprinter Usain Bolt’s gold in the
f / i f .100m. It was considered a greater priority to viewers than gold medals for an Ethiopian 10,000m 
runner, a Russian walker, a Ukrainian shooter and a Chinese badminton player. Similarly, on 21st 
August, when the four previously mentioned Arab 800m runners reached the men’s’ final this was the 
headline news at 1900.637 The second headline was about the three Arab women qualifying for the
634 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 126.
635 ‘Hasadal-yawm’ al-Jazeera, 2300 KSA, 17/8/08; ‘Hasadal-yawm’ al-Jazeera, 2300 KSA, 19/8/08.
636 ‘This evening’, al-Jazeera, 1900 KSA, 16/8/08.
637 ‘This evening’, al-Jazeera, 1900 KSA, 21/8/08.
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1500m women’s final. It wasn’t until the third story that of the 4x100m Jamaican men’s relay team, that 
a gold medal was reported.
Figure 12: Sports stories on 13th August 2008
6pm 'Rivada' (Sport):
1. Silver for Algerian and Bronze for Egyptian in Judo.
2. Michael Phelps gold medal record
3. Gold for Chinese female weightlifter
4. Injured Hungarian weightlifter
5. Gold for US Cyclist
6. Gold for Chinese shooter
7pm This Evening’:
1. Silver for Algerian and Bronze for Egyptian in Judo.
2. Michael Phelps gold medal record
3. Gold for Australian female swimmer
4. Gold for Italian female swimmer
5. Gold for Chinese female weightlifter
6. Gold for US Cyclist
7. Gold for Chinese shooter
8. Olympic football fixtures
9. Volleyball results.
11pm 'Hasad al-vawm’:
1. Silver for Algerian and Bronze for Egyptian in Judo.
2. Victory for Moroccan Boxer in round of 16, defeat for Algerian boxer in round of 16.
3. Phelps gold medal record
4. Gold for Australian female swimmer
5. Gold for Italian female swimmer
6. Gold Chinese female weightlifter
7. Olympic football fixtures
In an Olympic games that could be considered a poor one for the Arab states collectively, even 
comparatively obscure victories received some coverage. On the 15th August, the Algerian Abdelkader 
Chadi was given the fifth headline for reaching the quarterfinals of the 57kg men’s boxing.638 Similarly, 
the next day another boxer, the Tunisian Walid Cherif received a mention for reaching the same stage in 
the 51kg category.639 Again, these stories were not surrounded by stories of non-Arab athletes reaching 
quarterfinals or qualifying for finals. Instead, they were sandwiched between stories of gold-winning by 
athletes from non-Arab countries. The message of this content choice is quite clear: minor successes by 
Arab athletes should be as important to the viewer as major successes by non-Arab athletes.
5.4.4 Content: Quiet Losers
A noticeable feature when considering al-Jazeera’s content is what was not reported. Unlike many 
national television channels, such as the BBC, which show empathy and support not only for its 
nationals’ winners but also for its losers, al-Jazeera did not have the same attitude towards defeat as it
638 ‘This evening’, al-Jazeera, 1900 KSA, 15/8/08.
639 ‘Riyada (Sport)’, al-Jazeera, 1800 KSA, 16/8/08.
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did victory. Whilst the successes of Arab athletes, even the most minor ones, were given priority over 
seemingly greater non-Arab triumphs at the games, the defeats were rarely mentioned. Though there 
were a large number of Arab athletes competing each day in the Olympics, only their successes were 
reported. On a few days, such as the 14th and the 22nd August, there were no stories of Arab athletes in 
either sports bulletins. On the 14th, the Egyptian handball and volleyball teams were defeated, and on
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the 22 the Egyptian Aya Mendany finished 8 in the women’s modem pentathlon, Egypt finished last 
in a round of the synchronised swimming, a Qatari man was defeated in the round of 16 in 80kg 
Taekwondo, and an Emeriti woman was defeated at 67kg Taekwondo preliminaries. Yet none of these 
defeats were deemed reportable, even though there were no other Arab victories to report in their place. 
Instead, non-Arab successes were the only topics covered in these bulletins.
Though the station did tend to report qualification to semi finals and finals for Arab athletes, if they 
failed to perform in those events, their fate was left largely unmentioned. Hussein Taher a al Saba, the 
Saudi long jumper who finished 11th in the men’s long jump final on 18th August was, for example, 
ignored. The same fate met the Qatari Rashid Shafi al-Dosari when he finished 10th in the men’s discus 
final, despite representing al-Jazeera's parent state. Throughout the games, the hundreds of Arab 
athletes who failed to get beyond qualifying rounds, and even those who made it quite far but without 
achieving a medal, went unreported.
There were a few exceptions. For some reason the defeat of Tunisia’s Walid Cherif at the 51kg boxing 
quarterfinal was deemed worth reporting in a way that the Saudi long jumper and Qatari discuss 
thrower’s arguably more impressive achievements were not.640 There are some suggestions that the 
presence of North African producers in Al-Jazeera might explain this Maghreb bias. A more interesting 
case is that of the Bahraini Rogaya Al-Gassra, who attracted international attention for being the first 
female athlete to compete in a hijab. On 20th August Al-Gassra finished six in the women’s 200m semi­
final, failing to reach the final. Given precedent, al-Jazeera should not have considered this worth 
reporting. However, it was the second headline on both the 1900 and the 2300 bulletins, second only to 
the Jamaican Usain Bolt’s gold-winning second world record in the men’s 200m.641 It cannot be 
explained for certain why this athlete in particular was singled out as the one figure with whom Al- 
Jazeera's audience was asked to give sympathy, when so many more were not. It is possible that, due to 
the hijab, she was the Arab world’s most high-profile athlete and hence public interest was high 
irrespective of her performance on the track. Whatever the reasons it is clear that the al-Gassra case was 
the exception to al-Jazeera's general denial of defeat, rather than the rule.
640 'Riyada (Sport)’, al-Jazeera, 1800 KSA, 20/8/08.
641 ‘This evening’, al-Jazeera, 1900 KSA, 20/8/08; ‘Hasad al-yawm’ al-Jazeera, 2300 KSA, 20/8/08.
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This unwillingness to report the many defeats of athletes from Arab states might question the extent of 
the banal Arab nationalism that al-Jazeera*s Olympic coverage displays. It certainly suggests a kind of 
‘hot’ and ‘cold’ Arab identity: one that only wants to identify its audience with their fellow Arab 
athletes when they achieve success, and downplay it when they fail. However, all this demonstrates is 
that the five minute sports bulletins do not necessarily have the same level of blind patriotic loyalty that 
might be encountered on a nation-state television channel like the BBC. This might be an issue of 
limited time, or it might be an issue of consumer choice, with the perception that its audience does not 
want to hear of failure, whether Arab or other.
However, the idea that Arab identity is somehow ‘cold’ at times of defeat is questioned by an extended
iL
edition of the sports bulletin broadcast on 18 August entitled: ‘The Arabs at the Beijing Olympics: the 
Gold and the features of weakness’.642 In this section the regular sports host asked why it was that ‘the 
Arabs’ had only managed one gold medal -  at that time the solitary gold won by Tunisia in swimming -  
and yet so much failure. He interviewed Kamal Darwish, a representative from the Sports Education 
College in Cairo, to explain why Arab athletes had performed so badly. He probed about a lack of state 
funding, inadequate facilities and government schemes. Though Darwish was a representative from 
Egypt, the debate was conducted to encompass the problems facing athletes in all of the Arab world. 
The presenter maintained the Arab-wide tone with questions such as, “Could we see an Arab Michael 
Phelps in 10-20 years?” The existence of such a debate serves to support the idea that al-Jazeera 
maintains a banal flagging of Arab identity. Even when it comes to defeat, something they don’t like to 
display, the questions raised aren’t, ‘why has Egypt performed so badly?’ or ‘Why has Algeria 
underperformed’, but instead a general questions about why are ‘the Arabs’ weak.
5.4.5 Content: Region and Islam
Though addressing a largely Arabic-speaking audience, al-Jazeera*s news coverage is generally that of 
a regional broadcaster. Its articles on ‘Greater West Asia’ such as Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Israel 
are almost as numerous as its coverage of the Arab-speaking areas of North Africa, the Levant and the 
Arabian peninsular.643 As such, it is possible that analysts of the channel might view the identity that its 
discourse and content is banally flagging to be Middle Eastern or Islamic, rather than ‘Arab’. To an 
extent this can be viewed as true. Though this experiment did not focus upon news headlines, it stands 
to reason that, if repeatedly exposed to news about Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, al-Jazeera*s 
audience might eventually come to view them as contiguous with the more distinctly ‘Arab’ local
642 ‘Hasad al-yawm’ al-Jazeera, 2300 KSA, 18/8/08.
643 Fred Halliday, ‘Lebanon, Israel and the ‘Greater West Asia Crisis’,’ Open Democracy, 17/8/06, 
(http://www.opendemocracv.net/globalization/westasia crisis 3833.isp) accessed 6/12/09.
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conflicts in Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq. However, in scrutinising their coverage of the Olympics, it is 
quite clear that Al-Jazeera' s prime interest is in the competitors from Arab states, and not in athletes 
from neighbouring non-Arab countries nor in the triumphs of Muslims from distant states.
The three non-Arab states closest to Doha and neighbouring the Arab world -  Turkey, Iran and Israel -  
had more success than their Arab contemporaries at Beijing. Turkey in particular did well, collecting 1 
gold, 4 silvers and 3 bronze. Al-Jazeera's viewers, however, were not made aware of this fact as all but 
two of their medals were unreported in the evenings ’ sports bulletins. The silver won on 15th August by 
a Turk in the women’s 10,000m was briefly mentioned in an aside within the main news item about the 
Ethiopian who had won gold.644 It was not judged to be an event worth reporting in its own right. The 
gold won by Turkey in the 66kg men’s wrestling on 20th August was featured, but only as the seventh 
item in only one of the day’s two sports bulletins.645 Turkey was given no special treatment on account 
of it being either Muslim or local to the Arab world, and its triumphs certainly received nowhere near 
the same coverage given to the Arab medallists. A similar story is seen with Iran, who won one gold 
and one bronze. The bronze passed unreported whilst the gold, achieved in men’s taekwondo on 22nd 
August was featured only as the seventh story that day.646 Israel’s solitary bronze medal was, not 
unsurprisingly, unreported.
Unlike region, the role of Islam as a unifying factor between audience and athlete was not totally 
marginal in al-Jazeera's Olympic coverage. On several occasions, in reports about Arab athletes’ 
successes, amongst the few images displayed were shots of the victors praying. This was seen, for 
example, after the victories of the Algerian and Egyptian boxers on 13th August, the qualification of 
Walid Cherif on 16th August and the gold medal won by Rachid Ramzi on 19th August.647 This might be 
an example of al-Jazeera’s producers trying to appeal to the religious sentiment of its viewers, using 
Islam in the same way as they use Arab identity to draw in their audience and encourage viewers to 
identify with the athletes. However, as the case of Iran and Turkey showed, there is no similar attempt 
to draw lines of identification and solidarity with other Muslim athletes from outside of the Arab world. 
The unreported successes of Muslim states such as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan support 
this. None of the Muslim athletes who won Kazakhstan 2 golds, 4 silvers and 7 bronze medals were 
reported.648 The same goes for the Muslims who won one gold, two silvers and four bronzes for
644 ‘This evening’, al-Jazeera, 1900 KSA, 15/8/08.
645 ‘Hasadal-yawm’ al-Jazeera, 2300 KSA, 20/8/08.
646 ‘Hasad al-yawm’ al-Jazeera, 2300 KSA, 22/8/08.
647 ‘Hasad al-yawm’ al-Jazeera, 2300 KSA, 13/8/08; ‘Riyada (Sport)’, Al-Jazeera, 1800 KSA, 16/8/08; ‘Hasad al- 
yawm’ al-Jazeera, 2300 KSA, 19/8/08.
648 Of the two Kazakhs who won gold, at least one has a Muslim name: The winner of the 69kg Men’s Boxing, Bakhyt 
Sarsekbayev. The other winner, of Men’s 94kg Weightlifting, Ilya Ilin could possibly be of Russian and therefore of 
Christian or Jewish origin.
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Azerbaijan and one gold, two silvers and three bronzes for Uzbekistan. The lack of interest in these 
athletes is because religion is not the marker of identity used by al-Jazeera to bind its audience 
together: they are not Arab and therefore not deemed of sufficient interest to report upon.
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5.5 Conclusion
Khalil Rinnawi and others who contend that the rise of al-Jazeera and other transnational Arab satellite 
television channels has led to a weakening of state identity are mistaken, as are those who support 
Marwan Kraidy’s belief that any growth in supranational Arabism is ‘skin deep’. Both assessments 
view identities as mutually exclusive and fail to accommodate that both Arab and state identities might 
be strengthened by the growth of transnational television.
This survey of shows available to viewers in Jordan and Syria has illustrated several points about the 
potential impact of satellite television upon identity. Firstly it highlighted the weakness of a news-only 
approach as adopted by the majority of scholars such as Rinnawi and Pintak who use al-Jazeera as the 
main point of analysis to show Arab identity being strengthened. It firstly questioned their findings, by 
illustrating that though journalists may well, as Pintak suggests, be committed ideologically to a New 
Arabism, the owners of the stations are equally committed to preserving the state-system status quo and 
hence use Arab rhetoric to promote their own interests. This suggests the owners of satellite channels 
are as instrumental as the Syrian and Jordanian governments in their use of Arab identity. Similarly, 
whilst Islamic culture might be central to some news stories, Pintak is wrong to claim New Arabism is 
aligned with Islamism as the only Islamist voices given are those that serve either state nationalist or 
status quo-focused goals. News channels may indeed strengthen Arab identity, but this identity is 
supranational: specifically designed to maintain and even entrench further the state identities and 
system from which the owners’ power largely derives.
Yet most viewers of satellite television prefer to watch entertainment rather than news and the analysis 
of scholars such as Miles and Rinnawi is greatly limited by their unwillingness to assess this genre. A 
consideration of five types of entertainment television -  reality TV, music television, dramas, Islamic 
programming and sport -  offers a far better cross section of the identities flagged to viewers than just 
news. Whilst most entertainment is apolitical, different identities are still highlighted. Reality TV shows 
such as Superstar overtly encourage state nationalism to enhance their viewing figures. Similarly some 
songs found on music television are designed to appeal to consumers’ state nationalism. In a more 
nuanced and banal way, these same shows reproduce Arab identity at the same time. Superstar, for 
example, only encourages competition within the Arab world and creates an ‘Arab arena’ in which both 
competition and solidarity is expected. Similarly, music television channels continuously broadcast the 
flags and names of Arab states to advertise text messaging fees, banally highlighting to viewers which 
states are fellow viewers and part of a wider supranational audience.
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Arabism is more overtly flagged in other forms of entertainment, such as some musalsal drama series as 
Bab al-Hara that emphasise both state nationalism and Arabism by recreating the anti-imperialist 
struggles of the 1920s and 30s. However, many popular series are apolitical such as Nour, though these 
do have the impact of indirectly encouraging a stronger affinity between Arab viewers who are bound 
by the same displays of enthusiasm, such as naming children after the main characters. Al-Jazeera's 
coverage of the 2008 Beijing Olympics shows attempts at creating an ‘Arab’ audience. In this instance, 
despite taking a clear preference to only report on winners and not losers, successful athletes from the 
different states were labelled ‘Arab’ successes primarily before their country of origin was listed. The 
athlete’s Arab origin was shown to be more important than either their religion or regional origin, as 
seen by the marginal coverage of other competitors from non-Arab Muslim or Middle Eastern states. At 
the same time, state identity was emphasised and certainly not undermined as Rinnawi would suggest. 
The regular display of a league table of Arab states’ medals served the same purpose of Superstar: 
encouraging competition between the states whilst simultaneously delineating the countries with which 
they should be competing - the Arabs.
Finally, this investigation questioned Pintak’s claim that Islamism and Arabism have converged on 
satellite television. It was suggested that Islamic culture is banally flagged on certain shows. This can 
be seen by the undue attention given to a mediocre Bahraini runner during al-Jazeera ’s Olympic 
coverage simply because she wore a hijab. It should be noted though that there was no less coverage of 
unveiled athletes from Arab states. Some music videos and drama also banally flag Islamic identity, 
though again, they are seen alongside videos and series which are deliberately secular. A great indicator 
of how successfully Islamic identities are disseminating is a consideration of specifically Islamic 
television stations. Two things stand out. Firstly, that these stations are not widely popular suggesting 
viewers prefer less overtly religious shows, and secondly, that these are owned by the same elites as 
other stations and so promote a form of Islam which entrenches rather than challenges the state system. 
Even the one outlier, Hezbollah’s al-Manar channel works within the state system and channels its 
energies at Israel not the various state governments. Whatever Islamism is allowed on satellite 
television is therefore highly sanitised to not challenge the status quo. Any Islamic rhetoric, rather like 
the Arab rhetoric, is designed to entrench the state system not disrupt it.
The satellite media revolution of the 1990s has therefore not challenged the nationalist discourses of 
Syria and Jordan but rather fed into the supranational Arab identity that they have long constructed and 
reproduced. Syrians and Jordanians are exposed everyday to various public mediations originating from 
both within his state and from the outside which flag to them their state, Arab and, to a lesser extent, 
religious identities.
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Chapter 6
Receiving the Discourse: Everyday Arabs
“In relation to the Banal Nationalism thesis, it might be unfairly assumed, given the limits of his empirical data, that Billig 
believes nationalism is banal for everyone who happens to live in Britain at the current time. Given the complexity of a 
population of 60 million individuals containing four ‘national’ groups, first, second and third generation migrant 
‘communities’, distinct regional and class identities and so on, making such an assumption closes down our analysis where it 
should begin.” 649
Michael Skey’s above observations of Billig’s Banal Nationalism study of Britain could, until now, also 
be applied to this investigation. In applying Billig’s theory to Syria and Jordan, this thesis has expanded 
on his methodology in two ways. Firstly, it has covered a wider range of public mediations than Billig, 
including not only the images and speeches within leaders’ cults, but also state and transnational 
television. Secondly, whilst Billig focused his attention solely on the reproduction of national identities, 
the preceding chapters have focused on state, supranational and, to a lesser extent, religious identities 
flagged daily in Syria and Jordan. This chapter addresses a third expansion, the reaction of citizens to 
these identity discourses.
Billig’s assumptions about the response of his audience are a major weakness of his study. In stating 
that, “.. .this reminding is so familiar, so continual, that it is not consciously registered as reminding,” 
he implies that whatever is flagged is therefore absorbed by its audience.650 As Skey comments, Banal 
Nationalism, . .does not address how different constituencies might respond to the particular media
texts or political speeches used as examples of the nation being flagged in a routine or taken-for-granted 
manner.”651 In other words, Billig dedicates no space to assessing whether there actually is a direct 
correlation between attachment to an identity discourse and engagement with the mediations that 
regularly flag it.
Unlike Billig, this study aims to add depth and flavour to its observations by engaging with a section of 
the audience and considering their perceptions of identity. Skey’s comments about Britain apply equally 
to Syria and Jordan. Of the 20 million Syrians and 8 million Jordanians, one observes complex 
populations composed of different ethnicities, sects and religions. Syria is the more heterogeneous with 
Sunni Muslims, Christians, Druze, Alawis, Kurds and Armenians amongst many others. Jordan is more 
homogenous with 92% Sunni Muslim and 8% Christians, yet is divided amongst those of Palestinian or
649 Skey, ‘The national in everyday life,' p. 337.
650 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 8.
651 Skey, ‘The national in everyday life,' p. 337.
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Jordanian origin.652 Alongside these different ethnic and religious groupings, one encounters the same 
distinct regional and class identities as Skey noted of Britain, as well as divisions of age and gender. 
The following chapter discusses numerous ethnographic interviews conducted in Syria and Jordan that 
consider respondents’ attitudes towards identity and the public mediations shown to flag them.
It is beyond the scope of this study to establish conclusively how each of these segments of Syrian and 
Jordanian society might respond. To gain conclusive data one would need to conduct widespread 
surveys and correlate viewing figures that, in these regimes, are difficult to obtain. Though lacking 
scientific rigour, the 29 interviews conducted in Syria and 22 in Jordan, serve to examine further some 
of the observations drawn from earlier chapters. Whilst none of the data obtained could be considered 
conclusive, an exploration of the topic expands Billig’s model further and adds colour to this 
investigation.
The following chapter first discusses the methodology used for these qualitative interviews, explaining 
that the nature of the society and government ensured that an ethnographic approached proved the most 
advantageous. It then discusses the various findings focusing on five themes. The first is a broad 
discussion of identity in Syria and Jordan, whether respondents feel Arab, Syrian/Jordanian and/or 
Muslim as is flagged to them daily, and in particular how they feel about their layer of Arab identity. 
The next three themes discussed correspond to the public mediations investigated in chapters 3-5. 
Firstly the images and speeches of leaders in cults, followed by their viewing habits and opinions of 
state and transnational television. In each case, whilst respondents show a great deal of individuality, 
most seem to conform to the broad identity discourses flagged to them daily.
652 CIA World Fact book, https://www.cia.gov/librarv/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/io.html - accessed 22/1/10.
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6.1 Methodology
The purpose of this research was to assess the interaction with and opinions of ‘everyday’ Syrians and 
Jordanians towards the public mediations sampled in this thesis. Various methods were considered to 
obtain this data. One possibility was quantitative surveying but this would have caused numerous 
problems. Firstly, the scale was too great. For conclusive data to be obtained from surveys a minimal 
sample of 100 in each country is required which would mean 200 respondents in total. To distribute, 
collect and correlate such a large quantity of data was beyond the scope of this study. Additionally 
surveys discriminate against the illiterate, of which there are many in Syria and Jordan.653 Moreover, 
the Syrian government often object to surveying being conducted within its borders. Even had 
permission been granted, there is no guarantee against official interference, or that respondents would 
have felt comfortable answering questions in writing.
Qualitative interviewing was therefore more practical but also more suitable than quantitative 
analysis.654 Whilst quantitative data is able to provide larger samples, it fails to offer explanations as to 
why identities are felt or how they are manifested. A more ethnographic and anthropological approach 
that allows respondents to give detailed answers about their identities better serves this thesis’ goal of 
explaining why and how identity is reproduced and disseminated. Societal and political conditions in 
Syria and Jordan discourage the conduct of formal, structured interviews however. Whilst they may 
prove useful to interview regime officials, the climate of fear and paranoia amongst the everyday 
population brought on by both Syria and Jordan’s Mukhabarat intelligence services ensure that most 
feel uncomfortable being tape-recorded or having notes taken during interviews. With such 
circumstances, the best method to obtain data from everyday people therefore proved to be semi­
structured ethnographic interviews.655 Being semi-structured, the same topics were discussed with all 
respondents amongst other loosely unrelated questions. Whilst not recorded or noted at the time, the 
interviewer was able to type up the salient points and quotes from interviews immediately after they 
were conducted, using the five key themes as a memory aid.
The data was obtained in two separate research trips, one to Syria in June-July 2009, and the second to 
Jordan in October-November 2009. Interviews were conducted, as much as possible, during ‘normal’ 
time periods that did not hold any particular national or religious significance in case the resulting 
atmosphere swayed the answers of respondents. It should be noted that throughout 2009 Jordan saw an
653 See chapter 4.
654 Martin W. Bauer and George Gaskell, Qualitative researching with text, image and sound, p. 40.
655 See, for example, Raban, Arabia.
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extra burst of state-sponsored overt national flagging due to ongoing celebrations marking a decade on 
the throne for King Abdullah II.
Choosing respondents to interview was challenging. On the one hand, the author was aware of the 
diverse backgrounds, economic status, ethnicities and religions found in Syria and Jordan, and wanted 
to accommodate this within the results. On the other hand, the author was also aware of the limited 
scope of this sample and how inconclusive any variations according to background would be. As much 
as possible, therefore, respondents of different backgrounds, gender, age, ethnicity, religion and sect 
were sought, that loosely reflected the national demographics. However, these results are presented in 
the full knowledge that any conclusions drawn must only be suggestive as the sample size is small.
In total 51 respondents were interviewed, 29 in Syria and 22 in Jordan. Interviews were conducted in 
blocs around certain areas to increase the geographical spread. In Syria, 11 interviews were conducted 
in and around Damascus, the capital and largest city (pop. 5 million), 13 in Aleppo, the second largest 
city (pop. 4 million) and 6 in Lattakia and its surrounding countryside, the fourth largest city (pop. 
400,000) and a rich agricultural area. In Jordan, the majority of interviews, 13, were held in Amman, 
the capital and largest city (pop. 1.9 million). The next largest cities, Irbid (pop. 290,000) and Zarqa 
(pop. 400,000) hosted 5 and 2 interviews respectively. Finally the small Christian-dominated town of 
Madaba (pop. 65,000) produced 2 interviews.
Though both Syria and Jordan have a roughly equal gender balance the author, as a western male, 
struggled to find women from certain ethnic, religious and economic backgrounds to interview. Each 
sample is slightly skewed towards men with 18 men to 11 women in Syria and 16 men to 6 women in 
Jordan. Both countries have young populations. Syria has an average age of 21.7 and Jordan an average 
of 24.3.656 The author therefore attempted to balance the age of those interviewed. In Syria 14 of those 
interviewed were under-30, and 15 over-30, with 8 of those over-50. In Jordan, 13 interviewed were 
under-30 and 9 over-30, with 2 of those over-50. Most interviewees in each state were from urban
r-cn
areas, as most of the population in each state is urban, 78% in Jordan and 54% in Syria. In Syria 24
respondents were urban and 5 rural. In Jordan 18 were urban and 4 were rural.
Defining economic group in the Middle East is less straightforward than in western societies as 
standards of living are quite different. Both Jordan and Syria have large, bloated bureaucracies that,
656 CIA World Factbook -https://www.cia.gov/librarv/publications/the-world-factbook/eeos/io.html: 
https://www.cia.gov/librarv/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sv.html - accessed 22/1/10.
657 CIA World Factbook - https://www.cia.gov/librarv/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/io.html: 
https://www.cia.gov/librarv/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sv.html - accessed 22/1/10.
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whilst not returning a substantial salary, carry with them a sense of respect and economic stability 
comparable to western middle classes. Such employment could affect a person’s sense of identity. This 
study therefore attributed economic background based on the standards of Syrian and Jordanian 
societies rather than those of the West. In Syria, 5 respondents would be considered ‘rich’, 16 ‘middle 
class’ and 8 ‘poor’. In Jordan, 2 were ‘rich’, 10 ‘middle class’ and 10 ‘poor’.
Matching up proportions of ethnic and religious groups around their national average was the most 
challenging element of this study. Ethnicity in Syria is 90% Arab, 10% Kurds, Armenians and others. 
Religious groups in Syria are 74% Sunni (66% Sunni Arab, 7% Sunni Kurd), 13% Shia, including the 
Alawis (the largest Shia sect), 10% Christians and 3% Druze.658 This study interviewed 13 Sunni Arab 
Muslims, 6 Christians, 5 Druze, 3 Alawis and 2 Kurds. In Jordan, the ethnic and sectarian gap is less 
pronounced. 98% of the population is Arab, 92% Sunni, 6% Christian and 2% other (including a small 
Druze and Armenian community).659 1 9 Sunni Arab Muslims were interviewed and 3 Christians. 
However, there is a significant divide amongst those of Palestinian or Transjordanian origin. 10 
respondents originated from Transjordan, and 12 from Palestine.
A mention should be made before the results are presented of the numerous limitations encountered in 
obtaining this data. Firstly, certain segments of the population proved difficult to access, often due to 
the suspicion afforded a western white male. Women, the poor and certain rural communities in 
particular proved hard to approach. A second difficulty was one of language. Though the author speaks 
proficient Arabic, to ensure an exact translation, a translator was sometimes employed which creates a 
slight barrier and filter between interviewer and respondent. Thirdly, there was the difficulty of the 
author’s origin. Being western was a double-edged sword: some would confide facts they would rarely 
tell their peers, whilst others were reluctant to share anything. Equally, sometimes one feared 
respondents would say what they thought the interviewer wanted to hear. Fourthly, the location of 
interview greatly affected responses. Those held in private homes and offices proved far more open and 
enlightening than those held in public cafes. Finally, the semi-structured interview, though mostly 
useful, often gave respondents the opportunity to wander off-topic and sometimes respondents would 
refuse to discuss certain issues. Nevertheless, the interviews produced a wide range of responses and 
issues that enrich and deepen this study and its conclusions.
658 ‘Syria: International Religious Freedom Report 2006’, US State Department 
http://www. state, gov/e/drl/rls/irf/2006/71432.htm - accessed 22/1/10.
659 CIA World Factbook - https://www.cia.gov/librarv/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/io.html - accessed 22/1/10.
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6.2 Arab, State and Religious identity
“I don't agree with idea of an Arab Union, but I do feel Arab. I don’t want to be in the same country with the Maghreb 
or Saudi Arabia.” Bassel, Dentist, Greek Orthodox Christian, 29, Aleppo, Syria
‘The Arabic nation is not like you in Europe. In Europe you are British, Spanish, French whatever. We are Palestinian 
Arabs, Jordanian Arabs, Libyan Arabs etc.” Suleiman, Shopkeeper, Sunni Muslim o f Palestinian origin, 45, Amman, 
Jordan
6.2.1 Syria
A common trait held by the vast majority of Syrians interviewed was that they defined themselves in 
some regard as ‘Arab’. Of the 29 interviewed, only three said they were not Arab, and two of these 
were ethnically not so: one Kurd and one Armenian. The only ethnic Arab interviewed who did not feel 
a sense of Arab identity, Maha, a 55 year old wealthy religious Sunni Woman from Damascus stated 
that being Arab was, “not so important to her.” Indeed, national identity of any sort seemed irrelevant. 
“I do not feel very nationalistic about Syria,” she said, “Why should we celebrate? What do we have to 
celebrate? If a sportsman wins something? Who cares?” This attitude was quite exceptional and the 
remaining 26 interviewees all felt a sense of Arab-ness. When asked to list their identities, with a 
template of the interviewer feeling British first, European second and Christian third, Syrian 
respondents seemed fairly divided between those who considered their national (Syrian), supra-national 
(Arab) and religious identities the most important. Curiously, of the three identities more people 
thought themselves Arab first or joint-first, than anything else. 14 of the 29 thought themselves Arab 
first or joint first, whilst 9 saw their religion as most important, and 11 being Syrian. This suggests that, 
Arab identity remains an important, if not the most important, layer of identity within contemporary 
Syrian society.
However, what that layer of Arab identity actually meant to respondents varied greatly. For some, such 
as Reem, a wealthy secular Sunni woman from Lattakia, being Arab meant a belief in unitary Old 
Arabism. “Yes, I still feel an Arab nationalism,” she said, “If we could, we would all be united. We are 
the same people, with the same interests and same geographical region.” These feelings were shared by 
several others, unaffected by economic or geographical background.660 In contrast, several respondents 
expressed their scepticism of Arab unity, whilst still expressing a wider supra-national Arab identity.661 
Amal, a 45 year-old female Druze shop worker from Suweida, south of Damascus, for example stated,
660 Interviews with Umm Ghadeer (19/7/09), Ibrahim (20/7/09) and Hajj Khaled (16/7/09).
661 Interviews with Bassel (30/6/09), Karim (9/7/09) and Wissam (16/7/09).
199
“It’s a nice idea, Arab unity, but everyone has gone their separate ways. Everyone thinks it is a different thing. Even so, I 
still feel a closeness to the Arab world so I would say I am an Arab first. Yes, the Maghreb is a long way away and they are 
not like us, but they are still Arab. In the end this is what we all are. We are all one.”
Similarly, Ghazlan, a 31 year old student from Aleppo philosophically explained, “I do feel Arab, but 
don’t believe in Arab unity. If you run a race, you will be much slower if you have to carry someone 
with only one leg. So why would UAE ever want to be dragged down by carrying Sudan? It is not 
realistic.”
Quite who ‘the Arabs’ were, however, was not clearly defined. Whilst most expressed some sense of 
common identity with other Arab states, the boundaries of solidarity were often blurred. Whilst the 
Arab world promoted by the Syrian discourse includes North Africa and the Gulf several respondents 
dismissed these countries as un-Arab or ‘different’. Khalil, a 70 year-old Christian from Damascus 
claimed, “I don’t feel close to Saudi, the Gulf or North Africa -  they are African. They have a different 
culture and a different way of thinking to us.”662 More common, however, was an acknowledgement of 
the distance between Syria and North Africa, and consequent cultural differences, rather than an 
outright rejection of their Arab-ness. Bassel, a 29 year-old Aleppan Christian stated, “Whilst we have a 
long common history with Bilad as-sham (Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan), with North Africa we 
were only united for maybe 200 years a very long time ago.” This was supported by Ahmed, a middle 
aged Sunni shop keeper in Damascus who said, “The Maghreb are Arabs but they are much more 
Western than us. They are close to France in Morocco and Algeria and think they are different. They 
are still Arabs though.”
Most interviewees did broadly accept the government’s template of the Arab world, but showed a more 
varied interpretation of which Arab states were more important to them. Alongside a general belief that 
North Africans are some how ‘different Arabs’, Palestine and the other Bilad as-sham countries 
received more solidarity than other Arab states.663 In contrast, the Gulf states and specifically Saudi 
Arabia were notable for arousing hostility. “We don’t really like the Gulf,” said Ahmed, “they have too 
much money and think they are better than us. They are stupid though, they are not cultured and are 
narrow minded.” More common was specific hostility to Saudi Arabia. Zein, a wealthy secular Sunni 
25 year-old from Aleppo typified this secular-fuelled disapproval when she said, “I don’t like Saudi 
Arabia. It is too conservative and makes women cover up.” Bassel, a Christian, extended these
662 A common trait amongst Syrians and Jordanians was to often refer to ‘the Gulf and Saudi Arabia separately, 
ignoring the fact that Saudi Arabia is a Gulf country and member of the GCC. In some interviews ‘the Gulf seems to 
refer to the GCC countries except for Saudi, yet in others the term includes all such states, Saudi included.
663 Interviews with Maen (28/6/09), Bassel (30/6/09), Hassana (2/7/09), Mazer (4/7/09), Hisham (5/7/09), Reem 
(18/7/09) and Khalil (11/7/09).
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sentiments citing what he perceived as Riyadh’s influence on Syrian society: “People from Saudi 
Arabia pay Syrians to be more conservative. It makes me sad and angry -  they are changing my 
country.” Interestingly, some of the more religious Muslim respondents felt the opposite, and saw Saudi 
Arabia as the Arab country with which they most identified. Sana, a veiled 33 year-old Sunni said she, 
“... felt so comfortable and at home,” when in Saudi because, “the religion is the same and the system is 
more religious.” Of those encountered not all religious Muslims liked Saudi Arabia, yet almost all 
secular interviewees disliked it.664 That said, none denied that Saudi Arabia were real Arabs as some 
had North Africans. As Mazen, a 45 year old wealthy businessman from Aleppo stated, the Saudis are 
seen as Arab rivals to Syria rather than a completely different people. “All Arabs, including me, think 
that their country is the best in the Arab World, but there are only three who could lead it: Egypt, Syria 
and Saudi Arabia, so they are our main rivals.”665
A specifically Syrian national identity existed amongst all respondents. Of the three identities discussed 
-  Arab, religion and Syrian -  feeling ‘Syrian’ was the only one felt by all 29 respondents. This suggests 
that the modem Syrian state is now accepted or, at least, regarded as normal. Curiously though, only 11 
of the 29 respondents considered themselves Syrian first.
The weighting that respondents gave to their identities seemed to be affected by the ethnic, religious or 
sectarian group. The 5 Christians interviewed, whose community makes up 10% of the population, 
tended to feel Syrian ahead of Arab or Christian, but still identified with both.666 Indeed, for some 
Christians such as Marleine, a 53 year old Catholic teacher from Aleppo, it was Syria’s religious 
pluralism that gave her national pride.667 “I am very proud to be Syrian,” she said, “It is the best country 
in the world for inter-faith relations. Muslims and Christians give each other respect.” Yet this Syrian 
nationalism comes alongside, not in opposition to, Arab identity, and all but one Christian interviewed 
identified themselves as Arab. For Marlene, her Christianity and Arab identity were closely related. She 
stated, “I get annoyed when people in the West think that all Arabs are Muslims. We (the Christians) 
were here first; this is our culture too. The Muslims came later.”
Syria’s other minorities’ sense of identity provides an interesting contrast to the Christians. The Druze 
and the Alawis are similar in several ways. Though concentrated in opposite comers of Syria, the 
former largely south of Damascus, the latter in the hills and countryside near Lattakia, both are 
traditionally unreligious despite being nominally Muslim. Consequently, religion was the least
664 Interview with Hajj Khaled (16/7/09).
665 Interview with Mazen (26/6/09).
666 Interviews with Suzanne (25/6/09), Marlene (27/6/09), Bassel (30/6/09) and Khalil (11/7/09).
667 Thoughts also shared by Bassel, interviewed 30/6/09.
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important identity amongst the 5 Druze and 3 Alawis interviewed.668 Some, such as Roba, a 25 year-old 
Suweidan Druze even stated, “I definitely don’t feel Muslim.” Another Druze, Jabir, a 37 year-old 
government employee said his sense of Islamic identity was affected by context. “We Druze are a type 
of Muslim, like the Alawis, but we are definitely Muslim. Of course, when I am with other Druze, we 
are Druze together, but if I were abroad, I would say I was Muslim.” Such remarks support Drysdale’s 
observation that identity is situational.669 Curiously neither Druze nor Alawis felt a particularly strong 
minority identity. “I don’t really have any kind of Alawi nationalism,” said Wissam, a 25 year old 
Lattakian farmer, “none of us do. We don’t like to separate ourselves.” This was reflected when all but 
one of the 8 Alawi and Druze interviewees saw themselves as either Syrian or Arab first. Of the 
different groups in Syria, the few Druze and Alawis appeared to most consistently emphasise Arab 
identity. 6 of the 8 identified as Arab first or joint first. As explained by Umm Ghadeer, a 50 year old 
rural Alawi farmer’s wife in Lattakia, “It means everything to me to be an Arab. I like Arab nationalism 
very much. I wish we were all united.”
The 2 Kurds interviewed, in contrast, showed no such Arab identity, and had a stronger ethnic identity. 
Kurds are not afforded space in Syria’s national discourse and, unlike Armenian and Syriac minorities, 
are not permitted to speak in their own language in government schools. Neither defined themselves as 
Arab when asked to list their identities, though Akrash, a 37 year old shop worker in Aleppo later said 
he saw himself as ‘Kurdish Arab’. When pressed, he muttered that his answers were tempered by the 
fact that, “everyone else in this shop is Arab.” This is typical of the sense of second class citizenship 
felt by many Kurds in Syria.
More frank answers came from Abu Jamil, a 70 year old doorman, from Aleppo’s agricultural 
hinterland, who stated:
“I don’t like the Arabs. We don’t mix well. The Christians, they are ok, and I like the Europeans very much -  they freed 
Iraq. But no, I don’t like the other Arab countries. They are bad to the Kurds. Turkey, Iraq, Iran, all of them. We want 
Kurdish independence. We are Kurdistan.”
Interestingly Abu Jamil makes no distinction between Arab Syria and Iraq with non-Arab Turkey and 
Iran. To him, ‘Arab countries’ are defined by their behaviour to the Kurds, not their ethnic make up. 
Similarly, to him, ‘the Christians’ were not Arab, even though ethnically most are. Curiously though, 
we see in Abu Jamil a superficial level of integration with Arabs: having adopted an Arabic not a
668 Interviews with Maen (28/6/09), Jabir (9/7/09), Karim (9/7/09), Roba (9/7/09), Amal (9/7/09), Wissam (16/7/09), 
Umm Ghadeer (19/7/09) and Ibrahim (20/7/09).
669 Sadowski, ‘Political Identity in Syria,’ p. 138.
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Kurdish title. ‘Abu Jamil’ means ‘Father of Jamil’, the title of ‘Abu’ being given to most Arabs on the 
birth of their first son. Whether he actually has a son with an Arabic name, which would show an 
interesting attempt at integration despite his private Kurdish nationalism, or whether he feels the need to 
adopt an Arabic name himself to avoid discrimination is uncertain. Curiously Akrash, who seemed 
more resigned to Arab dominance of the Kurds than Abu Jamil, had chosen to retain his Kurdish name. 
It should be noted that both respondents still considered themselves Syrian: Akrash as Syrian first, then 
Kurdish, and Abu Jamil the reverse. Both saw Islam as of tertiary importance -  typical of the 
predominantly secular Kurds.
Most Syrians are Arab Sunni Muslims and this group proved the most religious of respondents. Unlike 
Christians, Druze, Alawis and Kurds, a roughly equal number of Arab Sunnis saw themselves as 
Muslim first as considered themselves Syrian or Arab first -  a far higher proportion than the other 
sectarian groups. Several of these seemed to subscribe to a Muslim universalism ahead of either Arab or 
Syrian nationalism. “Being Arab matters less than being Muslim,” stated Hisham, a 24 year old market 
stall vendor from Damascus. His thoughts were shared by Mahmoud, a 21 year-old Aleppan Student 
who stated, “For Muslims there is no nationality, race or colour. It does not matter if they are Arab or 
not.” Yet both of these also claimed that they felt both Arab and Syrian as well, even if being Muslim 
was their most important identity. This multi-layered feeling was illustrated by Sana from Aleppo who 
claimed, “Nationality does not matter to Muslims, but I am still proud to be Arab. We have so much 
culture, society and history.” Indeed, for several Sunnis, their Arab and Islamic identities were closely 
related. For Hajj Khaled, a 70 year old from Lattakia, being Arab and Muslim was, “the same thing,” 
and what made the Arabs special was that they spoke, “the language of the Quran.” A slightly more 
surreal way of making the same point was attempted by Mohammad, a 26 year-old Lattakian student, 
who said:
“I like the idea of Arab nationalism, but as a step to Islamic unity. Arab nationalism is like a car with no doors. It still works 
but it would be better if we have doors. We need the doors of Islamic unity to make it work better.”
Loosely breaking down other categories suggests a few other trends. More men felt a sense of Arab or 
Syrian identity first over women who were more balanced in the spread of their identities. No 
significant differences in identity priority were noticed between different economic groups or between 
rural and urban groups. The only further difference was noted in age group. Under 30s showed a greater 
tendency to prioritise Arab identity than over 30s. 9 out of 14 Under 30 year-olds saw themselves as 
Arab first, whilst only 5 out of 15 over 30 year-olds did. This might suggest that the resurgence of Arab 
identity during the satellite era has had an impact on the younger generation.
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In essence, what was clearly suggested was that most Syrians feel some sense of Arab, religious and 
Syrian identity and nationalism, but there is no uniformity as to which is the priority. In many ways, 
this reflects the deliberate ambiguity of the official discourse discussed in chapter three. However, these 
interviews do suggest there remains a difference between ethnic and sectarian groups as to how strongly 
these identities are felt. The interviews suggest that Sunnis are more likely to be the most religious of 
respondents, and Alawis and Druze the least so. Kurds feel the least Arab, not surprising as they are 
ethnically and linguistically separate and excluded form the national discourse. Alawis, Druze and 
Christians, those groups that arguable benefit most from the status quo and the regime’s discourse, feel 
the most Arab. These disparities suggest the limitations of how the discourse is successfully 
disseminated. Whilst most conform to the identities in some capacity, with the notable exception of the 
Kurds who are deliberately excluded, we do not see a uniformity of strength of identity.
All respondents did feel Syrian in some sense, and no-one openly rejected the idea of Syrian nationality, 
which suggests the broad goals of the discourse, to build a sense of commonality, had succeeded. Most 
also felt Arab, though quite what ‘being Arab’ actually means varies. Some see it as nationalism, 
echoing the Old Arabism discourse, whilst others see it as a supra-nationalism, reflecting the New 
Arabism discourse. Some still hope for physical unity, others recognize the differences between states. 
Likewise, the strength of solidarity with other Arab states varies, with Palestine and the bilad as-Sham 
countries seen as most important, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries viewed frequently as Arabs, 
but financial and political rivals, and North Africa sometimes considered ‘un-Arab’ and often as 
‘different’. This also reflects the ambiguous attitude of the ruling Ba’ath regime towards the Arab 
world: using Arab nationalist rhetoric yet actually pursuing policies that ensure Arabism serves state 
interests.
6.2.2 Jordan
As with the Syrian respondents, the majority of Jordanians interviewed felt a sense of Arab identity. Of 
the 22 interviewed, only one didn’t consider herself to be Arab. Soussa, a Sunni Pharmacist from Irbid 
took a universalist approach stating, “I am not going to say I only like this group and don’t like that 
group. I am a human being. That’s it. It does not matter if someone is European or Arab, all are the 
same to me.” This was the one exception though, and all other respondents felt a layer of Arab-ness. 
However, in contrast to Syrian respondents, who tended to rank their Arab identity as highly or higher 
than their religion or state nationality, most Jordanians relegated being Arab to a secondary or tertiary 
level of importance. Of the 22 interviewed, only 3 considered themselves to be Arab first or equal first. 
In contrast, 11 considered themselves Jordanian first, 5 Palestinian, and 5 their religion. This suggests
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that Jordanians do all feel a strong sense of Arab identity, but it is of lesser prominence than to their 
Syrian equivalents, again reflecting Jordan’s official discourse that overtly ranks ‘Jordan First’.
As in Syria, Jordanian respondents differed in what they felt that layer of Arab identity meant. A small 
number, fewer than in Syria, maintained an Old Arabism.670 One respondent, Moussa Haddad, a 70 
year-old Christian shopkeeper from Madaba, still spoke the language of rejecting the artificial 
boundaries of the modem Arab states:
“I am Arab. That is it. Some will say they are Jordanian or Saudi or Egyptian or Syrian or Lebanese. These borders, they 
were made by the British. If you go to America, you can travel 3000 miles and they will still tell you there are American. 
Here, the Arab world is 2000 miles long and you hear ‘Saudi’ or ‘Syrian’ but we are all Arab. The distance from Syria to 
Lebanon is barely 100 miles. It is the same people.”
The majority, however, used the language of supra-nationalism: seeing Jordan as an Arab state in a 
system of others. Many lamented the failure of Arab unitary, but seemed to accept that this would not 
happen. Abu Mohammad, for example, a 50 year-old hotel worker from Amman stated, “The Arabs are 
a system of states right? Now they are in two camps: one with America, one with Iran. I wish we were 
only one camp. We should be together and united.” A more negative reflection of the same feelings 
were displayed by Mohammad Hussein, a 21 year old fast food worker in Amman’s Wahdat Palestinian 
camp:
“How can there be an Arab nation whilst the Israelis are in Palestine and the Americans are in Iraq? Would I like an Arab 
nation? Sure, of course, all of us would but it isn’t here. In the future, maybe, but we are not an Arab nation now. They made 
sure it couldn’t happen -  King Hussein and the other leaders. They didn’t want a real Arab nation. How would it work 
anyway? Who would lead? Each country has their own leader -  Mubarak in Egypt, Assad in Syria. They won’t give up 
power will they?”
As with the Syrians, Jordanian respondents’ views of who were ‘the Arabs’ differed. As with Syria, the 
bilad as-Sham countries were most frequently referred to positively. However, whilst in Syria Palestine 
was most frequently mentioned as a state that people identified with, curiously amongst Jordanians it 
was Syria that appeared most liked.671 This might be explained by the extent of interaction -  be it 
positive or negative -  with Palestine in Jordanian society that it is not necessarily seen as a different 
Arab state, discussed below. Interestingly, the popularity of Syria seemed to come from a perceived 
sense of cultural closeness -  possibly related to the success of Syrian musalsals on satellite television.
670 Interviews with Abu Mohammad (27/10/09) and Suleiman (14/10/09).
671 Interviews with Bassam (11/10/09), Raca (11/10/09), Ruwan (12/10/09), Sandi (17/10/09), Ayman, Khaled and 
Hussein (together 15/10/09).
205
Sandi, a 24 year-old Christian tourist worker in Madaba who said, “I am closest to Syria, as they are 
like us and have the same culture”, typified this attitude. Curiously, more so than in Syria, Iraq and, in 
particular, Egypt, were added to the bilad as-Sham countries as Arab states with which Jordanians 
identified. As Shereen, a 21 year-old veiled student in Irbid stated, “Egypt is the Ummdunya - ‘mother’ 
to all Arabs.” This extra closeness to Egypt and Iraq might be the consequence of geography -  being 
closer to Jordan would mean more frequent interaction between the peoples -  or politics: Jordan has 
had better relations with both Iraq and Egypt than Syria in the past few decades.672
Ambivalence towards North Africa’s Arab-ness and hostility towards the Gulf and especially Saudi 
Arabia was found in Jordan as well as Syria. As with Syria, there was a sense that North Africans were 
somehow different or un-Arab.673 “I don’t like the North African countries -  Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia 
and Libya -  as they are not real Arabs,” said Shereen, “their culture is different, their language is 
different and their religion is different. They are Muslim but they don’t understand what the true 
meaning is.” These thoughts were echoed by Mohammad Zarqawi, a 45 year-old bookshop owner in 
Zarqa who said, “I most dislike Tunisia and Morocco. These are Arab and Muslim countries but they do 
not practice Islam well. They try too hard to copy the West but this is just empty.” Curiously both of 
these respondents used religion as the justification for the lack of Arab solidarity they felt towards the 
Maghreb, rather than, perhaps, the ethnic distinction that many in these states are Berber, or the 
geographical distinction that these countries are African not Asian.
A more frequent occurrence was hostility to the Gulf and particularly Saudi Arabia. Two of the most 
vicious criticisms came from Christians who both attacked Riyadh’s religious conservatism -  rather like 
the Syrian Christian Bassel. Sandi explained that, “I don’t like Saudi Arabia at all. They are very 
different. Look how they treat women!” Yet it was not just Christians who resented the Gulf. Three 
youths from Wahdat Palestinian camp in Amman shared this hostility, yet their anger was fuelled by 
politics and economics rather than religion and culture. “I really dislike the Gulf and Saudi, we all do,” 
said one of them, Khaled, “They take so much money from America and Israel and give none to us.” 
Interestingly there were few who had positive things to say about Saudi Arabia, and those who did, as 
in Syria, gave religious reasons. Ahmed, a student in Irbid, stated, “I would say that of the other Arab 
states I most like is Saudi Arabia. Not because of the government or our relations with them, but 
because this is the home of Mecca.” There is some irony here for this attachment given that it was 
Jordan’s ruling Hashemites that ruled the holy cities for over 1000 years -  the Saud’s being
672 Shlaim, Lion o f Jordan, pp. 437-9.
673 Thoughts also shared by Raca, interviewed 11/10/09.
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newcomers.674 That said, as with Syria, the Saudi’s Arab-ness was not questioned in the same way as 
was North Africa’s, suggesting a general consensus on who was Arab, even if some were less well liked 
than others.
Respondents’ attitude to Jordanian identity, in contrast to Syria, was somewhat paradoxical. On the one 
hand a far greater proportion of interviewees felt their state identity was most important, 50% of 
interviewees in Jordan, compared to 38% of Syrians. Yet there were more respondents in Jordan who 
rejected Jordanian identity. Four stated that they did not consider themselves Jordanian, for different 
reasons. Moussa Haddad rejected state identity for Old Arabist reasons. Fawzi, a 37 year-old policeman 
working in Amman, in contrast, rejected state nationality for Universalist reasons, declaring, “I don’t 
feel Jordanian really. I don’t think we should be divided into different countries. Not Arabs, not people, 
not humanity.” The final two rejectionists of Jordanian identity were of Palestinian origin, who felt 
proudly Palestinian. This defiance was typified by Abdullah from Zarqa, who said, “I am Muslim. Just 
Muslim. Not Jordanian, definitely not. I’m Palestinian, thanks be to God, and Arab. But not Jordanian.”
Whilst Jordan does not have the same sectarian and ethnic mix seen in Syria, its major fault-line divides 
those of Palestinian and Jordanian origin and responses seemed to vary accordingly. Whilst respondents 
from each background all considered themselves Arab, all 3 of those who considered themselves Arab 
first were of Jordanian not Palestinian origin.675 Of those Palestinians interviewed, about half -  5 out of 
12 -  saw themselves as Palestinian first rather than Jordanian.676 Interestingly, all 5 were from poorer 
backgrounds: from the slums of Wahdat and Zarqa, doing menial jobs such as hotel porters and fast 
food servers. This suggests that a lack of tangible benefit from the Jordanian state might discourage 
these poorer Palestinians from feeling attached to it. As Abu Mohammad, an aging hotel porter stated, 
“I don’t feel Jordanian as I am forbidden from doing things as a Palestinian. I have to pay taxes, but I 
cannot vote for the parliament. I am barred from working at 5, 4 and 3 star hotels, I can only work at 
cheap hotels, because I am Palestinian.” In contrast, the 7 Palestinians who regarded themselves as 
Jordanian ahead of Palestinian tended to have middle class or wealthier backgrounds.677 Two of these, 
Rowa and Ruwan, 21 year-old medical students explained that they can feel both identities 
simultaneously:
Rowa: “I feel both Jordanian and Palestinian. I mean I was brought up in Jordan and I love my country but when my Dad 
tells me of the old times in Jaffa it makes me feel so close to Palestine. I feel both Jordanian and Palestinian together.”
674 Fred Halliday, Arabia without Sultans (London: Saqi, 1974 [2nd ed. 2002]), pp. 48-9.
675 Interviews with Moussa Haddad (17/10/09), Fawzi (13/10/09) and Mohammad Zarqawi (10/11/09).
676 Interviews with Wedad (1/11/09), Ayman, Khaled and Hussein (together 15/10/09), Abu Mohammad (27/10/09) and 
Suleiman (14/10/09).
677 Interviews with Rowa and Ruwan (together 12/10/09), Mohammad (2/11/09) and Soussa (25/10/09).
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Ruwan: “Its different for me, all our family stayed in the West bank, we were the only ones to leave. We often see our 
relatives from there and know how bad it is day to day, so sometimes I feel more Palestinian. But I would say I was both.”
Integration and assimilation of Palestinians into a Jordanian sense of identity tended to rest not only on 
wealth and prosperity, but also on age. It appeared that the younger generation was more likely to feel 
Jordanian than the older migrants from Palestine. Along with wealthy Rowa and Ruwan, the three fast 
food workers in Wahdat Palestinian camp all felt Jordanian first, then Palestinian, whilst the aging hotel 
porter and shopkeeper felt Palestinian. That said this proved a grey area. Some of the younger 
generation of Palestinians did still feel Palestinian first, then Jordanian, such as Abdullah in Zarqa and 
Wedad in Amman.
Interestingly those who felt Jordanian had differing attitudes to the Palestinians within Jordan. Some, 
such as Bassam, a 50 year-old hotel owner saw Jordanians and Palestinians as, “the same.” This 
sentiment was shared by Housam, a taxi driver from Amman, who stated, “.. .there is no divide between 
Palestinians and Jordanians. We are all Jordanians no? Most Palestinians love the king even more than 
the Jordanians. We loved King Hussein even more.” In contrast some Jordanians are still hostile to the 
Palestinians in their society.678 “It is hard to describe,” says Shereen in Irbid, “but there is a problem 
between us and the Palestinian Jordanians.”
Jordanians have a greater level of religious homogeneity than Syria, with 92% being Sunni Arabs, 
compared to 66% in Syria.679 The pattern identified in Syria, that Sunni Arabs tended to be the most 
religious might explain why Jordanians tended to place a greater priority on religion on average. Whilst 
roughly the same proportion of interviewees in each state listed their religion as their most important 
identity, all Jordanians listed a religion whilst several Syrians did not -  generally non-Sunnis. This 
seems to reflect the Jordanian official discourse which emphasizes religion more than the Syrian. As in 
Syria, for some Sunni Muslims, an Islamic identity outstripped any nationality or supra-nationalism. As 
Rowa states, “We are culturally Arab but religiously Muslim. The religion should be first but culture is 
strong too.” Several respondents tied their Arab identity to being Muslim. Bassam, the elderly hotel 
owner saw being Arab and Muslim as, “the same,” -  a sentiment shared by several other 
interviewees.680 As Shereen says, “My Arab identity is closely tied to my Muslim identity. I am 
Muslim, therefore I am Arab before I am Jordanian.” Yet at the same time this was by no means 
universal, and several religious Muslims felt a stronger sense of Arab supra-nationalism than religion. 
Mohammad Suker, an 18-year-old student from the Irbid countryside said, “Being Arab is important to
678 Interview with Raca (11/10/09).
679 CIA World Fact book, https://www.cia.gov/librarv/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/io.html - accessed 22/1/10.
680 Interviews with Mohammad (2/11/09) and Shereen (25/10/09).
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us. There are some people who would put their religion ahead of their Arab identity. That is their 
choice, but for me my Arab-ness transcends religion. You can be Christian or Muslim and still be Arab. 
I prefer it this way.”
As in Syria, little distinction could be drawn between the attitudes of respondents from urban or rural 
areas, nor, this time, between men or women. A noticeable trend was seen in class, in that all three of 
those claiming to feel Arab first were from Middle Class or wealthy rather than poor backgrounds. The 
most significant distinction from these results though was the distinction of age. Under 30s in Jordan 
felt less Arab, more religious and more Jordanian than over 30s. Even younger Palestinians tended to 
feel more Jordanian than older Palestinians. Curiously, this is the reverse of a trend seen in Syria where 
younger respondents felt more Arab than older respondents.
The results suggest then that Jordanians do feel Arab but more as a secondary identity, unlike in Syria 
where it is a primary identity in many cases. Moreover, an age distinction is emerging whereby young 
Jordanians are less likely to feel Arab first, unlike Syrians. This might reflect die Jordanian discourse 
and Abdullah’s recent efforts to emphasise ‘Jordan First’, with those who were exposed to these slogans 
for most of their adult life more likely to respond. As with the Syrians, they feel closest to local Arab 
states -  including Egypt and Iraq to the bilad as-sham countries noted in Syria -  and are hostile to 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, with a few religious exceptions, whilst acknowledging the ‘differentness’ of 
North Africa. Again, this reflects the clear Arab supra-nationalism of Hussein and Abdullah. 
Interestingly state nationalism as a primary identity seems stronger in Jordan than Syria based on these 
responses, yet paradoxically, at the same time, more Jordanians questioned the existence of the 
Jordanian state than did Syrians. Even more so than in Syria, this suggests the possible limitation of the 
Jordanian discourse to disseminate to all its population. Though most feel Jordanian, in the face of the 
powerful Palestinian nationalist discourse, it seems the Hashemites still struggle in some quarters to 
overcome other identities.
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6.3 Images and Speeches
“These posters are normal. I don’t really read them as they are always there. Even if I do read them, I don’t store them in my 
brain.” Roba, Druze Shop Assistant, 25, Suweida, Syria
“Its not as if I look everyday at these pictures of the King and think of Jordan. I am accustomed to them. In many restaurants 
you will see pictures of the king, but most people like me, won’t even notice.” Sandi, Christian tourist worker, 22, Madaba, 
Jordan
6.3.1 Syria
One of the central hypotheses of chapter three was that the local population view seemingly overt 
images of their rulers with the same level of banality and indifference as an American views the 
‘unwaved’ Stars and Stripes. Discussions with everyday Syrians suggested that this claim was largely 
true. Most respondents regarded the many pictures of President Bashar al-Assad as ‘normal’ and rarely
iTOI
noticed them. Indeed, further travel in the region suggests that this is something found in most Arab 
states, adding to the sense of normalization. Syrian respondents said they noticed the posters, “very very 
little,” or that they, “don’t concentrate on them.” As Ibrahim, an Alawi shopkeeper from Lattakia stated, 
“Its not that we don’t notice the pictures, its just that they are normal. It is our national symbol that is 
displayed with pride.” In this case, as discussed in chapter three, the image of the President is revered 
with the same national pride as the flag in the USA. Some respondents suggested that when the posters 
are new, they are noticed yet, as Karim from Suweida states, “.. .most people will read the posters when 
they first appear, but will not look again until there is a new one.”
The extent to which the population views the pictures and posters as ‘normal’ was displayed when 
interviewees were asked about specific places. In Lattakia, for example, several respondents were asked 
to guess how many pictures of the president there were on a major thoroughfare, Baghdad Avenue. All 
estimates were way below the 54 posters that were present. Mohammad, a 25 year-old law student said, 
“I would say we don’t have many in Lattakia. Only when there is a celebration or an election. There are 
none around now. {Pause) Or maybe there are some but I don’t notice them because they are so 
normal.” A second curious facet of the cult in today’s Syria is that the majority of respondents accepted 
the view that, unlike Hafez al-Assad, Bashar Assad does not have a cult around him. As Louay, a 
student from Damascus stated, “Seriously, there aren’t so many posters anymore. Before they were 
everywhere -  even on the tables. Now there are fewer.” Moreover, even those who have noticed that,
681 Interviews with Zein (25/6/09), Suzanne (25/6/09), Louay (3/7/09), Karim (9/7/09), Amal (9/7/09), Roba (9/7/09), 
Mohammad (15/7/09), Wissam (16/7/09), Reem (18/7/09), Ibrahim (20/7/09) and Abu Jamil (22/7/09).
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indeed, there are many pictures of the new president in place, they maintain this is not from the 
President himself. As elderly Khalil states:
‘There are about the same number of posters under Bashar as under Hafez. The difference is that these posters are not from 
Bashar himself, they are from those around him. The Ba’ath party likes to do this sort of thing. He (Bashar) will change it. I 
think in 2 or 3 years it will come to an end. These things happen very slowly in Syria.”
Yet Syrians are far from brainwashed and, despite regarding the posters as normal, respondents were 
not passive. There were several examples of cynicism and dislike of the leadership cult and the posters 
of the President. Bassel, the dentist from Aleppo says, “I don’t need to read the posters to know what 
they say: ‘we are here forever’.” Even those who supported the regime expressed some disapproval. 
Wissam, the Alawi farming student from Lattakia said, “I don’t like the idea of so many posters of the 
president in the street, but I agree with what the slogans on them say.” All of those showing cynicism 
and doubt towards the cult and posters were of a middle class and educated background.
There were several respondents, however, who actively engaged with the posters and their content, 
seeing them as normal, but also claiming to regularly read their slogans and messages. Mostly, this was 
out of a professed ‘love’ of the president himself.682 As Hisham, a poor 24 year Sunni Damascene 
stated, “Every Syrian you will speak to loves this President. He tells the truth.” Indeed, this largely 
positive attitude towards Bashar was observed in most respondents, even if they disliked the 
government in general. This suggests that whilst the majority of respondents see, or do not see, the cult 
and the posters as an unwaved, unnoticed, ‘normal’ reminder of their nationality, there remains a 
minority for whom it is an active, overt, waved reminder with which their regularly interact.
6.3.2 Jordan
Jordan tended to have more national flags on display in public than in Syria and marginally fewer 
pictures of the leader. Nevertheless, as in Syria the vast majority of Jordanians interviewed regarded 
them as completely ‘normal’.683 As Mohammad Suker, a teenager from Irbid stated, “Maybe we don’t 
notice the pictures because there are so many. It is normal to have them.” These sentiments were 
echoed by Raca, a Christian from Amman who told the interviewer, “For you as a tourist you arrive and 
see all the flags and pictures and think, ‘Ok, I am in Jordan now. Hello Mr. King.’ But to us it is there 
everyday and so we don’t notice it.” The extent to which these images and flags were considered 
normal was expressed by the fact that several Jordanians, perhaps more worldly in outlook than their
682 Interviews with Suzanne (25/6/09), Maen (28/6/09), Sana (29/6/09), Hisham (5/7/09) and Ibrahim (20/7/09).
683 Interviews with Bassam (11/10/09), Raca (11/10/09), Rowa and Ruwan (together 12/10/09), Suleiman (14/10/09), 
Mohammad Suker (25/10/09), Soussa (25/10/09) and Shereen (25/10/09).
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Syrian counterparts, believed that such things were found in all countries. As Rowa the medical student 
stated, “Well yes there are pictures of the King but there are everywhere in the world -  we are just like 
everyone else.” Suleiman, the Palestinian shopkeeper similarly said,
“If you go to any country it is like this. I have relatives in Egypt who say there are pictures of the president and flags in the 
street. I ’m sure it is the same in Syria. This is just the system, seen everywhere, whether Arab or foreign. In Britain don’t 
you have many flags and pictures of your Queen everywhere?”
Such was the level of banality of the cult that even fewer respondents in Jordan than in Syria said they 
actively paid attention to the posters. The only noticeable interaction came from Fawzi the policeman 
who said:
“There is a huge photograph of him (the King) outside the police academy that I see everyday and I often look at as if he is 
watching me. It is like he is expressing different things at different time: sometimes approving, sometimes being strong to 
me.
Yet as with Syria, many respondents were unaware of the sheer volume of pictures and flags on show. 
At Yarmouk University in Irbid, students were asked to guess how many pictures they thought were on 
campus. Shereen said, “There really aren’t so many pictures, only one or two around the university.” 
The interviewer was able to find 14 free standing images of the king around the campus during a 10 
minute walk as well as a separate portrait at the entrance of every faculty building. There was even a 
giant picture of the royal family in the campus McDonalds, silently ignored by patrons.
Perhaps because the images are even less noticed in Jordan than in Syria, there also appeared to be less 
negativity towards them from respondents. Yet unlike in Syria, opposition to the images seemed to 
focus on opposition to the King himself. The three Palestinian youths in Wahdat camp in Amman, for 
example, said that you wouldn’t find many pictures up in the camp. “We don’t dislike him,” they said, 
“but we’re not going to celebrate him.” Indeed, all the opposition to the cult came from Palestinians 
rather than Jordanians. Another Palestinian, Abu Mohammad said:
“Why do we have these pictures of the king everywhere? They are not necessary. They are designed for outsiders so they 
think that we like this guy, but its not reality. Not at all.”
As with Syria, those who supported the regime were insistent that the images were put in place by 
active patriots. “We put the pictures up,” said Soussa, a pharmacist from Irbid, “not because there is a 
law or something, we just love him.” The more cynical critiques of the regime however, such as
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Mohammad Zarqawi, disagree though. “The pictures in the street,” he said, “are put up by the 
government and the Mukharbarat” However, from the interviews conducted the vast majority of 
respondents, as in Syria, seemed favorable towards the King and favorable to his image, which, again, 
seemed to adopt a national symbolism. As Fazwi states, “There are many flags and pictures of the king 
because people are patriotic. They want to show how much they love the king.” In Jordan, as in Syria, 
the consumption of these mediations was largely banal though occasionally engaged. They were rarely 
completely rejected, even amongst those who had their doubts. In almost all cases the images were 
regarded as ‘normal’ and the banal consumption of them by citizens might help to explain the largely 
successful dissemination of the identities they flag discussed earlier.
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6.4 State television
“Syrians watch so much TV, maybe 30 hours a week. Most women don’t work, maybe only 10%, so they watch TV all 
day instead. I have friends who know the TV schedule by heart - 1 call them up if I want to know what time something 
is on. If you walk down any poor street in Syria you will see satellite dishes everywhere. They care more about 
watching TV than paying for food!” Sana, Sunni Arab School teacher, 33, Aleppo, Syria
To complement Chapter four, which analysed the identities flagged daily on Syrian and Jordanian state 
television, a segment of each interview discussed respondents’ television preferences. The most 
obvious, but necessary, conclusion one can draw from the interviews is that Syrians and Jordanians 
watch a lot of television. As Sana, the veiled Syrian Sunni school teacher states above, the rate of 
television consumption is staggeringly high. Though rates vary, all respondents said they watch 
television and even those who said they were too busy admitted to watching during Ramadan. This 
suggests that the decision to use television rather than Billig’s preferred print newspaper to investigate 
banal nationalism is justified.
6.4.1 Syria
Khalil Rinnawi argued that consumption of state television has declined irrecoverably since the advent 
of satellite TV.684 Rinnawi’s focus is news channels such as al-Jazeera and the interviews did reveal 
that many Syrians are skeptical about the validity of the news available on state TV. Of the 26 
respondents who were willing to talk about television an equal number, 13 each, said they did regularly 
watch Syria TV news as said they definitely did not. As implied by Rinnawi, those who did not watch 
state news complained of bias, censorship and it being out of date. As the Alawi Ibrahim in Lattakia 
said, “I don’t watch Syria TV News as it is too censored. They do not show live stories, just pre­
prepared items.” As Bassel, the Aleppan dentist summarizes, “I don’t like it, because I already know 
today what it is going to say tomorrow.”
However, those who did consume state news did so whilst being aware of its limitations. Marlene, the 
Aleppan school teacher said, “I know that Syria TV is not free, but I like to watch it alongside other 
news channels to get a different opinion.” Similarly Amal, the Druze shopkeeper, said she, “.. .liked to 
watch Syria TV, “but admitted, “...it is not as comprehensive as al-Jazeera.” A few, such as Umm 
Ghadeer the elderly Alawi from Lattakia, maintained unconditional support for everything on the 
channel, news included: “Syria TV is my favourite channel, I watch it most of the time. I watch 
everything on it -  news, musalsals. It is brilliant!” However, the majority of viewers admitted they 
watched Syria TV news in conjunction with others. Mazen, a 45 year old Sunni businessman typified
684 Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism, p. xviii.
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this view when he stated, “I watch the Syrian government channel for local news, but if I want 
international stories there are better channels elsewhere.” This suggests that Syrian viewers are far from 
passive consumers and do use the availability of other channels to question the government message 
which they mostly know is one-sided. However, it is false to say that the majority do not watch state- 
run news. Many still watch it, whilst knowing its limitations.
Despite roughly an equal number admitting to watching news on Syria TV as those that did not most 
respondents said they would watch the channel for something. The new tradition of watching television 
with the family after Iftar during Ramadan seemed to have a substantial impact. Even those who had a 
generally negative view of the channel, claimed they would still watch it during Ramadan to catch the 
new musalsals.685 As Mohammad, the Sunni Law student from Lattakia stated, “I don’t really watch 
Syria TV. Sometimes I watch musalsals in Ramadan, but only if the schedule is good. Last year they 
showed Bab al-Hara first. I really like this show so I watched it then.” Whilst only a few such as Umm 
Ghadeer claimed to watch the station ‘a lot’, the majority claimed to watch it ‘sometimes’. The 
musalsals in particular seemed to attract interest. Similarly, only Syria TV showed the popular domestic
(L Q f.
football league. No-one made any comments about the banal nationalist symbols and shorts that 
linked programs, which would suggest that even in their occasional consumption of the channel viewers 
were not actively objecting to the identities being flagged.
Only a few respondents said they actively did not watch the channel and they tended to criticize the 
style and accessibility of the station rather than any political message. Bassel the dentist states that, 
“... everything is repeated over and over, so there is no need to watch it.” The two exceptions were Abu 
Jamil the elderly Kurd and Ghazlan an angry Aleppan Sunni who opposed the government. Abu Jamil 
stated, “I never watch Syria TV, it is rubbish! Never anything about the Kurds!” Ghazlan, was more 
comprehensive is his political and stylistic opposition;
“I never watch Syria TV, it is like watching something from the 1960s. The news is just like watching al-Manar 
(Hezbollah’s satellite channel). It only represents the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah-Hamas axis. In general, the channel is very bad. I 
used to watch it more, but now why would I when there are much better channels like al-Arabiyya and Abu Dhabi?”
Broadly however, these kinds of criticisms were rare. Whilst the news attracted the most criticism, the 
channel in general was received with mixed feelings. Five respondents were avid fans, who variously 
described the station as, “beautiful,” “wonderful,”, “brilliant,” and, rather nationalistically, “owr
685 Interviews with Moussa, Louay and Mamdouah (all 3/7/09).
686 Interview with Maen (28/6/09).
215
f.on
channel.” Curiously, all five of these respondents came from poor backgrounds. In contrast, the six 
who disliked the channel were all middle class except for the Kurdish doorman. The majority of 
respondents had mixed feelings. They accepted that the station had limitations, but also drew positives, 
such as stating that it had improved recently. As Sana stated, “Syria TV used to be a load of crap, but 
now it is much better.”
The interviews therefore suggest that Syrian viewers are neither brainwashed by their state channel, nor 
do they outright reject it. The majority watches it with enough regularity to consume some of the 
content and identities flagged, but very few uncritically accept everything it says. Transnational stations 
have provided competition, but have not totally reduced the importance of the state channel. Of all the 
shows, news is most doubted by viewers, with even those who regularly watch state news using other 
stations to make comparisons. Yet even some of the most cynical viewers still admit to watching 
musalsals during Ramadan, giving the opportunity to have their identities ‘re-flagged’.
6.4.2 Jordan
It is curious that several authors writing about the impact of al-Jazeera and other transnational channels 
in the Arab world, Rinnawi and Hugh Miles included, often chose Jordan TV as their example of Arab 
state television to case study.688 The relative unpopularity of Jordan TV is used to justify the inevitable 
rise of satellite TV. However, whilst the results of these interviews seem to confirm Rinnawi and Miles’ 
findings, that most Jordanians do not watch their own state TV much, it is important to compare these 
results with those found in Syria. Indeed, the comparative popularity of state television in Syria, 
suggests that Jordan could be the exception not the rule and that Rinnawi and Miles should have 
investigated more than one state television channel before drawing conclusions.
Fewer people watched state news in Jordan than in Syria, but there was less criticism too. Fewer than 
half of those interviewed watched Jordan TV news. As in Syria, those who did saw its value for local 
news, yet watched it in conjunction with other channels. As Moussa Haddad, the elderly Christian from 
Madaba states:
‘The news is good, but limited. If I want to know about what the King is doing, or the Prime Minister, or what new 
buildings have opened and hospitals and schools, I will watch Jordan TV news. If I want to know the whole story, or what is 
going on outside Jordan, I will watch al-Jazeera.”
687 Interviews with Amal (9/7/09), Hassana (2/7/09), Umm Ghadeer (19/7/09), and Hajj Khaled (16/7/09).
688 Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism, p. 112; Miles, Al-Jazeera, p. 339.
216
As in Syria, a few respondents complained about bias. Abu Mohammad, the Palestinian Hotel porter in 
Amman, for example described it as, “all lies.” In fact, only 4 respondents actively complained about 
the news’ bias, and all were of Palestinian origin and generally against the government. The content of 
state TV news generally bothered Jordanians less than their Syrian counterparts. Fewer watched it, and 
fewer complained about it.
The channel in general attracted fewer viewers than the Syrian equivalent, and far more people than in 
Syria actively did not watch it. Almost all of those who did said they only did so ‘ sometimes’ and there 
was not the sizeable minority found in Syria who mainly watched state TV. Only one respondent, Fawzi 
the policeman, said he, “probably watches Jordan TV more than other channels.” Most respondents 
who did watch it felt like Soussa who said, “I only watch Jordan TV now and again, if there is a 
musalsal I like.”689 Those who did not like the channel tended to criticize it for being ‘boring’ rather 
than for political reasons. Ayman in Wahdat Palestinian camp laughed on being asked about the 
channel stating, “No-one watches Jordan TV. Why would we? There is nothing on it!” Curiously the 
majority of the vocal critics of the station were under 30.
Despite Jordan 7Tbeing largely unpopular, the overt nationalist symbols it displayed, particularly the 
music videos about Jordan and the King played at the end of the evening news, aroused much support 
in certain quarters. Unlike the posters of the king, these music videos seemed to be noticed by viewers 
and prompted an opinion whether positive or negative. They were aware, in effect, that this was overt 
identity flagging. Amongst some respondents, all of which were East Bank Jordanians, the videos were 
received warmly. Similarly Shereen said, “I feel very proud when I see the videos of Jordan on Jordan 
T V -  it makes me feel more patriotic and happy.” Mohammad Suker even confidently predicted that, “I 
think everyone loves Jordan and so they like that they play these songs. It makes us see our country and 
be proud of it.”
Yet, in contrast several respondents voiced their opposition. Most were Palestinian, such as Abu 
Mohammad, who stated:
“The films and songs after the news are not designed for Jordanians, but for foreigners. They want you to see that we all love 
our country and think that Jordan is great.. .but we all know that is not true and it is a lie.”
The ‘foreigners’ he refers to seem to be die westerners from states allied to the regime. Similarly, 
Mohammad Zarqawi, who was not Palestinian but was politically opposed to the government said:
689 Thoughts also shared by Ruwan, interviewed 12/10/09.
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“Yes I see those songs after the news each night. You know, there are many problems in this country: social problems and 
economic problems. These songs are meant to make us feel together, but they don’t.”
In general, there were fewer positive remarks made in interviews about state TV in comparison to in 
Syria. Some negative comments were political such as Abu Mohammad who stated, “Jordan TV '\s not 
very good. All you hear about is the government’s message. If you read a state-owned newspaper and 
then watch Jordan TV, its exactly the same thing.” However, the majority of criticism was on style, 
with younger viewers in particular seeing it as boring and outdated.690 There were some mixed 
opinions, but generally the viewpoint was negative.691
Interestingly in both Syria and Jordan it is clear that State television has a large number of critics. 
Whilst a section of the population do like the channels and watch regularly, the majority only watch 
occasionally for certain shows. This largely negative view of the state channels might support 
Rinnawi’s claims that the transnational media is threatening traditional dominance. Moreover, regular 
criticism or at least awareness of certain overt identity flagging such as Jordan’s patriotic songs, might 
question whether state television is able to banally reproduce identity. However, the results are more 
nuanced than that. On the one hand, neither Syria nor Jordan have been able to produce a passive 
population that uncritically consume everything they watch. Their skepticism of the news illustrates 
this. On the other hand, the willingness to watch state television for popular shows like musalsals and 
an unawareness of the banal identities they and the linking segments between them flag suggests that 
state television can have a limited impact on reproducing identity. Interestingly, and unexpectedly, 
respondents were more critical of the obvious identity building aspects of state television than they 
were of the, presumably, more overt speeches and images of the leadership cults.
690 Interviews with Raca (11/10/09), Rowa and Ruwan (together 12/10/09).
691 Interviews with Mohammad (2/11/09) and Bassam (11/10/09).
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6.5 Transnational Arab Television
“Everyone in Syria has a dish.” Hassana, Sunni Cleaner, Aleppo, Syria
“It has become like a tradition in the last few years. The whole family sits down every night during Ramadan to watch the 
latest shows.” Ruwan, Sunni Medical Student, Amman, Jordan
As anticipated, interviews in both Syria and Jordan revealed a high proliferation of satellite dishes and 
the consumption of transnational television. Whilst statistics suggest that there is a sizeable minority in 
both states that do not have access to these channels, it was notable that not a single respondent, no 
matter their economic background, admitted this to the interviewer.692 On the one hand this might 
suggest that ownership of this technology is a status symbol and poorer interviewees were too proud to 
admit that they could not afford it. On the other hand, the author witnessed rusty satellite dishes 
screwed onto homes in the most humble of neighborhoods, refugee camps and rural villages. Moreover 
almost all cafes, coffee shops and public places displayed satellite TV, providing viewers with more 
opportunities. As the above quote from Hasana suggests, along with the earlier quote from Sana, the 
impression in both Syria and Jordan is that very few are unable to view transnational television if and 
when they wish.
6.5.1 Transnational Television in Syria
News
Whilst only half of respondents in Syria said that they regularly watched news on state television, the 
vast majority, 22 out of 26, listed news as something they watched on satellite. Only 4 claimed not to 
watch the news. As anticipated, al-Jazeera was by far the most popular channel for news with half the 
respondents, 14, specifically identifying it as their preferred channel. Abu Jamil, the elderly Kurd, 
explained this general preference when he said, “al-Jazeera shows everything: Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Palestine, Iran, everything. And they tell the truth.” The Qatar-based channel seemed to attract vocal 
and passionate fans in Syria. Quite often a preference for al-Jazeera would be followed by a criticism 
of its Saudi-owned rival al-Arabiyya. The issue of ‘truth’ in particular seemed to dominate preferences, 
with al-Jazeera widely considered the more reliable and unbiased. Mohammad from Lattakia stated, “I 
always watch al-Jazeera. al-Arabiyya is full of lies. It is just what the Saudi Arabians want us to 
hear.. .They don’t tell the truth like al-Jazeera does.” These sentiments were shared by many, including 
Hisham the young shopkeeper from Damascus who said, “al-Jazeera tells the truth always. Some of the 
other channels like al-Arabiyya are too focused on a certain area or biased.” This, interestingly,
692 Sakr, Arab Television Today, p. 1.
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reflected Syrian government policy at the time of research which was hostile to Saudi Arabia. This 
perhaps suggests the successful dissemination of Damascus’ political message.
Preference for Al-Jazeera was not universal, and it did attract some criticism. Ibrahim, the Alawi from 
Lattakia, for example, said that he preferred al-Arabiyya’s less confrontational style to al-Jazeera’s 
more direct approach. Ghazlan, the exacerbated Sunni from Aleppo, had a more political attitude:
“I am not like most people you will talk to in Syria. I do not like this axis of Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas. So I do not 
like al-Jazeera as they seem to represent this viewpoint only. I know that al-Arabiyya has the agenda of Saudi Arabia, but I 
agree with this so I watch it.”
More cynically, Khalil, the elderly Damascene Christian dismissed both channels saying, “I don’t watch 
either al-Jazeera or al-Arabiyya as they are controlled by Qatar and Saudi and so they tell you only 
what their governments want you to hear.” Alongside those who actively liked or disliked al-Jazeera 
were a sizeable number (8), who actively consumed several news outlets at once, and had no 
preference. Mazen, the businessman from Aleppo said he, “followed the story, not the channel,” and 
would switch channels regularly. Similarly Mazer, the student from Damascus said he, “Likes to jump 
between channels: al-Jazeera, al-Arabiyya, al-Hurra, BBC - 1 have no preferred channel.” Like many 
interviewed, Mazer only considered Arabic language channels for his news, despite the availability of 
English, French and German language alternatives -  illustrating the significant grip on discourse that 
these major networks have.
What becomes evident is that Syrian viewers are well aware of the different biases present in the news 
that they consume. For the same reason that many choose not to watch state TV, viewers make a 
conscious decision to follow a satellite news channel that follows their political opinions or what they 
regard as ‘the truth’. The interviews suggest that al-Jazeera is indeed the most popular news outlet and 
warrants a greater level of analysis. However, they also suggest that viewers are far from fixed on a 
single channel and obtain their news from several sources. This warns against the attitude of authors 
such as Miles and Rinnawi who focus solely on the Qatar-based channel as clearly the body of opinion 
making up ‘the Arab street’ is informed from other sources as well.
Musalsals
As the emerging centre of the Arab world’s drama (musalsal) industry it was perhaps unsurprising that 
most Syrians expressed enthusiasm for this genre. Many interviewees used the phrase ‘of course’ when
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asked if they watched musalsals, particularly women who proved the most avid fans.693 The extent to 
which watching drama is considered banal, normal or even expected in Syrian society was 
demonstrated when several respondents explained that though they were not regular viewers, even they 
would tune in for the new series aired during Ramadan.694 The popularity of the genre was considerable 
but not universal. Several respondents considered the dramas to be silly and pointless.695 Mahmoud, the 
student from Aleppo, for example, said, “I don’t ever watch musalsals as I don’t want to waste my 
time.” Notably, whilst men and women showed enthusiasm for musalsals all the critics were male.
Respondents who did watch drama series tended to prefer Syrian series to rivals from Egypt or Turkey, 
whose shows are translated into Arabic. The reasons given were normally about their quality or the 
degree of sympathy interviewees felt for the stories. Several claimed that familiarity was the key to 
success.696 Hassana, the Sunni cleaner form Aleppo said, “I prefer Syrian to Egyptian dramas as they 
are closer to our real life.” Other respondents said it was the quality of storylines and acting.697 The 
interviews only produced one case of outright hostility to Syrian musalsals, again from Ghazlan, who 
tied his opposition to the government to his opposition to drama series:
‘The musalsals present a view of Syria that is the ideal and not a true reflection of our society. Syrians are cheap and 
competitive with each other, yet this is not shown. The Egyptian shows are much better -  they are realistic of what society is 
like.”
Yet this was a minority opinion, and the overwhelming majority of respondents not only preferred the 
Syrian dramas, but also took national pride at their success. Even those who did not watch them were 
nationalistic about their fame. One notable feature of interviews was the frequent competition with
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Egypt. As Wissam, an Alawi farming student from Lattakia states, “I take much pride of course that 
Syria has the best musalsals. We like to stick it to Egypt!”
Curiously, there was not the same level of competitiveness with Turkish musalsals as with Egyptian 
ones, despite the former’s recent encroachment on the Syrian market.699 This seems to support the 
hypothesis voiced in Chapter five that it is to the Arab arena, not the regional that Syrians look to for 
competition. There was, however, less of a sense amongst respondents that musalsals were bringing
693 Interviews with Hassana (2/7/09), Roba (9/7/09) and Marlene (27/6/09).
694 Interviews with Reem (18/7/09) and Ibrahim (20/7/09).
695 Interviews with Mahmoud (1/7/09), Mazer (4/7/09), Abu Jamil (22/1/09), Ghazlan (20/7/09).
696 Interviews with Hassana (2/7/09), Reem (18/7/09), Umm Ghadeer (19/7/09), Ibrahim (20/7/09), Sana (29/6/09).
697 Interviews with Roba (9/7/09) and Mohammad (15/7/09).
698 Interviews with Maen (28/6/09), Karim (9/7/09), Amal (9/7/09), Mohammad (15/7/09), Wissam (16/7/09) and Hajj 
Khaled (16/7/09).
699 Interviews with Marlene (27/6/09) and Hajj Khaled (16/7/09).
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Arabs any closer together than before, although one interviewee, Mohammad from Lattakia, did raise 
this possibility:
“I take much pride that Syria has the most popular musalsals. Last year some friends of my uncle came to visit from 
Morocco. We found it hard to communicate because their Arabic is so different. But then the wives started to talk about how 
much they loved Syrian musalsals and we talked about that. I was very proud that they watch Syrian shows.”
It must be said that a few respondents did voice their indifference about the origin of the musalsals, 
stating they took no great national pride from the Syrian successes in the field.700 Hisham, the 
Damascene shopkeeper, for example stated, “The message of the musalsal is more important than 
where it was made...I would like this wherever it was from, Syria or not.” Such an opinion seems to be 
the minority though.
One of the Syrian musalsals discussed in Chapter five provoked interesting responses amongst 
interviewees. Bab al-Hara, which was one of the most popular shows in the Arab world at the time of 
research did indeed prove to be watched often by Syrian interviewees. Young men in particular where 
avid fans, with the reasons given for its popularity centered on nostalgia.701 Young men like Karim in 
Suweida beamed about how the series, “...is about a better time. A time when we were strong and 
society was closer together. Not so individualistic like now.” Yet just as unexpected were the few 
opponents of the show, who complained that it set a bad, reactionary role model for society. As Bassel, 
the Aleppan dentist complained, “We live in the 21st century, but people are obsessed by a show stuck 
in the past. Some people watch the show and want to recreate the old way of life. Its stupid.”
In general, the interviews suggested that musalsals are widely watched in Syrian society, but views 
about them are far from uniform. Whilst the majority enjoyed their stories and recreations of older 
societies, taking national pride in Syria’s success, several others view them as silly or even reactionary 
and counter-productive. Avid fans tended more to be women, whilst critics were largely men. Generally 
though, Syria’s musalsals did boost national pride, though specifically within the Arab arena.
Other entertainment
Whilst news and musalsals proved the most popular forms of television amongst Syrians interviewed, 
an unexpected discovery was that western entertainment shows were more popular than other Arabic 
entertainment. Western movies and dramas broadcast on transnational channels like MBC and Dubai 
One drew much praise from several respondents. Some, such as Reem from Lattakia, even said they
700 Interviews with Hisham (5/7/09), Reem (18/7/09) and Amal (9/7/09).
701 Interviews with Mohammad (15/7/09), Karim (9/7/09), Hisham (5/7/09).
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preferred western shows. “I do sometimes watch Arabic shows,” she said, “but I prefer to watch 
relaxing shows, like the western shows on MBC4 and MBC2, like Opera and Dr. Phil.” Similarly, 
Western movies proved more popular to viewers than Arabic movies. This was surprisingly even 
amongst poorer, non-English speaking viewers, who presumably watch the subtitled American movies. 
It should be noted that these American movies and dramas are presented by the Gulf owners of 
channels such as MBC as ‘the acceptable face of the West’. They are heavily edited to remove 
references to sex or pre-marital relationships, though ironically retain many violent themes. One such 
poorer interviewee was Hisham from Damascus who said, “Western movies have action and are well 
made, whilst Arabic movies are cheap and comedic.” In general it seemed with movies Syrians 
exercised the reverse of their views of musalsals: Western productions were considered superior to 
Arab.
That said, alongside popular western entertainment shows, Arab shows remained popular. Several 
respondents commented how they regularly watched sport, reality TV and music TV.702 Interestingly, 
no respondents said that they watched religious TV.
6.5.2 Transnational Television in Jordan
News
As in Syria, the vast majority of Jordanian respondents listed news as something they watched on TV, 
though marginally fewer said it was something they mostly watched.703 Jordanians’ news-watching 
habits are very close to Syria’s. Al-Jazeera actually proved more popular in Jordan than in Syria with 
over half the respondents specifically identifying it as their preferred channel. As in Syria these viewers 
saw al-Jazeera as, ‘more truthful,’ than its rivals.704 As in Syria, these viewers specifically criticized al- 
Arabiyya as part of their praise for the Qatar-based channel. As Ruwan, the Palestinian-originated 
medical student from Amman states:
“Al-Jazeera is up to date and tells the truth without restrictions. All Jordanians feel like this and prefer al-Jazeera. Al- 
Arabiyya will tell you the news 10 hours after something has happened -  and it will be wrong!”
Again, the issue of perceived ‘truthfulness’ and the level of bias on each station is a major issue in 
Jordan. Viewers are aware of Qatar’s control, but seem to see it as more benign than Saudi Arabia’s
702 Interviews with Hajj Khaled (16/7/09), Ibrahim (20/7/09), Mohammad (15/7/09), Wissam (16/7/09), Karim (9/7/09), 
Amal (9/7/09), Bassel (30/6/09), Sana (29/6/09) and Maen (28/6/09).
703 1 5 out of 22 Jordanian respondents said they watched news on TV; 10 out of 22 said they mostly watched news on 
TV, whilst 16 out of 29 in Syria said they mostly watched news.
704 Interviews with Sandi (17/10/09), Abu Mohammad (27/10/09), Ruwan (12/10/09) and Suleiman (14/10/09).
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similar influence over al-Arabiyya. Moussa Haddad, Madaba’s aging Christian shopkeeper explains this 
attitude:
“I prefer al-Jazeera. It is owned by the Prince of Qatar and he gives them the freedom to say whatever they like. There is 
freedom on al-Arabiyya as well, but not so much. I would say al-Arabiyya is 90% free but al-Jazeera is 100%.”
Whilst support for al-Jazeera is not universal, for a society that generally accepts free speech and 
criticism more, the Jordanians interviewed were less critical of the channel than the Syrians. Criticism 
was less cutting and more nuanced, such as Bassam, the Amman-based hotelier who said, “I don’t 
watch al-Jazeera or al-Arabiyya. It is not that they are bad but they always talk too much. Too much 
talking for so little is not good for you.” Only two others expressed any real criticism of the channel and 
it was similarly restrained.705 Moreover, though there were a few respondents who watched several 
news channels rather than specifying one, the number was fewer than in Syria.706
In general Jordanian respondents had less complex news viewing habits than Syrians. Most watched the 
news though a minority, larger than in Syria and curiously mostly under-30, proved more apathetic to 
current events. Those who did watch the news showed an overwhelming preference for al-Jazeera, an 
even larger proportion than in Syria, and any criticism of it was more subtle. This is interesting for two 
reasons. Firstly, the high popularity of al-Jazeera in Jordan seems to support the findings of both 
Rinnawi and Miles who used the state as their sample when commenting on the impact of the channel 
on the Arab world. However, the slightly varied results in Syria perhaps suggest their conclusions 
should be tested elsewhere before making generalizations. Secondly, the fact that Jordanians prefer the 
channel even more than Syrians, and reject al-Arabiyya even more asks questions about the success 
with which a ‘government line’ of politics is disseminated in Jordan.
Musalsals
“Here we don’t have time to watch TV, we have to work. This is a camp, they are simple people. They care about money, 
food and sleep, not what is on TV. You should talk to women: they sit around all day just watching TV.” Hussein, Wahdai 
Palestinian camp, Amman, Jordan
The attitudes to musalsals in Jordan also reflect what was seen in Syria, perhaps suggesting that this 
pattern is common in the wider Arab world. Again, the majority of viewers expressed enthusiasm about
705 Interviews with Mohammad (2/11/09) and Suleiman (14/10/09).
706 Interviews with Bassam (11/10/09), Moussa Haddad (17/10/09) and Mohammad (2/11/09).
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musalsals, particularly women, but also young men.707 The habitual watching of musalsals in Ramadan 
was widespread, even amongst Christians. As Sandi the Christian shop worker in Madaba states,
“Christian families all like the new musalsals during Ramadan. It makes no difference that it’s a Muslim holiday, we still 
gather as a family each night at home to watch them.”
As in Syria, those who criticized the drama series tended to be men. One, Raca, echoed the critics in 
Syria, by saying. “The dramas are silly, the comedy is stupid. Some fat guy falls over. It’s all just 
physical. You cannot compare it to the quality American dramas.” Interestingly two respondents 
criticised the musalsals on religious grounds. One said he felt Ramadan should be spent praying and 
reading the Quran rather than watching TV.708 Another, Fawzi, said he worried about some content:
“I don’t like some of the modem musalsals that go against religion. That’s not to say I only like religious shows, I just don’t 
like those that promote a lifestyle that is against Islam.”
Jordan has a comparatively weak drama industry, so respondents’ choice of drama series, unaffected by 
a sense of nationalism, proved interesting. As in Syria, most preferred Syrian shows, though a large 
group also liked the Turkish shows. Reasons given for the popularity of Syrian shows were akin to 
those found north of the border: the familiarity of the subject, the quality of writing and humour and, 
interestingly, the similarity between Syrian and Jordanian life. As Ruwan the medical student stated;
“I really like the modem shows, not the history shows. I especially like Syrian shows. Egyptian dramas are too dramatic, 
whereas Syrian shows make you feel like they are showing your life. It is so real.”
Bab al-Hara proved particularly popular, as found in Syria, with even cynics who generally didn’t like 
musalsals saying they liked the show.709 As Suleiman, the Palestinian shopkeeper stated, “I don’t really 
like musalsals, except for Bab al-Harra which is great.” Unlike in Syria there was no criticism of the 
series’ reactionary nature. This might suggest an even more nostalgic society in Jordan or, more likely, 
less ownership of the programme -  as it was made abroad -  and hence less shame that it was made.
Jordanians interviewed conformed with Syrian preferences when it came to musalsals. They too were 
largely avid viewers, with women and young men again most enthusiastic, and all the critics being 
male. Though more Jordanians said they enjoyed Turkish shows than Syrian interviewees, the most 
popular shows were again the Syrian musalsals. Moreover, the fact that many said they identified with
707 Interviews with Mohammad Suker (25/10/09), Ruwan (12/10/09), Soussa (25/10/09) and Shereen (25/10/09).
708 Interview with Suleiman (14/10/09).
709 Interviews with Raca (11/10/09) and Suleiman (14/10/09).
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the familiarity of the Syrian life seems to support the claim that, at least in some regard, the 
proliferation of transnational satellite television is able to bring viewers in Arab states closer.
Other Entertainment
Again, in other forms of entertainment, trends identified in Syria were repeated in Jordan. Firstly, the 
popularity of western programming which, after news and musalsals, proved the third most popular 
programme genre. The preference for American movies to Arabic ones was repeated amongst 
Jordanians. As Sandi, the Madaban Christian stated, “I mostly watch American movies on MBC. I 
watch some Arabic movies too, but the American ones are better.” This preference was particularly 
seen amongst younger viewers, who perhaps have been brought up in a more western-dominated 
environment than their parents. That said, there were a few respondents who like Arabic movies. One, 
Abdullah from Zarqa, even said he ‘only’ watched Arabic movies on TV, plus some musalsals. It 
should be noted that respondents who said they preferred Arabic movies to western tended to be poorer, 
and non-English speaking.
Curiously, interviews in Jordan did reveal one fan of religious television. Mohammad Zarqawi from 
Zarqa said, “I really like Islamic programming. I regularly watch al-Risalla and Irqa.” However, he 
was the only respondent in either Syria or Jordan, out of 51 in total, who even mentioned the Islamic 
channels. This supports the idea proposed in chapter five that, as a genre, it remains widely unpopular. 
Of other genres, sport proved particularly popular, especially among young men.710 Reality TV, music 
and documentaries were also watched, though with less frequency than American movies and sport. 
The general impression was that Jordanians had slightly more western preferences in entertainment than 
Syria.
710 Interviews with Mohammad Zarqawi (10/11/09), Tarek (25/10/09), Mohammad Suker (25/10/09), Moussa Haddad 
(17/10/09), Ayman, Khaled and Hussein (together 15/10/09).
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6.6 Conclusion
The ethnographic interviews conducted in Syria and Jordan seem to suggest a broad agreement with the 
overall hypothesis of this study that public mediations successfully reproduce identities in these states 
in both a banal and overt manner. That said, it is notable that several surprising results were also 
observed.
With regards to identity in general, Jordanians interviewed tended to feel Arab, but more as a solidly 
secondary identity, whilst more Syrians saw it as their primary identity. This reflected the position 
given to Arab identity in both official discourses -  more obviously a secondary identity in Jordan and 
more ambiguous in Syria. In both sates what ‘being Arab’ meant was open to interpretation: for some it 
remained the nationalism of Old Arabism, for others it was clearly supra-nationalism. This suggested 
some engagement with the official discourse: most accepted the aspect of the discourse which said they 
were Arab, but had differing opinions on what that meant.
Attachment to state identity was found in all Syrian respondents and all bar four Jordanian respondents. 
The Jordanian case presented a paradox: more people saw themselves as ‘Jordanian first’ than in Syria, 
reflecting the desired identity discourse, yet more in Jordan totally rejected the discourse than in Syria. 
This might illustrate the limitations of such overt nation-building in the face of other powerful 
discourses, such as Palestinian nationalism. Interestingly Jordanian identity seemed strongest amongst 
younger respondents, perhaps indicating a degree of success with Abdullah’s ‘Jordan First’ approach 
with those too young to remember otherwise. Conversely, Syria’s broader discourse that seemingly 
does not demand citizens choose any primary identity, seemed more successful and perhaps reflected 
better the multi-layered nature of identity in the Middle East. That said, the different attitudes to identity 
from Syria’s different ethnic and sectarian groups also illustrate the limitations of its ability to nation- 
build. Druze, Christians and Alawis felt most Arab whilst Sunnis felt most religious. The noticeable 
difference between these groups shows the limited success in creating a uniform national community 
who feel the same level of identity irrespective of ethnic or sectarian origin.
With regard to the images and speeches within leadership cults, both sets of respondents confirmed the 
hypothesis that the majority regard such overt displays of identity reproduction as everyday and normal. 
In Syria, whilst the majority of respondents see, or do not see, the cult and the posters as an unwaved, 
unnoticed, ‘normal’ reminder of their nationality, there remained a sizeable minority for whom it is an 
active, overt, waved reminder with which their regularly interact. There was some cynicism, all from 
the middle classes, but it was aimed at the notion of a cult not the president himself. In Jordan there was
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even more banality than in Syria and only one respondent actively interacted. What opposition there 
was, however, was focused on the king himself unlike in Syria. In both cases, the level of normalization 
of the images of the cult suggests that the identity discourse regularly flagged is consumed 
unknowingly by most citizens.
Syrians are neither brainwashed by state TV nor do they outright reject it. News is widely questioned, 
yet entertainment like musalsals watched avidly. Jordanians do not watch state TV as much as Syrians, 
especially not amongst the younger generation. On the one hand, neither Syria nor Jordan have been 
able to produce a passive population that uncritically consume everything they watch. On the other 
hand, the willingness to watch state television for popular shows like musalsals and an unawareness of 
the banal identities they and the linking segments between them flag suggests that state television can 
have a limited impact on reproducing identity.
Finally, in the area of satellite television, the popularity of al-Jazeera in both states justifies its 
widespread analysis, but the desire to look at several news sources questions Rinnawi and Miles’ 
tendency to only look at the Qatar-based channel to understand the ‘Arab street’. In Syria, viewers 
consciously chose which news channel to watch around their political views. For most this is al- 
Jazeera, but many seek alternative news sources. Musalsals were widely watched but reception is 
varied. In general they boost national pride, though the glorifications of the past tend to irk some as 
reactionary. Surprisingly, despite a more Arabist mentality, western shows are highly popular. Whilst 
this shows a diversity of choice, it must be remembered that these shows are the sanitized, censored 
versions allowed by Gulf producers. Moreover, the popularity of western shows does not question a 
viewer’s engagement with the national or supra-national discourses: the popularity of American shows 
in UK does not make people feel less British, for example.
In Jordan, the popularity of al-Jazeera seems even higher than in Syria, perhaps suggesting that a 
majority disapprove of their government’s pro-western line on foreign policy. In this sense they might 
be seen to challenge a part of the official discourse -  though it must be said that Jordanian official 
identity, whilst perhaps fitted around its choice to ally with the west, does not indicate that being 
Jordanian requires a pro-western sympathy. As in Syria, musalsals were highly popular and the sense of 
familiarity with Syria felt by viewers after watching them suggests their popularity enhances the 
supranational Arab discourse.
All these results seem to support this thesis’ central hypothesis. It is through the everyday, unnoticed 
reproduction of identity in Syria and Jordan, through both the public mediations officially and the new
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supranational New Arabism discourse promoted by transnational satellite television that has sustained a 
strong supranational Arab identity despite the failure of Old Arabism. At the same time, state identity is 
gradually strengthened in the same manner and has evolved into a nationalism, subscribed to by the 
majority, though not all, which encompasses, not opposes, Arab supra-national identity.
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Conclusion
The thesis posed three critical questions why it was that Arabs in Syria and Jordan maintain a sense of 
Arab identity. It firstly asked what Arabism means in the contemporary Middle East. Chapter 1 
unpicked the various debates and engaged with nationalist theory to illustrate that today’s Arabism 
differs considerably from the fusionist Arab nationalism of Nasser and al-Husri. Unlike this earlier ‘Old 
Arabism’, which can be seen as a failed nationalism, today’s ‘New Arabism’ is a supra-nationalism that 
operates alongside and in support of individual Arab state nationalism. Chapter four’s analysis of 
Jordanian and Syrian television demonstrated the subordinate position given to Arab identity within the 
daily discourses experienced by viewers in these two case study states. Simple mechanisms, such as the 
organisation of news items or the countries displayed on weather bulletin maps clearly flagged to 
citizens that their priorities should be firstly to the state, but that they should pay greater interest to the 
Arab world than to either the wider Muslim or non-Arab world. This confirmed what had been explored 
in chapter three that this supra-national Arabism was not a ‘new’ phenomenon but had formed a key 
pillar of the identity discourses of Syria and Jordan since the 1970s.
Chapter five revealed that the satellite television stations that many commentators claim are reviving an 
Arabism that challenges state nationalism actually further entrench the state system and an Arabism that 
is supra-national. Satellite television owners are almost all linked to state governments and, given the 
unprofitability of these supposedly commercial enterprises, stations such as al-Jazeera and al-Arabiyya 
primarily function to promote their backers’ interests rather than any political Arab nationalism. 
Promoting an Arab supra-national identity that does not harm the status quo is in owners’ interests 
though, as it boosts viewing figures and their ability to project influence. This status-quo orientated 
Arabism is seen in the promotion of Islam on satellite television. Contrary to commentators such as 
Pintak who see Islamism and Arabism converging on satellite TV, Islam is largely given cultural rather 
than political space and the Islamists allowed usually do not threaten the status quo. Content of satellite 
television analysed in chapter five was shown simultaneously to promote state and Arab identities, even 
seemingly apolitical entertainment shows. Shows like Superstar and Al-Jazeera’' s coverage of the 2008 
Olympics showed this duality: viewers were addressed as a common Arab audience whilst at the same 
time encouraged to be nationalistic towards their state within a given ‘Arab arena’ of states with whom 
they should primarily compete. The Arabism found today in both official state discourses and satellite 
television was thus shown to be a supra-nationalism not nationalism.
The second question asked why the Syrian and Jordanian governments continued to promote Arab 
identity and how it interacted with state nationalism. Chapter three illustrated how both Hafez al-Assad
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in Syria and King Hussein in Jordan deliberately built an ambiguous identity discourse. In Syria the 
layer of supra-national Arabism was seemingly given an equal footing with Greater Syrian and Syrian 
state nationalism, with Islam only occasionally drawn upon and often deliberately sidelined. Under 
Hafez’s son and heir, Bashar, the identity discourse has shifted slightly, with Greater Syrian identity 
lessened, but Arabism remaining prominent. Though foreign policy concerns have prompted a stronger 
emphasis on Syrian state nationalism, manifested in the growth of Syrian flags and images of Bashar 
displayed after 2005, an analysis of Bashar’s speeches and Syrian television discussed in chapter four 
shows that Arabism remains a prominent pillar of Syria’s identity discourse. In Jordan Hussein built a 
specific form of ‘Hashemite Arabism’ which presented him as the heir to the Arab revolt rather than 
Assad’s more Nasserist anti-imperialist Arabism. This allowed Hussein to maintain strong ties with the 
‘imperialist’ West without contradicting his Arabist discourse. Like Hafez, Hussein promoted a multi­
layered or ‘fuzzy’ nationalism that included a religious and a Jordanian element. Under his son 
Abdullah, this multi-layered discourse has continued though the new King has more clearly promoted 
Jordanian state nationalism above the other identities through his ‘Jordan first’ campaign.
As suggested in chapter one, the continuation of Arab identity in the discourses of Syria and Jordan is 
both instrumental and habitual. Whilst ethno-symbolist theories of the pre-modem roots of Arab 
identity were shown to be spurious, the habitual nature of identity reproduction is an important factor to 
be considered. Having spent several decades successfully promoting Arab identity it would be difficult 
to consciously ‘de-Arabise’ a population. Not only do many of the elites themselves, who have been 
exposed to this discourse, feel Arab and would not be inclined to do so, the recent growth of satellite 
television, outlined in chapter five, now offers a highly popular second source of supra-national Arabist 
discourse making it even harder to discard. That said the instrumental reasons for maintaining a layer of 
Arab identity in Jordan and Syria make any departure unlikely. Affinity between its population and 
Palestinians, Lebanese and Iraqis allows the Syrian government to use Arabism to legitimise its 
dictatorial mle, offering safety from Israel and a stability not seen in neighbouring states. A similar 
affinity allows Jordan’s government to present itself as ‘the best of a bad bunch’ and justify its own 
more benign dictatorship through Arabism. The Syrian and Jordanian regimes thus maintain an Arab 
identity that is subordinate to state nationalism but that remains a key aspect of their official discourse 
for reasons that are both habitual and instrumental.
The final question asked about the processes and mechanisms by which Arabism and state nationalism 
are produced and reproduced. Chapter two developed Michael Billig’s idea of Banal Nationalism 
beyond the limited western democratic national societies outlined in his 1995 book to illustrate how it 
can also explain the reproduction of supra-national Arabism in the dictatorships of Syria and Jordan. It
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was suggested that not only were Billig’s ‘unwaved’ flags present in Syria and Jordan, but also that the 
‘waved’, overt forms of identity building such as leadership cults that seem blatant propaganda to 
outsiders are now as normal and banal to locals as an unwaved stars and stripes in the USA. Chapters 
three and four then examined public meditations regularly experienced in Syria and Jordan in which the 
multi-layered identities described in chapter three were both banally and overtly flagged. The use of 
television in particular to build what Salamantra calls, ‘national cultural construction’ was notable, as 
was die fact that it was Jordan, perceived as less authoritarian than Syria, which had the most overt 
attempts at nation-building propaganda. Moreover, the discourse of new satellite television stations was 
shown to flag an Arabism that was supra-national and subordinate to state nationalism.
The interviews conducted in chapter six suggested that most viewers did indeed consider these often- 
overt attempts at identity building ‘normal’ and ‘everyday’. Whilst lacking the scientific rigour of 
quantitative surveys, these ethnographic interviews added anew layer to Billig’s methodology: offering 
depth and flavour of what public reaction might be to the identities flagged to them in daily discourse. 
What was evident was that most interviewed were sceptical about many of the mediations they 
consumed, but simultaneously seemed to accept the identities they flagged. Many Syrians accepted that 
Syrian television was propaganda, for example, yet most conformed to the identity discourse it flagged. 
Jordanians too were not positive about the propaganda shown on Jordan TV, yet saw nothing wrong 
with the large cult around King Abdullah II which most regarded as ‘normal’. Interestingly most 
Syrians and Jordanians were huge fans of satellite television and though a few recognised the way some 
channels framed their coverage around a political message, most accepted the discourse more 
unquestioningly than those on state television. Not unrelated to this, as suspected, almost all 
respondents felt a layer of Arab identity. Curiously though, respondents’ understanding of the meaning 
of their Arab identity tended to reflect the place of Arab identity in their state's official discourse rather 
than that of their preferred satellite station: firmly a secondary identity in Jordan, more ambiguous in 
Syria. An adaptation of Michael Billig’s notion of Banal nationalism, that identity is reproduced and 
sustained through the unnoticed daily habits of public mediations, thus serves to explain the processes 
of identity reproduction in contemporary Syria and Jordan.
These three conclusions seem to confirm this thesis’ original hypothesis that Syrians and Jordanians 
retain a strong sense of Arab identity because supra-nationalist Arabism remains a central component of 
each state’s nationalist discourse. That layer of identity is now strengthened alongside state nationalism 
by the daily Arabist discourse of transnational satellite television. This thesis has shown that an 
‘Everyday Arabism’ is at work in Syria and Jordan normalising state nationalism and sustaining Arab 
identity in both a banal and overt manner.
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Further Research
Locating Arabism today as a supra-nationalism embedded in the daily habits and structures of two Arab 
states and transnational satellite television stations is important both to the study of nationalism and 
international relations in the Middle East, and for the further questions it raises about identity and Arab 
politics. Illustrating how Billig’s theories and methodology can be adapted and expanded in order to 
explain today’s Arabism contributes to the growing academic study of everyday nationalism. Aside 
from the content of this thesis, which offers material for the growing body of literature on everyday 
nationalism, this dissertation offers new methodological and theoretical avenues to explore. 
Methodologically, the successful analysis of television content in the experiments of chapters four and 
five opens new doors for the study of the banal nationalist content of media in developing countries. 
Billig’s model of investigating only newspapers was replicated by subsequent investigators of Turkish, 
Catalan, Scottish and British everyday nationalism. Hopefully this thesis’ model for surveying the banal 
nationalist content of television, which is far more accessible than newspapers in semi-literate societies, 
can be replicated in areas previously considered unsuitable. Similarly, adding ethnographic interviews 
to gain a sample of how a society might actually engage with nationalist discourses, whilst not 
scientifically rigorous, adds greater depth and another layer to this investigation which one hopes will 
be replicated by nationalist scholars elsewhere.
Theoretically, by demonstrating that Billig’s theories can be liberated from the western, democratic and 
national box that he placed them in opens the way for further investigation. Having shown that a supra­
national identity can be flagged and sustained banally one would expect investigations into further non­
national ties to provide similar results. Cram’s work on ‘banal Europeanism’ has already led the way on 
this, and a similar study of ‘Latin Americanism’ or ‘Banal Africanism’ would prove interesting.711 A 
more relevant further study to this investigation would be to investigate the banal reproduction of 
religious identity, particularly Islam in the Middle East given its political potency. The position given to 
Islam in the official discourses of Syria and Jordan, discussed in chapters three and four, and the 
controlled cultural space given to Islam on satellite television, mentioned in chapter five, surely plays a 
role in sustaining and reproducing Islamic identity. A public mediation awaiting investigation are the 
speeches made at mosques every Friday, the khotbas.712 Such an investigation would offer a further 
dimension to the study of Arab and state identity, by assessing how much nationalist and supra- 
nationalist content was found, but might also shed some light on to how Islamic identity is reproduced.
711 Cram, ‘Imagining the union’ in Wallace, Whose Europe?
712 Gaffney, The Prophet’s Pulpit.
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The thesis, I hope, contributes to the study of politics and society in Syria and Jordan, two countries in 
the Middle East that receive limited academic attention. Whilst previous authors on Syria and Jordan 
have examined Hafez al-Assad and King Hussein’s role in building identity discourses in Syria and 
Jordan, this is one of the few works to discuss how these discourses have been adapted and continued 
under Bashar and Abdullah. Two contributions in particular are worth noting. Firstly, the thesis 
engaged Bashar’s Syria and Abdullah’s Jordan with nationalist theory, which until now has been done 
minimally. Secondly, the detailed television experiment of chapter four offers unique depth into the 
nation building content of Syria and Jordan’s media, analysis of which has largely been restricted in the 
past to newspapers and literature.
These contributions lead the way for further investigations into identity in Syria and Jordan. As well as 
the study of religion discussed above, many questions arise about sub-state identities. It was suggested 
in chapter six, for example, that ethnicity and sect had a substantial impact on respondents’ engagement 
with national and supra-national identity discourses. In Syria, whether someone was Druze, Kurdish, 
Christian, Sunni or Alawi seemed to affect how they felt about their Syrian and Arab identities. In 
Jordan, whether someone was of Palestinian or Transjordanian origin, or was Muslim or Christian, 
similarly seemed to affect how they conceived of their Jordanian and Arab identities. A further 
examination of how these sub-state identities are constructed and reproduced, sometimes in opposition 
to the official discourse, warrants further study. Further questions also emerge concerning the political 
structure of Syria and Jordan. As discussed in chapter three, both the Syrian and Jordanian 
governments strive to place the leaders -  Hafez, Hussein, Bashar and Abdullah -  at the very centre of 
the nationalist discourses. The obvious question then is, what happens to the discourse if these leaders 
fall from power? Casting an eye around the Arab world it seems there are two models. In states where 
strong man replaced strong man, as in Egypt in 1981 and Tunisia in 1987, the new dictator appeared 
able to adapt the nationalist discourse of old, simply replacing their predecessor at the centre of a 
similar discourse. However, in cases where a strong man was replaced by pluralist politics, as in post- 
Saddam Iraq or civil war Algeria, the fall of the dictator and his discourse prompted an often violent 
debate about the very meaning of national identity in these states. Popular rejection of a change to 
Iraq’s flag after 2003, away from the ‘Arab’ colours, is one clear example of this. More investigation is 
therefore needed into the link between authoritarian government and the building of national identity. 
Indeed, the survival of Algeria and Iraq, just, as complete political units might suggest a limited success 
of identity building under dictatorship.
With regard to the study of Arabism, this study has added to the growing debate on the impact of 
satellite television on Arab identity. It has suggested that, far from undermining state identity, the
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discourse of al-Jazeera and its rivals largely serves the supra-nationalist position given to Arab identity 
within official state nationalism. The obvious question to pose is, having shown this is the case in Syria 
and Jordan, would we see a similar result in other Arab states? On the one hand, Syria and Jordan prove 
useful case studies to make wider generalisations about other Arab states because they are so 
ideologically different. The Arabism seen in Syria’s anti-western republic might be replicated in 
Gaddafi’s Libya, Saleh’s Yemen, Saddam’s Iraq and Algeria. Similarly, the softer Arabism seen in 
Jordan’s pro-Western monarchy might be repeated in Morocco, Oman, Kuwait, and the Gulf 
monarchies. What would be interesting would be to assess how Arabism is used differently by different 
regimes and for what reasons. Hussein’s Hashemite Arabism was quite different to Hafez’s more 
Ba’athist Arabism in order to fit around the specific circumstances of their international alliances and 
domestic constituency, and the same differences continue under their sons. Would we expect a similar 
uniqueness to the Arabism of Sadat, Mubarak or Saddam? This expected variation might highlight 
another aspect of Arabism in today’s Middle Eastern states: its ideological vacuousness. When politics 
in the Arab world now seems to centre entirely on leaders and individuals rather than parties and 
ideology, it is not surprising that Arabism is instrumental to power rather than a consistent principle.
Certainly there is space to extend the experiments of this thesis into other Arab states to test if the same 
results are seen. Of particular interest would be Morocco, Egypt and Oman, which can claim far older 
roots as states and might see a different state/Arab balance within their national identity discourses. 
Equally interesting would be regimes that place Islam at the centre of their national discourse, such as 
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies. Might Arab identity be less important when a state’s 
population is more religiously homogeneous? How would this feed into the ethno-symbolist/modemist 
debate amongst nationalist scholars? Further questions arise about the relationship between geography 
and Arabism. Do states at the centre of the Arab world, such as Syria and Jordan, appear more Arabist 
than those on the periphery such as Sudan and Morocco? Another question would be about the 
relationship between Arabism and stability. Both Iraq and Lebanon have experienced questions about 
their Arab identity whilst undergoing civil wars and periods of domestic instability. The results of 
chapter six would suggest that no similar doubts would emerge in Syria and Jordan were they to suffer a 
similar fate, but circumstances can change. Can the place of Arabism in a discourse thus be seen as a 
sign of stability or merely a reflection of authoritarian politics?
Finally, this study offers something to the ongoing debate amongst international relations theorists. The 
thesis adds to realist accounts of international relations by illustrating how everyday nationalism is used 
instrumentally by elites to further their regime and state interests. At the same time it contributes to 
constructivist accounts by illustrating how everyday reproduction serves to constitute national and
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supra-national identity. It further continues some of Barnett’s themes by suggesting that the growth of 
satellite media has the potential to encourage renewed competition between states. This is currently 
being seen with states launching their own satellite channels to counter seemingly negative press. The 
fact that Saudi Arabian elites felt the need to launch al-Arabiyya to combat Qatar’s al-Jazeera echoes 
earlier competition between Nasser’s Egypt and other states over the norms of Arabism. This thesis’ 
account of ‘Everyday Arabism’ thus opens the door to question whether the age of satellite television 
invites a new competition for the norms of a supra-nationalism that are still being formed.
Final Thoughts
Commentators such as Fouad Ajami once argued that the defeat of Nasser’s Arab nationalism would 
mean that Arabism would fade away as separate Arab state identities rose in prominence and 
legitimacy. This thesis has demonstrated the contrary: that it is the states themselves who have 
embedded Arab identity within their own national discourses. Far from fading away Arabism has 
evolved into a supra-nationalism that is habitually reproduced daily alongside and subordinate to state 
nationalisms. Moreover, the recent growth of pan-Arab satellite television is now boosting that Arab 
supra-nationalism, perhaps meaning that national governments would struggle to ‘de-Arabise’ their 
discourses even if they wanted to. Therefore, just as Arabs are unlikely to forget that they are Arab 
anytime soon, we should not forget that they are Arab either. Whilst other identities in the multi-layered 
Middle East have correctly been identified as important, notably state and religious ties, Arabism is 
often neglected as a hangover from the past. This thesis has shown that in Syria and Jordan and, one 
would expect, the wider Arab world, Arabism remains salient. Whilst it would impossible for policy 
makers to deal with the Arab world as a single actor, governments must understand that their actions in 
Iraq, Palestine and Egypt will affect their perception in Morocco, Tunisia and Lebanon. I do hope that 
this thesis has contributed to our understanding of why this is.
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Appendix I: Images o f the leader in Syria and Jordan
A. ‘Yes for the beating heart o f  Arabism’, Damascus 2009;
B. ‘Syria: God is her protector, Assad is her Shepherd’, Damascus 2009
C .‘The eye doctor in the eyes,’ Aleppo 2009; D. Guild o f  Trade and Industry o f  Lattakia, Lattakia 2009
G. Hashemite dynasty, Zarqa 2009; H. Abdullah in Football shirt, Amman 2009
E. Pharmacy sign, Lattakia 2009; F. Amman airport, Amman 2009
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I. Abdullah, Zarqa 2009; J. Abdullah ‘Municipality o f  Greater Irbid’, Irbid 2009; K. Abdullah and son, Amman 2009
L. ‘We are all Jordan; Municipality o f  Greater Irbid,’ Irbid 2009 
All photographs taken by Christopher J. O. Phillips
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Appendix II: Leaders’ speeches in Syria and Jordan
A. Speech delivered by Bashar al-Assad on his inauguration as President of Syria, Syrian 
Parliament, July 2000. (Abridged)
(Source: www.al-bab.com;http://www.al-bab.com/arab/countries/svria/basharOQa.htm accessed 
13/11/08)
“As I stand today in this gracious Parliament all I can do is to start my address by thanking the Almighty God for granting us 
the strength in this resolute country and for providing us with the appropriate means that helped us bear the painful tragedy 
that has befallen all of us. I would also like to thank you all for the precious trust you have put in me and which you have 
expressed through your endorsement of what was contained in the letter from the Regional Leadership of the Baath Arab 
Socialist Party that included nominating me to the post of President of the Republic. I truly appreciate all the efforts you 
have exerted in your deliberations relating to the contents of this letter, these deliberations that revealed your high sense of 
responsibility and your abundant feeling of love for your country.
From behind this podium I would like to express a very special thank to all our people, men and women, old and young, 
inside and outside Syria who bestowed upon me their trust through voting in the referendum and through their active 
participation in this national duty. I would also like to thank them for all the love and loyalty they expressed to me which 
had a great effect on me and granted me strength and optimism in the future.
The result of the referendum is an expression of the will of the people and there is nothing I can do except to respond to the 
will of the people and to willingly accept to carry the mission I am asked to carry and shoulder the burdens and tasks related 
to fulfilling my duty during these very delicate and sensitive circumstances which our country, our nation and the world at 
large are going through at the moment. I shall try my very best to lead our country towards a future that fulfils the hopes and 
legitimate ambitions of our people.
These tasks are both very difficult and very easy.
These tasks are very easy because the great leader, Hafez al-Assad has prepared for us a firm ground, solid basis and a great 
heritage of values and principles which he defended and adhered to till he parted with us and moved to the after life. Added 
to this the infrastructure and the great achievements in all fields and throughout the country that will enable us to launch our 
work strongly and confidently towards a future we all desire. Yet, these tasks are difficult because the approach of the great 
leader, Hafez al-Assad, was a very special and unique approach and therefore it is not easy to emulate it especially as we 
remember that we are required not just to maintain it but to develop it as well. This undoubtedly requires great efforts and 
work at all levels with the aim of building on the basis of what has been achieved in the glorious period of Assad to continue 
with what has been achieved and to multiply the steps determined to overcome the difficulties and cope with the challenges 
without giving up our national principles ordained in our hearts and minds. In all this we have to imitate his wisdom by 
transforming sorrow to a creative energy and the painful event to continuous work and achievement...
Brothers and Sisters.
As we are talking about every thing that concerns our people at the domestic as well as external fronts we should not forget 
that there are the unknown soldiers who do not exert efforts only but who pay with their souls without any price. They are 
the sons of our military forces, the guardians of our country, the source of our pride and the symbol of bravery and heroism 
who were and will remain to be ready to defend our country and support our brothers. Our military forces shall remain an 
example of honour, and perfect national and responsible behaviour and shall always remain the focus of our great attention 
in order to remain able to carry out their duties whenever they are called upon. All our love and appreciation to the members 
of our glorious army and our high respect and loyalty to the innocent martyrs who fell in battles of honour and duty. I shall 
not forget to mention our brave people on the Golan who cling tenaciously to their country and their Arab nationality 
rejecting Zionist existence in all its forms and we say to them we are with you and our steadfastness together is the guarantee 
that our land will be liberated.
In Lebanon, the brave national resistance wrote the best anthem of heroism and martyrdom and shall always remain in its 
path and achievement and example that will live long with future generations.
Our dear people, my trust in you is infinite and so is my love to you. I hope you will allow me to emphasize to you a fact I 
feel that the man you have known and loved some of his merits and exchanged trust and love with him will not change at all 
once he assumes his post. He came out of the people and lived with them and shall remain one of them.
You may expect to see him every where whether in the work place or on the streets or in your picnics in order to learn from 
you and sharpen his determination by his contact with you and shall work for you as he has always done. The man who has 
become a president is the same man who was a doctor and an officer and first and foremost is the citizen.
May God bless you all.”
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B. Speech delivered by Bashar al-Assad on his second inauguration as President of Syria, Syrian 
Parliament, 18th July 2007. (Abridged)
(Source: Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA); http://www.sana.org/eng/21/2007/07/18/129596.htm 
accessed 13/11/08)
“Mr Speaker of the People’s Assembly,
Ladies and gentlemen members of the Assembly,
Sisters and brothers,
Speaking to you on this national day while embarking on a new phase of our national process, I am overwhelmed by 
different feelings which have been growing inside me since the people has chosen, seven years ago, to make me its leader. 
These feelings have become my most valued resource which inspires my every action, responsibility or decision. I feel love, 
appreciation, pride, and gratitude towards a great country and a proud people, towards my larger Syrian family who have 
engulfed me with a flood of noble emotions and provided me with power and will in difficult times...
Sisters and brothers,
We are before a new phase based on the achievements of the past in as much as it avoids its pitfalls and weaknesses. It will 
be enriched by experiences of the past in as much as it addresses difficulties and stumbles. I am all hope that I will achieve 
with you all our national ambitions the foundations of which we shall lay with our own hands and insure with our will the 
conditions for their achievement.
I look forward to the near future from the reality of the past which we lived together with its difficulties and successes, and 
today with its challenges and hopes, and I see Syria safe and assured enjoying stability, growth and prosperity. I see it strong 
with its people and their determination, self confident and confident in the steps she is taking and confident in its liberation 
project. At the heart of our Syria is the steadfast Golan which I can see returning to its mother country. I am fully confident 
of that. I salute our steadfast people in the Golan and our freedom fighters in prison sacrificing themselves for its sake. I 
salute them for their patriotic stances.
Here I must salute, with you, members of our armed forces the symbol of our steadfastness and pride, those who keep 
abreast with the march of our people, work silently and determinedly to maintain the honour of their country and their nation 
and stay fully alert so that the Syrian people continues to enjoy safety and dignity.
Dear sisters and brothers, I address you with all respect, appreciation, and love. I want us to make every possible effort to 
build Arab Syria, the model in its prosperity and progress as it is the model of steadfastness
I want you to be optimistic despite all these circumstances. This nation has known many invaders throughout history. They 
destroyed mosques and churches, burnt libraries and killed scientists and resistance men. But they have all gone and we 
remained with our nation, our heritage, our identity and our language.
Today, history repeats itself. They have not learnt the lesson. We did. Here is the lively spirit of this nation moving 
everywhere announcing its existence to the world that it is alive in the heart of every resistance man and declaring that it will 
triumph despite the pain. As for them, they will disappear once again.
We remain the owners and lovers of this land; we live on it, hold its soil sacred and bequeath its eternal love to one 
generation after another.”
As for me, I shall remain as you have known me, one of you, I work for you, I drink with you from the spring of patriotism 
and pan-Arabism and breath the blessings of God and the people.”
C. President Bashar al-Assad addresses the Arab League, Damascus, 29th March 2008. 
(Abridged)
(Source: Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA); www.sana.org/eng. accessed 13/11/08)
“Your Excellencies and Highnesses Dear brothers and sisters,
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On my behalf and on behalf of the Syrian Arab people, I extend to you a very warm welcome in your country, Syria, which 
receives you today with love, respect and sincere hope that this meeting among brothers is going to be a beneficial meeting 
for the Arab nation whose sons and daughters are looking forward to the achievement of solidarity, dignity and prosperity 
for this nation at a critical juncture of its modem history.
The convening of this Arab summit in Syria at this critical stage is a great honour and responsibility which we appreciate 
due to our strong belief in the importance of joint Arab work and its significance to our Arab nation that aspires to take its 
esteemed place in today's world.
We tried our utmost to prepare the right conditions to make this summit a success, and we tried to overcome many of the 
obstacles which stood in its way. Especially as we all recognize the difficult stage and the sensitive developments evinced by 
our nation, to the extent that it is not an exaggeration to say that we are no longer on the brink of danger but in its midst and 
we could feel its direct effects on our countries and people.
Every day passing without making a decisive decision that serves our Arab national interests makes the possibility of 
evading catastrophic results more remote and far reaching. However different our opinions may be about the nature of these 
dangers, their causes and the best ways to face them (and it is only normal that members of the same family may entertain 
different opinions about the same issue), what is beyond doubt is that we are all in the same boat, facing turbulent currents, 
and there is no doubt that we have no alternative to consulting, coordinating and working with each other to unify our 
stands, regain our rights and achieve growth and development for our countries.
We live in a world that is passing through extremely important changes which are basically initiated and mapped by great 
international powers. This has incited many countries in the world to formulate their own regional blocs which consolidate 
their powers and enhance their interests, sometimes without initially having any thing in common among them. How natural 
and logical it is, then, for us, the Arabs, who constitute a natural national gathering that possesses all factors of success, that 
by far exceeds the factors enjoyed by any other regional bloc, to group and coordinate our efforts together? This becomes 
even more pressing in view of the challenges which are threatening our inner strength, making some of our Arab countries 
open fields for conflicts among others, though assuming the shape of a conflict among our people, or making us a target for 
aggression, killing and violence exercised by our enemies....
Your Excellencies and Highnesses It is true that the time of the summit is calculated in days and hours, but it is an important 
juncture during which we add few blocs to the building we aspire to construct. It is true that what is important is not what we 
say at the summits, but rather, what we do in between the summits, but the summit remains essential to decide the right 
direction and the necessary speed of what we intend to do later. It is true that, in both words and deeds, we are open to 
cooperation with the others in the world, but what is truer is that this cooperation will bear fruit, only, when we rely on 
ourselves.
The common denominators that combine us as Arabs are many and fundamental; as for points of difference, if they fall 
under the framework of concern for our nation, there is no doubt, then, that the solid building, that we aspire to achieve for 
our Arab project, will be completed. I welcome you once again, my gracious brothers wishing you the best of times in your 
country and among your people. Wassalamu Alaikum Wa Rahmatu Allahi Wa Barakatuhu.”
D. President Bashar al-Assad addresses the 4th General Conference of the Journalists Union, Al- 
Umawyeen Conference Palace, Damascus 15th August 2006. (Abridged)
(Source: Syrian Arab News Agency; www.sana.org/eng. accessed 13/11/08)
“Ladies and gentlemen,
The heroic Lebanese national resistance has written with its blood and its people’s sacrifice an eternal epic in the history of 
the nation, destroyed the legend of the invincible army, buried under its feet the policy of surrender and humiliation and 
proved that the power of faith in land and homeland can defeat the power of armaments.
I express may appreciation and admiration to the men of resistance; I salute with great reverence our noble martyrs and I 
salute the brotherly Lebanese people whose steadfastness was the incubator of this resistance.
We say to those who accuse Syria that it stands by the resistance, and this accusation is not a new one at all. We say to those 
who accuse Syria that if standing by the resistance is a mortifying sin, then it is an honour and a source of pride for the 
Syrian people. This resistance is a badge of honour on the chest of each Arab citizen not only in Syria. By each drop of 
sweat, each drop of blood, each rocket that destroys a tank and by each Israeli soldier defeated in Lebanon, we consider that 
there is a badge of honour to be worn on the chest of Arab citizens.
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I would like to say to the Syrian Arab people that the word "proud" is not enough at all to express what a human being feels 
towards the greatness of your support to our Lebanese brothers. You were great when some persons wanted you to look 
small overwhelmed by malevolence. But, the great people of Syria always surprises the adversary by what is not expected. 
You dealt a blow to those who wanted to create a division between Syria and Lebanon. You were magnificent in your 
comprehending the magnitude of the conspiracy, and you were very strong in your reaction towards this conspiracy. In brief, 
you were the beating heart of Arabism with every sense of the word regarding the heat that will rise and the meaning which 
will be more powerful when we liberate the Golan by our hands, will and determination.
The destiny of Syria is to be proud of Arabism and to defend and maintain it because it is the only base for a bright and 
honourable future we build for our children. We have to implant in our hearts and minds that there is no place in this world 
but for the strong. Strength starts by the power of mind, will and faith and this is the base of resistance and the only way to 
achieve victory.
However, waiting for others to solve our problems, keeping faith in the international community as an alternative to the faith 
in our abilities, and yielding our mentality to fear and our will to others, is not only the adverse of wisdom but absolute 
ignorance.
I would like to repeat my salutations to the journalists and I wish your conference all success.
Thank you.”
E. King Abdullah II, Opening of the 3rd Ordinary Session of Jordan’s 13th Parliament, Speech 
from the Throne, Amman, Jordan, 1st November 1999. (Abridged)
(Source: Jordanian Embassy to the United States;
http://www.iordanembassvus.org/HMKASpeechl 10199.htm accessed 13/11/08)
“In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate
Prayers and Salutations on the Noblest and the Most Honourable Faithful Arab and Hashemite Prophet Mohammad.
Honourable Senators 
Honourable Deputies
Peace, God's Mercy and Blessings be upon you
In the name of Allah and with His blessings, we inaugurate the third session of the Thirteenth Parliament, being the first 
ordinary session in our reign; a reign of will and tenacity for the prosperity and advancement of Jordan, defending the causes 
of its nation and the future of its generations, in redemption of the great message that our forefathers left us to which they 
sacrificed immensely and in fulfilment of the noble aims His Majesty the late King Hussein endeavoured to establish, thus 
creating this lofty existence that we inherited and the great respect we see wherever we go that nestled in our conscience and 
hearts.
Since the first moment God honoured me to bear the first responsibility in Jordan, I have pledged myself to serve the loyal 
Jordanians who are Arabs in their presence, conscience and message, whom I cherish belonging to, and I am proud of their 
genuineness, their ability to face challenges and difficulties, their struggle to fulfil their duties, defend their nation's causes 
and participate in shaping its future which matches up to its history and its great human and civilised message.
My esteem for your Honourable Council is unlimited. Your council is the symbol of the free Jordanian will and it is the 
stronghold of our democratic path and its fortress. It is the beacon of freedom, democracy and respect for human rights. In 
recognition of this council's sacred message and the great national responsibilities it shoulders, my government will 
cooperate and consult with your Honourable Council over all national issues and causes, incarnation with the Constitution 
and within the framework of the detachment of the three authorities, creating a balance among them, specifying the 
responsibilities and duties that each of them holds...
Jordan has been and will remain, God willing, the inheritor of the message of the Great Arab Revolt and its noble aims and 
aspirations in freedom, unity and a better life, and it will always be Arab in its loyalty, position and message. Stemming 
from this clear vision, the inner Arab depth will remain for Jordan the base of all its relations. No relation will precede those 
of Jordan with its Arab brethren.
On this basis, Jordan will continue its endeavours to purify Arab relations, transcend Arab disputes and will continue to 
support joint Arab institutions, work for the purpose of uniting and mobilising its efforts in a framework of cooperation and
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integration aimed at a better future for the coming generations. Our relations with each Arab brethren state are based upon 
compassion, brotherhood, respect, trust, cooperation and non-interference with others' internal affairs.
My government will continue its efforts in advancing the peace process and allowing it to achieve the sought advancement 
on all tracks. It will continue to support our Palestinian brethren until they regain their rights and establish their independent 
state on their national soil with Jerusalem as its capital. Since we believe that the Palestinian cause is the core of conflict in 
this region, no aspired peace will be achieved without a fair settlement to this conflict.
As for our brethren in Syria and Lebanon, we will not fail to support them regain their rights and occupied land until a 
comprehensive, lasting and just peace is achieved as aspired by the region's peoples.
As for our brethren in Iraq and Sudan, we share their suffering under the blockade enforced on them, and we invite the 
international community to fulfil its human and moral duty in lifting the blockade on these two peoples and putting an end to 
this suffering which has exceeded all limits. In this regard, we confirm our firm position concerning safeguarding the unity 
and integrity of Iraq.
I steadfastly believe, in light of what I know, of your true appreciation of the hefty responsibility you bear, that you are able 
to enlist all capabilities to work, build, produce and establish fruitful cooperation between the executive and legislative 
authorities. The nation needs the efforts of all its sons and national institutions. Let us work together to build Jordan the 
model and to serve our Arab Nation.
I salute you and salute each brother and sister in this dear nation.
May Allah be with us.
"I wanted nothing but reform so far as I  am able, and with none but Allah is the direction o f my affair to the right issue; on 
Him do I  rely and to Him do I  return. ”
Peace, God's Mercy and Blessings be upon you.”
F. Speech of His Majesty King Abdullah II to Muta University Graduates, Muta University, 
Kerak, 11® June 2008. (Full test)
(Source: King Abdullah’s website;
http://www.kingabdullah.io/main.php7main page=0&lang hmkal=l accessed 13/11/08)
“In the Name of God, the Most Merciful, the Compassionate,
Dear Brothers the Graduates,
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
May God grant you good health.
On this blessed day, we celebrate the graduation of this group of the homeland's chivalrous knights who today become 
officers in the Arab Army and security institutions and who will have the honour of practical service in work, sacrifice 
and giving. They will work side by side with their brothers and comrades in arms - officers and soldiers - who have 
dedicated their souls to the defence of this country, its security and stability.
On this day and on this occasion, I extend to the graduates of the twenty-first class, the Khalid Bin A1 Walid Battalion, 
my greetings, along with my feelings of pride, and my sincere congratulations on their success and achievement in 
acquiring the knowledge, preparation and training that will enable them to perform their duties and responsibilities in 
the future. I would like also to extend my greetings and express my appreciation to the Muta University family, its 
professors, trainers and administrators, for their distinguished efforts and ceaseless giving in preparing this group of 
graduates and previous ones.
Dear Brothers, Graduates,
As of today, each one of you will enter the fields of honour, work and dedication, for you are the homeland's devoted 
soldiers. Difficulties and challenges will only enhance your determination and strength and your allegiance to the 
principles and goals of the Great Arab Revolt, which strove to liberate and unite the nation and defend the values of 
right, justice and freedom. I am confident that each and every one of you realises that the homeland's security and
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stability supersede all other interests and considerations. For all of us, the first priority is to protect this homeland and 
preserve its progress and achievements.
The armed forces is a major partner in comprehensive development, especially as it concerns training human resources, 
establishing productive enterprise and providing basic services of education and healthcare.
I want you and every member of the armed forces and security institutions to be assured of our keenness to support 
these institutions through modernisation and development, preparation and training and the provision of the latest 
weaponry and equipment. We are also keen to continually improve their living conditions and provide decent housing 
to the families of servicemen. We also owe the retirees and families of martyrs and injured military personnel their due 
care, attention and appreciation for their service and the sacrifices they have made for the homeland.
With the determination of the sons and daughters of the one Jordanian family, Jordan will remain an oasis of security 
and stability and a model of progress and prosperity. It will be able to face challenges and realise the greatest 
achievements.
Once again, we extend our greetings and appreciation to each officer and soldier in the Arab Army and security 
institutions and offer our congratulations to the graduating officers.. .with God's help, spirits will be high and the flag 
will wave high.
Peace, God's mercy and blessings be upon you.”
G. His Majesty King Abdullah II Speech to the 19th Arab League Summit, Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia, 29th March 2007. (Abridged)
(Source: King Abdullah’s website;
http://www.kingabdullah.io/main.nhp7main page=0&lang hmkal=l accessed 13/11/08)
“/« the Name o f God, the Most Merciful, the Compassionate
The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz,
Your Majesties, Your Excellencies, and Your Highnesses,
Kings, Presidents and Emirs of Arab States,
Peace, God's mercy and blessings be upon you,
Allow me first to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King 
Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz, to the people of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its government, for hosting the 19th Arab 
Summit. We value the tremendous efforts exerted by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques to enhance Arab 
solidarity and unify the Arab and Islamic Nation's stance. Thanks are also due to His Excellency the Sudanese President 
Field Marshall Omar Al-Bashir for his presidency of the 18th summit. We also renew our thanks to our Arab League 
and its Secretary General Amr Moussa on efforts exerted to convene this summit and ensure its success, God willing.
This summit convenes at a time when our Arab Nation is passing through the most dangerous stages of its 
contemporary history. The challenges and dangers facing our nation and endangering its security, identity, and future 
may be greater and more serious than any other test that the nation has faced in modem times. The Palestinian issue, 
which is the Arabs' core concern and the main cause of conflict in this region, has reached a stalemate, and the 
Palestinian people continue to suffer under occupation. The Iraqi people too are exposed to the worst forms of violence, 
killing and sedition....
Your Majesties, Excellencies and Highnesses,
The world around us is changing and moving forward. We also look to move forward. Hence our countries Eire in dire 
need of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, to enable us to build societies and update and modernize our fields of 
science, industry, agriculture and health. Hence we call for the establishment of an Arab centre for the peaceful use of 
atomic energy. We will continue to demand that Israel become a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation agreement, 
and that its atomic reactors be subjected to international inspection, just as those of other states in the world are. This 
will realize security for all the countries in the region, and guarantee that the region is free from weapons of mass 
destruction, which threaten the future of all humanity.
Finally, we reaffirm the need for this summit to suggest practical steps to lay the cornerstone for institutionalized and 
effective Arab action that will restore confidence in the Arab order, assert its credibility and enhance solidarity as a 
basis for cooperation, complementarily and consensus. And again we would like to express our heartfelt thanks to the
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Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques for hosting and sponsoring this summit, and for 
His Majesty's continued efforts to unite Arab ranks and strengthen the Islamic stance through the major role assumed by 
the Kingdom in the Gulf Cooperation Council and die Organization of Islamic Conference.
May God grant us all success in all that is good for our nation.
Peace, God's mercy and blessings be upon you.”
H. His Majesty King Abdullah's address to the nation, Amman, 10th November 2005. (Full 
Text)
(Source: King Abdullah’s website;
http://www.kingabdullah.io/main.php7main page=0&lang hmkal=l accessed 13/11/08)
“I would like to begin by extending my profound condolences to the families of all the innocent victims who were 
killed, and we are praying for a swift recovery for all of those who were injured.
This is not the first time that Jordan has been a target of terrorism. It is also not the only country that has been a victim 
of terrorism; there have been many countries in the region and throughout the world which have been similarly 
terrorized by attacks of greater scope and intensity.
We know, however, that Jordan has been targeted more than any other country for several reasons, among them, its role 
and its message defending the essence of Islam -  the religion of moderation and tolerance that abhors the terrorists who 
kill innocents in Islam's name, even as Islam is innocent of such crimes.
Let it be clear to everyone that we will pursue these terrorists and those who aide them; we will reach them wherever 
they are, pull them from their lairs and submit them to justice.
Jordan does not bow to coercion. We will not be intimidated into altering our position, nor will we abandon our 
convictions or forfeit our role in the fight against terrorism in all its forms. To the contrary, every act of terrorism 
strengthens our resolve to adhere to our convictions, and to confront, with all means at our disposal, those who seek to 
undermine the security and stability of this country.
Our confidence in the security services and their ability to protect the security of this country and its stability remains 
unwavering. We have succeeded in preventing many planned attacks on this country. For every infrequent success 
terrorists have had in carrying out one of their crimes, we have had many more successes in foiling their plots.
I appeal to every citizen - man and woman - of this country to consider himself or herself a soldier and a security 
officer. Each one of you has a responsibility to protect your country. Circumstances require each and every citizen to be 
cautious and vigilant, and to cooperate with the security services to prevent any attack on the security and stability of 
this country. We must be united in confronting these terrorists, who have neither a religion nor a conscience.
I am confident that the patriots of Jordan - men and women - will maintain, as they always have, a watchful eye over the 
country and its security, and will be the first line of defence in protecting Jordan and its achievements. Jordan will 
continue, with the help of God and the determination of its people, to overcome evil.
Finally, all my thanks and appreciation go to our security, military and civil institutions, as well as to the citizens of 
Jordan who have acted as one in confronting the attacks on our precious capital, Amman.”
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